Turn the Army Into a Working Force

#PUBLICATION NOTE

This edition of Turn the Army Into a Working Force has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the following editions:

  • Turn the Army Into a Working Force, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Vol. 4, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.
  • Directive of the Central Military Commission to Deng [Xiaoping], Chen [Yi], etc., on the Task of Army Training and Consolidating, in Mao's Road to Power, First English Edition, Vol. 10, Routledge, New York and London, 2023.

#INTRODUCTION NOTE

This is a telegram in reply to the Second and Third Field Armies of the Chinese People's Liberation Army drafted by Comrade Mao Zedong for the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Xibaipo, Pingshan, Hebei, China on the 8th of February, 1949.

In addition to the Second and Third Field Armies, the telegram was sent also to the other field armies concerned and to the bureaus of the Central Committee concerned. Considering that the period of severe fighting had ended after the three great campaigns of Liaoxi-Shenyang, Huai-Hai, and Beijing-Tianjin, Comrade Mao Zedong in this telegram pointed out in good time that the People's Liberation Army was not only a fighting force, but, at the same time, had to be a working force, and that, under certain conditions, it should function mainly as a working force. This policy played a very important role in solving the cadre problem of that period in the new Liberated Areas and in ensuring the smooth development of the people's revolutionary cause.


#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!

#TURN THE ARMY INTO A WORKING FORCE

#TELEGRAM FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COMMISSION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA TO THE SECOND AND THIRD FIELD ARMIES OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY

#Mao Zedong
#8th of February, 1949

#

#To Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yi, Su Yu, Tan Zhenlin, the Eastern China Bureau, the Working Committee of the Central China Bureau, the Central Plains Bureau, Lin Biao, and Luo Ronghuan

Your telegram of the 4th has been received. It is very good that you are speeding training and consolidation and preparing to start moving one month ahead of schedule.1 Please proceed along these lines and do not slacken. Actually, however, training and consolidation must continue in March; the study of policy must be stressed and preparations must be made to take over and administer the big cities. From now on, the formula followed in the past 20 years, «first the rural areas, then the cities», will be reversed and changed to the formula, «first the cities, then the rural areas». The army is not only a fighting force, it is mainly a working force. All army cadres should learn how to take over and administer cities. In urban work, they should learn how to be good at dealing with the imperialists and Nationalist reactionaries, good at dealing with the bourgeoisie, good at leading the workers and organizing trade unions, good at mobilizing and organizing the youth, good at uniting with and training cadres in the new Liberated Areas, good at managing industry and commerce, good at running schools, newspapers, news agencies, and broadcasting stations, good at handling foreign affairs, good at handling problems relating to the democratic political parties and people's organizations, good at adjusting the relations between the cities and the rural areas and solving the problems of food, coal, and other daily necessities, and good at handling monetary and financial problems. In short, all urban problems, with which in the past our army cadres and fighters were unfamiliar, should from now on be shouldered by them. You are to advance and occupy four or five provinces, and in addition to the cities, you will have to attend to vast rural areas. Since in the South, all the rural areas will be newly liberated, the work will be fundamentally different from that in the old Liberated Areas of the North. In the first year, the policy of reducing rent and interest cannot be applied, and rent and interest will have to be paid in roughly the same way as before. Our rural work will have to proceed under these conditions. Therefore, rural work must also be learned afresh. However, as compared with urban work, rural work is easy to learn. Urban work is more difficult and is the main subject you are studying. If our cadres cannot quickly master the administration of cities, we shall encounter extreme difficulties. Consequently, you must settle all other problems in February and use the whole month of March to learn how to work in the cities and in the new Liberated Areas. The Nationalist Party has only a bit more than 1'000'000 troops, scattered over a huge territory. Of course, there are still many battles to fight, but there is little possibility of such large-scale fighting as in the Huai-Hai Campaign, and it may even be said that there is no such possibility and that the period of severe fighting is over. The army is still a fighting force, and in this respect, there must be absolutely no relaxing; to relax would be a mistake. Nevertheless, the time has come for us to set ourselves the task of turning the army into a working force. If we do not now set ourselves this task and resolve to perform it, we shall be making an extremely big mistake. We are preparing to send 53'000 cadres south with the army, but this is a very small number. The occupation of eight or nine provinces and scores of big cities will require a huge number of working cadres, and to solve this problem, the army must rely chiefly on itself. The army is a school. Our field armies of 2'100'000 are equivalent to several thousand universities and secondary schools. We have to rely chiefly on the army to supply our working cadres. You must understand this point clearly. Since severe fighting is fundamentally over, replenishment of the army's troops and equipment should be kept within suitable limits, and too much must not be demanded as regards quantity, quality, and completeness, lest this should cause financial crisis. That is another point you should seriously consider. The above policies apply fully to the Fourth Field Army, and Comrades Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan are likewise asked to pay attention to them. We have talked at length with Comrade Kang Sheng and asked him and Comrade Rao Shushi to hurry to your place by the 12th to confer with you. After conferring, please inform us promptly by telegram of your views and what you propose to do. The Eastern China Bureau and the Eastern China Military Area Headquarters should move at once to Xuzhou to work jointly with the General Front Committee2 and with the Front Committee of the Third Field Army in a concentrated effort to plan the march to the South. Turn all your rear-area work over to the Shandong Sub-Bureau.

#Central Military Commission
#February

  1. Editor's Note: The Second and Third Field Armies had planned to advance the date of crossing the Yangzi River from April to March 1949. The crossing was postponed to late April because of the peace negotiations with the reactionary Nationalist government. 

  2. Editor's Note: In order to meet the needs of the Huai-Hai Campaign, the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided on the 16th of November, 1948 to form a General Front Committee consisting of Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, Deng Xiaoping, Su Yu, and Tan Zhenlin, with Deng Xiaoping as secretary, to assume unified leadership of the Central Plains Field Army and the Eastern China Field Army and to exercise command over military affairs and operations on the Huai-Hai front.