Win the Masses in Their Millions for the Anti-Japanese National United Front
#PUBLICATION NOTE
This edition of Win the Masses in Their Millions for the Anti-Japanese National United Front has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the following editions:
- Win the Masses in Their Millions for the Anti-Japanese National United Front, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Volume 1, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.
- Struggle to Win the Masses in Their Millions for the Anti-Japanese National United Front, in Mao's Road to Power, First English Edition, Volume 5, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 1999.
#INTRODUCTION NOTE
This is the concluding speech delivered by Comrade Mao Zedong at the National Conference of the Communist Party of China in Yan'an, Shaanxi, China on the 7th of May, 1937.
#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!
#WIN THE MASSES IN THEIR MILLIONS FOR THE ANTI-JAPANESE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT
#CONCLUDING SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA
#Mao Zedong
#7th of May, 1937
#★
Comrades!
In the course of the discussions of the last few days, you have expressed agreement with my report, The Tasks of the Communist Party of China in the Period of Resistance to Japan; only a few comrades expressed different views. As these dissenting views were rather significant, I shall discuss them first in my concluding speech before dealing with certain other problems.
#1. THE QUESTION OF PEACE
For nearly two years, our Party has fought for internal peace. After the Third Plenary Session of the Nationalist Central Executive Committee, we declared that peace had been attained, that the stage of «fighting for peace» was over, and that the new task was to «consolidate the peace». We also pointed out that this new task was linked with «fighting for democracy», that is, consolidating the peace by fighting for democracy. However, some comrades argue that this view of ours is untenable. It follows that they must either arrive at the opposite view or hover between the two. For they argue: «Japan is retreating1 and Nanjing is wavering more than ever; the contradiction between the two countries is becoming weaker and the contradiction within the country is growing sharper.» Naturally, according to this appraisal, there is no new stage or new task, and the situation has reverted to its old stage or even deteriorated. I think this view incorrect.
In saying that peace has been attained, we do not mean that it is consolidated; on the contrary, we have said that it is not consolidated. Bringing about peace and consolidating it are two different things. History might reverse its course for a while and peace might meet with setbacks because of the existence of Japanese imperialism, traitors, and the pro-Japanese group. But the fact is that peace was attained after the Xi'an Incident and was the product of several factors (Japan's fundamental policy of invasion, the favourable attitude of the Council Union, and also Britain, the United States and France, toward internal peace in China, the pressure of the Chinese people, the Communist Party's peace policy during the Xi'an Incident and its policy for ending the antagonism between the two regimes, the differentiation within the bourgeoisie, the differentiation within the Nationalist Party, and so on); peace cannot be made or unmade by Jiang Jieshi alone. To unmake it, he would have to fight against many forces and draw closer to the Japanese imperialists and the pro-Japanese group. There is no doubt that the Japanese imperialists and the pro-Japanese group are still endeavouring to prolong civil war in China. That is precisely why peace is not yet consolidated. Such being the case, we have come to the conclusion that, instead of reverting to the old slogans of «end the civil war» and «fight for peace», we should take a step forward and adopt the new slogan of «fight for democracy», for this is the only way to consolidate internal peace and bring the war of resistance against Japan into being. Why do we put forward the three closely related slogans of «consolidate the peace», «fight for democracy», and «carry out armed resistance»? The answer is that we desire to push the wheel of revolution forward and that circumstances allow us to do so. Those who deny the new stage and the new task, who deny that the Nationalist Party has «begun to change», and, by the same logic, also deny the achievements of all the forces that have been struggling for peace during the last year and a half will remain where they were before, without advancing an inch.
Why do these comrades make such an unsound appraisal? Because, in weighing up the current situation, they start not only from fundamentals (Japan's retreat, Nanjing's further wavering, the decline of national contradictions, and the rise of domestic contradictions), but also from a number of limited and transient phenomena (Sato's diplomacy, the Suzhou trial,2 the suppression of strikes, the eastward transfer of the North-Eastern Army,3 General Yang Hucheng's journey abroad,4 and so on), and link the two together; hence their dismal picture. We say that the Nationalist Party has begun to change, and we also say that it has not changed completely. It is inconceivable that the Nationalist Party's reactionary policy over the past ten years will completely change without new efforts — without more and greater efforts — on our part and on the part of the people. Quite a number of reputedly «Left-wing» people, who often bitterly denounce the Nationalist Party and who, during the Xi'an Incident, advocated putting Jiang to death and «fighting our way out through Tongguan»,5 are now astonished when events like the Suzhou trial occur immediately after peace is attained, and ask: «Why does Jiang Jieshi still do such things?» They ought to understand that neither the Communists nor Jiang Jieshi are gods, nor are they isolated individuals, but members of a political party or a class. The Communist Party can push the revolution forward by degrees, but cannot clear away all the evils in the country overnight. Jiang Jieshi and the Nationalist Party have begun to change, but the accumulated filth of the past ten years will certainly not be rapidly removed without great effort on the part of the whole people. We maintain that the trend is toward peace, democracy, and resistance, but this does not imply that the old evils — civil war, dictatorship, and non-resistance — will be swept away without any effort. It is only through struggle and hard work, and over a long period too, that we can eliminate the old evils, the old filth, and prevent setbacks or even reversals in the revolution.
«They are bent on destroying us.» Quite true, they are always trying to destroy us. I fully admit the soundness of this appraisal, and indeed one would have to be fast asleep to overlook the point. But the question is whether there has been any change in the way they are trying to destroy us. I think there has been. The change is from war and massacre to reform and deceit, from a tough policy to a soft one, from a policy of elimination to one of persuasion, from a military to a political policy. Why has there been such a change? Confronted with Japanese imperialism, the bourgeoisie and the Nationalist Party are temporarily forced to seek an ally in the proletariat, just as we are seeking an ally in the bourgeoisie. We should take this as our point of departure in considering the question. Internationally, for a similar reason, the French government has changed from hostility toward the Council Union to alliance with it.6 Our domestic task has changed from a military to a political one. We for our part have no use for plotting or scheming; our aim is to defeat Japanese imperialism in a common effort by uniting with all those members of the bourgeoisie and the Nationalist Party who favour resistance.
#2. THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRACY
«To put the emphasis on democracy is wrong, the emphasis should be solely on resistance to Japan. Without direct action against Japan, there can be no movement for democracy. The majority of the people want only resistance to Japan, not democracy, and what is needed is another 9th of December Movement.»7
Let me first put a few questions. Can it be said that what the majority of the people wanted in the previous stage (that is, from the 9th of December Movement of 1935 to the Third Plenary Session of the Nationalist Party's Central Executive Committee in February 1937) was merely resistance to Japan and not internal peace? Was it wrong to emphasize internal peace then? Was it impossible to have a movement for internal peace without direct action against Japan (the Xi'an Incident and the Third Plenary Session of the Nationalist Party's Central Executive Committee took place after the resistance in Suiyuan ended, and today, too, there is as yet nothing equivalent to the Suiyuan resistance or the 9th of December Movement)? Everybody knew that, in order to resist Japan, there had to be internal peace, that, without internal peace, there could be no resistance to Japan, and that internal peace was a condition for resistance. All the anti-Japanese activities in the previous stage, whether direct or indirect (beginning with the 9th of December Movement and ending with the Third Plenary Session of the Nationalist Party's Central Executive Committee), were centred on the struggle for internal peace which was then the key link, the most essential thing, in the anti-Japanese movement.
Similarly today, in the new stage, democracy is the most essential thing for resistance to Japan, and to work for democracy is to work for resistance to Japan. Resistance and democracy are interdependent, just as are resistance and internal peace, democracy and internal peace. Democracy is the guarantee of resistance, while resistance can provide favourable conditions for developing the movement for democracy.
We hope there may be — and indeed there will be — many direct and indirect struggles against Japan in the new stage, and these will give an impetus to the war of resistance and greatly assist the movement for democracy. But the core and essence of the revolutionary task history has set us is the winning of democracy. Is it, then, wrong to keep stressing democracy? I do not think so.
«Japan is stepping back, Britain and Japan are virtually inclined to strike a balance, and Nanjing is wavering more than ever.» Ignorance of the laws of historical development has given rise to this needless anxiety. If there were a revolution in Japan and it really withdrew from China, it would help the Chinese revolution and would be just what we want, marking the beginning of the collapse of the world front of aggression. What room for anxiety would there be then? But, as a matter of fact, this is not what is happening; Sato's diplomatic moves are preparations for a major war, and a major war confronts us. Britain's policy of wavering can get it nowhere, its clash of interests with Japan making this certain. If Nanjing continues to waver for long, it will become the enemy of the whole nation, and its own interests do not allow it to keep on wavering. A temporary retrogression cannot change the general law of history. Hence, one should not deny the existence of the new stage or the necessity of setting the task of winning democracy. In any case, moreover, the slogan of democracy is appropriate, because it is obvious to everybody that the Chinese people have far too little democracy, and not too much. Actual events have also shown that to define the new stage, and to set the winning of democracy as our task, is to move a step closer to resistance. Events have moved forward; let us not put the clock back!
«Why do we place so much emphasis on a National Assembly?» Because it is something which can affect every aspect of life, because it is the bridge from reactionary dictatorship to democracy, because it is connected with national defence, and because it is a legal institution. To recover eastern Hebei and northern Chaha'er, to combat smuggling,8 to oppose «economic collaboration»,9 and so on, as many comrades have proposed, is quite correct, but this complements rather than in any way conflicts with the fight for democracy and a National Assembly; the essential thing is still the National Assembly and freedom for the people.
It is correct and indisputable that the day-to-day struggle against Japan and the people's struggle for a better life must be linked up with the movement for democracy. Nevertheless, the central and essential thing in the present stage is democracy and freedom.
#3. THE QUESTION OF THE FUTURE OF THE REVOLUTION
Some comrades have raised this question, and here I can only give a brief answer.
In the writing of an article, the second half can be written only after the first half is finished. Resolute leadership of the democratic revolution is the prerequisite for the victory of socialism. We are fighting for socialism, and in this respect we are different from those who confine themselves to the revolutionary «Three People's Principles». It is the great future goal to which our present efforts are directed if we lose sight of the goal, we cease to be Communists. But equally, we cease to be Communists if we relax our efforts of today.
We are exponents of the theory of the transition of the revolution,10 and we are for the transition of the democratic revolution in the direction of socialism. The democratic revolution will develop through several stages, all under the slogan of a democratic republic. The change from the predominance of the bourgeoisie to that of the proletariat is a long process of struggle, of struggle for leadership in which success depends on the work of the Communist Party in raising the level of political consciousness and organization both of the proletariat and of the peasantry and urban small bourgeoisie.
The staunch ally of the proletariat is the peasantry, and next comes the urban small bourgeoisie. It is the bourgeoisie that will contend with us for leadership.
To overcome the vacillation of the bourgeoisie and its lack of revolutionary thoroughness, we must rely on the strength of the masses and on the correctness of our policy, or otherwise the bourgeoisie will come out on top.
A bloodless transition is what we would like and we should strive for it, but what will happen will depend on the strength of the masses.
We are exponents of the theory of the transition of the revolution, and not of the Trotskijite theory of «permanent revolution»11 or of the semi-Trotskijite theory of Li Lisan-ism. We are for the attainment of socialism by going through all the necessary stages of the democratic republic. We are opposed to tailism, but we are also opposed to adventurism and impetuosity.
To reject the participation of the bourgeoisie in the revolution on the ground that it can only be temporary and to describe the alliance with anti-Japanese factions of the bourgeoisie (in a semi-colonial country) as capitulation is a Trotskijite approach, with which we cannot agree. Today, such an alliance is in fact a necessary bridge on the way to socialism.
#4. THE QUESTION OF CADRES
A great revolution requires a great party and many first-rate cadres to guide it. In China, with a population of 450'000'000, it is impossible to carry through our great revolution, which is unprecedented in history, if the leadership consists of a small, narrow group and if the Party directors and cadres are petty, short-sighted, and incompetent. The Communist Party of China has been a large political party for a long time, and it is still large, despite the losses during the period of reaction; it has many good directors and cadres, but still not enough. Our Party organizations must be extended all over the country and we must purposefully train tens of thousands of cadres and hundreds of first-rate directors. They must be cadres and directors versed in Marxism-Leninism, politically far-sighted, competent in work, full of the spirit of self-sacrifice, capable of tackling problems on their own, steadfast in the midst of difficulties, and loyal and devoted in serving the nation, the class, and the Party. It is on these cadres and directors that the Party relies for its links with the militants and the masses, and it is by relying on their firm leadership of the masses that the Party can succeed in defeating the enemy. Such cadres and directors must be free from selfishness, from individualist heroism, ostentation, sloth, passivity, and sectarian arrogance, and they must be selfless national and class heroes; such are the qualities and the style of work demanded of the militants, cadres, and directors of our Party. Such is the spiritual legacy handed down to us by the tens of thousands of militants, the thousands of cadres, and the scores of first-rate directors who have laid down their lives for the cause. Beyond any doubt, we ought to acquire these qualities, do still better in remoulding ourselves, and raise ourselves to a higher revolutionary level. But even this is not enough; we must also regard it as our duty to discover many more new cadres and directors in the Party and the country. Our revolution depends on cadres. As Comrade Stalin has said: «Cadres decide everything.»12
#5. THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRACY WITHIN THE PARTY
To attain this aim, inner-Party democracy is essential. If we are to make the Party strong, we must practise democratic centralism to stimulate the initiative of the whole membership. There was more centralism during the period of reaction and civil war. In the new period, centralism should be closely linked with democracy. Let us apply democracy, and so give scope to initiative throughout the Party. Let us give scope to the initiative of the whole Party membership and so train new cadres and directors in great numbers, eliminate the remnants of sectarianism, and unite the whole Party as solidly as steel.
#6. UNITY IN THE CONFERENCE AND IN THE WHOLE PARTY
After explanation, the dissenting views on political issues voiced at this conference have given way to agreement, and the earlier difference between the line of the Central Committee and the line of retreat adopted under the leadership of certain comrades, has also been settled;13 this shows that our Party is very solidly united. This unity provides the most important basis for the present national and democratic revolution, because it is only through the unity of the Communist Party that the unity of the whole class and the whole nation can be achieved, and it is only through the unity of the whole class and the whole nation that the enemy can be defeated and the national and democratic revolution accomplished.
#7. WIN THE MASSES IN THEIR MILLIONS FOR THE ANTI-JAPANESE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT
The aim of our correct political policy and of our solid unity is to win the masses in their millions for the anti-Japanese national united front. The broad masses of the proletariat, the peasantry, and the urban small bourgeoisie need our work of propaganda, agitation, and organization. Further efforts on our part are also needed to establish an alliance with those factions of the bourgeoisie which are opposed to Japan. To make the policy of the Party the policy of the masses requires effort, long and persistent effort, unrelenting and strenuous, patient and painstaking effort. Without such effort, we shall achieve nothing. The formation and consolidation of the anti-Japanese national united front, the accomplishment of the task incumbent on it, and the establishment of a democratic republic in China are absolutely inseparable from our effort to win over the masses. If we succeed in bringing millions upon millions of the masses under our leadership by such effort, our revolutionary task can be speedily fulfilled. Japanese imperialism fears nothing about us except such efforts on our part. By our exertions, we shall surely overthrow Japanese imperialism and attain complete national and social liberation.
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Editor's Note: The Japanese imperialists made temporary conciliatory gestures after the Xi'an Incident in order to induce the Nationalist authorities to disrupt the internal peace which was being restored and to break up the anti-Japanese national united front which was taking shape. They arranged for the bogus autonomous government of Inner Mongolia under their control to release two messages, one in December 1936 and another in March 1937, pledging allegiance to the Nationalist government in Nanjing. And the Japanese foreign minister, Sato himself, publicly wooed Jiang Jieshi, slyly declaring that Japan would improve its relations with China and help China achieve political unification and economic recovery. Furthermore, Japan sent a so-called Economic Study Group, headed by Kodama Kenji, a Japanese financial magnate, ostensibly to help China «complete the organization of a modern State». These were schemes for aggression and were known as «Sato's diplomacy»; they were called a «retreat on the part of Japan» by those people who were deluded by the Japanese imperialist make-believe. ↩
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Editor's Note: In April 1937, the Nationalist High Court in Suzhou tried Shen Junru and six other leaders of the Resist Japan and Save the Nation Movement who had been arrested in November 1936 in Shanghai. The charge was «endangering the Republic», the usual trumped-up indictment the reactionary Nationalist authorities used to stigmatize all patriotic movements. ↩
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Editor's Note: Prior to the Xi'an Incident, the North-Eastern Army was stationed on the border between Shaanxi and Gansu Provinces and was in direct contact with the Red Army in northern Shaanxi. Greatly influenced by the Red Army, it subsequently staged the coup in Xi'an. In March 1937, the North-Eastern Army was forced to go east to Henan and Anhui Provinces, a move taken by the Nationalist reactionaries to cut it off from contact with the Red Army and at the same time to sow discord in its ranks. ↩
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Editor's Note: General Yang Hucheng was a military leader in China's North-West who staged the Xi'an Incident together with Zhang Xueliang. Thus, the prime movers in this incident were popularly linked together in the double-barreled surname «Zhang-Yang». When Jiang Jieshi was released, Zhang accompanied him to Nanjing, but was immediately placed under detention. In April 1937, Yang, too, was ousted from his post by the Nationalist reactionaries and had to take leave of absence abroad. When the War of Resistance began, Yang returned to China to offer his services, only to be interned by Jiang Jieshi for the rest of his life. In September 1949, when the People's Liberation Army was driving forward near Chongqing, the Nationalist Party had him murdered in a concentration camp. ↩
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Editor's Note: Tongguan is a strategically important gateway on the borders of Shaanxi, Henan, and Shanxi. At the time of the Xi'an Incident, the Nationalist troops were mainly quartered east of it. Certain reputedly «Left-wing» people in the Communist Party of China, like Zhang Guotao, then urged that the Red Army should «fight its way out through Tongguan», which meant that the Red Army should mount an offensive against the Nationalist troops. This proposal ran counter to the Central Committee's policy for a peaceful settlement of the Xi'an Incident. ↩
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Editor's Note: For a long time after the November Revolution, the French imperialists pursued a hostile policy toward the Council Union. From 1918 to '20, the French government took an active part in the armed intervention by 14 powers against the Council Union and continued its reactionary policy of isolating the Council Union, even after the intervention failed. It was not until May 1935 that, under the influence of the Council Union's peace policy among the French people and because of the German fascist menace, France concluded a treaty of mutual assistance with the Council Union, though the French reactionary government failed to observe it. ↩
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Editor's Note: The students' patriotic demonstration in Beijing on the 9th of December, 1935, led by the Communist Party of China. The movement called for the cessation of civil war and armed resistance to Japan and won nationwide support. ↩
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Editor's Note: The smuggling of Japanese commodities into China. ↩
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Editor's Note: This refers to the self-styled Sino-Japanese economic collaboration. ↩
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See: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels: Manifesto of the Communist Party (December 1847-January 1848), Section 4; Nikolaj Lenin: Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution (June-July 1905); and I.V. Stalin: History of the Communist Party of the Council Union (Majority) (Before September 1938), Section 3.3 ↩
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See: I.B. Stalin: The Foundations of Leninism (April 1924), Section 3; The November Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists (17th of December, 1924), Section 2; and Concerning Questions of Leninism (25th of January, 1926), Section 3 ↩
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Source: I.B. Stalin: Cadres Decide Everything (4th of May, 1935) ↩
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Editor's Note: This difference was between the line of the Party's Central Committee and Zhang Guotao's line of retreat in 1935-36. In stating that «the earlier difference [...] has [...] been settled», Comrade Mao Zedong was referring to the fact that the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army had joined forces with the Central Red Army. Zhang Guotao's subsequent open betrayal of the Party and his debasement into a counter-revolutionary was the act of an individual traitor and no longer a question of differences over Party line. ↩