Review of Karl Marx's Book «A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy»

Author: Friedrich Engels

Title: Review of Karl Marx’s Book A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy

Written: 3rd to 15th of August, 1859

First Published: Das Volk, Nos. 14 and 16, London (6th and 20th of August, 1859)

English Translation: Collected Works of Marx and Engels, First English Edition, Vol. 16, Lawrence & Wishart, London

Revised Digital Edition: Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism Under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland

#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!

#REVIEW OF KARL MARX’S BOOK A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

#Friedrich Engels

#3rd to 15th of August, 1859

#★

#1

The Germans have long since down that, in all spheres of science, they are equal, and in most of them, superior, to other civilized nations. Only one branch of science, political economy, had no German name among its leading figures. The reason is obvious. Political economy is the theoretical analysis of modern bourgeois society and therefore presupposes developed bourgeois conditions, conditions which for centuries, following the wars of the Reformation and the peasant wars, and especially the Thirty Years’ War, could not establish themselves in Germany. The separation of the Netherlands from the Empire¹ forced Germany out of world trade and restricted its industrial development from the very beginning to the smallest scale; and while the Germans painfully and slowly recovered from the devastations of the civil wars, while they used up all their civic energy, which had never been very great, in futile struggle against the customs barriers and absurd commercial regulations, which every small princeling and imperial baron imposed upon the industry of their subjects, while the imperial cities, with their craft-guild practices and patrician spirit, went to ruin — the Netherlands, England, and France meanwhile captured the leading positions in world trade, established one colony after another, and brought manufactory production to the height of its development, until finally England, owing to steam-power, which gave value to its coal and iron deposits, headed modern bourgeois development. But political economy could not arise in Germany so long as a struggle had still to be waged against such preposterously antiquated remnants of the Middle Ages as those which hampered the bourgeois development of its material forces until 1830. Only with the establishment of the Customs Union² were the Germans in a position to comprehend political economy at all. It was indeed at this time that English and French political economy began to be imported for the benefit of the German bourgeoisie. People of learning and bureaucrats soon mastered the imported material and treated it in a way which does little credit to the «German spirit». The motley crowd of pen-pushing knights of industry, merchants, schoolmasters, and bureaucrats produced a German literature on economics which, for triteness, insipidity, shallowness, verbosity, and plagiarism, is equalled only by the German novel. Among people pursuing practical objectives, there arose first the protectionist school for the industrialists, whose chief spokesperson, [Friedrich] List, is still the best that German bourgeois literature on economics has produced,³ although his celebrated work is entirely copied from the French [F.L.] Ferrier,⁴ the theoretical creator of the Continental System. In opposition to this trend, the free-trade school was formed in the 1840s by merchants from the Baltic provinces, who rehashed the arguments of the English Free Traders with childlike, but not disinterested, faith. Finally, among the schoolmasters and bureaucrats, who had to handle the theoretical aspect of the subject, there were desiccated and uncritical herbarium collectors, like Mr. [Karl] Rau,⁵ would-be clever speculators, who translated foreign propositions into undigested Hegelian language, like Mr. [Lorenz von] Stein,⁶ or gleaners with literary pretensions in the field of the «history of culture», like Mr. [Wilhelm] Riehl.⁷ The outcome of all this was Cameralism,⁸ a hotchpotch of sundry trivialities sprinkled with an eclectic economic sauce, the sort of stuff a junior civil servant might find useful to remember during their final examination.

While in this way, in Germany, the bourgeoisie, the schoolmasters, and the bureaucrats were still exerting themselves to learn by rote, and in some measure to understand, the first elements of Anglo-French political economy, which they regarded as incontestable dogmas, the German proletarian political party appeared on the scene. The whole of its theory was derived from the study of political economy, and it is from the emergence of this political party that German political economy as an independent science also dates. The essential foundation of this German political economy is the materialist conception of history, whose principal features are briefly outlined in the Preface to the above-named work. Since the Preface has in the main already been published in Das Volk [The People], we refer to it. The proposition: «The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life»;⁹ that all social and political relations, all religious and legal systems, all theoretical conceptions which arise in the course of history can only be understood if the material conditions of life existing during the relevant epoch have been understood and the former are traced back to these material conditions — this proposition was a revolutionary discovery, not only for economics, but also for all historical sciences (and all branches of science which are not natural sciences are historical).

It is not people’s consciousness that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.⁹

This proposition is so simple that it should be self-evident to anyone not bogged down in idealist humbug. But it leads to highly revolutionary consequences, not only in the sphere of theory, but also in that of practice.

At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or — this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms — with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated until then. From forms of development of the productive forces, these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic basis lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure. [...] The bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic form of the social process of production — antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism, but of an antagonism that emanates from the individuals’ social conditions of existence — but the productive forces developing within bourgeois society create also the material conditions for a solution of this antagonism.⁹

The prospect of a gigantic revolution, the most gigantic revolution that has ever taken place, therefore presents itself to us as soon as we pursue our materialist thesis further and apply it to the present time.

However, closer consideration also shows immediately that, already in its first consequences, the apparently so simple proposition — that people’s consciousness depends on their being, and not the other way around — is a fatal blow to all forms of idealism, even the most concealed. Through it, all the conventional and customary views of history are denied. The entire traditional manner of political reasoning falls to the ground; patriotic nobility indignantly resists such an unprincipled interpretation. It was thus inevitable that the new standpoint should shock, not only the exponents of the bourgeoisie, but also the mass of French Socialists, who intended to revolutionize the world by the magic formula: Liberté, égalité, fraternité. [Liberty, equality, fraternity.] But it utterly enraged the vociferous German vulgar democrats. Nevertheless, they have been fond of trying to plagiarize the new ideas in their own interest, although with a rare lack of understanding.

The development of the materialist conception in respect of even a single historical example was a scientific task requiring years of quiet research, for it is evident that mere phrases can achieve nothing here and that only an abundance of critically examined historical material which has been completely mastered can make it possible to solve such a problem. Our Party was propelled onto the political stage by the February Revolution and was thus prevented from pursuing purely scientific aims. The fundamental worldview, nevertheless, runs like an unbroken thread through all the Party’s literary productions. Every one of them shows that action in each particular case was begun by direct material causes and not by the accompanying phrases, that, on the contrary, the political and legal phrases, like political action and its results, originated in material causes.

After the defeat of the Revolution of 1848-49, at a time when it became increasingly impossible to exert any influence on Germany from abroad, our Party relinquished the field of emigrant squabbles — for that was the only feasible action left — to the vulgar democrats. While these were chasing about to their heart’s content, scuffling today, fraternizing tomorrow, and once more airing their dirty laundry in public the day after, while they went begging throughout the United States and immediately afterwards started another row over the division of the few dollars they had collected — our Party was glad to have peace once more for study. It had the great advantage that its theoretical foundation was a new scientific worldview, the elaboration of which kept it busy enough; for this reason alone, it could never become so demoralized as the «heroes» of the exile.¹⁰

The book under consideration is the first result of these studies.

#2

The purpose of a work like the one under review cannot simply be a desultory criticism of separate propositions of political economy or a discussion of some economic issue or other in isolation. On the contrary, it is from the beginning designed to give a systematic resume of the whole complex of political economy and a coherent elaboration of the laws governing bourgeois production and bourgeois exchange. This elaboration is at the same time a critique of all economic literature, for economists are nothing but interpreters of and apologists for these laws.

Since Hegel’s death, hardly any attempt has been made to develop any branch of science in its specific inner coherence. The official Hegelian school had assimilated only the most simple devices of the master’s dialectics and applied them to everything and anything, often with ridiculous incompetence. Hegel’s whole legacy was, so far as they were concerned, limited to a mere template, by means of which any subject could be shaped aright, and to a list of words and phrases whose only purpose was to turn up at the right moment, when ideas and positive knowledge were lacking. Thus it happened, as a professor at Bonn has said, that these Hegelians understood nothing, but could write about everything. And that is what it came to. For all their conceit, these gentlefolk were, however, sufficiently conscious of their weakness to avoid major problems as far as possible. The old pedantic learning held its ground because of its superior positive knowledge, and then with Feuerbach’s renunciation of the speculative method, Hegelianism gradually fell asleep, and it seemed that science was once more dominated by the old metaphysics with its fixed categories.

For this, there were quite natural reasons. The rule of the Hegelian Diadochi,¹¹ which ended in empty phrases, was naturally followed by a period in which the positive content of science predominated once more over the formal aspect. But at the same time, Germany applied itself with quite extraordinary energy to the natural sciences, according to the immense bourgeois development after 1848; and with the coming into fashion of these sciences, in which the speculative trend had never achieved any real importance, the old metaphysical mode of thinking, even down to Wolff’s extreme platitude, also regained its ground. Hegel was forgotten and a new materialism arose in the natural sciences; theoretically, it differed very little from the materialism of the 18th century, and its advantage consisted mostly in its greater stock of data relating to the natural sciences, especially chemistry and physiology. We find the narrow-minded philistine mode of thinking of the pre-Kantian period reproduced in its most banal form by Büchner and Vogt, and even Moleschott, who swears by Feuerbach, gets himself stuck most amusingly at every turn in the most simple categories. The jaded cart-horse of the commonplace bourgeois mind falters, of course, in confusion in front of the ditch separating substance from appearance, and cause from effect; but one should not ride cart-horses if one intends to go hunting over the very rough ground of abstract reasoning.

Here there was, therefore, a question to be solved, which was not connected with political economy as such. How was science to be dealt with? There was, on the one hand, the Hegelian dialectic in the quite abstract, «speculative» form, in which Hegel had left it, and on the other hand, the ordinary, essentially Wolffian, metaphysical method, which had again come into vogue, and which was used by bourgeois economists to write their bulky, rambling volumes. The second method had been theoretically so demolished by Kant, and particularly by Hegel, that its continued use in practice could only be rendered possible by inertia and the absence of an alternative simple method. The Hegelian method, on the other hand, was, in its existing form, quite inapplicable. It was essentially idealist, while the task here was to elaborate a worldview more materialist than any previous one. Hegel’s method took as its point of departure pure thought, whereas here, the starting point was to be inexorable facts. A method which was, according to its own avowal, «the movement from nothing to nothing»¹² was in this shape by no means suitable. It was, nevertheless, the only element among the entire available logical material which could at least serve as a point of departure. It had not been subjected to criticism, had not been overthrown; none of the opponents of the great dialectician had been able to make a breach in its proud edifice. It has been forgotten because the Hegelian school did not know how to apply it. Hence, it was first of all essential to subject the Hegelian method to thoroughgoing criticism.

What distinguished Hegel’s mode of thinking from that of all other philosophers was the exceptional historical sense underlying it. However abstract and idealist the form employed, the development of his ideas runs always parallel to the development of world history, and the latter is indeed supposed to be only the proof of the former. Although this reversed the actual relation and stood it on its head, the real content was still invariably incorporated in his philosophy, especially since Hegel — unlike his pupils — did not rely on ignorance, but was one of the most erudite thinkers of all time. He was the first to try to demonstrate that there is development, an intrinsic coherence in history, and however strange some things in his philosophy of history may seem to us now, the grandeur of the fundamental conception is still admirable today, compared with either his predecessors or those who following him ventured to advance general observations on history. This monumental conception of history pervades the Phenomenology, the Aesthetics, and the History of Philosophy, and the material is everywhere set forth historically, in a definite historical context, even if in an abstract, distorted manner.

This epoch-making conception of history was the direct theoretical precondition of the new materialist worldview, and already this constituted a connecting link with the logical method as well. Since, even from the standpoint of «pure thinking», this forgotten dialectics had led to such results, and had, moreover, with the greatest ease coped with the whole of the former logic and metaphysics, there had, at all events, to be more to it than sophistry and hairsplitting. But criticism of this method, which the entire official philosophy had evaded and still evades, was no small matter.

Marx was and is the only one who could undertake the work of extracting from the Hegelian logic the kernel containing Hegel’s real discoveries in this field, and of establishing the dialectical method, divested of its idealist wrappings, in the simple form in which it becomes the only correct mode of the development of thought. The working out of the method which underlies Marx’s critique of political economy is, we think, a result hardly less significant than the fundamental materialist worldview.

Even after the determination of the method, the critique of political economy could still be arranged in two ways — historically or logically. Since, in the course of history, as in its literary reflection, development proceeds by and large from the simplest to the more complex relations, the historical development of political economy constituted a natural clue, which the critique could take as a point of departure, and then the economic categories would appear on the whole in the same order as in the logical development. This form seems to have the advantage of greater lucidity, for it traces the actual development, but in fact, it would thus become, at most, more accessible. History often moves in leaps and bounds and in zigzags, and as this would have to be followed throughout, it would mean not only that a considerable amount of material of slight importance would have to be absorbed, but also that the train of thought would frequently have to be interrupted; it would, moreover, be impossible to write the history of political economy without that of bourgeois society, and the work would thus be endless because of the absence of all preliminary studies. The logical method of approach was therefore the only suitable one. This, however, is indeed nothing but the historical method, only stripped of the historical form and of interfering contingencies. The point where this history begins must also be the starting point of the train of thought, and its further progress will be simply the reflection, in abstract and theoretically consistent form, of the course of history, a corrected reflection, but corrected in accordance with laws provided by the actual course of history, since each moment can be examined at the stage of development where it reaches its full maturity, its classical form.

Using this method, we begin with the first and simplest relation which is historically, actually available, thus in this context with the first economic relation to be found. We analyse this relation. The fact that it is a relation already implies that it has two aspects which are related to each other. Each of these aspects is examined separately; this reveals the nature of their attitude to one another, their reciprocal action. Contradictions will emerge which require a solution. But since we are not examining here an abstract mental process that takes place solely in our mind, but an actual event which really took place at some time or other, or is still taking place, these contradictions, too, will have arisen in practice and have probably been solved. We shall trace the mode of this solution and find that it has been effected by establishing a new relation, whose two contradictory aspects we shall then have to set forth, and so on.

Political economy begins with commodities, with the moment when products are exchanged, either by individuals or by primitive communities. The product being exchanged is a commodity. But it is a commodity only because of the thing, the product being linked with a relation between two persons or communities, the relation between producer and consumer, who at this stage are no longer united in the same person. Here is at once an example of a peculiar fact, which pervades the whole of economics and has produced serious confusion in the minds of bourgeois economists: economics is not concerned with things, but with relations between persons, and, in the final analysis, between classes; these relations, however, are always bound to things and appear as things. Some economists had an inkling of this connection in isolated instances, but Marx was the first to reveal its significance for the whole of economics, thus making the most difficult problems so simple and clear that even bourgeois economists will now be able to grasp them.

If we examine the various aspects of the commodity, that is, of the fully evolved commodity, and not as it at first slowly emerges in the spontaneous barter of two primitive communities, it presents itself to us from two angles, that of use-value and of exchange-value, and thus, we come immediately to the sphere of economic debate. Anyone wishing to find a striking instance of the fact that the German dialectical method at its present stage of development is at least as superior to the old superficially glib metaphysical method as railways are to mediaeval means of transport, should look up Adam Smith or some other officially recognized economist of repute to see how much distress exchange-value and use-value caused these gentlefolk, how much difficulty they had in distinguishing properly between the two and in grasping each of them in its peculiar determinateness, and then compare the clear, simple exposition given by Marx.

After use-value and exchange-value have been expounded, the commodity, seen as a direct unity of the two, is described as it enters the exchange process. The contradictions arising here may be found on pages 20 and 21. We merely note that these contradictions are not only of interest for theoretical, abstract reasons, but also reflect the difficulties arising from the nature of direct interchange, simple barter, and the impossibilities inevitably confronting this first, crude form of exchange. The solution of these impossibilities is achieved by investing a specific commodity — money — with the attribute of representing the exchange-value of all other commodities. Money or simple circulation is then analysed in Chapter 2, namely:

• First, money as a measure of value, in which context value measured in terms of money, that is, price, is more closely defined.
• Second, money as a means of circulation.
• Third, money as the unity of the two aspects, as real money, which represents the entire bourgeois material wealth.

This concludes the first part, the conversion of money into capital being left for the second part.

We see that, with this method, logical development need by no means be confined to the purely abstract sphere. On the contrary, it requires historical illustration and continuous contact with reality. A great variety of such evidence is therefore included, comprising references both to the actual course of history at various stages of social development and to literature on economics, in which the working out of lucid definitions of economic relations is traced from the beginning. The criticism of particular, more or less one-sided or confusing standpoints is thus given essentially already in the logical exposition and can be kept quite short.

The economic content of the book itself will be discussed in a third article.