The Struggle in the Jinggang Mountains

#PUBLICATION NOTE

This edition of The Struggle in the Jinggang Mountains has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the following editions:

• The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Vol. 1, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.
• The Struggle in the Jinggangshan, in Mao's Road to Power, First English Edition, Vol. 3, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 1995.

#INTRODUCTION NOTE

This is a report submitted by Comrade Mao Zedong to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on behalf of the Party's Front Committee in the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army on the 25th of November, 1928. It was first published in the 1947 Chinese Edition of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong.

#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!

#THE STRUGGLE IN THE JINGGANG MOUNTAINS

#REPORT TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

#Mao Zedong

#25th of November, 1928

#★

#To the Hunan Provincial Party Committee

Please forward this report to the Central Committee.

#1. ON THE LETTER FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

The 4th of June letter from the Central Committee passed through the hands of the Jiangxi Provincial Committee and the Ji'an County Committee and did not reach the Jinggang Mountains until the 2nd of November. This is an excellent letter. It has corrected many of our mistakes and resolved many controversial issues here. As soon as it arrived, we sent copies to Party committees at all levels, both in the army and in the localities. Troops which had set out for Suichuan gathered in the Jinggang Mountains on the 6th of November, and the Special Committee called a meeting of over 30 people to discuss the letter from the Central Committee. Participants were Special Committee members and militants in the army and in the localities. (Those who attended included Zhu De, Chen Yi, He Tingying, He Changgong, Yuan Wencai, Wang Zuo, Tan Zhenlin, Deng Ganyuan, Li Quefei, Chen Zhengren, Wang Zuonong, Xiao Wanxia, Liu Huixiao, Xie Chunbiao, Lu Di, Xiong Shouqi, Yang Kaiming, Cao Shuo, Deng Jiuting, Mao Zedong, Song Qiaosheng, and Peng Gu. The representative of the Hunan Provincial Committee, Yuan Desheng, also participated.) It was recognized that, apart from one or two points relating to concrete circumstances (such as the recommendations that guerrilla warfare should be extended to an excessively wide area, and that the system of Party representatives should be abolished), all the principles and strategies embodied in the letter were extremely appropriate to the current situation, and we should act accordingly. A Front Committee was also immediately organized as the Party's highest body in the Border Area. In accordance with the letter, the Front Committee now comes under the jurisdiction of the Jiangxi Provincial Committee, because it is in Jiangxi at the moment. When it moves to Hunan, it comes automatically under the jurisdiction of the Hunan Provincial Committee. At the same time, it can request direct directives from the Central Committee through these two provincial committees. Unfortunately, of the four appendices to the letter from the Central Committee, we have decrypted only two. The two that have been converted into plaintext are Confiscate the Land and Establish the Councils and The February Resolution of the International. We are unable to decrypt the two other documents, Military Work and Organizational Questions. We need them badly. Please send us as soon as possible the decryption code, or send us another copy.

#2. THE INDEPENDENT REGIME IN THE HUNAN-JIANGXI BORDER AREA AND THE AUGUST DEFEAT

China is the only country in the world today where one or more small areas under Council Power have emerged in the midst of a White regime which encircles them. We find on analysis that one reason for this phenomenon lies in the incessant splits and wars within China's comprador and feudal classes. So long as these splits and wars continue, it is possible for an armed independent regime of workers and peasants to survive and grow. Under such circumstances of splits and wars within the comprador and feudal classes, in addition, its survival and growth require the following conditions:

• First, a sound mass basis.
• Second, a sound Party organization.
• Third, a fairly strong Red Army.
• Fourth, terrain favourable to military operations.
• Fifth, economic resources sufficient for sustenance.

An independent regime must vary its strategy against the encircling ruling classes, adopting one strategy when the ruling class regime is temporarily stable and another when it is split up. In a period when the ruling classes are split up, as during the wars between Li Zongren and Tang Shengzhi in Hunan and Hubei Provinces,¹ and between Zhang Fakui and Li Jishen in Guangdong Province,² our strategy can be comparatively adventurous and the area carved out by military operations can be comparatively large. However, we must take care to lay a solid foundation in the central districts, so that we shall have something secure to rely on when the White terror strikes. In a period when the regime of the ruling classes is comparatively stable, as it was in the southern provinces after April this year, our strategy must be one of gradual advance. In such a period, the worst thing in military affairs is to divide our forces for an adventurous advance, and the worst thing in local work (distributing land, establishing political power, expanding the Party, and organizing local armed forces) is to scatter our personnel and neglect to lay a solid foundation in the central districts. The defeats which many small Red areas have suffered have been due either to the absence of the requisite objective conditions or to subjective mistakes in tactics. Mistakes in tactics have been made solely because of failure to distinguish clearly between the two kinds of period, that in which the regime of the ruling classes is temporarily stable and that in which it is split up. In a period of temporary stability, some comrades advocated dividing our forces for an adventurous advance and even proposed leaving the defence of extensive areas to the Red Guards alone, as though oblivious of the fact that the enemy could attack, not merely with the feudal levies, but even in concentrated operations with regular troops. In local work, they utterly neglected to lay a solid foundation in the central districts and attempted unrestricted expansion regardless of whether it was within our capacity. If anyone advocated a policy of gradual advance in military operations or a policy of concentrating our effort in local work on laying a solid foundation in the central districts, so as to secure an invincible position, they dubbed them a «conservative». Their wrong ideas were the root cause of the defeats sustained last August by the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area and by the Fourth Red Army in southern Hunan.

Our work in the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area began in October last year. At the start, all our Party organizations in the counties were defunct. The local armed forces consisted only of the two units under Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo in the vicinity of the Jinggang Mountains, each unit having 60 rifles in bad repair, while the peasant self-defence corps in the counties of Yongxin, Lianhua, Chaling, and Lingxian had been totally disarmed by the feudal class and the revolutionary ardour of the masses had been stifled. By February this year, Ninggang, Yongxin, Chaling, and Suichuan had county Party committees, Lingxian had a special district Party committee, and, in Lianhua, a Party organization was beginning to function and establish connections with the Wan'an County Committee. All the counties except Lingxian had a few local armed units. In Ninggang, Chaling, Suichuan, and Yongxin, and especially in the two latter counties, there were a good many guerrilla uprisings against the feudal lords which mobilized the masses, and all were fairly successful. In that period, the agrarian revolution had not yet been carried very far. The bodies of political power were called « of workers', peasants', and soldiers' deputies, people's committees, or governments of the workers, peasants, and soldiers. The term «council» was not used as yet. Councils of soldiers' deputies³ were set up in the army, and the mercenary system was abolished. When guerrilla units went on separate missions, action committees were set up to direct them. These simple methods were partly the product of our own invention and were partly copied from reports on the Guangzhou Uprising of the 11th of December, 1927, as we had read about it in newspapers (for example, people's committees). This was because all communication with the Provincial Committee had been cut off since later November, and we knew nothing at all about the Party's standpoints and policies. The resolution of the November Enlarged Plenary Session of the Central Committee, which is of momentous significance in the history of the Chinese revolution, exerted an influence on Party organizations in the Border Area only after Comrade Zhu De and others brought a copy from Hunan this April. The leading body of the Party there was the Front Committee (with Mao Zedong as secretary), which had been appointed by the Hunan Provincial Committee during the Autumn Harvest Uprising. In early March, upon the request of the Southern Hunan Special Committee, the Front Committee was abolished and reorganized as the Divisional Party Committee (with He Tingying as secretary), which thus became a body in charge of Party organizations in the army only and without authority over the local Party organizations. This had great drawbacks. Meanwhile, Mao Zedong's forces were dispatched to southern Hunan upon the request of the Special Committee there, and, consequently, the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area was occupied by the enemy for more than a month. At the end of March came the defeat in southern Hunan, and, in April, the forces under Zhu De and those under Mao Zedong, together with the peasant army of southern Hunan, withdrew to Ninggang and began to reestablish the independent regime in the Border Area.

From April onward, the independent regime in the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area was confronted with a temporarily stable ruling power in the south, and Hunan and Jiangxi would dispatch at least eight or nine regiments of reactionary forces to «suppress» us, and sometimes as many as 18. Yet, with a force of less than four regiments, we fought the enemy for four long months, daily enlarging the territory under our independent regime, deepening the agrarian revolution, extending the people's political power, and expanding the Red Army and the Red Guards. This was possible because the policies of the Party organizations (local and army) in the Border Area were correct. The policies of the Border Area Special Committee (with Mao Zedong as secretary) and the Army Committee (with Chen Yi as secretary) of the Party were then as follows:

• Struggle resolutely against the enemy, set up political power in the middle section of the Luoxiao mountain range, and oppose flightism.
• Deepen the agrarian revolution in areas under the independent regime.
• Promote the development of the local Party organization with the help of the army Party organization and promote the development of the local armed forces with the help of the regular army.
• Be on the defensive against Hunan with its comparatively strong ruling power, and take the offensive against Jiangxi with its comparatively weak ruling power.
• Devote great efforts to the development of Yongxin, set up an independent regime of the people there, and prepare for a prolonged struggle.
• Concentrate the Red Army units in order to fight the enemy confronting them when the time is opportune, and oppose the division of forces so as to avoid being destroyed one by one.
• Adopt the policy of advancing in a series of waves to expand the area under the independent regime, and oppose the policy of expansion by adventurist advance.

Thanks to these proper tactics, to the terrain of the Border Area which favoured our struggle, and to the inadequate coordination between the troops invading from Hunan and those invading from Jiangxi, we were able to win a number of military victories and expand the people's independent regime in the four months from April to July. Although several times stronger than we, the enemy was unable to prevent the expansion of our regime, let alone to destroy it. Our regime tended to exert an ever-growing influence on Hunan and Jiangxi. The sole reason for the August defeat was that, failing to realize that the period was one of temporary stability for the ruling classes, some comrades adopted a policy suited to a period of splits within the ruling classes and divided our forces for an adventurous advance on southern Hunan, thus causing defeat both in the Border Area and in southern Hunan. Du Xiujing, the representative of the Hunan Provincial Committee, and Yang Kaiming, the secretary of the Border Area Special Committee who had been appointed by the Provincial Committee, failed to grasp the actual situation and, taking advantage of the fact that Mao Zedong, Wan Xixian, and other strongly dissenting comrades were far away in Yongxin, they disregarded the resolutions of the joint meeting of the Army Committee, the Special Committee, and the Yongxin County Committee of the Party, which disapproved of the views of the Hunan Provincial Committee. They just mechanically enforced the order of the Hunan Provincial Committee to march to southern Hunan and fell in with the desire of the Red Army's 29th Regiment (composed of peasants from Yizhang) to evade struggle and return home, thus causing defeat both in the Border Area and in southern Hunan. This was truly an extremely great error.

Originally, in mid-July, the Eighth Army from Hunan, under Wu Shang, had invaded Ninggang, penetrated to Yongxin, sought battle with us in vain (our soldiers tried to attack them from a side road, but missed them), and then, being afraid of the masses who supported us, hurriedly retreated to Chaling via Lianhua. In the meantime, the major detachment of the Red Army, which was advancing from Ninggang to attack Lingxian and Chaling, changed its plans on reaching Lingxian and turned toward southern Hunan, while the enemy forces from Jiangxi, consisting of five regiments of the Third Army under Wang Jun and Jin Handing and six regiments of the Sixth Army under Hu Wendou (amounting to 11 regiments in all), launched a joint assault on Yongxin. At that point, we had only one regiment (led by Mao Zedong) in Yongxin, which, under the cover provided by the broad masses of the people, pinned down these 11 regiments within a radius of 30 li [15 kilometres] of Yongxin county town for as long as 25 days by means of guerrilla attacks from every direction. In the end, we lost Yongxin, because of the enemy's fierce assault and their having learned our real situation, and also lost Lianhua and Ninggang shortly afterward. At that moment, internal dissensions suddenly flared up among the Jiangxi enemy forces; the Sixth Army under Hu Wendou withdrew in haste and presently engaged Wang Jun's Third Army at Zhangshu. The other five Jiangxi regiments then hastily withdrew to the county town of Yongxin. Had our major detachment not moved to southern Hunan, it would have been entirely possible, aided by the power of the masses, to rout this enemy force and extend the area of the independent regime to include Ji'an, Anfu, and Pingxiang and to link it up with Pingjiang and Liuyang. But, as the major detachment was away and the one remaining regiment was much too exhausted, it was decided that some soldiers should remain to defend the Jinggang Mountains in cooperation with the two units under Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo, and that I should take the rest to Guidong to meet the major detachment and to invite it back. By that time the major detachment was retreating from southern Hunan to Guidong, and, on the 23rd of August, we joined forces there.

The enemy's Eighth Army from Hunan under Wu Shang invaded Ninggang, and subsequently advanced to Yongxin, but they could not engage us in any way. (It was not worthwhile to ambush them.) When, fearing our masses, they left Yongxin to retreat back to Chaling via Lianhua, the enemy's 11th Regiment from Jiangxi occupied the county town of Yongxin the next day. At this time, the major detachment of the Red Army (led by Zhu De) launched an offensive from Ninggang against Chaling and Lingxian. When they reached Lingxian, the officers and soldiers of the 29th Regiment, who were wavering politically and wanted to return to their homes in southern Hunan, refused to obey orders, while the 28th Regiment was against going to southern Hunan and wanted to go to southern Jiangxi, but in any case did not want to return to Yongxin. As Du Xiujing encouraged the 29th Regiment in their mistaken ideas and the Army Committee failed to dissuade them, the major detachment set out from Miandu in Lingxian for Chenzhou via Zixing on the 17th of July. In an engagement with the enemy forces under Fan Shisheng in Chenzhou on the 24th of July, it was initially successful, but was later defeated and withdrew from the battle. Thereupon, acting on its own, the 29th Regiment hurried homeward to Yizhang with the result that one section was annihilated at Lechang by Hu Fengzhang's bandits, another scattered in the Chenzhou-Yizhang area and has never been heard of since, and no more than 100 soldiers were mustered again that day. Fortunately, the 28th Regiment, which was the main force, had not suffered great losses, and, on the 18th of August, it occupied Guidong. On the 23rd of August, the regiment was joined by the troops from the Jinggang Mountains, to which it was decided that the combined forces should return by way of Chongyi and Shangyou. In the afternoon of the same day, two regiments under Wu Shang in Lingxian launched a sudden fierce attack on Guidong. The ferocious battle lasted for half a day and resumed the next morning. Casualties on our side were rather heavy (the enemy's losses were even greater), so we retreated to Jiangxi. While the army was marching from Miandu to southern Hunan, the original Army Committee was disbanded and replaced by the Front Committee appointed by the Hunan Provincial Committee, with Chen Yi as secretary. After we were defeated and evacuated Guidong, the Front Committee was dissolved, and an Action Committee was organized to take command, with Mao Zedong as secretary. The army arrived at the foot of the Jinggang Mountains on the 8th of September, after passing through Chongyi, Shangyou, and Suichuan.

The causes of our August defeat were as follows:

• First, some officers and soldiers, who were wavering and homesick, lost their fighting capacity, while others, who were unwilling to go to southern Hunan, were lacking in enthusiasm.
• Second, our soldiers were exhausted by long marches in the sweltering summer heat.
• Third, having ventured several hundred li away from Lingxian, our soldiers lost contact with the Border Area and became isolated.
• Fourth, as the masses in southern Hunan had not yet been mobilized, the expedition proved to be pure military adventurism.
• Fifth, we were uninformed about the enemy situation.
• Sixth, the preparations were inadequate, and officers and soldiers did not understand the purpose of the operation.

When we reached Chongyi, battalion commander Yuan Chongquan defected with an infantry company and an artillery company, and, though the two companies were brought back, our regimental commander Wang Erzhuo lost his life in this action. When our soldiers had been defeated in Guidong and were returning, but had not yet reached their destination, enemy units from Hunan and Jiangxi seized the opportunity to attack the Jinggang Mountains on the 30th of August. Using their points of vantage, the defending troops, numbering less than one battalion, fought back, and routed the enemy. The enemy suffered very great casualties. This battle and saved the base area, and struck a blow at the enemy's morale. Since then, they have not dared to look down on the Red Army any longer. This battle has become one of the best-known encounters in the Border Area.

While in Hunan, the Front Committee organized county Party committees in Guidong and Rucheng, which it passed through going and coming. A Special Committee was also set up to take charge of the existing county Party committees in Zixing and Chenzhou. Du Xiujing was the secretary, and the address was Gate 12, Longxia, Zixing. 80 guns were distributed to arm the newly established Red Guards in Zixing, Guidong, and Rucheng Counties. In Chenzhou, there were Red Guards at Yaoling, with 40 to 50 guns. Things were unclear in counties such as Leiyang and Yongxing. The 30th and 33rd Regiments of the Red Army, which returned to southern Hunan in May, have long since been dispersed, and the enemy has captured most of the 300 to 400 guns. The broad masses in southern Hunan, who were mobilized by the Red Army in the spring, had been totally repressed by the enemy. On this occasion, the Red Army again mobilized part of the local masses while passing through Zixing, Rucheng, and Guidong Counties, organized councils, and divided up the land in Shatian, Guidong. We do not know what conditions have been created there at present. Because of the communications blockade, we have received no correspondence as yet from the recently organized Southern Hunan Special Committee.

#3. THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE AREA UNDER THE INDEPENDENT REGIME

Since April this year, the Red areas have been gradually extended. After the battle of Longyuankou (on the borders of Yongxin and Ninggang) on the 23rd of June, in which we defeated the Jiangxi enemy forces for the fourth time, the Border Area reached the peak of its development, embracing the three counties of Ninggang, Yongxin, and Lianhua, small sections of Ji'an and Anfu, the northern section of Suichuan, and the south-eastern section of Lingxian. In the Red areas, the greater part of the land had been distributed, and the remainder was being distributed. Bodies of political power were set up everywhere in the districts and townships. County governments were set up in Ninggang, Yongxin, Lianhua, and Suichuan, and a Border Area Government was formed. Insurrectionary detachments of workers and peasants, armed with spears, were organized in the villages, and Red Guards, armed with rifles, were formed at the district and county levels. In July, the Jiangxi enemy forces launched attacks, and, in August, the Hunan and Jiangxi enemy forces jointly attacked the Jinggang Mountains. All the county towns and the plains in the Border Area were occupied by the enemy. The enemy's jackals — the peace preservation corps (armed with rifles) and the feudal levies (armed with spears) — ran amok, and White terror raged throughout the towns and countryside. Most of the Party and government organizations collapsed. The rich peasants and the opportunists in the Party went over to the enemy in great numbers. It was not until the Battle of the Jinggang Mountains was fought on the 30th of August that the Hunan enemy forces realized that there was no hope of overcoming the natural barrier of the Jinggang Mountains and retreated to Lingxian; but the Jiangxi forces still held all the county towns and most of the villages in the plains area. However, the enemy has never been able to capture the mountain areas, which include the western and northern districts of Ninggang; the Tianlong, Xiaoxijiang, and Wannianshan districts in the northern, western, and southern sections of Yongxin respectively; the Shangxi district of Lianhua; the Jinggangshan district of Suichuan; and the Qinshigang and Dayuan districts of Lingxian. In July and August, in coordination with the Red Guards of the various counties, one regiment of the Red Army fought scores of battles, big and small, losing only 30 rifles, before it finally withdrew to the mountains. The enemy went all out to invade and finally launched an offensive against our Jinggang Mountains base area with the combined forces of the two provincial armies. They were not successful in a single encounter, and finally gave up and retreated. We triumphed over combined forces sent to suppress us at Huangyangjie on the 30th of August. Our army returned to the Jinggang Mountains on the 9th of September after its campaigns in the South, and this marked the beginning of the new phase from September onward.

As our soldiers were marching back to the Jinggang Mountains via Chongyi and Shangyou, the enemy force from southern Jiangxi, the Independent Seventh Division under Liu Shiyi, taking advantage of the fact that we were the remnants of a defeated army, pursued us with five battalions as far as Suichuan. On the 13th of September, we defeated Liu Shiyi, captured several hundred rifles, and took Suichuan. We also took prisoners, including one battalion and one company commander, three or four platoon commanders, and some 200 soldiers. The Action Committee (with Mao Zedong as secretary) commanding the army and the Suichuan County Committee jointly administered the affairs of the masses of Suichuan and provided for the maintenance of the army. The army sent columns in four directions toward four townships to wage guerrilla warfare, each branch setting up its own action committee to take command. The branch heading east pushed as far as Wan'an and established liaison with the Wan'an County Committee. On the 24th of September, Li Wenbin's regiment of the Jiangxi army arrived from Taihe, and the Independent Seventh Division arrived from Gangzhou and attacked the town of Suichuan. Our forces were not concentrated, and we could commit only two battalions to the battle. Although we could not sustain the fight and withdrew, the morale of the soldiers remained intact. On the 26th of September, we returned to the Jinggang Mountains. On the 1st of October, at Ninggang, we engaged and defeated one of Xiong Shihui's brigades commanded by Zhou Hunyuan. We captured one battalion commander, one company commander, two platoon commanders, 100 soldiers, and 110 rifles. We drove the remaining enemies to Yongxin, recovering the entire county of Ninggang. Li Wenbin's regiment thought that w would attack Ninggang. Consequently, it left Suichuan, taking an indirect route through Taihe and Yongxin to bring reinforcements. Suichuan was left in the hands of the Independent Seventh Division (the weakest in number of troops) alone. Since we expected that the masses in Suichuan would be very highly mobilized, and since our army was hard pressed for supplies, we recaptured Suichuan on the 13th of October. The Independent Seventh Division fled without firing a shot. The Suichuan Action Committee in command of the troops (with Zhu De as secretary) joined the Suichuan County Committee in planning the work in Suichuan. They decided to establish five guerrilla columns, distribute the land, establish a council, expand the Party organization, and raise funds. Meanwhile, 126 soldiers of the Hunan enemy forces under Yan Zhongxing, which had been stationed in Guidong, came over to us and were organized into a special task battalion with Bi Zhanyun as commander. On the 2nd of November, two regiments of the 21st Brigade of the Jiangxi enemy (commanded by Li Wenbin), together with a segment of the Independent Seventh Division, launched a new offensive against us at Suichuan. In order to avoid a direct clash, our army gave up Suichuan, intending to fall on the enemy with the suddenness of a thunderbolt at Ninggang and Yongxin, where their forces were relatively weak, thus breaking the siege. On the 9th of November, we routed one regiment of Zhou's brigade at Longyuankou and the county town of Ninggang. We captured 160 guns, killed one enemy battalion commander and several dozen enemy soldiers, and took prisoner two deputy battalion commanders, one company commander, one platoon commander, and over 100 soldiers. On the morning of the next day, we advanced and occupied Yongxin to fight the 28th Regiment of Zhou's brigade and the remnants of the 27th Regiment. It was not until 15:00 that we forced the enemy to retreat, and our vanguard occupied the town of Yongxin. Unexpectedly, the enemy was reinforced by the 35th Brigade from Hongtianhe (between Ji'an and Yongxin), so we retreated toward Ninggang for fear of a disadvantageous battle. Although the enemy suffered heavy casualties that day, we, too, had over 100 casualties. This was the biggest battle after we returned to the Border Area. The Red Guards and the insurrectionary detachments participated in both these campaigns, although their strength was not very great. Present circumstances in the Border Area are as follows: Zhou Hunyuan's 14th Brigade and Liu Shiyi's 15th Brigade are stationed on the Jiangxi border. Both have already been defeated by us and are in the process of reorganization. Li Wenbin's 21st Brigade and the 35th Brigade (commander unknown) are our most powerful opponents. Wu Shang's Eighth Army is still occupying Chaling, Lingxian, and Guidong Counties on the Hunan border. At present, our area, extending from the southern slopes of the Jinggang Mountains in Suichuan County in the South to the border of Lianhua County in the North, embraces the whole of Ninggang and parts of Suichuan, Lingxian, and Yongxin, forming a narrow unbroken stretch running north to south. The Shangxi district of Lianhua and the Tianlong and Wannianshan districts of Yongxin, however, are not firmly linked with this unbroken stretch, but are under the Council Power. The enemy is attempting to encircle the entire territory under the Council Power, so as to destroy our base area by military attacks and economic blockade, and we are now preparing to defeat their attacks. The difficulty and intensity of the struggle will increase with every passing day; we cannot afford a moment's repose.

#4. EXISTING QUESTIONS

#4.1. MILITARY QUESTIONS

#4.1.1. THE MILITARY PERIOD

Since the struggle in the Border Area is almost exclusively military, both the Party and the masses have to be militarized. How to deal with the enemy, how to fight, has become an important item on the daily agenda of the army and of local Party bodies at all levels, and fighting has become the central problem in our daily life. An independent regime must be an armed one. Wherever such an area is located, it will be immediately occupied by the enemy if armed forces are lacking or inadequate, or if wrong tactics are used in dealing with the enemy. As the struggle is getting fiercer every day, our problems have become extremely complex and serious.

#4.1.2. ORIGINS OF THE RED ARMY

Broadly speaking, the Red Army in the Border Area is drawn from the following six categories of soldiers:

• First, troops formerly under Ye Ting and He Long in Chaozhou and Shantou.⁴
• Second, the Guards Regiment of the former National Government at Wuchang.⁵
• Third, peasants from Pingjiang and Liuyang.⁶
• Fourth, peasants from southern Hunan⁷ and workers from Shuikoushan.⁸
• Fifth, soldiers captured from the forces under Xu Kexiang, Tang Shengzhi, Bai Chongxi, Zhu Peide, Wu Shang, and Xiong Shihui.
• Sixth, peasants from the counties in the Border Area.

However, of the troops formerly commanded by Ye Ting and He Long, the Guards Regiment, and the peasants from Pingjiang and Liuyang, only 1/3 is left after more than a year's fighting. Casualties have also been heavy among the peasants from southern Hunan. Thus, although the first four categories remain the backbone of the Fourth Red Army to this day, they are now far outnumbered by the last two categories. Furthermore, in the latter, the peasants are outnumbered by the captured soldiers; without replacement from this source, there would be a serious troop-supply problem. Despite the existence of these reinforcements, of which the quality is inferior to the former groups (though quite a few among them are good soldiers), the increase in soldiers does not keep pace with the increase in rifles. Rifles are not easily lost, but soldiers are wounded or killed, fall sick or desert and so are lost more easily. (A few soldiers desert every time we are defeated.) Moreover, few peasants in the Border Area are willing to serve as soldiers. As soon as the land is divided up, everyone goes to till it. Now, the soldiers of peasant or working-class origin in the Fourth Army in the Border Area constitute an extreme minority. Thus, the problem is still very great. The Hunan Provincial Committee has promised to send us workers from Anyuan,⁹ and we earnestly hope it will do so.

#4.1.3. CLASS ORIGIN OF THE RED ARMY

The Red Army consists partly of workers and peasants and partly of lumpen-proletarians. (So, it is not true to say, as the Hunan Provincial Committee does, that they are all lumpen-proletarians.) Of course, it is inadvisable to have too many of the latter. It is urgently necessary to replace this contingent of lumpen-proletarians by workers and peasants, but workers and peasants are hard to come by, the lumpen-proletarians are particularly able to fight, and, as fighting is going on every day with mounting casualties, it is already no easy matter to get replacements even from among them. In these circumstances, the only solution is to intensify political education, so as to effect a qualitative change in these elements.

#4.1.4. CLASS CHARACTER OF THE RED ARMY

The majority of the Red Army soldiers come from the mercenary armies, but their character changes once they are in the Red Army. First of all, the Red Army has abolished the mercenary system, making the soldiers feel they are fighting for themselves and for the people and not for somebody else. So far, the Red Army has no system of regular pay, but issues grain, money for cooking oil, salt, firewood, and vegetables, and a little pocket money. Land has been allotted to all Red Army officers and soldiers who are natives of the Border Area, but it is rather difficult to allot land to those from other parts of the country. First of all, the independent regime is small, and much of it is mountainous, so local peasants themselves barely have enough land to share, and there is no surplus-product. Secondly, the outcome of battles is unpredictable, and the independent regime does not have a stable territory. Yesterday, the land was distributed by the Red regime, but today the White regime seizes it back and demands that the peasants pay rent to the landlords. Consequently, not only do the officers and soldiers of the Red Army have no notion of sharing out the land themselves, but many, even among the peasants, do not consider the distribution of the land to be necessarily final. This is the result of the overwhelming strength of the White regime and of the incessant and fierce struggles between the Red regime and the White regime. It is, however, our unwavering principle that the Red Army soldiers should get land, and we are continuing to discuss methods for implementing this principle.

#4.1.5. POLITICAL EDUCATION OF THE RED ARMY

In general, after receiving political education, the Red Army soldiers have become class-conscious, learned the essentials of distributing land, setting up political power, arming the workers and peasants, and so on, and they know they are fighting for themselves, for the working class, and for the peasantry. Hence, they can endure the hardships of the bitter struggle without complaint.

Each company, battalion, or regiment has its council of soldiers' deputies, which supervises the officers, represents the interests of the soldiers, and carries out political and mass work. Once the council of soldiers' deputies has been fully established, the political department can be abolished. Its staff members can all be taken into the council of soldiers' deputies and work there. This would be better than having a separate political department. Before April this year, all the armies here had political departments. Then, they were abolished because of the unfavourable influence they exerted. Whenever there is a political department, the officers and soldiers, as well as the masses, are led to think that political work rests only with the few people in the department, and that the job of all the rest is merely to fight. Only if we abolish the political department, so that everyone will have to both fight and do political work (political education and mass work), can the purely military standpoint be smashed.

Experience has proved that the system of Party representatives¹⁰ must not be abolished yet. The Party representatives at the army and divisional levels (here, there is no such thing as a division; the regiment is directly subordinated to the army) can be abolished. At the regimental, battalion, and company levels, they must not be abolished now. The Party representative is particularly important at company level, since Party branches are organized on a company basis. They have to see that the council of soldiers' deputies carries out political training, to guide the work of the mass movements, and to serve concurrently as the secretary of the Party branch. Facts have shown that the better the company Party representative, the sounder the company, and that the company commander can hardly play this important political role. As the casualties among the lower cadres are heavy, captured enemy soldiers often become platoon commanders or company commanders in a very short time; some of those captured in February or March are already battalion commanders. It might seem that, since our army is called the Red Army it could do without Party representatives, but this is a gross error. At one time, Zhu De's 28th Regiment in southern Hunan abolished the system, only to restore it later, because they felt that this was not a good idea and could not be maintained. When they reached the Border Area, they restored the system. To rename the Party representatives «directors» would be to confuse them with the directors in the Nationalist army, who are detested by the captured soldiers. A change of name does not affect the nature of the system. Hence, we have decided to make no change. Casualties among Party representatives are very heavy, and, while we have started classes for training and replenishment, we hope that the Central Committee and the Hunan and Jiangxi Provincial Committees will send us at least 30 comrades who are able to serve as Party representatives.

#4.1.6. MILITARY TRAINING OF THE RED ARMY

Ordinarily, a soldier needs six months' or a year's training before they can fight, but our soldiers, recruited only yesterday, have to fight today with practically no training. Consequently, part of the middle- and lower-ranking cadres, as well as many soldiers, are poor in military technique and fight on courage alone. This is very dangerous. As long periods of rest and training are out of the question, the only thing to do is to try and avoid certain engagements if possible and thus gain time for training. We now have a corps of 150 people in training as lower-ranking officers, and we intend to make this course a permanent institution. We hope that the Central Committee and the two Provincial Committees will send us more officers from platoon commander and company commander upward.

#4.1.7. SUPPLY QUESTIONS

The Hunan Provincial Committee has asked us to attend to the material conditions of the soldiers and make them at least a little better than those of the average worker or peasant. Actually, they are worse; no doubt few people are as poor as the Red Army soldiers. Because of the shortage of funds, each person receives only 5 cents a day for cooking oil, salt, firewood, and vegetables, in addition to receiving grain, and even this is hard to keep up. The common saying of the soldiers, «Overthrow the capitalists, and eat pumpkin every day», reflects their poverty. Probably, there are not many people in this world who suffer more bitterly than the Fourth Army. The monthly cost of food alone, the other items being provided for by the Provincial Committee, amounts to more than 10'000 yuan, which is obtained exclusively through expropriation of the local tyrants.¹¹ But, first of all, you can only expropriate a given locality once; afterward, there is nothing left tot take. Second, we are tightly surrounded by the enemy, and in order to get at the local tyrants, we often have to break through the enemy's lines, so we cannot get far. Third, the hostile armies must be taken seriously, and one or two battalions would not be able to raise funds on their own. We need many soldiers in order to raise funds, so the problem is now a simple one. We now have cotton padding for winter clothing for the whole regular army of 5'000 soldiers, but are still short of cloth, and we do not know when this problem can be resolved. Cold as the weather is, many of our soldiers are still wearing only two layers of thin clothing. Fortunately, we are inured to hardships. What is more, all of us share the same hardships; from the commander of the army to the cook, everyone lives on the daily food allowance of 5 cents, apart from grain. As for pocket money, everybody gets the same amount, whether it is 20 cents, or 40 cents.¹² Everybody realizes that they are «suffering on behalf of the proletariat»; consequently, the soldiers have no complaints against anyone. Despite this, financial problems have been and remain very serious.

#4.1.8. QUESTIONS OF THE SICK AND WOUNDED

After each engagement, there are some wounded. Also, many officers and soldiers have fallen ill from malnutrition, exposure to cold, or other causes. Our Red Army hospital up in the Jinggang Mountains gives both Chinese and Western treatment, but is short of doctors and medicines, and the problem is very serious. In September, we had over 200 sick and wounded soldiers, and after the recent Battle of Yongxin, the number increased. At present, it has over 800 patients and staff. If we do not take care of the sick and wounded, the morale of the army will be shaken. If we want to take good care of them, we face truly great difficulties getting medical equipment and supplies. The Hunan Provincial Committee long ago promised to obtain medicines for us, but, so far, we have received none. We still hope the Central Committee and the two Provincial Committees will send us a few doctors with Western training, and some iodine.

#4.1.9. DEMOCRACY IN THE RED ARMY

Apart from the role played by the Party, the reason why the Red Army has been able to carry on in spite of such poor material conditions and such frequent engagements is its practice of democracy. The officers do not beat the soldiers; officers and soldiers have the same food and clothing, and receive equal treatment; soldiers are free to hold meetings and to speak out; trivial formalities have been done away with; the accounts are open for all to inspect; and the soldiers' deputies inspect the accounts. The soldiers handle the mess arrangements, and, out of the daily 5 cents for cooking oil, salt, firewood, and vegetables, they can even save a little for pocket money, amounting to roughly 6 or 7 coppers per person per day, which is called «mess savings». All this gives great satisfaction to the soldiers. The newly captured soldiers in particular feel that our army and the Nationalist army are worlds apart. They feel spiritually liberated, even though material conditions in the Red Army are not equal to those in the White army. Therefore, they are reasonably content. The very soldiers who had no courage in the White army yesterday are very brave in the Red Army today; such is the effect of democracy. The Red Army is like a furnace, in which all captured soldiers are transmuted the moment they come over. In China, the army needs democracy as much as the people do. Democracy in our army is an important weapon for undermining the feudal mercenary army.¹³ For the life of a soldier in the feudal mercenary army is simply more than any human being can bear.

#4.1.10. THE PARTY ORGANIZATION IN THE RED ARMY

The Party organization now has four levels: the company branch, the battalion committee, the regimental committee, and the army committee. In a company, there is the branch, with a group in each squad. «The Party branch is organized on a company basis»; this is an important reason why the Red Army has been able to carry on such arduous fighting without falling apart. Two years ago, when we were in the Nationalist army, our Party had no organizational roots among the soldiers, and, even among Ye Ting's troops,¹⁴ there was only one Party branch to each regiment; that is why we could not stand up to any serious test. In the Red Army today, the ratio of Party to non-Party people is approximately 1:3, or an average of one Party member in every four soldiers. Recently, we decided to recruit more Party members among the combat soldiers, so as to attain a 1:1 ratio.¹⁵ At present, the company branches are short of good Party secretaries, and we ask the Central Committee to send us a number of militants from among those who can no longer function where they are now. Almost all the cadres from southern Hunan are doing Party work in the army (and political work at the same time). But, since some of them were scattered during the retreat in southern Hunan in August, we now have no people to spare. In the seven months since the Congress of the Communist Party of China in the Fourth Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army elected the Army Party Committee last April, we have held in all six such Party congresses in the army. The Sixth Congress was held on the 14th and 15th of November, after we received the letter from the Central Committee. Decisions were reached on political, military, organizational, and propaganda matters, which all represented progress as compared with the previous five congresses. A 23-member Army Committee was set up, with Zhu De as secretary (as designated by the Central Committee). Within the army, it serves as the highest body of Party leadership and is subordinate to the Front Committee. Outside the army, it serves as the Army Committee of the Border Area Council, in command of the Red Army and the local militia. The model of the Party within the army has broadly taken shape already. Some of the Party members are resolute in their revolutionary worldview, but the majority still lack a good education, and in the future we must pay attention to this.

#4.1.11. THE LOCAL ARMED FORCES

The local armed forces consist of Red Guards and insurrectionary detachments of workers and peasants. Armed with spears and shotguns, these detachments are organized on a township basis, each township having one detachment, whose strength varies with the population. Its job is to suppress counter-revolution, protect the township government, and assist the Red Army and Red Guards in battle when the enemy appears. The insurrectionary detachments started in Yongxin as an underground force for carrying out the armed uprising, but they have come into the open since we captured the entire county. The organization has now been extended to other counties in the Border Area, and the name remains unchanged. The arms of the Red Guards are mainly five-round rifles, but also include some nine-round and single-round rifles. There are 140 rifles in Ninggang, 220 in Yongxin, 43 in Lianhua, 50 in Chaling, 90 in Lingxian, 130 in Suichuan, and 10 in Wan'an, making a total of 683. Most of the rifles have been supplied by the Red Army, but a small number were captured from the enemy by the Red Guards themselves. Fighting constantly against the peace preservation corps and levies of the feudal lords, most of the Red Guards in the counties are steadily increasing their marksmanship and fighting capacity. Before the 21st of May Incident,¹⁶ all the counties had peasant self-defence corps. There were 300 rifles in Youxian, 300 in Chaling, 60 in Lingxian, 50 in Suichuan, 80 in Yongxin, 60 in Lianhua, 60 in Ninggang (Yuan Wencai's troops), and 60 in the Jinggang Mountains (Wang Zuo's troops), totaling 970. After the Incident, apart from the rifles in the hands of Yuan's and Wang's troops, which remained intact, only six rifles were left in Suichuan and one in Lianhua, all the rest having been seized by the feudal lords. The peasant self-defence corps were not able to hold on to their rifles as a result of the opportunist line. At present, the Red Guards in the counties still have far too few rifles, fewer than those of the feudal lords; the Red Army should continue to help them with arms. The Red Army should do everything, short of reducing its own fighting capacity, to help arm the people. The Party congress in the army laid it down that each battalion of the Red Army should consist of four companies, each with 75 rifles, and, counting the rifles of the special task company, machine-gun company, trench-mortar company, regimental headquarters, and the three battalion headquarters, each regiment will have 1'075 rifles. Those captured in action should be used as far as possible for arming the local forces. The commanders of the Red Guards should be people who have been sent from the counties to the Red Army training corps and have finished their training. The Red Army should send fewer and fewer people from outside areas to command local forces. Zhu Peide is arming his peace preservation corps and levies, while the armed forces of the feudal lords in the border counties are of considerable size and fighting capacity. This makes it all the more urgent to enlarge our local Red forces.

#4.1.12. THE STRATEGY OF THE RED ARMY AND THE RED GUARDS

Besides adhering to the principles laid down (annihilate small enemy forces swiftly with our main forces; make use of the masses to combat big enemy forces; do not launch foolhardy attacks), the principle for the Red Army is concentration, and that for the Red Guards dispersion. At the present time, when the reactionary regime is temporarily stable, the enemy can mass huge forces to attack the Red Army, and dispersion would not be to the Red Army's advantage. In our experience, the dispersion of forces has almost always led to defeat, while the concentration of forces to fight a numerically inferior, equal, or slightly superior enemy force has often led to victory. The Central Committee has instructed us to develop guerrilla warfare in much too large an area, extending several thousand li in both length and breadth; this is probably due to an overestimation of our strength. (The Hunan Provincial Committee is already informed regarding the number of guns in the possession of the Fourth Army. Comrade Yuan Desheng has been asked to brief you on this in person, so it is excluded from this report.) For the Red Guards, dispersion is an advantage, and they are now using this method in their operations in all the counties.

#4.1.13. ORGANIZATIONAL QUESTIONS

At present, we are still following the old methods of organization of the Nationalist Party. We are unable to decrypt the Central Committee's Resolution on Military Work, and are unable to guess at the organization of the army of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom.¹⁷ Please prepare another copy of the document and send it to us, so as to facilitate discussion.

#4.1.14. PROPAGANDA DIRECTED AT THE ENEMY FORCES

The two most effective methods in propaganda directed at the enemy forces are to release captured soldiers and to give the wounded medical treatment. Whenever soldiers, platoon commanders, or company or battalion commanders of the enemy forces are captured, we immediately conduct propaganda among them; they are divided into those wishing to stay and those wishing to leave, and the latter are given travelling expenses and set free. This concrete propaganda immediately knocks the bottom out of the enemy's slander that «the Communist bandits kill everyone on sight». Writing about this measure, the Ten-Day Review, the journal of Yang Chisheng's Ninth Division, exclaimed: «How vicious!» The Red Army soldiers show great concern for the prisoners and arrange warm farewells for them, and, at every «Farewell Party for Our New Siblings», the prisoners respond with speeches of heartfelt gratitude. Medical treatment for the enemy wounded also has a great effect. Clever people on the enemy side, like Li Wenbin, have recently imitated us by stopping the killing of prisoners and by giving medical attention to the wounded. Nevertheless, after staying in the enemy camp when captured or wounded, our soldiers rejoin us at the very next engagement, bringing their arms with them, and this has happened twice already. Very few Red Army soldiers have been captured by the enemy, because the Red Army has suffered few defeats in the Border Area. In addition, we do as much written propaganda as possible, for instance, painting slogans. Wherever we go, we cover the walls with them. But we are short of people who can draw and hope the Central Committee and the two Provincial Committees will send us a few.

#4.1.15. MILITARY BASES

As for the military bases, the first base, the Jinggang Mountains, is at the juncture of four counties: Ninggang, Lingxian, Suichuan, and Yongxin. The distance between Maoping on the northern slope in Ninggang County and Huang'ao on the southern slope in Suichuan is 90 li [45 kilometres]. The distance between Nashan on the eastern slope in Yongxin County and Shuikou on the western slope in Lingxian is 80 li [40 kilometres]. The circumference measures 550 li [275 kilometres], stretching from Nashan to Longyuankou (both in Yongxin County), Xincheng, Maoping, Dalong (all in Ninggang County), Shidu, Shuikou, Xiaocun (all in Lingxian County), Yingpanxu, Daijiapu, Dafen, Duiziqian, Huang'ao, Wudoujiang, and Che'ao (all in Suichuan County), and back to Nashan. In the mountains, there are paddy fields and villages at Big Well, Small Well, Upper Well, Middle Well, Lower Well, Ciping, Xiazhuang, Xingzhou, Caoping, Bainihu, and Luofu. All these places used to be infested by bandits and deserters, but have now been turned into our base area. Its population is under 2'000, and the yield of unhusked rice is less than 10'000 dan [500 tons], and so the entire grain for the army has to be supplied from Ninggang, Yongxin, and Suichuan Counties. All the strategic passes in the mountains are strongly fortified. Our Red Army hospital, bedding and clothing workshops, ordnance department, and regimental rear offices are all here. At the present moment, grain is being transported to the mountains from Ninggang. Provided we have adequate supplies (grain and money, the most important being money), the enemy can never break in. There is a Defence Committee in the camp, in charge of defence, with Wang Zuo as Chairperson. The second base, the Jiulong Mountains, is at the juncture of the four counties of Ninggang, Yongxin, Lianhua, and Chaling. It is less important than the Jinggang Mountains, but serves as the rearmost base for the local armed forces of the four counties, and it, too, has been fortified. It is essential for an independent Red regime encircled by the White regime to make use of the strategic advantages offered by mountains. Because the enemy is present on all four sides, and we must defend ourselves on all four sides, it would be extremely difficult for the Red independent regime to survive for long when the bourgeois political power is stable without taking advantage of the natural barriers to make up for occasional deficiencies in the supply of troops (for instance, when the enemy's overwhelming numbers present grave dangers).

#4.2. LAND QUESTIONS

#4.2.1. THE LAND SITUATION IN THE BORDER AREA

Roughly speaking, more than 60% of the land belonged to the feudal lords and less than 40% to the peasants. If we distinguish among the different cases, in the Jiangxi sector, landownership was most concentrated in Suichuan County, where about 80% of the land belonged to the feudal lords. Yongxin came next with about 70%. In Ninggang and Lianhua, there were more owner-peasants, but the feudal lords still owned the bulk of the land, that is, about 60% of the total, while the peasants owned only 40%. In the Hunan sector, about 70% of the land in both Chaling and Lingxian Counties belonged to the feudal lords.

#4.2.2. THE QUESTION OF THE MIDDLE CLASS

Given this land situation, it is possible to win the support of the majority for the confiscation and redistribution of all the land.¹⁸ The rural population is roughly divided into three classes: the class of big and middle feudal lords, the middle class of small feudal lords and rich peasants, and the class of middle and poor peasants. Within the middle class, the interests of the rich peasants are often interwoven with those of the small feudal lords. The land of the rich peasants forms only a small percentage of the total, yet, if the land of the small feudal lords is counted in, the amount is considerable. Probably, this is more or less the case throughout the country. The land policy which has been adopted in the Border Area is complete confiscation and thorough distribution; consequently, in the Red area, the big and middle feudal class and the middle class are both being attacked. Such is the policy, but, in its actual execution, we have met with a great deal of obstruction from the middle class. In the early days of the revolution, the middle class ostensibly capitulated to the poor peasant class, but, in reality, they exploited their traditional social position and clan authority to intimidate the poor peasants for the purpose of delaying the distribution of land. When higher-level political authorities put pressure on them until no further delay was possible, they concealed their actual holdings, or retained the good land and gave up the poor land. In this period, the poor peasants, having long been trampled down and feeling that the victory of the revolution was uncertain, frequently yielded to the middle class and dared not take vigorous action. It is taken against the middle class in the villages only when the revolution is on the upsurge, for instance, when political power has been conquered in one or more counties, the reactionary army has suffered several defeats, and the prowess of the Red Army has been repeatedly demonstrated. The most serious instances of delay in land distribution and concealment of landholdings occurred in the southern section of Yongxin County, where the middle class was the largest. The actual land distribution in this area was carried out only after the Red Army won its great victory at Longyuankou on the 23rd of June and the district government punished several people for delaying distribution. But, as the feudal family system prevails in every county, and as all the families in a village or group of villages belong to a single clan, it will be quite a long time before people become conscious of their class and clan sentiment is overcome in the villages. In the countryside, where clan organizations prevail, the most troublesome people are not the evil gentry, but the middle class. This is the biggest problem.

#4.2.3. THE DEFECTION OF THE MIDDLE CLASS UNDER THE WHITE TERROR

Having been under attack during the revolutionary upsurge, the middle class deserted to the enemy as soon as the White terror struck. In Yongxin and Ninggang, it was precisely the small feudal lords and rich peasants who led the reactionary troops in setting fire to the houses of revolutionary peasants. On the instructions of the reactionaries, they burned down houses and made arrests, and quite brazenly, too. In September, when the Red Army returned to the area of Ninggang, Xincheng, Gucheng, and Longshi, several thousand peasants fled with the reactionaries to Yongxin, because they were duped by the reactionary propaganda that the Communists would kill them. It was only after we had conducted propaganda to the effect that «peasants who have defected will not be killed» and «peasants who have defected are welcome to come back to reap their crops» that some of them slowly came back.

#4.2.4. KEEPING A FIRM HOLD ON THE MIDDLE CLASS

When the revolution is at a low ebb in the country as a whole, the most difficult problem in our areas is to keep a firm hold on the middle class. The main reason for betrayal by this class is that it has received too heavy a blow from the revolution. But, when there is a revolutionary upsurge in the country as a whole, the poor peasant class has something to rely on and becomes bolder, while the middle class has something to fear and dare not get out of hand. When the war between Li Zongren and Tang Shengzhi spread to Hunan, the small feudal lords in Chaling tried to placate the peasants, and some even sent them pork as a New Year gift (though by then the Red Army had already withdrawn from Chaling to Suichuan). But, after the war ended, no one ever heard of such things again. Now that there is a nationwide tide of counter-revolution, the middle class in the White areas, having suffered heavy blows, has attached itself almost wholly to the big feudal class, and the poor peasant class has become isolated. This is indeed a very serious problem.¹⁹

#4.2.5. THE PRESSURE OF DAILY LIFE AS A CAUSE OF THE DEFECTION OF THE MIDDLE CLASS

The Red and the White areas are now facing each other like two countries at war. Owing to the tight enemy blockade and to our mishandling of the small bourgeoisie, trade between the two areas has almost entirely ceased; necessities, such as salt, cloth, and medicines, are scarce and costly, and agricultural products such as timber, tea, and oil cannot be sent out, so that the peasants' cash in come is cut off and the people as a whole are affected. Poor peasants are more able to bear such hardships, but the middle class will go over to the big feudal class when it can bear them no longer. This economic problem is extremely serious. Unless the splits and wars within the feudal class and among the warlords in China continue, and unless a nationwide revolutionary situation develops, the small independent Red regimes will come under great economic pressure, and it is doubtful whether they will be able to last. For not only is such economic strain intolerable to the middle class, but, some day, it will prove too much even for the workers, poor peasants, and Red Army soldiers. In the counties of Yongxin and Ninggang, there was at one time no salt for cooking, and supplies of cloth and medicines, not to mention other things, were entirely cut off. Now, because we are not in a high tide of counter-revolution, salt can be had again, but is very expensive. Cloth and medicines are still unobtainable. Timber, tea, and oil, which are all produced abundantly in Ninggang, western Yongxin, and northern Suichuan (all within our areas at present), cannot be sent out.²⁰ The shortage of cash is extremely acute. If the captured evil gentry do not send us money, we have no money to use. All this poses an enormous problem.

#4.2.6. THE CRITERION FOR LAND DISTRIBUTION

The township is taken as the unit for land distribution. In hillier regions with less farm land, for instance, in the Xiaojiang district of Yongxin, three or four townships were sometimes taken as the unit, but such cases were extremely rare. All the inhabitants, regardless of gender and age, received equal shares. A change has now been made in accordance with the Central Committee's plan, whereby labour-power is taken as the criterion, so that a person with labour-power is allotted twice as much land as one without.²¹

#4.2.7. THE QUESTION OF CONCESSIONS TO THE OWNER-PEASANTS

This has not yet been discussed in detail. Among the owner-peasants, the rich peasants have requested that productive capacity should be taken as the criterion, that is, that those with more people and capital (such as farm implements) should be allotted more land. They feel that neither equal distribution nor distribution according to labour-power is to their advantage. They have indicated that they are willing to put in more effort, which, coupled with the use of their capital, would enable them to raise bigger crops. They will not like it if they are allotted the same amount of land as everybody else and their special efforts and extra capital are ignored (left unused). Land distribution here is still being carried out in the way laid down by the Central Committee. But this question deserves further discussion, and a report will be submitted when conclusions are reached.

#4.2.8. THE LAND TAX

In Ninggang, the tax rate is 20% of the crop, or 5% more than the rate fixed by the Central Committee; it is inadvisable to make any change now, as collection is already under way, but the rate will be reduced next year. Then there are the sections of Suichuan, Lingxian and Yongxin under our regime, which are all hilly areas, and where the peasants are so poverty-stricken that any taxation is inadvisable. We have to rely on expropriating the local tyrants in the White areas to cover the expenses of the government and the Red Guards. As for the provisioning of the Red Army, rice is obtained for the time being from the land tax in Ninggang, while cash is obtained solely from expropriation of the local tyrants. During our guerrilla operations in Suichuan in October, we collected more than 10'000 yuan, which will last us some time, and we shall see what can be done when it is spent.

#4.3. QUESTIONS OF THE COUNCIL POWER

#4.3.1. THE COUNCIL POWER AT THE COUNTY, DISTRICT, AND TOWNSHIP LEVELS IN THE BORDER AREA

The Council Power has been established everywhere in the Border Area at county, district, and township levels, but more in name than in reality. The majority of the masses of workers and peasants, and even of Party members, have not yet understood the idea of the Council Power. In many places, there is no council of workers', peasants', and soldiers' deputies. The executive committees of the township, district, or even county governments were invariably elected at some kind of mass meeting. But mass meetings called on the spur of the moment can neither discuss questions nor help in training the masses politically, and, what is more, they are only too apt to be manipulated by intellectuals or careerists. The greatest error regarding the bodies of political power in many localities in the Border Area consists in ignorance of what is meant by a council, ignorance of the fact that the council of workers', peasants', and soldiers' deputies is the supreme permanent body of political power, and the executive committee merely the body in charge of day-to-day affairs when the council is not in session. Some places do have a council, but it is regarded merely as a temporary body for electing the executive committee; once the election is over, authority is monopolized by the committee and the council is never heard of again. Not that there are no councils of workers', peasants', and soldiers' deputies worthy of the name, but they are very few. The reason is the lack of propaganda and education concerning this new political system. The evil feudal practice of arbitrary dictation is so deeply rooted in the minds of the people and even of the ordinary Party members that it cannot be swept away at once; when anything crops up, they choose the easy way and have no liking for the bothersome democratic system. Democratic centralism can be widely and effectively practised in mass organizations only when its efficacy is demonstrated in revolutionary struggle and the masses understand that it is the best means of mobilizing their forces and is of the utmost help in their struggle. We are drafting a detailed organic law for the councils at all levels (based on the outline drawn up by the Central Committee) in order gradually to correct previous mistakes. In the Red Army, councils of soldiers' deputies are now being established on a permanent basis and at all levels, so as to correct the mistake of having only councils and not congresses of soldiers' deputies.

#4.3.2. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES AT ALL LEVELS

At present, all the masses of the people know the «council government of workers, peasants, and soldiers». In Ninggang, they call it the «-ai» [from suweiai, meaning council] government for short. (In the dialect of settlers from other provinces, we use the same character; the «-ai» government means «our government»). In some other places, it is known in a truncated form as the «su-» government. What they generally understand by these names is the executive committee, because they are still unaware of the powers of the council, and think that the executive committee alone is the real power. Such an attitude is not universal. An executive committee without a council behind it often acts without regard for the views of the masses, and there are instances everywhere of hesitation and compromise on the confiscation and redistribution of land, of squandering or embezzling funds, and of recoiling before the White forces or fighting only halfheartedly. In addition, the committee seldom meets in full session, all business being decided and handled by its standing committee. In the district and township governments, even the standing committee rarely meets, and business is decided and handled separately by the four individuals who work in the office, namely, the chairperson, secretary, treasurer, and commander of the Red Guards (or insurrectionary detachment). Thus, democratic centralism has not become a regular practice, even in the work of the government.

#4.3.3. THE QUESTION OF SMALL-BOURGEOIS CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT COMMITTEES

In the early days, the small feudal lords, rich peasants, and intellectuals scrambled to get on to government committees, especially at the township level. Wearing red ribbons and feigning enthusiasm, they wormed their way into the government committees by trickery and seized control of everything, relegating the poor-peasant members to a minor role. They can be cleared out only when they are unmasked in the course of struggle and the poor peasants assert themselves. Though not widespread, such a state of affairs exists in quite a number of places.

#4.3.4. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE PARTY AND THE GOVERNMENT

Although the Party does not order the government bodies around, neither does it realize the importance of respecting the independence of government bodies. The Party enjoys immense prestige and authority among its membership and the masses, the government much less. The reason is that, for the sake of convenience, the Party handles many things directly and brushes aside the government bodies. There are many such instances. In some places, there are no leading Party members' groups in the government organizations, while, in others, they exist, but are not functioning properly. From now on, the Party must carry out its task of giving leadership to the government; with the exception of propaganda, the Party's policies and the measures it recommends must be carried out through the government organizations. The Nationalist Party's wrong practice of directly imposing orders on the government must be avoided.

#4.3.5. THE SUPREME COUNCIL

We proclaimed the Council Government of Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers of the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area as early as May, but, due to time pressure, it was far from perfect. We have now decided to reshuffle the Border Area Council and its Executive Committee, which will be the highest body of political border in the Border Area.

#4.4. QUESTIONS OF PARTY ORGANIZATION

#4.4.1. THE STRUGGLE AGAINST OPPORTUNISM

It may be said that, around the time of the 21st of May Incident, the Party organizations in the Border Area counties were controlled by opportunists. When the counter-revolution set in, there was very little resolute struggle. In October last year, when the Red Army (the First Regiment of the First Division of the First Army of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army) arrived in the Border Area counties, only a few Party member who had gone into hiding were left and the Party organizations had been entirely destroyed by the enemy. The period from last November to April was one of rebuilding the Party, and the period since May has been one of great expansion. But, in the last 12 months, manifestations of opportunism continued to be widespread. On the approach of the enemy, some members, lacking the will to fight, hid in remote hills, which they called «lying in ambush». Other members, though very active, resorted to blind uprising. These were both expression of small-bourgeois ideology. After a long period of tempering through struggle and of inner-Party education, such things have become less frequent. In the past year, the same small-bourgeois ideology also existed in the Red Army. On the approach of the enemy, either reckless battle or precipitate flight would be proposed. Often, both ideas emanated from the same individual in the course of the discussions on what military action to take. This opportunist ideology has been gradually corrected through prolonged inner-Party struggle and through lessons learned from actual events, for instance, from the losses incurred in reckless battle and the reverses suffered during precipitate flight.

#4.4.2. LOCALISM

The economy in the Border Area is agricultural, with some places still in the age of the hand-pestle (in the hilly regions, the wooden pestle is still in general use for husking rice, while, in the plains, there are many stone pestles). The unit of social organization everywhere is the clan, consisting of people having the same family name. In the Party organizations in the villages, it often happens that a branch meeting virtually becomes a clan meeting, since branches consist of members bearing the same family name and living close together. In these circumstances, it is very hard indeed to build a «militant Majoritarian Party». Such members do not quite understand when they are told that the Communists draw no sharp line of demarcation between one nation and another or between one province and another, or that a sharp line should not be drawn between different counties, districts, and townships. Localism exists to a serious extent in the relations between counties and even between districts and townships within the same county. In eliminating localism, reasoning can at best produce only limited results, and it takes White oppression, which is by no means localized, to do much more. For instance, it is only when counter-revolutionary «joint suppression» campaigns by the two provinces make the people share a common lot in struggle that their localism is gradually broken down. Localism is declining as a result of many such lessons.

#4.4.3. THE QUESTION OF THE NATIVE INHABITANTS AND THE SETTLERS

There is another peculiar feature in the border counties, namely, the rift between the native inhabitants and the settlers. A very wide rift has long existed between the native inhabitants and the settlers, whose ancestors came from the north several hundred years ago; their traditional feuds are deep-seated, and they sometimes erupt in violent clashes. The settlers, numbering several millions, live in a zone extending from the Fujian-Guangdong border all the way along the Hunan-Jiangxi border to southern Hubei. These settlers, who live in the hilly regions, have been oppressed by the native inhabitants in the plains and have never had any political rights. They welcomed the national revolution of the past two years, thinking that the day had come for them to raise their heads. But, unfortunately, the revolution failed, and they continue to be oppressed by the native inhabitants. Within our own area, the problem of the native inhabitants and the settlers exists in Ninggang, Suichuan, Lingxian, and Chaling, and is most serious in Ninggang. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, the revolutionaries among the native inhabitants of Ninggang, together with the settlers, overthrew the political power of the native feudal lords and gained control of the whole county in 1926-27. In June last year, the Jiangxi government under Zhu Peide turned against the revolution; in September, the feudal lords acted as guides for Zhu's troops in the «suppression» campaign against Ninggang, and once again stirred up the conflict between the native inhabitants and the settlers. In theory, this rift between the native inhabitants and the settlers ought not to extend into the exploited classes of workers and peasants, much less into the Communist Party. But it does, and it persists by force of long historical tradition. Here is an example. After the August defeat in the Border Area, when the native feudal lords returned to Ninggang, bringing with them the reactionary troops and spreading the rumour that the settlers were going to massacre the native inhabitants, most of the native peasants defected, put on white ribbons, and guided the White troops in burning down houses and searching the hills. And, when the Red Army routed the White troops in October and November, the native peasants fled with the reactionaries, and their property in turn was seized by the settler-peasants. This situation, reflected in the Party, often leads to senseless conflicts. Our solution is, on the one hand, to announce that «peasants who have defected will not be killed» and «peasants who have defected will also be given land when they return», in order to help them shake off the influence of the feudal lords and return home without misgivings (many of them have already done so); on the other hand, it is to get our county government to order the restoration by settler-peasants of any property they have seized, and to post notices that the native peasants will be protected. Inside the Party, the causes of differences must be eliminated, and education must be intensified to ensure unity between these two sections of the membership.

#4.4.4. THE DEFECTION OF THE CAREERISTS

During the revolutionary upsurge (in June), many careerists took advantage of the Party's open recruitment of members and sneaked into the Party, with the result that the membership in the border area rapidly rose to more than 10'000. Since the directors of the branches and district committees were mostly new members, good inner-Party education was out of the question. As soon as the White terror struck, the careerists defected and acted as guides for the counter-revolutionaries in rounding up our comrades, and the Party organizations in the White areas mostly collapsed.

#4.4.5. THE PARTY PURGE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF UNDERGROUND ORGANIZATIONS

After September, the Party carried out a drastic house cleaning and set strict class qualifications for membership. All the Party organizations in Yongxin and Ninggang Counties were dissolved, and a re-registration was undertaken. Though greatly reduced in numbers, the membership has gained in fighting capacity. All Party organizations used to be in the open, thus completely neglecting the importance of secret work, but, since September, underground organizations have been built up to prepare the Party for carrying on its activities when the reactionaries come. At the same time, we have been making every effort to penetrate into the White areas and operate inside the enemy camp. In some areas, this has begun to show some results. But, in the nearby towns, the foundations have not yet been laid for Party organization. The reasons are that, first, the enemy is stronger in the towns, and, second, our army hurt the interests of the small bourgeoisie too much during its occupation of the towns, slowing down business, and causing the handicraftspeople to cease working, so that it is difficult for Party members to keep a foothold there. We are now correcting these mistakes and doing our best to build Party organizations in the towns, but so far without much success.

#4.4.6. THE PARTY'S LEADING BODIES

The branch executive has been renamed the branch committee. Above the branch, there is the district committee, and, above that, the county committee. Where there are special circumstances, a special district committee is formed between the district and the county levels, as, for instance, the Beixiang Special District Committee and the South-Eastern Special District Committee in Yongxin County. In the Border Area, there are altogether five county committees, in Ninggang, Yongxin, Lianhua, Suichuan, and Lingxian. There used to be a county committee in Chaling, but, as the work there did not take root, most of the organizations formed last winter and this spring have been crushed by the Whites; consequently, for the last six months, we have been able to work only in the hilly regions near Ninggang and Yongxin, and so the Chaling County Committee has been changed into a special district committee. Comrades were sent to Youxian and Anren Counties, which can be reached only via Chaling, but they have returned without accomplishing anything. The Wan'an County Committee was cut off from us by the Whites for more than six months after its joint meeting with us in Suichuan in January, and it was not until September, when the Red Army reached Wan'an in a guerrilla operation, that we resumed contact. According to a letter from the Wan'an County Party Committee, it lost its previous nine district committees and all its 120 guns. At present, our organizations exist only in the Guards Regiment. Our comrades there have taken some of the guns. One battalion of the Red Army guerrilla forces reached a point close to the Wan'an county town, and then returned, after the responses previously arranged from within the city and from other places totally failed to materialize. From Wan'an, 80 revolutionary peasants returned with our soldiers to the Jinggang Mountains and were organized as a detachment of the Wan'an Red Guards, with ten guns. There is no Party organization in Anfu. The County Committee of Ji'an, which borders on Yongxin, has got in touch with us only twice and has given us no help, which is very strange. In the Shatian area of Guidong County, land distribution was carried out on two occasions, in March and in August, and Party organizations have been built up and placed under the Southern Hunan Special Committee with its centre at Shiertong in Longxi. Above the county committees, there is the Special Committee of the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area. On the 20th of May, the First Party Congress of the Border Area was held at Maoping in Ninggang County, and it elected 23 people as members of the First Special Committee, with Mao Zedong as secretary. In July, the Hunan Provincial Committee sent over Yang Kaiming, and he became acting secretary. In September, Yang fell ill, and Tan Zhenlin took his place. In August, when the major detachment of the Red Army had gone to southern Hunan and the White forces were pressing hard on the Border Area, we held an emergency meeting at Yongxin. In October, after the Red Army's return to Ninggang, the Second Party Congress of the Border Area was held at Maoping. In its three-day session beginning on the 4th of October, it adopted a number of resolutions, including The Political Problems and the Tasks of the Border Area Party Organization, and elected the following 19 people as members of the Second Special Committee: Tan Zhenlin, Zhu De, Chen Yi, Long Chaoqing, Zhu Changjie, Liu Tianqian, Yuan Panzhu, Tan Sicong, Tan Bing, Li Quefei, Song Yiyue, Yuan Wencai, Wan Zuonong, Chen Zhengren, Mao Zedong, Wan Xixian, Wang Zuo, Yang Kaiming, and He Tingying. A standing committee of five was formed, with Tan Zhenlin (a worker) as secretary and Chen Zhengren (an intellectual) as deputy secretary. The Sixth Party Congress of the Red Army was held on the 14th of November, and it elected an Army Committee of 23 members, five of them forming a standing committee with Zhu De as secretary. Both the Border Area Special Committee and the Army Committee are subordinate to the Front Committee. The Front Committee was reorganized on the 6th of November, with the following five members designated by the Central Committee: Mao Zedong, Zhu De, the secretary of the local Party headquarters (Tan Zhenlin), a worker comrade (Song Qiaosheng,) and a peasant comrade (Mao Kewen), with Mao Zedong as secretary. For the time being, this committee has set up a secretariat, a propaganda section, an organization section, a labour movement commission, and a military affairs commission (that is, the one elected by the Party congress in the Red Army mentioned above). Now that it has been established, the Front Committee is in charge of the local Party organizations. It is necessary to retain the Special Committee, because sometimes the Front Committee has to move about with the troops. In our opinion, the question of proletarian ideological leadership is very important. It can almost be said that the Party organizations in the Border Area counties, which are composed almost exclusively of peasants, will go astray without the ideological leadership of the proletariat. Besides paying close attention to the labour movement in the county towns and other big towns in the countryside, we should increase the workers' representation in the government bodies. The proportion of workers and poor peasants should also be increased in the leading bodies of the Party at all levels, and Party members from among the workers, poor peasants, and soldiers should join the leadership of the local Party and military bodies. We have paid attention to this point during the past year, and the proportion of workers and peasants in local Party leadership has gradually increased. Soldiers' participation in Red Army bodies at all levels is also relatively satisfactory. The only thing we need to do is further to increase their quantity and pay attention to their quality, so that they may take «real control», and gradually divest themselves of small-bourgeois consciousness, becoming truly pure.

#4.5. THE QUESTION OF THE CHARACTER OF THE REVOLUTION

#4.5.1. THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL'S RESOLUTION ON CHINA

We fully agree with the Communist International's resolution on China. There is no doubt that China is still at the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The programme for a thorough democratic revolution in China comprises, externally, the overthrow of imperialism, so as to achieve complete national liberation and unification, and, internally, the elimination of the power and influence of the comprador class in the cities, the completion of the agrarian revolution in order to abolish feudal relations in the villages, and the overthrow of the government of the warlords, which is a metamorphosed form of the political organization of the evil gentry. We must go through the process of such a democratic revolution before we can lay a real foundation for the transition to socialism. In the past year, we have fought in many places and are keenly aware that the revolutionary tide is on the ebb in the country as a whole. While the Council Power has been established in a few small areas, in the country as a whole, the people lack the ordinary democratic rights, the workers, the peasants, and even the bourgeois democrats do not have freedom of speech or assembly, and the worst crime is to join the Communist Party. Wherever the Red Army goes, the masses are cold and aloof, and only after our propaganda do they slowly move into action. Whatever enemy units we face, there are hardly any cases of mutiny or desertion to our side, and we have to fight it out. This holds even for the enemy's Sixth Army, which recruited the greatest number of «rebels» after the 21st of May Incident. This cannot be called an insurrection, it is merely a military struggle for territory. We have an acute sense of our isolation, which we keep hoping will end. Only by launching a political and economic struggle for democracy, which will also involve the urban small bourgeoisie, can we turn the revolution into a seething tide that will surge through the country. Consequently, the resolution of the International is entirely correct.

#4.5.2. OUR POLICY TOWARD THE SMALL BOURGEOISIE

Up to February this year, we applied our policy toward the small bourgeoisie fairly well. In March, the representative of the Southern Hunan Special Committee arrived in Ninggang and criticized us for having leaned to the Right, for having done too little burning and killing, and for having failed to carry out the so-called policy of «turning the small bourgeois into proletarians and then forcing them into the revolution», whereupon the leadership of the Front Committee was reorganized and the policy was changed. In April, after the whole of our army arrived in the Border Area, there was still not much burning and killing, but the expropriation of the middle merchants in the towns and the collection of compulsory contributions from the small feudal lords and rich peasants in the countryside were rigorously enforced. The slogan of «All factories to the workers!», put forward by the Southern Hunan Special Committee, was also given wide publicity. This «Far-Left» policy of attacking the small bourgeoisie drove most of them to the side of the feudal lords, with the result that they put on white ribbons and opposed us. With the gradual change of this policy, the situation has been steadily improving. Good results have been achieved in Suichuan in particular, for the small merchants in the county town and other market towns no longer fight shy of us, and quite a few speak well of the Red Army. The fairs in Gelin and Shangfeng (held every three days at noon) attract some 20'000 people, an attendance which breaks all previous records. This is proof that our policy is now correct. The feudal lords imposed very heavy taxes and levies on the people; the Pacification Guards²² of Suichuan levied five toll charges along the 70-li [35-kilometre] road from Huang'ao to Caolin, no farm produce being exempt. We crushed the Pacification Guards and abolished these tolls, thus winning the support of all the peasants as well as of the small and middle merchants.

#4.5.3. OUR POLITICAL PROGRAMME

The Central Committee wants us to issue a political programme which takes into account the interests of the small bourgeoisie, and we for our part propose that the Central Committee work out, for general guidance, a programme and a slogan for the whole democratic revolution which takes into account the workers' interests, the agrarian revolution, and national liberation.

#4.5.4. MILITARY WORK

A special characteristic of the revolution in China, a country with a predominantly agricultural economy, is the use of military action to develop uprisings. We recommend that the Central Committee should devote great effort to military work. The most important form of military work is inside the enemy armies. The development of the Red army remains secondary at present.

#4.6. THE QUESTION OF THE LOCATION OF OUR INDEPENDENT REGIME

The area stretching from northern Guangdong along the Hunan-Jiangxi border into southern Hubei lies entirely within the Luoxiao Mountain Range. We have traversed the whole range, and a comparison of its different sections shows that the middle section, with Ninggang as its centre, is the most suitable for our armed independent regime. The northern section has terrain which is less suitable for our taking either the offensive or the defensive, and it is too close to the enemy's big political centres. Besides, stationing large forces in the area of Liuyang, Liling, Pingxiang, and Tonggu would involve a considerable risk, unless we plan a quick seizure of Changsha or Wuhan. The southern section has better terrain than the northern, but our mass basis there is not as good as in the middle section, nor can we exert as great a political influence on Hunan and Jiangxi from it as we can from the middle section, from which any move can affect the lower river valleys of the two provinces. The middle section has the following advantages:

• First, a mass basis, which we have been cultivating for more than a year.
• Second, a fairly good basis for the Party organizations.
• Third, local armed forces which have been built up for more than a year and are well experienced in struggle — a rare achievement — and which, coupled with the Fourth Red Army, will prove indestructible in the face of any enemy force.
• Fourth, an excellent military base, the Jinggang Mountains, and bases for our local armed forces in all the counties.
• Fifth, the influence it can exert on the two provinces and on the lower valleys of their rivers, an influence endowing it with much more political importance than that possessed by southern Hunan or southern Jiangxi, the influence of either of which can reach out only to its own province, or only to the upper river valley and the hinterland of its own province.

The disadvantage of the middle section is that, since it has long been under the independent regime and is confronted by the enemy's large «encirclement and suppression» forces, its economic problems, especially the shortage of cash, are extremely difficult.

As for a plan of action here, the Hunan Provincial Committee advocated three different plans within a few weeks in June and July. First, Yuan Desheng came with a letter and approved our plan to establish political power in the middle section of the Luoxiao Mountain Range. Then, Du Xiujing and Yang Kaiming came with another letter and urged that the Red Army should move towards southern Hunan without the least hesitation and leave a force of only 200 rifles behind to defend the Border Area together with the Red Guards — this, they said, was the «absolutely correct» policy. The third time, barely ten days later, Yuan Desheng came again with a letter which, besides rebuking us at great length, urged that the Red Army should set out for eastern Hunan; this was again described as the «absolutely correct» policy, to be carried out «without the least hesitation». These rigid directives put us in a real dilemma, because failure to comply would be tantamount to disobedience, while compliance would mean certain defeat. When the second message came, the Army Committee, the Border Area Special Committee, and the Yongxin County Committee of the Party met in a joint session and decided against carrying out the Provincial Committee's directives, as it was considered dangerous to move toward southern Hunan. But, a few days later, Du Xiujing and Yang Kaiming -- persisting in the Provincial Party Committee's plan, taking advantage of the 29th Regiment's homesickness, and using the Provincial Committee's directives as an excuse -- dragged the Red Army off to attack the county town of Chenzhou, thus bringing defeat both to the Border Area and to the Red Army. The Red Army lost about half its soldiers, and countless houses were burned down and innumerable people massacred in the Border Area, county after county fell to the enemy, and some of them have not been recovered to this day. As for moving to eastern Hunan, it was certainly inadvisable for the main forces of the Red Army to do so unless there was a split among the ruling feudal lords of Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi Provinces. If we had not advanced on southern Hunan in July, we would not only have averted the August defeat in the Border Area, but we could also have exploited the fighting between the Nationalist Party's Sixth Army and Wang Jun's Nationalist forces in Zhangshu, Jiangxi Province, to crush the enemy forces in Yongxin, overrun Ji'an and Anfu, and make it possible for our advanced guard to reach Pingxiang and establish contact with the Fifth Red Army in the northern section of the Luoxiao mountain range. Even if all that had happened, the proper place for our general headquarters should have still been Ninggang, and only guerrilla forces should have been dispatched to eastern Hunan. Since fighting had not broken out among the feudal lords and since formidable enemy forces were still in Pingxiang, Chaling, and Youxian on the Hunan border, we would have been giving the enemy their chance if we had moved our main forces northward. The Central Committee asked us to consider an advance on eastern or on southern Hunan, but either course was very dangerous; although the proposed expedition to eastern Hunan has not been carried out, the expedition to southern Hunan has proved a failure. One false move, and the whole game is lost. The Fifth Army suffered defeat for loss of contact between the Border Area in southern Hunan and Pingxiang and Liuyang. Anyuan also suffered setbacks. This painful experience is always worth remembering.

We are not yet in a period when the regime of the feudal class has split up, and the «suppression» forces of the enemy deployed around the Border Area still number more than ten regiments. But, if we can continue to find ways of getting cash (food and clothing no longer being a big problem), then, with the foundation for our work established in the Border Area, we shall be able to cope with these enemy forces, and even with larger ones. As far as the Border Area is concerned, it would at once suffer devastation, just as it did in August, if the Red Army moved away. Although not all our Red Guards would be wiped out, the Party and our mass basis would receive a crippling blow, and, while there are places in the mountains where we might retain a foothold, in the plains, we would all have to go underground as in August and September. If the Red Army does not move away, then, building on the foundations we already have, we shall be able gradually to expand to surrounding areas, and our prospects will be very bright. If we want to enlarge the Red Army, the only way is to engage the enemy in a prolonged struggle in the vicinity of the Jinggang Mountains where we have a good mass basis, namely, in the counties of Ninggang, Yongxin, Lingxian, and Suichuan, utilizing in this struggle the divergence of interests between the enemy forces of Hunan and Jiangxi Provinces, their need to defend themselves on all sides, and their consequent inability to concentrate their forces. We can gradually enlarge the Red Army by the use of correct tactics, fighting no battle unless we can win it and capture arms and soldiers. With the preparatory work that had already been done among the masses in the Border Area between April and July, the Red Army could undoubtedly have been enlarged in August had its major detachment not made its expedition to southern Hunan. Despite that mistake, the Red Army has returned to the Border Area, where the terrain is favourable and the people are friendly, and the prospects are not bad even now. Only through the determination to fight and stamina in fighting in places such as the Border Area can the Red Army add to its arms and train up good soldiers. The Red Flag has been kept flying in the Border Area for a whole year. It has incurred the bitter hatred of the feudal class of Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi, and indeed of that of the whole country, but it is steadily raising the hopes of the workers, peasants, and soldiers in the surrounding provinces. Consider the soldiers. Because the warlords are making the «bandit-suppression» campaign against the Border Area their major task and are issuing such statements as «a year has been spent and 1'000'000 yuan used up in the effort to suppress the bandits» (Lu Diping), or the Red Army «has 20'000 soldiers with 5'000 rifles» (Wang Jun), the attention of their soldiers and disheartened junior officers is gradually turned toward us, and more and more of them will break away from the enemy to join our ranks, thus providing the Red Army with another source of recruitment. Besides, the fact that the Red Flag has never been lowered in the Border Area shows at once the strength of the Communist Party and the bankruptcy of the ruling classes, and this is of nationwide political significance. Therefore, our contingency plan to «use southern Jiangxi as a retreat» will not be put into effect unless our economic situation worsens to such a degree that southern Jiangxi becomes the only place where we can survive. We might have to go there some time; but it would be entirely for economic rather than political reasons. Politically speaking, we hold, as we have always held, that it is absolutely necessary and correct to build up and expand the Council Power in the middle section of the Luoxiao Mountain Range.

#4.7. COMMUNICATIONS AND OTHER QUESTIONS

It is of crucial importance to establish a body in charge of communications. 200 yuan in gold has been entrusted to Comrades Yuan and Xiao, who will be in full charge of establishing this body. Necessary expenses will be met by us. The body will be located in Pingxiang. Another such body is also required in the Ji'an area; the Jiangxi Provincial Committee will be responsible for it.

When we had almost finished writing this letter, we received a letter from the Central Committee. The copy from Hunan includes Notice No. 47 (on underground organization), although it still does not contain the Resolution on Military Work. In addition, there is also the 15th of August letter from the Hunan Provincial Committee, stating that the messenger had been sent to deliver the Central Committee's letter and notice, but we have never received either of them. We did not receive the three poems either.

We have ready access to newspapers now. We are a lot happier than before, when we could not get hold of a paper for two or three months at a time. We still hope, however, that you will regularly send us analyses of the political situation.

The August southern expeditionary army held a conference of representatives on arrival at Shatian in Guidong. It resolved to ask the Provincial Committee to punish Du Xiujing for his mistakes, since he is the representative of the Provincial Committee.

The Front Committee approves completely Mao Zedong's long letter of August to the Provincial Committee, which is to be forwarded to the Central Committee. Comrade Yuan will again be the messenger.

It is only now that Comrade Yuan Desheng is returning to the Provincial Committee, because he was waiting for the completion of the discussion of the letter from the Central Committee and our reply.

We earnestly request that future directives from higher levels should be based on our reports, rather than on inspectors' biased reports. The inspector who came here in June, Du Xiujing, made his report to the Provincial Committee from a completely false standpoint (200 guns plus the Red Guards were enough to defend the independent regime in the Border Area; the Red Army at that time was conservative; and so on), and, since the Provincial Committee decided to act in accordance with that kind of report, defeat was sure to follow. In addition, future directives from higher levels regarding military action must, above all, not be too rigid. The Central Committee's letter is the most appropriate and leaves us room for manoeuvre, as it orders us to take independent decisions based on current situations. Even more disastrous was that the Hunan Provincial Committee and the Southern Hunan Special Committee believed in the rumours spread by Su Xianjun (a regimental commander expelled from the Party by us, who was a criminal army deserter and informer who later arrested Guo Liang) and He Jie (chief of staff, responsible for the burning and massacre at Chenzhou). Please do not listen to any more irresponsible words in the future.

Yang Kaiming is seriously ill. Wan Xixian is kept here by important tasks and cannot come to southern Hunan.

The Special Committee of the Communist Youth League will report to the Provincial Committee regarding the state of the Youth League. We will not weary you with it here.

There are three copies of this letter. The Hunan Provincial Committee is to forward one to the Central Committee and one to the Jiangxi Provincial Committee. The Ji'an County Committee is to forward one copy to the Jiangxi Provincial Committee, which is to forward it to the Central Committee. Thus, one copy should certainly arrive.

#Secretary Mao Zedong of the Front Committee