Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War

#PUBLICATION NOTE

This edition of Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the following editions:

Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Vol. 1, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.
Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War, in Mao's Road to Power, First English Edition, Vol. 5, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk and London, 1999.

#INTRODUCTION NOTE

This is a textbook written by Comrade Mao Zedong between the autumn and the 12th of December, 1936. It was first published as a separate book in 1941.

Comrade Mao Zedong wrote this work to sum up the experience of the Agrarian Revolutionary War and used it for his lectures at the Red Army College in northern Shaanxi. Only five chapters were completed. The chapters on the strategic offensive, political work, and other problems were left undone, because he was too busy in consequence of the Xi'an Incident. This work, a result of a major inner-Party controversy on military questions during the Agrarian Revolutionary War, gives expression to one line in military affairs as against another. The Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held at Zunyi in January 1935 settled the controversy about the military line, reaffirmed Comrade Mao Zedong's views, and repudiated the erroneous line. In October 1935, the Central Committee moved to northern Shaanxi, and, in December, Comrade Mao Zedong made a report, On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism, in which problems concerning the political line of the Party in the Agrarian Revolutionary War were systematically solved. He wrote this work a year later, in 1936, to explain the problems of strategy in China's revolutionary war in a systematic way.

#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!

#PREFACE TO THE 1941 CHINESE EDITION

#Mao Zedong

#23rd of February, 1941

#★

This small volume was written in the autumn of 1936 as a textbook for the Red Army College of that time. The goal was to synthesize the experience derived from the civil war. It has only five chapters dealing with the strategic offensive, strategic change, political work, and a number of other questions. I did not have time to write more than this. In the past four years, there have only been mimeographed copies. In response to the request of the publishing house of the Military and Political Magazine, it is being printed for the reference of comrades in the Party. The result of a great debate, this expressed the view of one line in opposition to another line and is still useful in the present anti-Japanese war.

#The Author

#23rd of February, 1941

#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!

#PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY IN CHINA'S REVOLUTIONARY WAR

#Mao Zedong

#Autumn-December 1936

#★

#1. HOW TO STUDY WAR

#1.1. THE LAWS OF WAR ARE DEVELOPMENTAL

The laws of war are a problem which anyone directing a war must study and solve.

The laws of revolutionary war are a problem which anyone directing a revolutionary war must study and solve.

The laws of China's revolutionary war are a problem which anyone directing China's revolutionary war must study and solve.

We are now engaged in a war; our war is a revolutionary war; and our revolutionary war is being waged in this semi-colonial and semi-feudal country of China. Therefore, we must study, not only the laws of war in general, but the specific laws of revolutionary war, and the even more specific laws of revolutionary war in China.

It is well known that, when you do anything, unless you understand its actual circumstances, its nature, and its relations to other things, you will not know the laws governing it, or know how to do it, or be able to do it well.

War is the highest form of struggle for resolving contradictions, when they have developed to a certain stage, between classes, nations, States, or political groups, and it has existed ever since the emergence of private property and of classes. Unless you understand the actual circumstances of war, its nature, and its relations to other things, you will not know the laws of war, or know how to direct war, or be able to win victory.

Revolutionary war, whether a revolutionary class war or a revolutionary national war, has its own specific circumstances and nature, in addition to the circumstances and nature of war in general. Therefore, besides the general laws of war, it has specific laws of its own. Unless you understand its specific circumstances and nature, unless you understand its specific laws, you will not be able to direct a revolutionary war and wage it successfully.

China's revolutionary war, whether civil war or national war, is waged in the specific environment of China and so has its own specific circumstances and nature distinguishing it both from war in general and from revolutionary war in general. Therefore, besides the laws of war in general and of revolutionary war in general, it has specific laws of its own. Unless you understand them, you will not be able to win in China's revolutionary war.

Therefore, we must study the laws of war in general, we must also study the laws of revolutionary war, and, finally, we must study the laws of China's revolutionary war.

Some people hold a wrong view, which we refuted long ago. They say that it is enough merely to study the laws of war in general, or, to put it more concretely, that it is enough merely to follow the military manuals published by the reactionary Chinese government or the reactionary military academies in China. They do not see that these manuals give merely the laws of war in general and moreover are wholly copied from abroad, and that if we copy and apply them exactly without the slightest change in form or content, we shall be «cutting the feet to fit the shoes» and be defeated. Their argument is: why should knowledge which has been acquired at the cost of blood be of no use? They fail to see that although we must cherish the earlier experience thus acquired, we must also cherish experience acquired at the cost of our own blood.

Others hold a second wrong view, which we also refuted long ago. They say that it is enough merely to study the experience of revolutionary war in Russia, or, to put it more concretely, that it is enough merely to follow the laws by which the civil war in the Council Union was directed and the military manuals published by Soviet military organizations. They do not see that these laws and manuals embody the specific characteristics of the civil war and the Red Army in the Council Union, and that, if we copy and apply them without allowing any change, we shall also be «cutting the feet to fit the shoes» and be defeated. Their argument is: since our war, like the war in the Council Union, is a revolutionary war, and since the Council Union won victory, how, then, can there be any alternative but to follow the Soviet example? They fail to see that, while we should set special store by the war experience of the Council Union, because it is the most recent experience of revolutionary war and was acquired under the guidance of Lenin and Stalin, we should likewise cherish the experience of China's revolutionary war, because there are many factors that are specific to the Chinese revolution and the Chinese Red Army.

Still others hold a third wrong view, which we likewise refuted long ago. They say that the most valuable experience is that of the Northern Expedition of 1926-27 and that we must learn from it, or, to put it more concretely, that we must imitate the Northern Expedition in driving straight ahead to seize the big cities. They fail to see that, while the experience of the Northern Expedition should be studied, it should not be copied and applied mechanically, because the circumstances of our present war are different. We should take from the Northern Expedition only what still applies today, and work out something of our own in the light of present conditions.

Thus, the different laws for directing different wars are determined by different circumstances of those wars — differences in their time, place, and nature. As regards the time factor, both war and its laws develop; each historical stage has its special characteristics, and hence the laws of war in each historical stage have their special characteristics and cannot be mechanically applied in another stage. As for the nature of war, since revolutionary war and counter-revolutionary war both have their special characteristics, the laws governing them also have their own characteristics, and those applying to one cannot be mechanically transferred to the other. As for the factor of place, since each country or nation, especially a large country or nation, has its own characteristics, the laws of war for each country or nation also have their own characteristics, and here, too, those applying to one cannot be mechanically transferred to the other. In studying the laws for directing wars that occur at different historical stages, that differ in nature and that are waged in different places and by different nations, we must fix our attention on the characteristics and development of each, and must oppose a mechanical approach to the problem of war.

Nor is this all. It signifies progress and development in a commander who is initially capable of commanding only a small formation, if they become capable of commanding a big one. There is also a difference between operating in one locality and in many. It likewise signifies progress and development in a commander who is initially capable of operating only in a locality they know well, if they become capable of operating in many other localities. Owing to technical, tactical, and strategic developments on the enemy side and on our own, the circumstances also differ from stage to stage within a given war. It signifies still more progress and development in a commander who is capable of exercising command in a war at its lower stages, if they become capable of exercising command in its higher stages. A commander who remains capable of commanding only a formation of a certain size, only in a certain locality, and at a certain stage in the development of a war shows that they have made no progress and have not developed. There are some people who, contented with a single skill or a peep-hole view, never make any progress; they may play some role in the revolution at a given place and time, but not a significant one. We need directors of war who can play a significant role. All the laws for directing war develop as history develops and as war develops; nothing is changeless.

#1.2. THE AIM OF WAR IS TO ELIMINATE WAR

War, this monster of mutual slaughter among human beings, will be finally eliminated by the progress of human society, and in the not too distant future, too. But there is only one way to eliminate it, and that is to oppose war with war, to oppose counter-revolutionary war with revolutionary war, to oppose national counter-revolutionary war with national revolutionary war, and to oppose counter-revolutionary class war with revolutionary class war. History knows only two kinds of war, just and unjust. We support just wars and oppose unjust wars. All counter-revolutionary wars are unjust, all revolutionary wars are just. Humanity's era of wars will be brought to an end by our own efforts, and, beyond doubt, the war we wage is part of the final battle. But, also beyond doubt, the war we face will be part of the biggest and most ruthless of all wars. The biggest and most ruthless of unjust counter-revolutionary wars is hanging over us, and the vast majority of humanity will be ravaged unless we raise the banner of a just war. The banner of humanity's just war is the banner of humanity's salvation. The banner of China's just war is the banner of China's salvation. A war waged by the great majority of humanity and of the Chinese people is beyond doubt a just war, a most lofty and glorious undertaking for the salvation of humanity and China, and a bridge to a new era in world history. When human society advances to the point where classes and States are eliminated, there will be no more wars, counter-revolutionary or revolutionary, unjust or just; that will be the era of perpetual peace for humanity. Our study of the laws of revolutionary war springs from the desire to eliminate all wars; herein lies the distinction between us Communists and all the exploiting classes.

#1.3. STRATEGY IS THE STUDY OF THE LAWS OF A WAR SITUATION AS A WHOLE

Wherever there is war, there is a war situation as a whole. The war situation as a whole may cover the entire world, may cover an entire country, or may cover an independent guerrilla zone or an independent major operational front. Any war situation which acquires a comprehensive consideration of its various aspects and stages forms a war situation as as a whole.

The task of the science of strategy is to study those laws for directing a war that govern a war situation as a whole. The task of the science of campaigns and the science of tactics¹ is to study those laws for directing a war that govern a partial situation.

Why is it necessary for the commander of a campaign or a tactical operation to understand the laws of strategy to some degree? Because an understanding of the whole facilitates the handling of the part, and because the part is subordinate to the whole. The view that strategic victory is determined by tactical successes alone is wrong, because it overlooks the fact that victory or defeat in a war is first and foremost a question of whether the situation as a whole and its various stages are properly taken into account. If there are serious defects or mistakes in taking the situation as a whole and its various stages into account, the war is sure to be lost. «One careless move loses the whole game» refers to a move affecting the situation as a whole, a move decisive for the whole situation, and not to a move of a partial nature, a move which is not decisive for the whole situation. As in chess, so in war.

But the situation as a whole cannot be detached from its parts and become independent of them, for it is made up of all its parts. Sometimes certain parts may suffer destruction or defeat without seriously affecting the situation as a whole, because they are not decisive for it. Some defeats or failures in tactical operations or campaigns do not lead to deterioration in the war situation as a whole, because they are not of decisive significance. But the loss of most of the campaigns making up the war situation as a whole, or of one or two decisive campaigns, immediately changes the whole situation. Here, «most of the campaigns» or «one or two campaigns» are decisive. In the history of war, there are instances where defeat in a single battle nullified all the advantages of a series of victories, and there are also instances where victory in a single battle after many defeats opened up a new situation. In those instances, the «series of victories» and the «many defeats» were partial in nature and not decisive for the situation as a whole, while «defeat in a single battle» or «victory in a single battle» played the decisive role. All this explains the importance of taking into account the situation as a whole. What is most important for the person in overall command is to concentrate on attending to the war situation as a whole. The main point is that, according to the circumstances, they should concern themself with the problems of the grouping of their military units and formations, the relations between campaigns, the relations between various operational stages, and the relations between our activities as a whole and the enemy's activities as a whole — all these problems demand their greatest care and effort, and, if they ignore them and immerse themself in secondary problems, they can hardly avoid setbacks.

The relationship between the whole and the part holds, not only for the relationship between strategy and campaign, but also for that between campaign and tactics. Examples are to be found in the relation between the operations of a division and those of its regiments and battalions, and in the relation between the operations of a company and those of its platoons and squads. The commanding officer at any level should centre their attention on the most important and decisive problem or action in the whole situation they are handling, and not on other problems or actions.

What is important or decisive should be determined, not by general or abstract considerations, but according to the concrete circumstances. In a military operation, the direction and point of assault should be selected according to the actual situation of the enemy, the terrain, and the strength of our own forces at the moment. One must see to it that the soldiers do not overeat when supplies are abundant, and take care that they do not go hungry when supplies are short. In the White areas, the mere leakage of a piece of information may cause defeat in a subsequent engagement, but in the Red areas, such leakage is often not a very serious matter. It is necessary for the high commanders to participate personally in certain battles, but not in others. For a military school, the most important question is the selection of a director and instructors and the adoption of a training programme. For a mass meeting, the main thing is mobilizing the masses to attend and putting forward suitable slogans. And so on and so forth. In a word, the principle is to centre our attention on the important links that have a bearing on the situation as a whole.

The only way to study the laws governing a war situation as a whole is to do some hard thinking. For what pertains to the situation as a whole is not visible to the eye, and we can understand it only by hard thinking; there is no other way. But because the situation as a whole is made up of parts, people with experience of the parts, experience of campaigns and tactics, can understand matters of a higher order provided they are willing to think hard. The problems of strategy include the following:

Giving proper consideration to the relation between the enemy and ourselves.
Giving proper consideration to the relation between various campaigns or between various operational stages.
Giving proper consideration to those parts which have a bearing on (are decisive for) the situation as a whole.
Giving proper consideration to the special features contained in the general situation.
Giving proper consideration to the relation between the front and the rear.
Giving proper consideration to the distinction as well as the connection between losses and replacements, between fighting and resting, between concentration and dispersion, between attack and defence, between advance and retreat, between concealment and exposure, between the main attack and supplementary attacks, between assault and containing action, between centralized command and decentralized command, between protracted war and lightning war, between positional war and mobile war, between our own forces and friendly forces, between one military arm and another, between higher and lower levels, between cadres and the rank and file, between old and new soldiers, between senior and junior cadres, between old and new cadres, between Red areas and White areas, between old Red areas and new ones, between the central district and the borders of a given base area, between the warm season and the cold season, between victory and defeat, between large and small troop formations, between the regular army and the guerrilla forces, between destroying the enemy and winning over the masses, between expanding the Red Army and consolidating it, between military work and political work, between past and present tasks, between present and future tasks, between tasks arising from one set of circumstances and tasks arising from another, between fixed fronts and fluid fronts, between civil war and national war, between one historical stage and another, and so on, and so forth.

None of these problems of strategy is visible to the eye, and yet, if we think hard, we can comprehend, grasp, and master them all, that is, we can raise the important problems concerning a war or concerning military operations to the higher plane of principle and solve them. Our task in studying the problems of strategy is to attain this goal.

#1.4. THE IMPORTANT THING IS TO BE GOOD AT LEARNING

Why have we organized the Red Army? For the purpose of defeating the enemy. Why do we study the laws of war? For the purpose of applying them in war.

To learn is no easy matter and to apply what one has learned is even harder. Many people appear impressive when discoursing on military science in classrooms or in books, but when it comes to actual fighting, some win battles and others lose them. Both the history of war and our own experience in war have proved this point. Where then does the crux lie?

In real life, we cannot ask for «ever-victorious generals», who are few and far between in history. What we can ask for is generals who are brave and sagacious and who normally win their battles in the course of a war, generals who combine wisdom with courage. To become both wise and courageous one must acquire a method, a method to be employed in learning as well as in applying what has been learned.

What method? The method is to familiarize ourselves with all aspects of the enemy situation and our own, to discover the laws governing the actions of both sides, and to make use of these laws our own operations.

The military manuals issued in many countries point both to the necessity of a «flexible application of principles according to circumstances» and to the measures to be taken in case of defeat. They point to the former in order to warn a commander against subjectively committing mistakes through too rigid an application of principles, and to the latter in order to enable them to cope with the situation after they have committed subjective mistakes or after unexpected and irresistible changes have occurred in the objective circumstances.

Why are subjective mistakes made? Because the way the forces in a war or a battle are disposed or directed does not fit the conditions of the given time and place, because subjective direction does not correspond to, or is at variance with, the objective conditions; in other words, because the contradiction between the subjective and the objective has not been resolved. People can hardly avoid such situations whatever they are doing, but some people prove themselves more competent than others. As in any job, we demand a comparatively high degree of competence, so, in war, we demand more victories or, conversely, fewer defeats. Here the crux is to bring the subjective and the objective into proper correspondence with each other.

Take an example in tactics. If the point chosen for attack is on one of the enemy's flanks and it is located precisely where their weak spot happens to be, and in consequence the assault succeeds, then the subjective corresponds with the objective, that is, the commander's reconnaissance, judgement, and decision have corresponded with the enemy's actual situation and dispositions. If the point chosen for attack is on another flank or in the centre and the attack hits a snag and makes no headway, then such correspondence is lacking. If the attack is properly timed, if the reserves are used neither too late nor too early, and if all the other dispositions and operations in the battle are such as to favour us and not the enemy, then the subjective direction throughout the battle completely corresponds with the objective situation. Such complete correspondence is extremely rare in a war or a battle, in which the belligerents are groups of live human beings bearing arms and keeping their secrets from each other; this is quite unlike handling inanimate objects or routine matters. But if the direction given by the commander corresponds in the main with the actual situation, that is, if the decisive elements in the direction correspond with the actual situation, then there is a basis for victory.

A commander's correct dispositions stem from their correct decisions, their correct decisions stem from their correct judgements, and their correct judgements stem from a thorough and necessary reconnaissance and from pondering on and piecing together the data of various kinds gathered through reconnaissance. They apply all possible and necessary methods of reconnaissance, and ponder on the information gathered about the enemy's situation, discarding the dross and selecting the essential, eliminating the false and retaining the true, proceeding from the one to the other and from the outside to the inside; then, they take the conditions on their own side into account, and make a study of both sides and their interrelations, thereby forming their judgements, making up their mind, and working out their plans. Such is the complete process of knowing a situation which a military person goes through before they formulate a strategic plan, a campaign plan, or a battle plan. But, instead of doing this, a careless military person bases their military plans on their own wishful thinking, and hence their plans are fanciful and do not correspond with reality. A rash military person relying solely upon enthusiasm is bound to be tricked by the enemy, or lured on by some superficial or partial aspect of the enemy's situation, or swayed by irresponsible suggestions from subordinates that are not based on real knowledge or deep insight, and so they run their head against a brick wall, because they do not know or do not want to know that every military plan must be based on the necessary reconnaissance and on careful consideration of the enemy's situation, their own situation, and their interrelations.

The process of knowing a situation goes on, not only before the formulation of a military plan, but also after. In carrying out the plan, from the moment it is put into effect to the end of the operation, there is another process of knowing the situation, namely, the process of practice. In the course of this process, it is necessary to examine anew whether the plan worked out in the preceding process corresponds with reality. If it does not correspond with reality, or if it does not fully do so, then in the light of our new knowledge, it becomes necessary to form new judgements, make new decisions, and change the original plan, so as to meet the new situation. The plan is partially changed in almost every operation, and sometimes it is even changed completely. A rash person who does not understand the need for such alterations or is unwilling to make them, but who acts blindly, will inevitably run their head against a brick wall.

The above applies to a strategic action, a campaign, or a battle. Provided they are modest and willing to learn, an experienced military person will be able to familiarize themself with the character of their own forces (commanders, fighters, arms, supplies, and so on, and their sum total), with the character of the enemy forces (likewise, commanders, fighters, arms, supplies, and so on, and their sum total) and with all other conditions related to the war, such as politics, economics, geography, and weather; such a military person will have a better grasp in directing a war or an operation and will be more likely to win victories. They will achieve this, because, over a long period of time, they have come to know the situation on the enemy side and their own, discovered the laws of action, and resolved the contradictions between the subjective and the objective. This process of knowing is extremely important; without such a long period of experience, it would be difficult to understand and grasp the laws of an entire war. Neither a beginner nor a person who fights only on paper can become a really able high-ranking commander; only one who has learned through actual fighting in war can do so.

All military laws and military theories, which are in the nature of principles, are the experience of past wars summed up by people in former days or in our own times. We should seriously study these lessons, paid for in blood, which are a heritage of past wars. That is one point. But there is another. We should put these conclusions to the test of our own experience, assimilating what is useful, rejecting what is useless, and adding what is specifically our own. The latter is very important, for otherwise we cannot direct a war.

Reading is learning, but applying is also learning, and the more important kind of learning at that. Our chief method is to learn warfare through warfare. A person who has had no opportunity to go to school can also learn warfare — they can learn through fighting in war. A revolutionary war is a mass undertaking; it is often not a matter of first learning and then doing, but of doing and then learning, for doing is itself learning. There is a gap between the ordinary civilian and the soldier, but it is no Great Wall, and it can be quickly closed, and the way to close it is to take part in revolution, in war. By saying that it is not easy to learn and to apply, we mean that it is hard to learn thoroughly and to apply skilfully. By saying that civilians can very quickly become soldiers, we mean that it is not difficult to cross the threshold. To put the two statements together, we may cite the Chinese adage: «Nothing in the world is difficult for one who sets their mind to it.» To cross the threshold is not difficult, and mastery, too, is possible provided one sets one's mind to the task and is good at learning.

The laws of war, like the laws governing all other things, are reflections in our minds of objective realities; everything outside of the mind is objective reality. Consequently, what has to be learned and known includes the state of affairs on the enemy side and that on our side, both of which should be regarded as the object of study while the mind (the capacity to think) alone is the subject performing the study. Some people are good at knowing themselves and poor at knowing their enemy, and some are the other way around; neither can solve the problem of learning and applying the laws of war. There is a saying in the book of Sun Wu, the great military scientist of ancient China, «Know the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles with no danger of defeat»,² which refers both to the stage of learning and to the stage of application both to knowing the laws of the development of objective reality and to deciding on our own action in accordance with these laws in order to overcome the enemy facing us. We should not take this saying lightly.

War is the highest form of struggle between nations, States, classes, or political groups, and all the laws of war are applied by warring nations, States, classes, or political groups for the purpose of achieving victory for themselves. Unquestionably, victory or defeat in war is determined mainly by the military, political, economic, and natural conditions on both sides. But not by these alone. It is also determined by each side's subjective ability in directing the war. In their endeavour to win a war, a military person cannot overstep the limitations imposed by the material conditions; within these limitations, however, they can and must strive for victory. The stage of action for a military person is built upon objective material conditions, but, on that stage, they can direct the performance of many a drama, full of sound and colour, power and grandeur. Therefore, given the objective material foundations, that is, the military, political, economic, and natural conditions, our Red Army commanders must display their prowess and marshal all their forces to crush the national and class enemies and to transform this evil world. Here is where our subjective ability in directing war can and must be exercised. We do not permit any of our Red Army commanders to become a blundering hothead; we decidedly want every Red Army commander to become a hero who is both brave and wise, who possesses both all-conquering courage and the ability to remain master of the situation throughout the changes and vicissitudes of the entire war. Swimming in the ocean of war, they not only must not flounder, but must make sure of reaching the opposite shore with measured strokes. The laws for directing war constitute the art of swimming in the ocean of war.

So much for our methods.

#2. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA AND CHINA'S REVOLUTIONARY WAR

China's revolutionary war, which began in 1924, has passed through two stages: the first, from 1924 to '27; and the second, from 1927 to '36; the stage of national revolutionary war against Japan will now commence. In all three of its stages this revolutionary war has been, is, and will be fought under the leadership of the Chinese proletariat and its political party, the Communist Party of China. The chief enemies in China's revolutionary war are imperialism and the feudal forces. Although the Chinese bourgeoisie, especially the big bourgeoisie, which is comprador and feudal in character, may take part in the revolutionary war at certain historical junctures, its selfishness and lack of political and economic independence render it both unwilling and unable to lead China's revolutionary war on to the road of complete victory. The masses of China's peasantry and urban small bourgeoisie wish to take an active part in the revolutionary war and to carry it to complete victory. They are the main forces in the revolutionary war, but, being small-scale producers, they are limited in their political worldview (and some of the unemployed masses have Anarchist views), so that they are unable to give correct leadership in the war. Therefore, in an era when the proletariat has already appeared on the political stage, the responsibility for leading China's revolutionary war inevitably falls on the shoulders of the Communist Party of China. In this era, any revolutionary war will definitely end in defeat if it lacks, or runs counter to, the leadership of the proletariat and the Communist Party. Of all the social strata and political groupings in semi-colonial China, the proletariat and the Communist Party are the ones most free from narrow-mindedness and selfishness, are politically the most far-sighted, the best organized, and the readiest to learn with an open mind from the experience of the vanguard class, the proletariat, and its political party throughout the world and to make use of this experience in their own cause. Hence, only the proletariat and the Communist Party can lead the peasantry, the urban small bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie, can overcome the narrow-mindedness of the peasantry and the small bourgeoisie, the destructiveness of the unemployed masses, and also (provided the Communist Party does not err in its policy) the vacillation and lack of thoroughness of the bourgeoisie — and can lead the revolution and the war on to the road of victory.

The revolutionary war of 1924-27 was waged, basically speaking, in conditions in which the international proletariat and the Chinese proletariat and its political party exerted political influence on the Chinese national bourgeoisie and its political parties and entered into political cooperation with them. However, this revolutionary war failed at the critical juncture, first of all, because the big bourgeoisie turned traitor, and, at the same time, because the opportunists within the revolutionary ranks voluntarily surrendered the leadership of the revolution.

The Agrarian Revolutionary War, lasting from 1927 to the present, has been waged under new conditions. The enemy in this war is not imperialism alone, but also the alliance of the big bourgeoisie and the big feudal lords. And the national bourgeoisie has become a tail to the big bourgeoisie. This revolutionary war is led by the Communist Party alone, which has established absolute leadership over it. This absolute leadership is the most important condition enabling the revolutionary war to be carried through firmly to the end. Without it, it is inconceivable that the revolutionary war could have been carried on with such perseverance.

The Communist Party of China has led China's revolutionary war courageously and resolutely, and for 15 long years,³ has demonstrated to the whole nation that it is the people's friend, fighting at all times in the forefront of the revolutionary war in defence of the people's interests and for their freedom and liberation.

By its arduous struggles and by the martyrdom of hundreds of thousands of its heroic members and tens of thousands of its heroic cadres, the Communist Party of China has played a great educative role among hundreds of millions of people throughout the country. The Party's great historic achievements in its revolutionary struggles have provided the prerequisite for the survival and salvation of China at this critical juncture, when it is being invaded by a national enemy; and this prerequisite is the existence of a political leadership enjoying the confidence of the vast majority of the people and chosen by them after long years of testing. Today, the people accept what the Communist Party says more readily than what any other political party says. Were it not for the arduous struggles of the Communist Party of China in the last 15 years, it would be impossible to save China in the face of the new menace of subjugation.

Besides the errors of the Right-wing opportunism of Chen Duxiu⁴ and the «Left-wing» opportunism of Li Lisan,⁵ the Communist Party of China has committed two other errors in the course of the revolutionary war. The first error was the «Left-wing» opportunism of 1931-34,⁶ which resulted in serious losses in the Agrarian Revolutionary War, so that, instead of our defeating the enemy's fifth campaign of «encirclement and suppression», we lost our base areas and the Red Army was weakened. This error was corrected at the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee at Zunyi in January 1935. The second was the Right-wing opportunism of Zhang Guotao in 1935-36,⁷ which grew to such an extent that it undermined the discipline of the Party and of the Red Army and caused serious losses to part of the Red Army's main forces. But this error was also finally rectified, thanks to the correct leadership of the Central Committee and the political consciousness of Party members, commanders, and fighters in the Red Army. Of course all these errors were harmful to our Party, to our revolution and the war, but, in the end, we overcame them, and, in doing so, our Party and our Red Army have tempered themselves and become still stronger.

The Communist Party of China has led and continues to lead the stirring, magnificent, and victorious revolutionary war. This war is not only the banner of China's liberation, but has international revolutionary significance as well. The eyes of the revolutionary people the world over are upon us. In the new stage, the stage of the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war, we shall lead the Chinese revolution to its completion and exert a profound influence on the revolution in the East and in the whole world. Our revolutionary war has proved that we need a correct Marxist military line as well as a correct Marxist political line. 15 years of revolution and war have hammered out such political and military lines. We believe that from now on, in the new stage of the war, these lines will be further developed, filled out, and enriched in new circumstances, so that we can attain our aim of defeating the national enemy. History tells us that correct political and military lines do not emerge and develop spontaneously and tranquilly, but only in the course of struggle. These lines must combat «Left-wing» opportunism on the one hand and Right-wing opportunism on the other. Without combating and thoroughly overcoming these harmful tendencies, which damage the revolution and the revolutionary war, it would be impossible to establish a correct line and win victory in this war. It is for this reason that I often refer to erroneous views in this pamphlet.

#3. CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINA'S REVOLUTIONARY WAR

#3.1. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT

People who do not admit, do not know, or do not want to know that China's revolutionary war has its own characteristics have equated the war waged by the Red Army against the Nationalist forces with war in general or with Russian Civil War. The experience of the Russian Civil War directed by Lenin and Stalin has a worldwide significance. All Communist Parties, including the Communist Party of China, regard this experience and its theoretical summary by Lenin and Stalin as their guide. But this does not mean that we should apply it mechanically to our own conditions. In many of its aspects China's revolutionary war has characteristics distinguishing it from the Russian Civil War. Of course, it is wrong to take no account of these characteristics or deny their existence. This point has been fully borne out in our ten years of war.

Our enemy has made similar mistakes. They did not recognize that fighting against the Red Army required a different strategy and different tactics from those used in fighting other forces. Relying on their superiority in various respects, they took us lightly and stuck to their old methods of warfare. This was the case both before and during their fourth «encirclement and suppression» campaign in 1933, with the result that he suffered a series of defeats. In the Nationalist army, a new approach to the problem was suggested first by the reactionary Nationalist general Liu Weiyuan and then by Tai Yue. Their idea was eventually accepted by Jiang Jieshi. That was how Jiang Jieshi's Officers' Training Corps at Mount Lu⁸ came into being and how the new reactionary military principles⁹ applied in the fifth «encirclement and suppression» campaign were evolved.

But when the enemy changed their military principles to suit operations against the Red Army, there appeared in our ranks a group of people who reverted to the «old ways». They urged a return to ways suited to the general run of things, refused to go into the specific circumstances of each case, rejected the experience gained in the Red Army's history of bloody battles, belittled the strength of imperialism and the Nationalist Party, as well as that of the Nationalist army, and turned a blind eye to the new reactionary principles adopted by the enemy. As a result, all the revolutionary bases except the Shaanxi-Gansu Border Area were lost, the Red Army was reduced from 300'000 to a few tens of thousands, the membership of the Communist Party of China fell from 300'000 to a few tens of thousands, and the Party organizations in the Nationalist areas were almost all destroyed. In short, we paid a severe penalty, which was historic in its significance. This group of people called themselves Marxist-Leninists, but actually they had not learned an iota of Marxism-Leninism. Lenin said that the most essential thing in Marxism, the living soul of Marxism, is the concrete analysis of concrete conditions.¹⁰ That was precisely the point these comrades of ours forgot.

Hence, one can see that, without an understanding of the characteristics of China's revolutionary war, it is impossible to direct it and lead it to victory.

#3.2. WHAT ARE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINA'S REVOLUTIONARY WAR?

What, then, are the characteristics of China's revolutionary war?

I think there are four main ones.

The first is that China is a vast, semi-colonial country which is unevenly developed politically and economically and which has gone through the Revolution of 1924-27.

This characteristic indicates that it is possible for China's revolutionary war to develop and attain victory. We already pointed this out (at the First Party Congress of the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area),¹¹ when, in late 1927 and early '28, soon after guerrilla warfare was started in China, some comrades in the Jinggang Mountains in the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area raised the question: «How long can we keep the Red Flag flying?» For this was a most fundamental question. Without answering this question of whether China's revolutionary base areas and the Chinese Red Army could survive and develop, we could not have advanced a single step. The Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1928 again gave the answer to the question. Since then, the Chinese revolutionary movement has had a correct theoretical basis.

Let us now analyse this characteristic.

China's political and economic development is uneven — a weak capitalist economy coexists with a preponderant semi-feudal economy; a few modern industrial and commercial cities coexist with a vast, stagnant countryside; several million industrial workers coexist with several hundred millions of peasants and handicraftspeople labouring under the old system; big warlords controlling the central government coexist with small warlords controlling the provinces; two kinds of reactionary armies, the so-called Central Army under Jiang Jieshi and «miscellaneous troops» under the warlords in the provinces, exist side by side; a few railways, steamship lines, and motor roads exist side by side with a vast number of wheelbarrow paths and foot-paths, many of which are difficult to negotiate even on foot.

China is a semi-colonial country — disunity among the imperialist powers makes for disunity among the ruling groups in China. There is difference between a semi-colonial country controlled by several countries and a colony controlled by a single country.

China is a vast country — «When it is dark in the East, it is light in the West; when things are dark in the South, there is still light in the North.» Hence, one need not worry about lack of room for manoeuvre.

China has gone through a great revolution — this has provided the seeds from which the Red Army has grown, provided the leader of the Red Army, namely, the Communist Party of China, and provided the masses with experience of participation in a revolution.

We say, therefore, that the first characteristic of China's revolutionary war is that it is waged in a vast semi-colonial country which is unevenly developed politically and economically and which has gone through a revolution. This characteristic basically determines our military strategy and tactics as well as our political strategy and tactics.

The second characteristic is that our enemy is big and powerful.

How do matters stand with the Nationalist Party, the enemy of the Red Army? It is a political party that has conquered political power and has more or less stabilized its power. It has gained the support of the world's main counter-revolutionary States. It has remodeled its army, which has thus become different from any other army in Chinese history and on the whole similar to the armies of modern States; this army is much better supplied with weapons and materiel than the Red Army, and is larger than any army in Chinese history, or for that matter than the standing army of any other country. There is a world of difference between the Nationalist army and the Red Army. The Nationalist Party controls the key positions or lifelines in the politics, economy, communications, and culture of China; its political power is nationwide.

The Chinese Red Army is thus confronted with a big and powerful enemy. This is the second characteristic of China's revolutionary war. It necessarily makes the military operations of the Red Army different in many ways from those of wars in general and from those of the Russian Civil War or of the Northern Expedition.

The third characteristic is that the Red Army is small and weak.

The Chinese Red Army, starting as guerrilla units, came into being after the defeat of the first great revolution. This occurred in a period of relative political and economic stability in the reactionary capitalist countries of the world as well as in a period of reaction in China.

Our political power exists in scattered and isolated mountainous or remote regions and receives no outside help whatsoever. Economic and cultural conditions in the revolutionary base areas are backward compared with those in the Nationalist areas. The revolutionary base areas embrace only rural districts and small towns. These areas were extremely small in the beginning and have not grown much larger since. Moreover, they are fluid and not stationary, and the Red Army has no really consolidated bases.

The Red Army is numerically small, its arms are poor, and it has great difficulty in obtaining supplies such as food, bedding, and clothing.

This characteristic presents a sharp contrast to the preceding one. From this sharp contrast have arisen the strategy and tactics of the Red Army.

The fourth characteristic is Communist Party leadership and the agrarian revolution.

This characteristic is the inevitable consequence of the first one. It has given rise to two features. On the one hand, despite the fact that China's revolutionary war is taking place in a period of reaction in China and throughout the capitalist world, victory is possible, because it is under the leadership of the Communist Party and has the support of the peasantry. Thanks to this support, our base areas, small as they are, are politically very powerful and stand firmly opposed to the enormous Nationalist regime, while militarily they place great difficulties in the way of the Nationalist attacks. Small as it is, the Red Army has great fighting capacity, because its members, led by the Communist Party, are born of the agrarian revolution and are fighting for their own interests, and because its commanders and fighters are politically united.

The Nationalist Party, on the other hand, presents a sharp contrast. It opposes the agrarian revolution and therefore has no support from the peasantry. Though it has a large army, the Nationalist Party cannot make its soldiers and the many lower-ranking officers, who were originally small-scale producers, risk their lives willingly for it. Its officers and soldiers are politically divided, which reduces its fighting capacity.

#3.3. OUR STRATEGY AND TACTICS ENSUING FROM THESE CHARACTERISTICS

Thus, the four main characteristics of China's revolutionary war are: a vast semi-colonial country, which is unevenly developed politically and economically, and which has gone through a great revolution; a big and powerful enemy; a small and weak Red Army; and the agrarian revolution. These characteristics determine the line for guiding China's revolutionary war as well as many of its strategic and tactical principles. It follows from the first and fourth characteristics that it is possible for the Chinese Red Army to grow and defeat its enemy. It follows from the second and third characteristics that it is impossible for the Chinese Red Army to grow very rapidly or defeat its enemy quickly; in other words, the war will be protracted and may even be lost if it is mishandled.

These are the two aspects of China's revolutionary war. They exist simultaneously, that is, there are favourable factors and there are difficulties. This is the fundamental law of China's revolutionary war, from which many other laws ensue. The history of our ten years of war has proved the validity of this law. Anyone who has eyes but fails to see this fundamental law cannot direct China's revolutionary war, cannot lead the Red Army to victories.

It is clear that we must correctly settle all the following matters of principle:

Determine our strategic orientation correctly, oppose adventurism when on the offensive, oppose conservatism when on the defensive, and oppose flightism when shifting from one place to another.
Oppose guerrillaism in the Red Army, while recognizing the guerrilla character of its operations.
Oppose protracted campaigns and a lightning strategy, and uphold the strategy of protracted war and lightning campaigns.
Oppose fixed battle lines and positional warfare, and favour fluid battle lines and mobile warfare.
Oppose fighting merely to rout the enemy, and uphold fighting to annihilate the enemy.
Oppose the strategy of striking with two «fists» in two directions at the same time, and uphold the strategy of striking with one «fist» in one direction at one time.¹²
Oppose the principle of maintaining one large rear area, and uphold the principle of small rear areas.
Oppose an absolutely centralized command, and favour a relatively centralized command.
Oppose the purely military standpoint and the ideology of roving rebel bands,¹³ and recognize that the Red Army is a propagandist and organizer of the Chinese revolution.
Oppose bandit ways,¹⁴ and uphold strict political discipline.
Oppose warlord ways, and favour both democracy within proper limits and an authoritative discipline in the army.
Oppose an incorrect, sectarian policy on cadres, and uphold the correct policy on cadres.
Oppose the policy of isolation, and affirm the policy of winning over all possible allies.
Oppose keeping the Red Army at its old stage, and strive to develop it to a new stage.

Our present discussion of the problems of strategy is intended to elucidate these matters carefully in the light of the historical experience gained in China's ten years of bloody revolutionary war.

#4. «ENCIRCLEMENT AND SUPPRESSION» CAMPAIGNS AND COUNTER-CAMPAIGNS, THE MAIN PATTERN OF CHINA'S CIVIL WAR

In the ten years since our guerrilla war began, every independent Red guerrilla unit, every Red Army unit, or every revolutionary base area has been regularly subjected by the enemy to «encirclement and suppression». The enemy looks upon the Red Army as a monster and seeks to capture it the moment it shows itself. They are forever pursuing the Red Army and forever trying to encircle it. For ten years, this pattern of warfare has not changed, and unless the civil war gives place to a national war, the pattern will remain the same until the day the enemy becomes the weaker contestant and the Red Army the stronger.

The Red Army's operations take the form of counter-campaigns against «encirclement and suppression». For us, victory means chiefly victory in combating «encirclement and suppression», that is, strategic victory and victories in campaigns. The fight against each «encirclement and suppression» campaign constitutes a counter-campaign, which usually comprises several or even scores of battles, big and small. Until an «encirclement and suppression» campaign has been fundamentally smashed, one cannot speak of strategic victory or of victory in the counter-campaign as a whole, even though many battles may have been won. The history of the Red Army's decade of war is a history of counter-campaigns against «encirclement and suppression».

In the enemy's «encirclement and suppression» campaigns and the Red Army's counter-campaigns against them, the two forms of fighting, offensive and defensive, are both employed, and here there is no difference from any other war, ancient or modern, in China or elsewhere. The special characteristic of China's civil war, however, is the repeated alternation of the two forms over a long period of time. In each «encirclement and suppression» campaign, the enemy employs the offensive against the Red Army's defensive, and the Red Army employs the defensive against their offensive; this is the first stage of a counter-campaign against «encirclement and suppression». Then, the enemy employs the defensive against the Red Army's offensive, and the Red Army employs the offensive against their defensive; this is the second stage of the counter-campaign. Every «encirclement and suppression» campaign has these two stages, and they alternate over a long period.

By repeated alternation over a long period, we mean the repetition of this pattern of warfare and these forms of fighting. This is a fact obvious to everybody. An «encirclement and suppression» campaign and a counter-campaign against it — such is the repeated pattern of the war. In each campaign, the alternation in the forms of fighting consists of the first stage, in which the enemy employs the offensive against our defensive and we meet their offensive with our defensive, and of the second stage, in which the enemy employs the defensive against our offensive and we meet their defensive with our offensive.

As for the content of a campaign or of a battle, it does not consist of mere repetition, but is different each time. This, too, is a fact and obvious to everybody. In this connection it has become a rule that with each campaign and each counter-campaign, the scale becomes larger, the situation more complicated, and the fighting more intense.

But this does not mean that there are no ups and downs. After the enemy's fifth «encirclement and suppression» campaign, the Red Army was greatly weakened, and all the base areas in the South were lost. Having shifted to the North-West, the Red Army now no longer holds a vital position threatening the internal enemy as it did in the South, and as a result, the scale of the «encirclement and suppression» campaigns has become smaller, the situation simpler, and the fighting less intense.

What constitutes a defeat for the Red Army? Strategically speaking, there is a defeat only when a counter-campaign against «encirclement and suppression» fails completely, but even then, the defeat is only partial and temporary. For only the total destruction of the Red Army would constitute complete defeat in the civil war; but this has never happened. The loss of extensive base areas and the shift of the Red Army constituted a temporary and partial defeat, not a final and complete one, even though this partial defeat entailed losing 90% of the Party membership, of the armed forces, and of the base areas. We call this shift the continuation of our defensive and the enemy's pursuit the continuation of their offensive. That is to say, in the course of the struggle between the enemy's «encirclement and suppression» and our counter-campaign, we allowed our defensive to be broken by the enemy's offensive instead of turning from the defensive to the offensive; and so, our defensive turned into a retreat and the enemy's offensive into a pursuit. But when the Red Army reached a new area, as for example when we shifted from Jiangxi Province and various other regions to Shaanxi Province, the repetition of «encirclement and suppression» campaigns began afresh. That is why we say that the Red Army's strategic retreat (the Long March) was a continuation of its strategic defensive and the enemy's strategic pursuit was a continuation of their strategic offensive.

In the Chinese civil war, as in all other wars, ancient or modern, in China or abroad, there are only two fundamental forms of fighting, attack and defence. The special characteristic of China's civil war consists in the long-term repetition of «encirclement and suppression» campaigns and of our counter-campaigns together with the long-term alternation in the two forms of fighting, attack and defence, with the inclusion of the phenomenon of the great strategic shift of more than 10'000 kilometres (the Long March).¹⁵

A defeat for the enemy is much the same. It is a strategic defeat for the enemy when their «encirclement and suppression» campaign is broken and our defensive becomes an offensive, when the enemy turns to the defensive and has to reorganize before launching another «encirclement and suppression» campaign. The enemy has not had to make a strategic shift of more than 10'000 kilometres such as we have, because they rule the whole country and are much stronger than we are. But there have been partial shifts of their forces. Sometimes, enemy forces in White strongholds encircled by the Red Army in some base areas have broken through our encirclement and withdrawn to the White areas to organize new offensives. If the civil war is prolonged and the Red Army's victories become more extensive, there will be more of this sort of thing. But the enemy cannot achieve the same results as the Red Army, because they do not have the help of the people and because their officers and fighters are not united. If they were to imitate the Red Army's long-distance shift, they would certainly be wiped out.

In the period of the Li Lisan line in 1930, Comrade Li Lisan failed to understand the protracted nature of China's civil war and for that reason did not perceive the law that, in the course of this war, there is repetition over a long period of «encirclement and suppression» campaigns and of their defeat (by that time there had already been three in the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area and two in Fujian). Hence, in an attempt to achieve rapid victory for the revolution, he ordered the Red Army, which was then still in its infancy, to attack Wuhan, and also ordered a nationwide armed uprising. Thus, he committed the error of «Left-wing» opportunism.

Likewise, the «Left-wing» opportunists of 1931-34 did not believe in the law of the repetition of «encirclement and suppression» campaigns. Some responsible comrades in our base area along the Hubei-Henan-Anhui border held an «auxiliary force» theory, maintaining that the Nationalist army had become merely an auxiliary force after the defeat of its third «encirclement and suppression» campaign and that the imperialists themselves would have to take the field as the main force in further attacks on the Red Army. The strategy based on this estimate was that the Red Army should attack Wuhan. In principle, this fitted in with the views of those comrades in Jiangxi who called for a Red Army attack on Nanchang, were against the work of linking up the base areas and the tactics of luring the enemy in deep, regarded the seizure of the capital and other key cities of a province as the starting point for victory in that province, and held that «the fight against the fifth ‹encirclement and suppression› campaign represents the decisive battle between the road of revolution and the road of colonialism». This «Left-wing» opportunism was the source of the wrong line adopted in the struggles against the fourth «encirclement and suppression» campaign in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Border Area and in those against the fifth in the Central Red Area in Jiangxi; and it rendered the Red Army helpless before these fierce enemy campaigns and brought enormous losses to the Chinese revolution.

The view that the Red Army should under no circumstances adopt defensive methods was directly related to this «Left-wing» opportunism, which denied the repetition of «encirclement and suppression» campaigns, and it, too, was entirely erroneous.

The proposition that a revolution or a revolutionary war is an offensive is of course correct. A revolution or a revolutionary war in its emergence and growth from a small force to a big force, from the absence of political power to the conquest of political power, from the absence of a Red Army to the creation of a Red Army, and from the absence of revolutionary base areas to their establishment, must be on the offensive and cannot be conservative; and tendencies toward conservatism must be opposed.

The only entirely correct proposition is that a revolution or a revolutionary war is an offensive, but also involves defence and retreat. To defend in order to attack, to retreat in order to advance, to move against the flanks in order to move against the front, and to take a roundabout route in order to get on to the direct route — this is inevitable in the process of development of many phenomena, especially military movements.

Of the two propositions stated above, the first may be correct in the political sphere, but it is incorrect when transposed to the military sphere. Moreover, it is correct politically only in one situation (when the revolution is advancing), but incorrect when transposed to another situation (when the revolution is in retreat, in general retreat as in Russia in 1906¹⁶ and in China in 1927, or in partial retreat as in Russia at the time of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918).¹⁷ Only the second proposition is entirely correct and true. The «Left-wing» opportunism of 1931-34, which mechanically opposed the employment of defensive military measures, was nothing but infantile thinking.

When will the pattern of repeated «encirclement and suppression» campaigns come to an end? In my opinion, if the civil war is prolonged, this repetition will cease when a fundamental change takes place in the balance of forces. It will cease when the Red Army has become stronger than the enemy. Then we shall be encircling and suppressing the enemy and they will be resorting to counter-campaigns, but political and military conditions will not allow them to attain the same position as that of the Red Army in its counter-campaigns. It can be definitely asserted that by then the pattern of repeated «encirclement and suppression» campaigns will have largely, if not completely, come to an end.

#5. THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE

Under this heading, I would like to discuss the following problems:

First, active and passive defence.
Second, preparations for combating «encirclement and suppression» campaigns.
Third, strategic retreat.
Fourth, strategic counter-offensive.
Fifth, starting the counter-offensive.
Sixth, concentration of troops.
Seventh, mobile warfare.
Eighth, lightning war.
Ninth, war of annihilation.

#5.1. ACTIVE AND PASSIVE DEFENCE

Why do we begin by discussing defence? After the failure of China's First National United Front of 1924-27, the revolution became a most intense and ruthless class war. While the enemy ruled the whole country, we had only small armed forces; consequently, from the very beginning, we have had to wage a bitter struggle against their «encirclement and suppression» campaigns. Our offensives have been closely linked with our efforts to break them, and our fate depends entirely on whether or not we are able to do so. The process of breaking an «encirclement and suppression» campaign is usually circuitous and not as direct as one would wish. The primary problem, and a serious one too, is how to conserve our strength and await an opportunity to defeat the enemy. Therefore, the strategic defensive is the most complicated and most important problem facing the Red Army in its operations.

In our ten years of war, two deviations often arose with regard to the strategic defensive; one was to belittle the enemy, the other was to be terrified of them.

As a result of belittling the enemy, many guerrilla units suffered defeat, and on several occasions, the Red Army was unable to break the enemy's «encirclement and suppression».

When the revolutionary guerrilla units first came into existence, their commanders often failed to assess the enemy's situation and our own correctly. Because they had been successful in organizing sudden armed uprisings in certain places or mutinies among the White troops, they saw only the momentarily favourable circumstances, or failed to see the grave situation actually confronting them, and so usually underestimated the enemy. Moreover, they had no understanding of their own weaknesses (that is, lack of experience and smallness of forces). It was an objective fact that the enemy was strong and we were weak, and yet some people refused to give it thought, talked only of attack but never of defence or retreat, thus mentally disarming themselves in the matter of defence, and hence misdirected their actions. Many guerrilla units were defeated on this account.

Examples in which the Red Army, for this reason, failed to break the enemy's «encirclement and suppression» campaigns were its defeat in 1928 in the Haifeng-Lufeng area of Guangdong Province,¹⁸ and its loss of freedom of action in 1932 in the fourth counter-campaign against the enemy's «encirclement and suppression» in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Border Area, where the Red Army acted on the theory that the Nationalist army was merely an auxiliary force.

There are many instances of setbacks which were due to being terrified of the enemy.

As against those who underestimated them, some people greatly overestimated them and also greatly underestimated our own strength, as a result of which they adopted an unwarranted policy of retreat and likewise disarmed themselves mentally in the matter of defence. This resulted in the defeat of some guerrilla units, or the failure of certain Red Army campaigns, or the loss of base areas.

The most striking example of the loss of a base area was that of the Central Red Area in Jiangxi during the fifth counter-campaign against «encirclement and suppression». The mistake here arose from a Right-wing standpoint. The commanders feared the enemy as if they were a tiger, set up defences everywhere, fought defensive actions at every step, and did not dare to advance to the enemy's rear and attack them there, which would have been to our advantage, or boldly to lure the enemy troops in deep, so as to herd them together and annihilate them. As a result, the whole base area was lost and the Red Army had to undertake the Long March of over 12'000 kilometres. However, this kind of mistake was usually preceded by a «Left-wing» error of underestimating the enemy. The military adventurism of attacking the key cities in 1932 was the root cause of the line of passive defence subsequently adopted in coping with the enemy's fifth «encirclement and suppression» campaign.

The most extreme example of being terrified of the enemy was the retreatism of the Zhang Guotao line. The defeat of the Western Column of the Fourth Front Red Army west of the Yellow River¹⁹ marked the final bankruptcy of this line.

Active defence is also known as offensive defence, or defence through decisive engagements. Passive defence is also known as purely defensive defence or pure defence. Passive defence is actually a spurious kind of defence, and the only real defence is active defence, defence for the purpose of counter-attacking and taking the offensive. As far as I know, there is no military manual of value nor any sensible military expert, ancient or modern, Chinese or foreign, that does not oppose passive defence, whether in strategy or tactics. Only a complete fool or a crazy person would cherish passive defence as a talisman. However, there are people in this world who do such things. That is an error in war, a manifestation of conservatism in military matters, which we must resolutely oppose.

The military experts of the newer and rapidly developing imperialist countries, namely, Germany and Japan, trumpet the advantages of the strategic offensive and come out against the strategic defensive. This kind of military thinking is absolutely unsuited to China's revolutionary war. These military experts assert that a serious weakness of the defensive is that it shakes popular morale, instead of inspiring it. This applies to countries where class contradictions are acute and the war benefits only the reactionary ruling strata or the reactionary political groups in power. But our situation is different. With the slogan of defending the revolutionary base areas and defending China, we can rally the overwhelming majority of the people to fight with one heart and one mind, because we are the oppressed and the victims of aggression. It was also by using the form of the defensive that the Red Army of the Council Union defeated its enemies during the Russian Civil War. When the imperialist countries organized the Whites for attack, the war was waged under the slogan of defending the councils; even when the November Uprising was being prepared, the military mobilization was carried out under the slogan of defending the capital. In every just war, the defensive not only has a lulling effect on politically alien elements, it also makes possible the rallying of the backward sections of the masses to join in the war.

When Engels said that, once an armed uprising is started, there must not be a moment's pause in the attack,²⁰ he meant that the masses, having taken the enemy unawares in an insurrection, must give the reactionary rulers no chance to retain or recover their political power, must seize this moment to beat the nation's reactionary ruling forces when they are unprepared, and must not rest content with the victories already won, underestimate the enemy, slacken their attacks, or hesitate to press forward, and so let slip the opportunity of destroying the enemy, bringing failure to the revolution. This is correct. It does not mean, however, that when we are already locked in battle with an enemy who enjoys superiority, we revolutionaries should not adopt defensive measures even when we are hard pressed. Only a prize idiot would think in this way.

Taken as a whole, our war has been an offensive against the Nationalist Party, but militarily, it has assumed the form of breaking the enemy's «encirclement and suppression».

Militarily speaking, our warfare consists of the alternate use of the defensive and the offensive. In our case, it makes no difference whether the offensive is said to follow or to precede the defensive, because the crux of the matter is to break the «encirclement and suppression». The defensive continues until an «encirclement and suppression» campaign is broken, whereupon the offensive begins, these being but two stages of the same thing; and one such enemy campaign is closely followed by another. Of the two stages, the defensive is the more complicated and the more important. It involves numerous problems of how to break the «encirclement and suppression». The fundamental principle here is to stand for active defence and oppose passive defence.

In our civil war, when the strength of the Red Army surpasses that of the enemy, we shall, in general, no longer need the strategic defensive. Our policy then will be the strategic offensive alone. This change will depend on an overall change in the balance of forces. By that time, the only remaining defensive measures will be of a partial character.

#5.2. PREPARATIONS FOR COMBATING «ENCIRCLEMENT AND SUPPRESSION» CAMPAIGNS

Unless we have made necessary and sufficient preparations against a planned enemy «encirclement and suppression» campaign, we shall certainly be forced into a passive position. To accept battle in haste is to fight without being sure of victory. Therefore, when the enemy is preparing an «encirclement and suppression» campaign, it is absolutely necessary for us to prepare our counter-campaign. To be opposed to such preparations, as some people in our ranks were at one time, is childish and ridiculous.

There is a difficult problem here on which controversy may easily arise. When should we conclude our offensive and switch to the phase of preparing our counter-campaign against «encirclement and suppression»? When we are victoriously on the offensive and the enemy is on the defensive, their preparations for the next «encirclement and suppression» campaign are conducted in secret, and therefore it is difficult for us to know when their offensive will begin. If our work of preparing the counter-campaign begins too early, it is bound to reduce the gains from our offensive and will sometimes even have certain harmful effects on the Red Army and the people. For the chief measures in the preparatory phase are the military preparations for withdrawal and the political mobilization for them. Sometimes, if we start preparing too early, this will turn into waiting for the enemy; after waiting a long time without the enemy's appearing, we will have to renew our offensive. And sometimes, the enemy will start their offensive just as our new offensive is beginning, thus putting us in a difficult position. Hence the choice of the right moment to begin our preparations is an important problem. The right moment should be determined with due regard both to the enemy's situation and our own and to the relation between the two. In order to know the enemy's situation, we should collect information on their political, military, and financial position and the state of public opinion in their territory. In analysing such information, we must take the total strength of the enemy into full account and must not exaggerate the extent of their past defeats, but, on the other hand, we must not fail to take into account their internal contradictions, their financial difficulties, the effect of their past defeats, and so on. As for our side, we must not exaggerate the extent of our past victories, but neither should we fail to take full account of their effect.

Generally speaking, however, on the question of timing the preparations, it is preferable to start them too early rather than too late. For the former involves smaller losses and has the advantage that preparedness averts peril and puts us in a fundamentally invincible position.

The essential problems during the preparatory phase are the preparations for the withdrawal of the Red Army, political mobilization, recruitment, arrangements for finance and provisions, and the handling of politically alien elements.

By preparations for the Red Army's withdrawal, we mean taking care that it does not move in a direction jeopardizing the withdrawal or advance too far in its attacks or become too fatigued. These are the things the main forces of the Red Army must attend to on the eve of a large-scale enemy offensive. At such a time, the Red Army must devote its attention mainly to planning the selection and preparation of the battle areas, the acquisition of supplies, and the enlargement and training of its own forces.

Political mobilization is a problem of prime importance in the struggle against «encirclement and suppression». That is to say, we should tell the Red Army and the people in the base area clearly, resolutely, and fully that the enemy's offensive is inevitable and imminent and will do serious harm to the people, but, at the same time, we should tell them about the enemy's weaknesses, the factors favourable to the Red Army, our indomitable will to victory, and our general plan of work. We should call upon the Red Army and the entire population to fight against the enemy's «encirclement and suppression» campaign and defend the base area. Except where military secrets are concerned, political mobilization must be carried out openly, and, what is more, every effort should be made to extend it to all who might possibly support the revolutionary cause. The key link here is to convince the cadres.

Recruitment of new soldiers should be based on two considerations: first, on the level of political consciousness of the people and the size of the population, and, second, on the current state of the Red Army and the possible extent of its losses in the whole course of the counter-campaign.

Needless to say, the problems of finance and food are of great importance to the counter-campaign. We must take the possibility of a prolonged enemy campaign into account. It is necessary to make an estimate of the minimum material requirements — chiefly of the Red Army, but also of the people in the revolutionary base area — for the entire struggle against the enemy's «encirclement and suppression» campaign.

With regard to politically alien elements, we should not be off our guard, but neither should we be unduly apprehensive of treachery on their part and adopt excessive precautionary measures. Distinction should be made between the landlords, the merchants, and the rich peasants, and the main point is to explain things to them politically and win their neutrality, while, at the same time, organizing the masses of the people to keep an eye on them. Only against the very few elements who are most dangerous should stern measures like arrest be taken.

The extent of success in a struggle against «encirclement and suppression» is closely related to the degree to which the tasks of the preparatory phase have been fulfilled. Relaxation of preparatory work which is due to underestimation of the enemy and panic which is due to being terrified of the enemy's attacks are harmful tendencies, and both should be resolutely opposed. What we need is an enthusiastic but calm state of mind and intense but orderly work.

#5.3. STRATEGIC RETREAT

A strategic retreat is a planned strategic step taken by an inferior force for the purpose of conserving its strength and biding its time to defeat the enemy, when it finds itself confronted with a superior force whose offensive it is unable to smash quickly. But military adventurists stubbornly oppose such a step and advocate «engaging the enemy outside the gates».

We all know that, when two boxers fight, the clever boxer usually gives a little ground at first, while the foolish one rushes in furiously and uses up all their resources at the very start, and, in the end, they are often beaten by the person who has given ground.

In the novel Water Margin,²¹ the drill master Hong, challenging Lin Chong to a fight on Chai Jin's estate, shouts: «Come on! Come on! Come on!» In the end, it is the retreating Lin Chong who spots Hong's weak point and floors him with one blow. During the Spring and Autumn Era, when the States of Lu and Qi²² were at war, Duke Zhuang of Lu wanted to attack before the Qi troops had tired themselves out, but Cao Gui prevented him. When instead he adopted the tactic of «the enemy tires, we attack», he defeated the Qi army. This is a classic example from China's military history of a weak force defeating a strong force. Here is the account given by the historian Zuo Qiuming:²³

In the spring, the Qi troops invaded us. The Duke was about to fight. Cao Gui requested an audience. His neighbours said: «This is the business of meat-eating officials, why meddle with it?» Cao replied: «Meat-eaters are fools, they cannot plan ahead.» So, he saw the Duke. And he asked: «What will you rely on when you fight?» The Duke answered: «I never dare to keep all my food and clothing for my own enjoyment, but always share them with others.» Cao said: «Such paltry charity cannot reach all. The people will not follow you.» The Duke said: «I never offer to the gods less sacrificial beasts, jade, or silk than are due to them. I keep good faith.» Cao said: «Such paltry faith wins no trust. The gods will not bless you.» The Duke said: «Though unable personally to attend to the details of all trials, big and small, I always demand the facts.» Cao said: «That shows your devotion to your people. You can give battle. When you do so, I beg to follow you.» The Duke and he rode in the same chariot. The battle was joined at Changshao. When the Duke was about to sound the drum for the attack, Cao said: «Not yet.» When the soldiers of Qi had drummed thrice, Cao said: «Now we can drum.» The army of Qi was routed. The Duke wanted to pursue. Again, Cao said: «Not yet.» He got down from the chariot to examine the enemy's wheel-tracks, then mounted the armrest of the chariot to look afar. He said: «Now we can pursue!» So began the pursuit of the Qi troops. After the victory, the Duke asked Cao why he had given such advice. Cao replied: «A battle depends upon courage. At the first drum, courage is awakened; at the second, it flags; and, with the third, it runs out. When the enemy's courage ran out, ours was still high, and so we won. It is difficult to fathom the moves of a great State, and I feared an ambush. But, when I examined the enemy's wheel-tracks and found them crisscrossing and looked afar and saw their banners drooping, I advised pursuit.

That was a case of a weak State resisting a strong State. The story speaks of the political preparations before a battle — winning the confidence of the people; it speaks of a battlefield favourable for switching over to the counter-offensive — Changshao; it indicates the favourable time for starting the counter-offensive — when the enemy's courage is running out and one's own is high; and it points to the moment for starting the pursuit — when the enemy's tracks are crisscrossed and their banners are drooping. Though the battle was not a big one, it illustrates the principles of the strategic defensive. China's military history contains numerous instances of victories won on these principles. In such famous battles as the Battle of Chenggao between the States of Chu and Han,²⁴ the Battle of Kunyang between the States of Xin and Han,²⁵ the Battle of Guandu between Yuan Shao and Cao Cao,²⁶ the Battle of Red Cliff between the States of Wu and Wei,²⁷ the Battle of Yiling between the States of Wu and Shu,²⁸ and the Battle of Feishui between the States of Qin and Jin,²⁹ in each case, the contending sides were unequal, and the weaker side, yielding some ground at first, gained mastery by striking only after the enemy had struck, and so defeated the stronger side.

When Napoleon raised his Great Army of 300'000 to attack Russia, the Russian government accepted the view of those military experts who proposed to abandon and raze the capital city of Moscow and then to strike, and rejected the views of a number of common military figures and politicians who asked: «How can we abandon the capital, much less raze it?» Threatened with starvation and exhaustion, and with disarray in his rear lines, Napoleon's troops were finally surrounded, and he had no choice but to retreat. Seizing the opportunity, the Russian army counter-attacked, and Napoleon fled with only 50'000 of his troops intact. This was the greatest defeat in Napoleon's entire career and is one of the famous great defeats in the military history of the world.

In August 1914, at the time of the First World War in Europe, France began by planning to engage the enemy outside the nation's gates and concentrated a great army on the border between Germany and France. When they saw that the German army was not taking this route, they shifted their troops to the Franco-Belgian border. It was only after they were defeated in battle that they really changed plans. In a great retreat toward Paris, they totally abandoned the northern industrial and agricultural regions. But this great strategic retreat was entirely correct. To do this required enormous determination and courage. Although Germany, in less than one week, moved a large army of nearly 100'000 troops all the way to the very outskirts of Paris, the German army was exhausted, its troop strength had been diminished, its morale was lax, and the battle-lines were greatly extended. The defensive lines of the French army had contracted, its troop strength increased, and the hearts of the people were filled with anger. For this reason, the comparative strengths of the two armies began to change. At this point, France concentrated its main forces to the north-west of Paris, surrounded the right flank of the German army, and won in a single battle. The German army, which had been called the bravest in the world, retreated to northern France and was forced to go on the defensive. This had a decisive influence on the whole course of the war. This was a very recent and extremely famous great battle.

It was in this same First World War in Europe, and, furthermore, at the same time as the fighting on the Western Front described above, that another German army won a campaign against the Russian army, which was also a very famous battle. This was the East Prussian Campaign. Just at the time that the German army was engaged on the Western Front, the Russian army brought together a big army much faster than Germany had expected, took advantage of an opening, and struck into East Prussia. It marched straight ahead for a long distance. Berlin was shaken. Hindenburg gathered a force of less than 100'000 troops, including a portion transferred back from the Western Front. When the two Russian columns were advancing along separate routes and had entered difficult terrain (a marshland), although greatly outnumbered, the Germans concentrated their forces, attacked, and destroyed the Russian left flank, capturing more than 90'000 troops. The right flank of the Russian army retreated in fear and trembling, and Hindenburg shook the world with this news.

The several examples described above from ancient, mediaeval, and modern history prove that a weak army that is attacked by a strong army has no choice but to adopt a strategically defensive policy in the opening phase of a war or campaign, and wait for an advantageous time to mount its counter-offensive. Since this is the only policy that can actually win, any other is doomed to defeat.

Our war began in the autumn of 1927, and we then had no experience at all. The Nanchang Uprising³⁰ and the Guangzhou Uprising³¹ failed, and, in the Autumn Harvest Uprising,³² the Red Army in the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Area also suffered several defeats and shifted to the Jinggang Mountains on the Hunan-Jiangxi border. In the following April, the units which had survived the defeat of the Nanchang Uprising also moved to the Jinggang Mountains by way of southern Hunan. By May 1928, however, fundamental principles of guerrilla warfare, simple in nature and suited to the conditions of the time, had already been evolved, that is, the 16-character formula: «The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue.» This 16-character formulation of military principles was accepted by the Central Committee before the Li Lisan line. Later, our operational principles were developed a step further. At the time of our first counter-campaign against «encirclement and suppression» in the Jiangxi base area, the principle of «luring the enemy in deep» was put forward and, moreover, successfully applied. By the time the enemy's third «encirclement and suppression» campaign was defeated, a complete set of operational principles for the Red Army had taken shape. This marked a new stage in the development of our military principles, which were greatly enriched in content and underwent many changes in form, mainly in the sense that, although they fundamentally remained the same as in the 16-character formula, they transcended their originally simple nature. The 16-character formula covered the fundamental principles for combating «encirclement and suppression»; it covered the two stages of the strategic defensive and the strategic offensive, and, within the defensive, it covered the two stages of the strategic retreat and the strategic counter-offensive. What came later was only a development of this formula.

But beginning, from January 1932, after the publication of the Party's resolution entitled Struggle for Victory First in One or More Provinces After Smashing the Third «Encirclement and Suppression» Campaign, which contained serious errors of principle, the «Left-wing» opportunists attacked these correct principles, finally abrogated the whole set, and instituted a complete set of contrary «new principles» or «regular principles». From then on, the old principles were no longer to be considered as regular, but were to be rejected as «guerrillaism». The opposition to «guerrillaism» reigned for three whole years. Its first stage was military adventurism; in the second, it turned into military conservatism; and, finally, in the third stage, it became flightism. It was not until the Central Committee held the Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau at Zunyi, Guizhou Province, in January 1935, that this wrong line was declared bankrupt and the correctness of the old line reaffirmed. But at what a cost!

Those comrades who vigorously opposed «guerrillaism» argued along the following lines. It was wrong to lure the enemy in deep, because we had to abandon so much territory. Although battles had been won in this way, was not the situation different now? Moreover, was it not better to defeat the enemy without abandoning territory? And was it not better still to defeat the enemy in their own areas, or on the borders between their areas and ours? The old practices had had nothing «regular» about them and were methods used only by guerrillas. Now, our own State had been established and our Red Army had become a regular army. Our fight against Jiang Jieshi had become a war between two States, between two great armies. History should not repeat itself, and everything pertaining to «guerrillaism» should be totally discarded. The new principles were «completely Marxist», while the old had been created by guerrilla units in the mountains, and there was no Marxism in the mountains. The new principles were the antithesis of the old. They were: «Pit one against ten, pit ten against a hundred, fight bravely and determinedly, and exploit victories by hot pursuit»; «Attack on all fronts»; «Seize key cities»; and «Strike with two ‹fists› in two directions at the same time». When the enemy attacked, the methods of dealing with them were: «Engage the enemy outside the gates», «Gain mastery by striking first», «Don't let our pots and pans be smashed», «Don't give up an inch of territory», and «Divide the forces into six routes». The war was «the decisive battle between the road of revolution and the road of colonialism», a war of short, swift thrusts, blockhouse warfare, war of attrition, «protracted war». There were, further, the policy of maintaining a great rear area and an absolutely centralized command. Finally, there was a large-scale «house-moving». And anyone who did not accept these things was to be punished, labeled an opportunist, and so on and so forth.

Without a doubt, these theories and practices were all wrong. They were nothing but subjectivism. Under favourable circumstances, this subjectivism manifested itself in small-bourgeois revolutionary fanaticism and impetuosity, but, in times of adversity, as the situation worsened, it changed successively into desperate recklessness, conservatism, and flightism. They were the theories and practices of hotheads and ignoramuses; they did not have the slightest flavour of Marxism about them; indeed, they were anti-Marxist.

Here, we shall discuss only strategic retreat, which in Jiangxi was called «luring the enemy in deep» and in Sichuan «contracting the front». No previous theorist or practitioner of war has ever denied that this is the policy a weak army fighting a strong army must adopt in the initial stage of a war. It has been said by a foreign military expert that, in strategically defensive operations, decisive battles are usually avoided in the beginning, and are sought only when conditions have become favourable. That is entirely correct and we have nothing to add to it.

The object of strategic retreat is to conserve military strength and prepare for the counter-offensive. Retreat is necessary, because not to retreat a step before the onset of a strong enemy inevitably means to jeopardize the preservation of one's own forces. In the past, however, many people were stubbornly opposed to retreat, considering it to be an «opportunist line of pure defence». Our history has proved that their opposition was entirely wrong.

To prepare for a counter-offensive, we must select or create conditions favourable to ourselves, but unfavourable to the enemy, so as to bring about a change in the balance of forces, before we go on to the stage of the counter-offensive.

In the light of our past experience, during the stage of retreat, we should in general secure at least two of the following conditions before we can consider the situation as being favourable to us and unfavourable to the enemy and before we can go over to the counter-offensive. These conditions are:

The population actively supports the Red Army.
The terrain is favourable for operations.
All the main forces of the Red Army are concentrated.
The enemy's weak spots have been discovered.
The enemy has been reduced to a tired and demoralized state.
The enemy has been induced to make mistakes.

The first condition, active support of the population, is the most important one for the Red Army. It means having a base area. Moreover, given this condition, it is easy to achieve conditions four, five, and six. Therefore, when the enemy launches a full-scale offensive, the Red Army generally withdraws from the White area into the base area, because that is where the population is most active in supporting the Red Army against the White army. Also, there is a difference between the borders and the central district of a base area; in the latter, the people are better at blocking the passage of information to the enemy, better at reconnaissance, transportation, joining in the fighting, and so on. Thus, when we were combating the first, second, and third «encirclement and suppression» campaigns in Jiangxi, all the places selected as «terminal points for the retreat» were situated where the first condition, popular support, was excellent or quite good. This characteristic of our base areas made the Red Army's operations very different from ordinary operations and was the main reason why the enemy subsequently had to resort to the policy of blockhouse warfare.

One advantage of operating on interior lines is that it makes it possible for the retreating army to choose terrain favourable to itself and force the attacking army to fight on its terms. In order to defeat a strong army, a weak army must carefully choose favourable terrain as a battleground. But this condition alone is not enough and must be accompanied by others. The first of these is popular support. The next is a vulnerable enemy, for instance, an enemy who is tired or has made mistakes, or an advancing enemy column that is comparatively poor in fighting capacity. In the absence of these conditions, even if we have found excellent terrain, we have to disregard it and continue to retreat in order to secure them. In the White areas, there is no lack of good terrain, but we do not have the favourable condition of active popular support. If other conditions are not yet fulfilled, the Red Army has no alternative but to retreat toward its base area. Distinctions such as those between the White areas and the Red areas also usually exist between the borders and the central district of a base area.

Except for local units and containing forces, all our assault troops should, on principle, be concentrated. When attacking an enemy who is on the defensive strategically, the Red Army usually disperses its own forces. Once the enemy launches a full-scale offensive, the Red Army effects a «retreat toward the centre». The terminal point chosen for the retreat is usually in the central section of the base area, but sometimes it is in the frontal or rear sections, as circumstances require. By such a retreat toward the centre, all the main forces of the Red Army can be concentrated.

Another essential condition for a weak army fighting a strong one is to pick out the enemy's weaker units for attack. But, at the beginning of the enemy's offensive, we usually do not know which of their advancing columns is the strongest and which the second strongest, which is the weakest and which the second weakest, and so a process of reconnaissance is required. This often takes a considerable time. That is another reason why strategic retreat is necessary.

If the attacking enemy is far more numerous and much stronger than we are, we can accomplish a change in the balance of fores only when the enemy has penetrated deeply into our base area and tasted all the bitterness it holds for them. As the chief of staff of one of Jiang Jieshi's brigades remarked during the third «encirclement and suppression» campaign: «Our stout soldiers have worn themselves thin and our thin soldiers have worn themselves to death.» Or, in the words of Chen Mingshu, Commander-in-Chief of the Western Route of the Nationalist Party's «Encirclement and Suppression» Army: «Everywhere, the National Army gropes in the dark, while the Red Army walks in broad daylight.» By then, the enemy army, although still strong, is much weakened, its soldiers are tired, its morale is sagging, and many of its weak spots are revealed. But the Red Army, though weak, has conserved its strength and stored up its energy, and is waiting at its ease for the fatigued enemy. At such a time, it is generally possible to attain a certain parity between the two sides, or to change the enemy's absolute superiority to relative superiority and our absolute inferiority to relative inferiority, and occasionally even to become superior to the enemy. When fighting against the third «encirclement and suppression» campaign in Jiangxi, the Red Army executed a retreat to the extreme limit (to concentrate in the rear section of the base area); if it had not done so, it could not have defeated the enemy, because the enemy's «encirclement and suppression» forces were then over ten times the size of the Red Army. When Sun Wu said, «Avoid the enemy when they are full of vigour, strike when they are fatigued and withdraws», he was referring to tiring and demoralizing the enemy, so as to reduce their superiority.

Finally, the object of retreat is to induce the enemy to make mistakes or to detect their mistakes. One must realize that an enemy commander, however wise, cannot avoid making some mistakes over a relatively long period of time, and hence it is always possible for us to exploit the openings they leave us. The enemy is liable to make mistakes, just as we ourselves sometimes miscalculate and give them openings to exploit. In addition, we can induce the enemy to make mistakes by our own actions, for instance, by «counterfeiting an appearance», as Sun Wu called it, that is, by making a feint to the East but attacking in the West. If we are to do this, the terminal point for the retreat cannot be rigidly limited to a definite area. Sometimes, when we have retreated to the predetermined area and not yet found openings to exploit, we have to retreat farther and wait for the enemy to give us an opening.

The favourable conditions which we seek by retreating are in general those stated above. But this does not mean that a counter-offensive cannot be launched until all these conditions are present. The presence of all of them at the same time is neither possible nor necessary. But a weak force operating on interior lines against a strong enemy should strive to secure such conditions as are necessary in the light of the enemy's actual situation. All views to the contrary are incorrect.

The decision on the terminal point for retreat should depend on the situation as a whole. It is wrong to decide on a place which, considered in relation to only part of the situation, appears to be favourable for our passing to the counter-offensive, if it is not also advantageous from the point of view of the situation as a whole. For, at the start of our counter-offensive, we must take subsequent developments into consideration, and our counter-offensives always begin on a partial scale. Sometimes, the terminal point for retreat should be fixed in the frontal section of the base area, as it was during our second and fourth counter-campaigns against «encirclement and suppression» in Jiangxi and our third counter-campaign in the Shaanxi-Gansu area. At times, it should be in the middle section of the base area, as in our first counter-campaign in Jiangxi. At other times, it should be fixed in the rear section of the base area, as in our third counter-campaign in Jiangxi. In all these cases, the decision was taken by correlating the partial situation with the situation as a whole. But, during the fifth counter-campaign in Jiangxi, our army gave no consideration whatsoever to retreat, because it did not take account of either the partial or the total situation, and this was really rash and foolhardy conduct. A situation is made up of a number of factors; in considering the relation between a part of the situation and the whole, we should base our judgements on whether the factors on the enemy's side and on ours, as manifested in both the partial and the whole situation, are to a certain extent favourable for our starting a counter-offensive.

The terminal points for retreat in a base area can be generally divided into three types: those in the frontal, those in the middle, and those in the rear section of the base area. Does this, however, mean refusing to fight in the White areas altogether? No. It is only when we have to deal with a large-scale campaign of enemy «encirclement and suppression» that we refuse to fight in the White areas. It is only when there is a wide disparity between the enemy's strength and ours that, acting on the principle of conserving our strength and biding our time to defeat the enemy, we advocate retreating to the base area and luring them in deep, for only by so doing can we create or find conditions favourable for our counter-offensive. If the situation is not so serious, or if it is so serious that the Red Army cannot begin its counter-offensive even in the base area, or if the counter-offensive is not going well and a further retreat is necessary to bring about a change in the situation, then we should recognize, theoretically at least, that the terminal point for the retreat may be fixed in a White area, though we have had very little experience of this kind.

In general, the terminal points for retreat in a White area can also be divided into three types:

First, those in front of our base area.
Second, those on its flanks.
Third, those behind it.

Here is an example of the first type.

During our first counter-campaign against «encirclement and suppression» in Jiangxi, had it not been for the disunity inside the Red Army and the split in the local Party organization (the two difficult problems created by the Li Lisan line and the Anti-Majoritarian Corps),³³ it is conceivable that we might have concentrated our forces within the triangle formed by Ji'an, Nanfeng, and Changshu and launched a counter-offensive. For the enemy force advancing from the area between the Gan and Fu Rivers was not very greatly superior to the Red Army in strength (100'000 against 40'000). Though the popular support there was not as active as in the base area, the terrain was favourable; moreover, it would have been possible to smash, one by one, the enemy forces advancing along separate routes.

Now for an example of the second type.

During our third counter-campaign in Jiangxi, if the enemy's offensive had not been on so large a scale, if one of the enemy's columns had advanced from Jianning, Lichuan, and Taining on the Fujian-Jiangxi border, and if that column had not been too strong for us to attack, it is likewise conceivable that the Red Army might have massed its forces in the White area in western Fujian and crushed that column first, without having to make a thousand-li [500-kilometre] detour through Ruijin to Xingguo.

Finally, an example of the third type.

During that same third counter-campaign in Jiangxi, if the enemy's main force had headed south instead of west, we might have been compelled to withdraw to the Huichang-Xunwu-Anyuan area (a White area), in order to induce the enemy to move further south; the Red Army could have then driven northward into the interior of the base area, by which time the enemy force in the north of the base area would not have been very large.

The above, however, are all hypothetical examples not based on actual experience; they should be regarded as exceptional and not treated as general principles. When the enemy launches a large-scale «encirclement and suppression» campaign, our general principle is to lure them in deep, withdraw into the base area, and fight them there, because this is our surest method of smashing their offensive.

Those who advocate «engaging the enemy outside the gates» oppose strategic retreat, arguing that to retreat means to lose territory, to bring harm on the people («to let our pots and pans be smashed», as they call it), and to give rise to unfavourable repercussions outside. During our fifth counter-campaign, they argued that every time we retreated a step the enemy would push their blockhouses forward a step, so that our base areas would continuously shrink and we would have no way of recovering lost ground. Even though luring the enemy deep into our territory might have been useful in the past, it would be useless against the enemy's fifth «encirclement and suppression» campaign, in which they adopted the policy of blockhouse warfare. The only way to deal with this campaign, they said, was to divide up our forces for resistance and make short swift thrusts at the enemy.

It is easy to give an answer to such views, and our history has already done so. As for loss of territory, it often happens that only by loss can loss be avoided; this is the principle of «Give in order to take». If what we lose is territory and what we gain is victory over the enemy, plus recovery and also expansion of our territory, then it is a paying proposition. In a business transaction, if a buyer does not «lose» some money, they cannot obtain commodities; if a seller does not «lose» some commodities, they cannot obtain money. The losses incurred in a revolutionary movement involve destruction, and what is gained is construction of a progressive character. Sleep and rest involve loss of time, but energy is gained for tomorrow's work. If any fool does not understand this and refuses to sleep, they will have no energy the next day, and that is a losing proposition. We lost out in the fifth counter-campaign for precisely such reasons. Reluctance to give up part of our territory resulted in the loss of it all. Ethiopia, too, lost all its territory when it fought the enemy head-on, though that was not the sole cause of its defeat. The same holds true on the question of bringing damage on the people. If you refuse to let the pots and pans of some households be smashed over a short period of time, you will cause the smashing of the pots and pans of all the people to go on over a long period of time. If you are afraid of unfavourable short-term political repercussions, you will have to pay the price in unfavourable long-term political repercussions. After the November Revolution, if the Russian Majoritarians had acted on the opinions of the «Left-wing Communists» and refused to sign the peace treaty with Germany, the newborn councils would have been in danger of early death.³⁴

Such seemingly revolutionary «Left-wing» opinions originate from the revolutionary impetuosity of the small-bourgeois intellectuals as well as from the narrow conservatism of the peasant small-scale producers. People holding such opinions look at problems only one-sidedly and are unable to take a comprehensive view of the situation as a whole; they are unwilling to link the interests of today with those of tomorrow or the interests of the part with those of the whole, but cling like grim death to the partial and the temporary. Certainly, we should cling tenaciously to the partial and the temporary when, in the concrete circumstances of the time, they are favourable — and especially when they are decisive — for the whole current situation and the whole period, or otherwise we shall become advocates of letting things slide and doing nothing about them. That is why a retreat must have a terminal point. We must not go by the short-sightedness of the small-scale producer. We should learn the wisdom of the Majoritarians. The naked eye is not enough, we must have the aid of the telescope and the microscope. The Marxist methodology is our telescope and microscope in political and military matters.

Of course, strategic retreat has its difficulties. To pick the time for beginning the retreat, to select the terminal point, to convince the cadres and the people politically — these are difficult problems demanding solution.

The problem of timing the beginning of the retreat is very important. Not only was the timing of the retreat of the French army beginning on the 21st of August, 1914 exactly right, but it afterward became the first precondition for the later counter-attack and victory; it was a brave and admirable decision. If, in the course of our first counter-campaign against «encirclement and suppression» in Jiangxi Province, our retreat had not been carried out just when it was, that is, if it had been delayed, then, at the very least, the extent of our victory would have been affected. Both a premature and a belated retreat, of course, bring losses. But generally speaking, a belated retreat brings more losses than a premature one. A well-timed retreat, which enables us to keep all the initiative, is of great assistance to us in switching to the counter-offensive when, having reached the terminal point for our retreat, we have regrouped our forces and are waiting at our ease for the fatigued enemy. When smashing the enemy's first, second, and fourth campaigns of «encirclement and suppression» in Jiangxi, we were able to handle them confidently and without haste. It was only during the third campaign that the Red Army was very fatigued by the detour it had hastily had to make in order to reassemble, because we had not expected the enemy to launch a new offensive so quickly after suffering such a crushing defeat in the second campaign (we ended our second counter-campaign on the 29th of May, 1931, and Jiang Jieshi began his third «encirclement and suppression» campaign on the 1st of July). The timing of the retreat is decided in the same way as the timing of the preparatory phase of a counter-campaign which we discussed earlier, that is, entirely on the basis of the requisite information we have collected and of the appraisal of the general situation on the enemy side and on our own.

It is extremely difficult to convince the cadres and the people of the necessity of strategic retreat when they have had no experience of it, and when the prestige of the army leadership is not yet such that it can concentrate the authority for deciding on strategic retreat in the hands of a few persons or of a single person and at the same time enjoy the confidence of the cadres. Because the cadres lacked experience and had no faith in strategic retreat, great difficulties were encountered at the beginning of our first and fourth counter-campaigns and during the whole of the fifth. During the first counter-campaign, the cadres, under the influence of the Li Lisan line, were in favour not of retreat but of attack until they were convinced otherwise. In the fourth counter-campaign, the cadres, under the influence of military adventurism, objected to making preparations for retreat. In the fifth, they at first persisted in the military-adventurist view, which opposed luring the enemy in deep, but later turned to military conservatism. Another case is that of the adherents of the Zhang Guotao line, who did not admit the impossibility of establishing our bases in the regions of the Tibetan and the Hui peoples³⁵ until they ran up against a brick wall. Experience is essential for the cadres, and failure is indeed the mother of success. But it is also necessary to learn with an open mind from other people's experience, and it is sheer «narrow empiricism» to insist on one's own personal experience in all matters and, in its absence, to adhere stubbornly to one's own opinions and reject other people's experience. Our war has suffered in no small measure on this account.

The people's lack of faith in the need for a strategic retreat, which was due to their inexperience, was never greater than in our first counter-campaign in Jiangxi. At that time, the local Party organizations and the masses of the people in the counties of Ji'an, Xingguo, and Yongfeng were all opposed to the Red Army's withdrawal. But, after the experience of the first counter-campaign, no such problem occurred in the subsequent ones. Everyone was convinced that the loss of territory in the base area and the sufferings of the people were temporary and was confident that the Red Army could smash the enemy's «encirclement and suppression». However, whether or not the people have faith is closely tied up with whether or not the cadres have faith, and hence the first and foremost task is to convince the cadres.

Strategic retreat is aimed solely at switching over to the counter-offensive and is merely the first stage of the strategic defensive. The decisive link in the entire strategy is whether victory can be won in the stage of the counter-offensive which follows.

#5.4. STRATEGIC COUNTER-OFFENSIVE

To defeat the offensive of an enemy who enjoys absolute superiority, we rely on the situation created during the stage of our strategic retreat, a situation which is favourable to ourselves, unfavourable to the enemy, and different from that at the beginning of their offensive. It takes many elements to make up such a situation. All this has been dealt with above.

However, the presence of these conditions and of a situation favourable to ourselves and unfavourable to the enemy does not mean that we have already defeated them. Such conditions and such a situation provide the possibility for our victory and their defeat, but do not constitute the reality of victory or defeat; they have not yet brought actual victory or defeat to either army. To bring about victory or defeat a decisive battle between the two armies is necessary. Only a decisive battle can settle the question as to which army is the victor and which the vanquished. This is the sole task in the stage of strategic counter-offensive. The counter-offensive is a long process, the most fascinating, the most dynamic, and also the final stage of a defensive campaign. What is called active defence refers chiefly to this strategic counter-offensive, which is in the nature of a decisive engagement.

Conditions and situation are created, not only in the stage of the strategic retreat, but continue to be created in that of the counter-offensive. Whether in form or in nature, they are not exactly the same in the latter stage as in the former.

What might remain the same in form and in nature, for example, is the fact that the enemy troops will be even more fatigued and depleted, which is simply a continuation of their fatigue and depletion in the previous stage.

But wholly new conditions and a wholly new situation are bound to emerge. Thus, when the enemy has suffered one or more defeats, the conditions advantageous to us and disadvantageous to them will not be confined to their fatigue, and so on, but a new factor will have been added, namely, that they have suffered defeats. New changes will take place in the situation, too. When the enemy begins to manoeuvre their troops in a disorderly way and to make false moves, the relative strengths of the two opposing armies will naturally no longer be the same as before.

But if it is not the enemy's forces but ours that have suffered one or more defeats, then both the conditions and the situation will change in the opposite direction. That is to say, the enemy's disadvantages will be reduced, while on our side disadvantages will emerge and even grow. That again will be something entirely new and different.

A defeat for either side will lead directly and speedily to a new effort by the defeated side to avert disaster, to extricate itself from the new conditions and the new situation unfavourable to it and favourable to the enemy, and to recreate such conditions and such a situation as are favourable to it and unfavourable to its opponent, in order to bring pressure to bear on the latter.

The effort of the winning side will be exactly the opposite. It will strive to exploit its victory and inflict still greater damage on the enemy, add to the conditions that are in its favour and further improve its situation, and prevent the enemy from succeeding in extricating themself from their unfavourable conditions and unfavourable situation and averting disaster.

Thus, for either side, the struggle at the stage of the decisive battle is the most intense, the most complicated, and the most changeful, as well as the most difficult and trying in the whole war or the whole campaign; it is the most exacting time of all from the point of view of command.

In the stage of counter-offensive, there are many problems, the chief of which are the starting of the counter-offensive, the concentration of troops, mobile warfare, lightning war, and war of annihilation. Whether in a counter-offensive or in an offensive, the principles with regard to these problems do not differ in their fundamental character. In this sense, we may say that a counter-offensive is an offensive.

Still, it is not exactly an offensive. The principles of the counter-offensive are applied when the enemy is on the offensive. The principles of the offensive are applied when the enemy is on the defensive. In this sense, there are certain differences between a counter-offensive and an offensive.

For this reason, although the various operational problems are all included in the discussion of the counter-offensive in the present chapter on the strategic defensive, and although the chapter on the strategic offensive will deal only with other problems in order to avoid repetition, we should not overlook either the similarities or the differences between the counter-offensive and the offensive when it comes to actual application. In order to avoid repetition, what has already been discussed here will not be included under the heading of the strategic offensive.

#5.5. STARTING THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE

The problem of starting a counter-offensive is the problem of the «initial battle» or «prelude».

Many bourgeois military experts advise caution in the initial battle, whether one is on the strategic defensive or on the strategic offensive, but more especially when on the defensive. In the past, we, too, have stressed this as a serious point. Our operations against the five enemy campaigns of «encirclement and suppression» in Jiangxi Province have given us rich experience, a study of which will not be without benefit.

In their first campaign, the enemy employed about 100'000 soldiers, divided into eight columns, to advance southward from the Ji'an-Jianning line against the Red Army's base area. The Red Army had about 40'000 soldiers and was concentrated in the area of Huangpi and Xiaobu in Ningdu County, Jiangxi Province, as shown in the following map:

The situation was as follows:

The «suppression» forces did not exceed 100'000 soldiers, none of whom were Jiang Jieshi's own troops, and the general situation was not very grave.
The enemy division under Luo Lin, defending Ji'an, was located across the Gan River to the west.
The three enemy divisions under Gong Bingfan, Zhang Huizan, and Tan Daoyuan had advanced and occupied the Futian-Tonggu-Longgang-Yuantou sector south-east of Ji'an and north-west of Ningdu. The main body of Zhang Huizan's division was at Longgang and that of Tan Daoyuan's division at Yuantou. It was not advisable to select Futian and Tonggu as the battleground, as the inhabitants, misled by the Anti-Majoritarian Corps, were for a time mistrustful of and opposed to the Red Army.
The enemy division under Liu Heting was far away in Jianning in the White area of Fujian, and was unlikely to cross into Jiangxi.
The two enemy divisions under Mao Bingwen and Xu Kexiang had entered the Toupi-Luokou-Dongshao sector lying between Guangchang and Ningdu. Toupi was a White area, Luokou a guerrilla zone, and Dongshao, where there were Anti-Majoritarian Corps elements, was a place from which information was liable to leak out. Furthermore, if we were to attack Mao Bingwen and Xu Kexiang and then drive westward, the three enemy divisions in the west under Zhang Huizan, Tan Daoyuan, and Gong Bingfan might join forces, thus making it difficult for us to win victory and impossible to bring the issue to a final solution.
The two divisions under Zhang Huizan and Tan Daoyuan, which made up the enemy's main force, were troops belonging to Lu Diping, who was commander-in-chief of this «encirclement and suppression» campaign and governor of Jiangxi Province, and Zhang Huizan was the field commander. To wipe out these two divisions would be practically to smash the campaign. Each division had about 14'000 soldiers and Zhang='s was divided between two places, so that if we attacked one division at a time, we would enjoy absolute superiority.
The entire advancing «suppression» army numbered no more than 100'000 troops, and the overall situation was not terribly serious.
The Longgang-Yuantou sector, where the main forces of the Zhang and Tan divisions were located, was close to our concentrations, and there was good popular support to cover our approach.
The terrain in Longgang was good. Yuantou was not easy to attack. But were the enemy to advance to Xiaobu to attack us, we would have good terrain there, too.
We could mass the largest number of troops in the Longgang sector. In Xingguo, less than 100 li [50 kilometres] to the south-west of Longgang, we had an independent division of over 1'000 soldiers, which could manoeuvre in the enemy's rear.
If our troops made a breakthrough at the centre and breached the enemy's front, their columns to the east and west would be cut into two widely separated groups.
We could concentrate the largest number of troops in Longgang, and in Xingguo, less than 100 li [50 kilometres] to the south-west, we also had an independent division of over 1'000 troops, which could move around to the enemy's rears.

For the above reasons, we decided that our first battle should be against Zhang Huizan's main force, and we successfully hit two of his brigades and his divisional headquarters, capturing the entire force of 9'000 soldiers and the divisional commander himself, without letting a single soldier or horse escape. This one victory scared Tan's division into fleeing toward Dongshao and Xu's division into fleeing toward Toupi. Our troops then pursued Tan's division and wiped out half of it. We fought two battles in five days (27th of December, 1930 to 1st of January, 1931), and, fearing defeat, the enemy forces in Futian, Tonggu, and Toupi retreated in disorder. So ended the first campaign of «encirclement and suppression».

The enemy offensive and our concentrations for the second «encirclement and suppression» campaign are shown in the following map:

The situation in the second campaign was as follows:

The «suppression» forces numbering 200'000 were under the command of He Yingqin with headquarters at Nanchang.
As in the first enemy campaign, none of the forces were Jiang Jieshi's own troops. Among them, the 19th Route Army under Cai Tingkai, the 26th under Sun Lianzhong, and the Eighth under Zhu Shaoliang were strong, or fairly strong, while all the rest were rather weak.
The Anti-Majoritarian Corps had been cleaned up, and the entire population of the base area supported the Red Army.
The Fifth Route Army under Wang Jinyu, newly arrived from the north, was afraid of us, and, generally speaking, so were the two divisions on its left flank under Guo Huazong and Hao Mengling.
If our troops attacked Futian first and then swept across to the east, we could expand the base area to the Jianning-Lichuan-Taining sector on the Fujian-Jiangxi border and acquire supplies to help smash the next «encirclement and suppression» campaign. But if we were to thrust westward, we would come up against the Gan River and have no room for expansion after the battle. To turn east again after the battle would tire our troops and waste time.
Though our army (numbering over 30'000 soldiers) was somewhat smaller than in the first campaign, it had had four months in which to recuperate and build up energy.

For these reasons, we decided, for our first battle, to engage the forces of Wang Jinyu and of Gong Bingfan (totaling 11 regiments) in the Futian sector. After winning this battle, we attacked Guo Huazong, Sun Lianzhong, Zhu Shaoliang, and Liu Heding in succession. In 15 days (from the 16th of May to 30th of May, 1931) we marched 700 li [350 kilometres], fought five battles, captured more than 20'000 rifles, and roundly smashed the enemy's «encirclement and suppression» campaign. When fighting Wang Jinyu, we were between the two enemy forces under Cai Tingkai and Guo Huazong, some ten li [five kilometres] from the latter and 40 li [20 kilometres] from the former, and some people said we were «getting into a blind alley», but we got through all the same. This was mainly due to the popular support we enjoyed in the base area and to the lack of coordination among the enemy units. After Guo Huazong's division was defeated, Hao Mengling's division fled by night back to Yongfeng, and so avoided disaster.

The situation of the enemy and ourselves during the third «encirclement and suppression» campaign was as shown in the following map:

The situation in the third «encirclement and suppression» campaign was as follows:

Jiang Jieshi personally took the field as commander-in-chief. Under him, there were three subordinate commanders, each in charge of a column — the left, the right, and the centre. The central column was commanded by He Yingqin, who, like Jiang Jieshi, had his headquarters in Nanchang; the right was commanded by Chen Mingshu, with headquarters at Ji'an; and the left by Zhu Shaoliang, with headquarters at Nanfeng.
The «suppression» forces numbered 300'000. The main forces, totaling about 100'000 soldiers, were Jiang Jieshi's own troops and consisted of five divisions (of nine regiments each), commanded by Chen Cheng, Luo Zhouying, Zhao Guantao, Wei Lihuang, and Jiang Dingwen respectively. Besides these, there were three divisions (totaling 40'000 soldiers) under Jiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai, and Han Deqin. Then there was Sun Lianzhong's army of 20'000. In addition, there were other, weaker forces that were likewise not Jiang's own troops.
The enemy's strategy in this «suppression» campaign was to «drive straight in», which was vastly different from the strategy of «consolidating at every step» they used in the second campaign. The aim was to press the Red Army back against the Gan River and annihilate it there.
There was an interval of only one month between the end of the second enemy campaign and the beginning of the third. The Red Army (then about 30'000 strong) had had neither rest nor replenishments after much hard fighting and had just made a detour of 1'000 li [500 kilometres] to concentrate at Xingguo in the western part of the southern Jiangxi base area, when the enemy pressed it hard from several directions.

In this situation, the plan we first decided on was to move from Xingguo by way of Wan'an, make a breakthrough at Futian, and then sweep from west to east across the enemy's rear communication lines, thus letting the enemy's main forces make a deep but useless penetration into our base area in southern Jiangxi; this was to be the first phase of our operation. Then, when the enemy turned back northward, inevitably very fatigued, we were to seize the opportunity to strike at their vulnerable units; that was to be the second phase of our operation. The heart of this plan was to avoid the enemy's main forces and strike at their weak spots. But when our forces were advancing on Futian, we were detected by the enemy, who rushed the two divisions under Chen Cheng and Luo Zhuoying to the scene. We had to change our plan and fall back to Gaoxingxu in the western part of Xingguo County, which, together with its environs of less than 100 square li [50 square kilometres], was then the only place for our troops to concentrate in. The day after our concentration, we decided to make a thrust eastward towards Liantang in eastern Xingguo County, Liangcun in southern Yongfeng County, and Huangpi in northern Ningdu County. That same night, under cover of darkness, we passed through the 40-li [20-kilometre] gap between Jiang Dingwen's division and the forces of Jiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai, and Han Deqin, and swung to Liantang. On the second day, we skirmished with the forward units under Shangguan Yunxiang (who was in command of Hao Mengling's division as well as his own). The first battle was fought on the third day with Shangguan Yunxiang's division and the second battle on the fourth day with Hao Mengling's division; after a three-day march, we reached Huangpi and fought our third battle against Mao Bingwen's division. We won all three battles and captured over 10'000 rifles. At this point, all the main enemy forces, which had been advancing westward and southward, turned eastward. Focusing on Huangpi, they converged at furious speed to seek battle and closed in on us in a major compact encirclement. We slipped through in the high mountains that lay in the 20-li [10-kilometre] gap between the forces of Jiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai, and Han Deqin on the one side and Chen Cheng and Luo Zhuoying on the other, and thus, returning from the east to the west, reassembled within the borders of Xingguo County. By the time the enemy discovered this fact and began advancing west again, our forces had already had a fortnight's rest, whereas the enemy forces, hungry, exhausted, and demoralized, were no good for fighting and so decided to retreat. Taking advantage of their retreat, we attacked the forces of Jiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai, Jiang Dingwen, and Han Deqin, wiping out one of Jiang Dingwen's brigades and Han Deqin's entire division. As for the divisions under Jiang Guangnai and Cai Tingkai, the fight resulted in a stalemate and they got away.

The situation of the enemy and ourselves during the fourth «encirclement and suppression» campaign is shown in the following map:

The situation in the fourth «encirclement and suppression» campaign was as follows. The enemy was advancing on Guangchang in three columns; the eastern one was their main force, while the two divisions forming their western column were exposed to us and were also very close to the area where our forces were concentrated. Thus, we had the opportunity to attack their western column in southern Yihuang County first, and at one stroke we annihilated the two divisions under Li Ming and Chen Shiji. As the enemy then sent two divisions from the eastern column to give support to their central column and advanced further, we were again able to wipe out a division in southern Yihuang County. In these two battles we captured more than 10'000 rifles and, in the main, smashed this campaign of «encirclement and suppression».

In their fifth campaign, the enemy advanced by means of their new strategy of building blockhouses and first occupied Lichuan. But, in attempting to recover Lichuan and engage the enemy outside the base area, we made an attack north of Lichuan at Xiaoshi, which was an enemy strongpoint and was situated, moreover, in the White area. Failing to win the battle, we shifted our attack to Zixiqiao, which was also an enemy strongpoint situated in the White area south-east of Xiaoshi, and again we failed. Then, in seeking battle, we milled around between the enemy's main forces and their blockhouses and were reduced to complete passivity. All through our fifth counter-campaign against «encirclement and suppression», which lasted a whole year, we showed not the slightest initiative or drive. In the end, we had to withdraw from our Jiangxi base area. The situation before the first battle is shown in the following map:

Our army's experience in these five counter-campaigns against «encirclement and suppression» proves that the first battle in the counter-offensive is of the greatest importance for the Red Army, which is on the defensive, if it is to smash a large and powerful enemy «suppression» force. Victory or defeat in the first battle has a tremendous effect upon the entire situation, all the way to the final engagement. Hence, we arrive at the following conclusions.

First, the first battle must be won. We should strike only when positively certain that the enemy's situation, the terrain, and popular support are all in our favour and not in theirs. Otherwise, we should rather fall back and carefully bide our time. There will always be opportunities; we should not rashly accept battle. In our first counter-campaign, we originally planned to strike at Tan Daoyuan's troops; we advanced twice, but each time had to restrain ourselves and pull back, because they would not budge from their commanding position on the Yuantou heights. A few days later, we sought out Zhang Huizan's troops, which were more vulnerable to our attack. In our second counter-campaign, our army advanced to Tonggu, where, for the sole purpose of waiting for Wang Jinyu's troops to leave their strongpoint at Futian, we encamped close to the enemy for 25 days even at the risk of leakage of information; we rejected all impatient suggestions for a quick attack and finally attained our aim. In our third counter-campaign, although the storm was breaking all around us and we had made a detour of 1'000 li [500 kilometres], and although the enemy had discovered our plan to outflank them, we nevertheless exercised patience, turned back, changed our tactics to a breakthrough in the centre, and finally fought the first battle successfully at Liantang. In our fourth counter-campaign, after our attack on Nanfeng had failed, we unhesitatingly withdrew, wheeled around to the enemy's right flank, and reassembled our forces in the area of Dongshao, whereupon we launched our great and victorious battle in southern Yihuang County. It was only in the fifth counter-campaign that the importance of the first battle was not recognized at all. Taking alarm at the loss of the single county town of Lichuan, our forces marched north to meet the enemy in an attempt to recover it. Then, the unexpected encounter at Xunkou, which had resulted in a victory (with the annihilation of an enemy division), was not treated as the first battle, nor were the changes that were bound to ensue predicted, but instead, Xiaoshi was rashly attacked with no assurance of success. Thus, the initiative was lost at the very first move, and that is really the worst and most stupid way to fight.

Second, the plan for the first battle must be the prelude to, and an organic part of, the plan for the whole campaign. Without a good plan for the whole campaign, it is absolutely impossible to fight a really good first battle. That is to say, even though victory is won in the first battle, if the battle harms rather than helps the campaign as a whole, such a victory can only be reckoned a defeat (as in the case of the battle of Xunkou in the fifth campaign). Hence, before fighting the first battle, one must have a general idea of how the second, third, fourth, and even the final battle will be fought, and consider what changes will ensue in the enemy's situation as a whole if we win, or lose, each of the succeeding battles. Although the result may not — and, in fact, definitely will not — turn out exactly as we expect, we must think everything out carefully and realistically in the light of the general situation on both sides. Without a grasp of the situation as a whole, it is impossible to make any really good move on the chessboard.

Third, one must also consider what will happen in the next strategic stage of the war. Whoever directs strategy will not be doing their duty if they occupy themself only with the counter-offensive and neglect the measures to be taken after it succeeds, or in case it fails. In a particular strategic stage, they should take into consideration the succeeding stages, or, at the very least, the following one. Even though future changes are difficult to predict and the farther ahead one looks the more blurred things seem, a general calculation is possible and an appraisal of distant prospects is necessary. In war as well as in politics, planning only one step at a time as one goes along is a harmful way of directing matters. After each step, it is necessary to examine the ensuing concrete changes and to modify or develop one's strategic and operational plans accordingly, or otherwise one is liable to make the mistake of rushing straight ahead regardless of danger. However, it is absolutely essential to have a long-term plan which has been thought out in its general outline and which covers an entire strategic stage or even several strategic stages. Failure to make such a plan will lead to the mistake of hesitating and allowing oneself to be tied down, which in fact serves the enemy's strategic objects and reduces one to a passive position. It must be borne in mind that the enemy's supreme command is not lacking in strategic insight. Only when we have trained ourselves to be a head taller than the enemy will strategic victories be possible. During the enemy's fifth «encirclement and suppression» campaign, failure to do so was the main reason for the errors in strategic direction under the «Left»-opportunist and the Zhang Guotao lines. In short: in the stage of retreat, we must see ahead to the stage of the counter-offensive; in the stage of the counter-offensive, we must see ahead to that of the offensive; and, in the stage of the offensive, we must again see ahead to a stage of retreat. Not to do so, but to confine ourselves to considerations of the moment, is to court defeat.

The first battle must be won. The plan for the whole campaign must be taken into account. And the strategic stage that comes next must be taken into account. These are the three principles we must never forget when we begin a counter-offensive, that is, when we fight the first battle.

#5.6. CONCENTRATION OF TROOPS

The concentration of troops seems easy but is quite hard in practice. Everybody knows that the best way is to use a large force to defeat a small one, and yet many people fail to do so and on the contrary often divide their forces up. The reason is that such military commanders have no head for strategy and are confused by complicated circumstances; hence, they are at the mercy of these circumstances, lose their initiative, and have recourse to passive response.

No matter how complicated, grave, and harsh the circumstances, what a military commander needs most of all is the ability to function independently in organizing and employing the forces under their command. They may often be forced into a passive position by the enemy, but the important thing is to regain the initiative quickly. Failure to do so spells defeat.

The initiative is not something imaginary, but is concrete and material. Here the most important thing is to conserve and mass an armed force that is as large as possible and full of fighting spirit.

It is easy to fall into a passive position in defensive warfare, which gives far less scope for the full exercise of initiative than does offensive warfare. However, defensive warfare, which is passive in form, can be active in content, and can be switched from the stage in which it is passive in form to the stage in which it is active both in form and in content. In appearance, a fully planned strategic retreat is made under compulsion, but, in reality, it is effected in order to conserve our strength and bide our time to defeat the enemy, to lure them in deep and prepare for our counter-offensive. On the other hand, refusal to retreat and hasty acceptance of battle (as in the Battle of Xiaoshi) may appear a serious effort to gain the initiative, while in reality it is passive. Not only is a strategic counter-offensive active in content, but in form, too, it discards the passive posture of the period of retreat. In relation to the enemy, our counter-offensive represents our effort to make them relinquish the initiative and put them in a passive position.

Concentration of troops, mobile warfare, lightning war, and war of annihilation are all necessary conditions for the full achievement of this aim. And of these, concentration of troops is the first and most essential.

This concentration is necessary for the purpose of reversing the situation as between the enemy and ourselves. First, its purpose is to reverse the situation as regards advance and retreat. Previously, it was the enemy who was advancing and we who were retreating; now, we seek a situation in which we advance and they retreat. When we concentrate our troops and win a battle, then in that battle we gain the above purpose, and this influences the whole campaign.

Second, its purpose is to reverse the situation with regard to attack and defence. In defensive warfare, the retreat to the prescribed terminal point belongs fundamentally to the passive, or «defence», stage. The counter-offensive belongs to the active, or «attack», stage. Although the strategic defensive retains its defensive character throughout its duration, still as compared with the retreat the counter offensive already represents a change not only in form but in content. The counter-offensive is transitional between the strategic defensive and the strategic offensive, and in the nature of a prelude to the strategic offensive; it is precisely for the purpose of the counter-offensive that troops are concentrated.

Third, its purpose is to reverse the situation with regard to interior and exterior lines. An army operating on strategically interior lines suffers from many disadvantages, and this is especially so in the case of the Red Army, confronted as it is with «encirclement and suppression». But in campaigns and battles we can and absolutely must change this situation. We can turn a big «encirclement and suppression» campaign waged by the enemy against us into a number of small, separate campaigns of encirclement and suppression waged by us against the enemy. We can change the converging attack directed by the enemy against us on the plane of strategy into converging attacks directed by us against the enemy on the plane of campaigns and battles. We can change the enemy's strategic superiority over us into our superiority over them in campaigns and battles. We can put the enemy who is in a strong position strategically into a weak position in campaigns and battles. At the same time, we can change our own strategically weak position into a strong position in campaigns and battles. This is what we call exterior-line operations within interior-line operations, encirclement and suppression within «encirclement and suppression», blockade within blockade, the offensive within the defensive, superiority within inferiority, strength within weakness, advantage within disadvantage, and initiative within passivity. The winning of victory in the strategic defensive depends fundamentally on this measure — concentration of troops.

In the war annals of the Chinese Red Army, this has often been an important controversial issue. In the Battle of Ji'an on the 4th of October, 1930, our advance and attack were begun before our forces were fully concentrated, but fortunately the enemy force (Deng Ying's division) fled of its own accord; by itself, our attack was ineffective.

Beginning from 1932, there was the slogan «Attack on all fronts», which called for attacks from the base area in all directions — north, south, east, and west. This is wrong, not only for the strategic defensive, but even for the strategic offensive. As long as there is no fundamental change in the overall balance of forces, both strategy and tactics involve the defensive and the offensive, containing actions and assaults, and «attacks on all fronts» are in fact extremely rare. This slogan expresses the military equalitarianism which accompanies military adventurism. When the revolution is advancing, this is correct as a political slogan, but not as a military slogan.

In 1933, the exponents of military equalitarianism put forward the theory of «striking with two ‹fists›» and splitting the main force of the Red Army in two, to seek victories simultaneously in two strategic directions. As a result, one fist remained idle while the other was tired out with fighting, and we failed to win the greatest victory possible at the time. In my opinion, when we face a powerful enemy, we should employ our army, whatever its size, in only one main direction at a time, not two. I am not objecting to operations in two or more directions, but, at any given time, there ought to be only one main direction. During the First World War in Europe, the powerful German army had only one main direction of operations at a time from beginning to end. Among the military critics, there are some who consider that it was an error to withdraw part of the troops from the Western Front to reinforce the Eastern Front in August-September 1914, because of the threat to East Prussia. If we assume that the failure to succeed on the Western Front was primarily or partly the result of this redeployment, then this criticism is justified. The Chinese Red Army, which entered the arena of the civil war as a small and weak force, has since repeatedly defeated its powerful antagonist and won victories that have astonished the world, and it has done so by relying largely on the employment of concentrated strength. Any one of its great victories can prove this point. When we say, «Pit one against ten, pit ten against a hundred», we are speaking of strategy, of the whole war and the overall balance of forces, and, in the strategic sense, that is just what we have been doing. However, we are not speaking of campaigns and tactics, in which we must never do so. Whether in counter-offensives or offensives, we should always concentrate a big force to strike at one part of the enemy forces. We suffered every time we did not concentrate our troops, as in the battles against Tan Daoyuan in the Dongshao area of Ningdu County in Jiangxi Province in January 1931, against the 19th Route Army in the Gaoxingxu area of Xingguo County in Jiangxi in August 1931, against Chen Jitang in the Shuikouxu area of Nanxiong County in Guangdong Province in July 1932, and against Chen Cheng in the Tuancun area of Lichuan County in Jiangxi in March 1934. In the past, battles such as those of Shuikouxu and Tuancun were generally deemed victories or even big victories (in the former, we routed 20 regiments under Chen Jitang; in the latter, 12 regiments under Chen Cheng), but we never welcomed such victories and in a certain sense even regarded them as defeats. For, in our opinion, a battle has little significance when there are no prisoners or war loot, or when they do not outweigh the losses. Our strategy is «pit one against ten» and our tactics are «pit ten against one» — this is one of our fundamental principles for gaining mastery over the enemy.

Military equalitarianism reached its extreme point in our fifth counter-campaign against «encirclement and suppression» in 1934. It was thought that we could beat the enemy by «dividing the forces into six routes» and «resisting on all fronts», but instead we were beaten by the enemy, and the reason was fear of losing territory. Naturally, one can scarcely avoid loss of territory when concentrating the main forces in one direction while leaving only containing forces in others. But this loss is temporary and partial and is compensated for by victory in the place where the assault is made. After such a victory is won, territory lost in the area of the containing forces can be recovered. The enemy's first, second, third, and fourth campaigns of «encirdement and suppression» all entailed the loss of territory — particularly the third campaign, in which the Jiangxi base area of the Red Army was almost completely lost — but, in the end, we not only recovered, but extended our territory.

Failure to appreciate the strength of the people in the base area has often given rise to unwarranted fear of moving the Red Army too far away from the base area. This happened when the Red Army in Jiangxi made a long drive to attack Zhangzhou in Fujian Province in 1932, and also when it wheeled around to attack Fujian after the victory in our fourth counter-campaign in 1933. There was fear in the first case that the enemy would seize the entire base area, and in the second that they would seize part of it; consequently, there was opposition to concentrating our forces and advocacy of dividing them up for defence, but, in the end, all this proved to be wrong. As far as the enemy is concerned, they are afraid to advance into our base area, but the main danger in their eyes is a Red Army that has driven into the White area. Their attention is always fixed on the whereabouts of the main force of the Red Army, and they rarely take their eyes off it to concentrate on the base area. Even when the Red Army is on the defensive, it is still the centre of the enemy's attention. Part of their overall plan is to reduce the size of our base area, but if the Red Army concentrates its main force to annihilate one of their columns, the enemy's supreme command will be compelled to focus greater attention on the Red Army and concentrate larger forces against it. Hence, it is possible to wreck an enemy plan for reducing the size of a base area.

Also, it was wrong to say: «In the fifth ‹encirclement and suppression› campaign, which is being carried on by means of blockhouse warfare, it is impossible for us to operate with concentrated forces, and all we can do is to divide them up for defence and for short swift thrusts.» The enemy's tactics of pushing forward three, five, eight, or ten li [1,5, 2,5, 4, or 5 kilometres] at a time and building blockhouses at each halt were entirely the result of the Red Army's practice of fighting defensive actions at every successive point. The situation would certainly have been different if our army had abandoned the tactics of point-by-point defence on interior lines and, when possible and necessary, had turned and driven into the enemy's interior lines. The principle of concentration of forces is precisely the means for defeating the enemy's blockhouse warfare.

The kind of concentration of forces we advocate does not mean the abandonment of people's guerrilla warfare. To abandon small-scale guerrilla warfare and «concentrate every single rifle in the Red Army», as advocated by the Li Lisan line, has long since been proved wrong. Considering the revolutionary war as a whole, the operations of the people's guerrillas and those of the main forces of the Red Army complement each other like a person's right arm and left arm, and if we had only the main forces of the Red Army without the armed people and the people's guerrillas, we would be like a warrior with only one arm. In concrete terms, and especially with regard to military operations, when we talk of the people in the base area as a factor, we mean that we have an armed people. That is the main reason why the enemy is afraid to approach our base area.

It is also necessary to employ Red Army detachments for operations in secondary directions; not all the forces of the Red Army should be concentrated. The kind of concentration we advocate is based on the principle of guaranteeing absolute or relative superiority on the battlefield. To cope with a strong enemy or to fight on a battlefield of vital importance, we must have an absolutely superior force; for instance, a force of 40'000 was concentrated to fight the 9'000 soldiers under Zhang Huizan on the 30th of December, 1930, in the first battle of our first counter-campaign. To cope with a weaker enemy or to fight on a battlefield of no great importance, a relatively superior force is sufficient; for instance, only some 10'000 Red Army soldiers were employed to fight Liu Heting's division of 7'000 soldiers in Jianning on the 29th of May, 1931, in the last battle of our second counter-campaign.

That is not to say we must have numerical superiority on every occasion. In certain circumstances, we may go into battle with a relatively or absolutely inferior force. Take the case of going into battle with a relatively inferior force when we have only a rather small Red Army force in a certain area (it is not that we have more troops and have not concentrated them). Then, in order to smash the attack of the stronger enemy in conditions where popular support, terrain, and weather are greatly in our favour, it is of course necessary to concentrate the main part of our Red Army force for a surprise attack on a segment of one flank of the enemy while containing their centre and their other flank with guerrillas or small detachments, and in this way victory can be won. In our surprise attack on this segment of the enemy flank, the principle of using a superior force against an inferior force, of using the many to defeat the few, still applies. The same principle also applies when we go into battle with an absolutely inferior force, for example, when a guerrilla force makes a surprise attack on a large White Army force, but is attacking only a small part of it.

As for the argument that the concentration of a large force for action in a single battle area is subject to the limitations of terrain, roads, supplies, and billeting facilities, it should be evaluated according to the circumstances. There is a difference in the degree to which these limitations affect the Red Army and the White Army, as the Red Army can stand greater hardships than the White Army.

We use the few to defeat the many — this we say to the rulers of China as a whole. We use the many to defeat the few — this we say to each separate enemy force on the battlefield. That is no longer a secret, and, in general, the enemy is by now well acquainted with our way. However, they can neither prevent our victories nor avoid their own losses, because they do not know when and where we shall act. This we keep secret. The Red Army generally operates by surprise attacks.

#5.7. MOBILE WARFARE

Mobile warfare or positional warfare? Our answer is mobile warfare. So long as we lack a large army or reserves of ammunition, and so long as there is only a single Red Army force to do the fighting in each base area, positional warfare is generally useless to us. For us, positional warfare is generally inapplicable in attack as well as in defence.

One of the outstanding characteristics of the Red Army's operations, which follows from the fact that the enemy is powerful while the Red Army is deficient in technical equipment, is the absence of fixed battle lines.

The Red Army's battle lines are determined by the direction in which it is operating. As its operational direction often shifts, its battle lines are fluid. Though the main direction does not change in a given period of time, within its ambit, the secondary directions may shift at any moment; when we find ourselves checked in one direction, we must turn to another. If, after a time, we also find ourselves checked in the main direction, then we must change it too.

In a revolutionary civil war, there cannot be fixed battle lines, which was also the case in the Council Union. The difference between the Soviet Red Army and ours is that its battle lines were not so fluid as ours. There cannot be absolutely fixed battle lines in any war, because the vicissitudes of victory and defeat, advance and retreat, preclude it. But relatively fixed battle lines are often to be found in the general run of wars. Exceptions occur only where an army faces a much stronger enemy, as is the case with the Chinese Red Army in its present stage.

Fluidity of battle lines leads to fluidity in the size of our base areas. Our base areas are constantly expanding and contracting, and often as one base area falls another rises. This fluidity of territory is entirely a result of the fluidity of the war.

Fluidity in the war and in our territory produces fluidity in all fields of construction in our base areas. Construction plans covering several years are out of the question. Frequent changes of plan are all in the day's work.

It is to our advantage to recognize this characteristic. We must base our planning on it and must not have illusions about a war of advance without any retreats, take alarm at any temporary fluidity of our territory or of the rear areas of our army, or endeavour to draw up detailed long-term plans. We must adapt our thinking and our work to the circumstances, be ready to sit down as well as to march on, and always have our marching rations handy. It is only by exerting ourselves in today's fluid way of life that tomorrow we can secure relative stability, and eventually full stability.

The exponents of the strategy of «regular warfare», which dominated our fifth counter-campaign, denied this fluidity and opposed what they called «guerrillaism». Those comrades who opposed fluidity managed affairs as though they were the rulers of a big State, and the result was an extraordinary and immense fluidity — the 25'000-li [12'500-kilometre] Long March.

Our workers' and peasants' democratic republic is a State, but today it is not yet a full-fledged one. Today, we are still in the period of strategic defensive in the civil war, the form of our political power is still far from that of a full-fledged State, our army is still much inferior to the enemy both in numbers and technical equipment, our territory is still very small, and our enemy is constantly out to destroy us and will never rest content until they have done so. In defining our policy on the basis of these facts, we should not repudiate guerrillaism in general terms, but should honestly admit the guerrilla character of the Red Army. It is no use being ashamed of this. On the contrary, this guerrilla character is precisely our distinguishing feature, our strong point, and our means of defeating the enemy. We should be prepared to discard it, but we cannot do so today. In the future, this guerrilla character will definitely become something to be ashamed of and to be discarded, but today it is invaluable and we must stick to it.

«Fight when you can win, move away when you can't win» — this is the popular way of describing our mobile warfare today. There is no military expert anywhere in the world who approves only of fighting and never of moving, though few people do as much moving as we do. We generally spend more time in moving than in fighting and would be doing well if we fought an average of one sizable battle a month. All our «moving» is for the purpose of «fighting», and all our strategy and tactics are built on «fighting». Nevertheless, there are times when it is inadvisable for us to fight. In the first place, it is inadvisable to fight when the force confronting us is too large; second, it is sometimes inadvisable to fight when the force confronting us, though not so large, is very close to other enemy forces; third, it is generally inadvisable to fight an enemy force that is not isolated and is strongly entrenched; fourth, it is inadvisable to continue an engagement in which there is no prospect of victory. In any one of these situations, we are prepared to move away. Such moving away is both permissible and necessary. For our recognition of the necessity of moving away is based on our recognition of the necessity of fighting. Herein lies the fundamental characteristic of the Red Army's mobile warfare.

Mobile warfare is primary, but we do not reject positional warfare where it is possible and necessary. It should be admitted that positional warfare should be employed for the tenacious defence of particular key points in a containing action during the strategic defensive, and when, during the strategic offensive, we encounter an enemy force that is isolated and cut off from help. We have had considerable experience in defeating the enemy by such positional warfare; we have cracked open many enemy cities, blockhouses, and forts and broken through fairly well-fortified enemy field positions. In the future, we shall increase our efforts and remedy our inadequacies in this respect. We should by all means advocate positional attack or defence when circumstances require and permit it. At the present time, what we are opposed to is the general use of positional warfare or putting it on an equal footing with mobile warfare; that is impermissible.

During the ten years' civil war, have there been no changes whatsoever in the guerrilla character of the Red Army, its lack of fixed battle lines, the fluidity of its base areas, or the fluidity of construction work in its base areas? Yes, there have been changes. The period from the days in the Jinggang Mountains to our first counter-campaign against «encirclement and suppression» in Jiangxi was the first stage, the stage in which the guerrilla character and fluidity were very pronounced, the Red Army being in its infancy and the base areas still being guerrilla zones. In the second stage, comprising the period from the first to the third counter-campaign, both the guerrilla character and the fluidity were considerably reduced, front armies having been formed and base areas with a population of several millions established. In the third stage, which comprised the period from the end of the third to the fifth counter-campaign, the guerrilla character and the fluidity were further reduced, and the Central Government and the Revolutionary Military Commission had already been set up. The fourth stage was the Long March. The mistaken rejection of guerrilla warfare and fluidity on a small scale had led to guerrilla warfare and fluidity on a great scale. Now we are in the fifth stage. Because of our failure to smash the fifth «encirclement and suppression» campaign and because of this great fluidity, the Red Army and the base areas have been greatly reduced, but we have planted our feet in the North-West and consolidated and developed the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, our base area here. The three front armies which form the main forces of the Red Army have been brought under a unified command, which is unprecedented.

Going by the nature of our strategy, we may also say the period from the days in the Jinggang Mountains to our fourth counter-campaign was one stage, the period of the fifth counter-campaign was another, and the period from the Long March to the present is the third. During the fifth counter-campaign, the correct policy of the past was wrongly discarded; today, we have correctly discarded the wrong policy adopted during the fifth counter-campaign and revived the earlier and correct policy. However, we have not thrown out everything in the fifth counter-campaign, nor revived everything that preceded it. We have revived only what was good in the past, and discarded only the mistakes of the period of the fifth counter-campaign.

Guerrillaism has two aspects. One is irregularity, that is, decentralization, lack of uniformity, absence of strict discipline, and simple methods of work. These features stemmed from the Red Army's infancy, and some of them were just what was needed at the time. As the Red Army reaches a higher stage, we must gradually and consciously eliminate them, so as to make the Red Army more centralized, more unified, more disciplined, and more thorough in its work — in short, more regular in character. In the directing of operations, we should also gradually and consciously reduce such guerrilla characteristics as are no longer required at a higher stage. Refusal to make progress in this respect and obstinate adherence to the old stage are impermissible and harmful, and are detrimental to large-scale operations.

The other aspect of guerrillaism consists of the principle of mobile warfare, the guerrilla character of both strategic and tactical operations, which is still necessary at present, the inevitable fluidity of our base areas, flexibility in planning the development of the base areas, and the rejection of premature regularization in building the Red Army. In this connection, it is equally impermissible, disadvantageous, and harmful to our present operations to deny the facts of history, oppose the retention of what is useful, and rashly leave the present stage in order to rush blindly toward a «new stage», which as yet is beyond reach and has no real significance.

We are now on the eve of a new stage with respect to the Red Army's technical equipment and organization. We must be prepared to go over to this new stage. Not to prepare ourselves would be wrong and harmful to our future warfare. In the future, when the technical and organizational conditions in the Red Army have changed and the building of the Red Army has entered a new stage, its operational directions and battle lines will become more stable; there will be more positional warfare; the fluidity of the war, of our territory, and of our construction work will be greatly reduced and finally disappear; and we will no longer be handicapped by present limitations, such as the enemy's superiority and their strongly entrenched positions.

At present, we oppose both the wrong measures of the period of the domination of «Left-wing» opportunism and the revival of many of the irregular features which the Red Army had in its infancy, but which are now unnecessary. But we should be resolute in restoring the many valuable principles of army building and of strategy and tactics by which the Red Army has consistently won its victories. At the same time, we must accept some of those good and useful lessons learned in the areas of Red Army building and fighting during the struggles against the fifth «encirclement and suppression» campaign. We must sum up all that is good from the past in a systematic, more highly developed and richer military line, in order to win victories over the enemy today and prepare to go over to the new stage in the future.

The waging of mobile warfare involves many problems, such as reconnaissance, judgement, decision, combat disposition, command, concealment, concentration, advance, deployment, attack, pursuit, surprise attack, positional attack, positional defence, encounter action, retreat, night fighting, special operations, evading the strong and attacking the weak, besieging the enemy in order to strike at their reinforcements, feint attack, defence against aircraft, operating among several enemy forces, bypassing operations, consecutive operations, operating without a rear, the need for rest, and building up energy. These problems exhibited many specific features in the history of the Red Army, features which should be methodically dealt with and summed up in the science of campaigns, and I shall not go into them here.

#5.8. LIGHTNING WAR

A strategically protracted war and lightning campaigns or battles are two aspects of the same thing, two principles which should receive equal and simultaneous emphasis in civil wars and which are also applicable in anti-imperialist wars.

Because the reactionary forces are very strong, revolutionary forces grow only gradually, and this fact determines the protracted nature of our war. Here, impatience is harmful and advocacy of «quick decision» incorrect. To wage a revolutionary war for ten years, as we have done, might be surprising in other countries, but for us, it is like the opening sections in an «eight-legged essay» — the «presentation, amplification, and preliminary exposition of the theme»³⁶ — and many exciting parts are yet to follow. No doubt developments in the future will be greatly accelerated under the influence of domestic and international conditions.

As changes have already taken place in the international and domestic situation and greater changes are coming, it can be said that we have outgrown the past state of slow development and fighting in isolation. But we should not expect successes overnight. The aspiration to «wipe out the enemy before breakfast» is admirable, but it is bad to make concrete plans to do so. As China's reactionary forces are backed by many imperialist powers, our revolutionary war will continue to be a protracted one until China's revolutionary forces have built up enough strength to breach the main positions of our internal and external enemies, and until the international revolutionary forces have crushed or contained most of the international reactionary forces. To proceed from this point in formulating our strategy of long-term warfare is one of the important principles guiding our strategy.

The reverse is true of campaigns and battles — here the principle is not protractedness, but quick decision. Quick decision is sought in campaigns and battles, and this is true at all times and in all countries. In a war as a whole, too, quick decision is sought at all times and in all countries, and a long, drawn-out war is considered harmful. China's war, however, must be handled with the greatest patience and treated as a protracted war. During the period of the Li Lisan line, some people ridiculed our way of doing things as «shadow-boxing tactics» (meaning our tactics of fighting many battles back and forth before going on to seize the big cities), and said that we would not see the victory of the revolution until our hair turned white. Such impatience was proved wrong long ago. But if their criticism had been applied not to strategy but to campaigns and battles, they would have been perfectly right, and for the following reasons. First, the Red Army has no sources from which to replenish its arms and especially its ammunition; second, the White forces consist of many armies while there is only one Red Army, which must be prepared to fight one operation after another in quick succession in order to smash each campaign of «encirclement and suppression»; and, third, though the White armies advance separately, most of them keep fairly close to one another, and if we fail to gain a quick decision in attacking one of them, all the others will converge upon us. For these reasons, we have to fight lightning battles. It is usual for us to conclude a battle in a few hours, or in a day or two. It is only when our plan is to «besiege the enemy in order to strike at their reinforcements» and our purpose is to strike, not at the besieged enemy, but at their reinforcements, that we are prepared for a certain degree of protractedness in our besieging operations; but even then, we seek a quick decision against the reinforcements. A plan of protracted operations is often applied in campaigns or battles when we are strategically on the defensive and are tenaciously defending positions on a holding front, or when, in a strategic offensive, we are attacking isolated enemy forces cut off from help, or are eliminating White strongholds within our base areas. But protracted operations of this kind help rather than hinder the main Red Army force in its lightning battles.

A quick decision cannot be achieved simply by wanting it (although wanting it is certainly the primary condition), but requires many specific conditions. The main requirements are: adequate preparations, seizing the opportune moment, concentration of superior forces, encircling and outflanking tactics, favourable terrain, and striking at the enemy when they are on the move, or when they are stationary, but have not yet consolidated their positions. Unless these requirements are satisfied, it is impossible to achieve quick decision in a campaign or battle.

The smashing of an enemy «encirclement and suppression» is a major campaign, but the principle of quick decision and not that of protractedness still applies. For the troop supply, financial resources, and military strength of a base area do not allow protractedness.

While quick decision is the general principle, we must oppose undue impatience. It is altogether necessary that the highest military and political leading body of a revolutionary base area, having taken into account the circumstances in its base area and the situation of the enemy, should not be overawed by their truculence, dispirited by hardships that can be endured, or dejected by setbacks, but should have the requisite patience and stamina. The smashing of the first enemy «encirclement and suppression» campaign in Jiangxi Province took only one week from the first battle to the last; the second was smashed in barely a fortnight; the third dragged on for three months before it was smashed; the fourth took three weeks; and the fifth taxed our endurance for a whole year. When we were compelled to break through the enemy's encirclement after the failure to smash their fifth campaign, we showed an unjustifiable haste. In the circumstances then existing, we could well have held out for another two or three months, giving the troops some time for rest and reorganization. If that had been done, and if the leadership had been a little wiser after our breakthrough, the outcome would have been very different.

For all that, the principle of shortening the duration of a campaign by every possible means remains valid. Campaign and battle plans should call for our maximum effort in concentration of troops, mobile warfare, and so on, so as to ensure the destruction of the enemy's effective strength on the interior lines (that is, in the base area) and the quick defeat of their «encirclement and suppression» campaign, but where it is evident that the campaign cannot be terminated on our interior lines, we should employ the main Red Army force to break through the enemy's encirclement and switch to our exterior lines (that is, the enemy's interior lines) in order to defeat them there. Now that the enemy has developed their blockhouse warfare to a high degree, this will become our usual method of operation. At the time of the Fujian Incident,³⁷ two months after the commencement of our fifth counter-campaign, the main forces of the Red Army should undoubtedly have thrust into the Jiangsu-Zhejiang-Anhui-Jiangxi region, with Zhejiang as the centre, and swept over the length and breadth of the area between Hangzhou, Suzhou, Nanjing, Wuhu, Nanchang, and Fuzhou, turning our strategic defensive into a strategic offensive, menacing the enemy's vital centres, and seeking battles in the vast areas where there were no blockhouses. By such means we could have compelled the enemy, who was attacking southern Jiangxi and western Fujian, to turn back to defend their vital centres, broken their attack on the base area in Jiangxi, and rendered aid to the Fujian People's Government — we certainly could have aided it by this means. As this plan was rejected, the enemy's fifth «encirclement and suppression» campaign could not be broken, and the People's Government in Fujian inevitably collapsed. Even after a year's fighting, though it had become inopportune for us to advance on Zhejiang, we could still have turned to the strategic offensive in another direction by moving our main forces toward Hunan, that is, by driving into central Hunan instead of going through Hunan to Guizhou, turning the greater part of Hunan into our strategic zone of operations, and, in this way, we could have manoeuvred the enemy from Jiangxi into Hunan and destroyed them there. This could have been used to break the «encirclement and suppression» campaign and protect the Central Red Area. As this plan, too, was rejected, all hope of breaking the enemy's fifth campaign was finally dashed, and we had no alternative but to set out on the Long March.

#5.9. WAR OF ANNIHILATION

It is inappropriate to advocate a «contest of attrition» for the Chinese Red Army today. A «contest of treasures», not between Dragon Kings, but between a Dragon King and a beggar, would be rather ludicrous. For the Red Army, which gets almost all its supplies from the enemy, war of annihilation is the fundamental policy. Only by annihilating the enemy's effective strength can we smash their «encirclement and suppression» campaigns and expand our revolutionary base areas. Inflicting casualties is a means of annihilating the enemy, or otherwise there would be no sense to it. We incur losses ourselves in inflicting casualties on the enemy, but we replenish ourselves by annihilating their units, thereby not only making good our losses, but adding to the strength of our army. This is the military equivalent of the principle of exchange of equal values. A battle in which the enemy is routed is not fundamentally decisive in a contest with a foe of great strength. A battle of annihilation, on the other hand, produces a great and immediate impact on any enemy. Injuring all of a person's ten fingers is not as effective as chopping off one, and routing ten enemy divisions is not as effective as annihilating one of them.

Our policy for dealing with the enemy's first, second, third, and fourth «encirclement and suppression» campaigns was war of annihilation. The forces annihilated in each campaign constituted only part of their total strength, and yet all these «encirclement and suppression» campaigns were smashed. In our fifth counter-campaign, however, the opposite policy was pursued, which in fact helped the enemy to attain their aims.

Campaigns like those at Gaoxingxu and Shuikouxu are not good models, and it has always been recognized that they were not profitable. According to our classics, loot must be taken.

War of annihilation entails the concentration of superior forces and the adoption of encircling or outflanking tactics. We cannot have the former without the latter. Conditions such as popular support, favourable terrain, a vulnerable enemy force, and the advantage of surprise are all indispensable for the purpose of annihilation. Of course, the complete annihilation of an entire regiment or division is, in fact, seldom achieved, but, whenever the possibility presents itself, it should be our plan to attempt to do so. Our plans are usually based on the premise of attempting to annihilate the greater part of the enemy force.

Merely routing one enemy force or permitting it to escape has meaning only if, in the battle or campaign as a whole, our main force is concentrating its operations of annihilation against another enemy force, or otherwise it is meaningless. Here, the losses are justified by the gains.

In establishing our own war industry, we must not allow ourselves to become dependent on it. Our fundamental policy is to rely on the war industries of the imperialist countries and of our domestic enemy. We have a claim on the output of the arsenals of London as well as of Hanyang, and, what is more, it is delivered to us by the enemy's transport corps. This is the sober truth, it is not a jest. Wherever the Red Army has not yet learned this truth, the output of the war industries (though not large) will be the best, and the Red Army will win the fewest victories.

The whole world is approaching yet another great war of attrition. The imperialist First World War was a great war of attrition, but this will not be the model for the revolutionary uprisings and revolutionary wars that will arise from the Second World War, and that will grow from small beginnings to great results. These uprisings and wars will rely mainly on war of annihilation to solve the world's problems.

Editor's Note: The science of strategy, the science of campaigns, and the science of tactics are all components of the military science of the proletariat. The science of strategy deals with the laws that govern the war situation as a whole. The science of campaigns deals with the laws that govern campaigns and is applied in directing campaigns. The science of tactics deals with the laws that govern battles and is applied in directing battles. ↩
Source: Sun Wu: The Art of War (5th century BCE) ↩
Editor's Note: When Comrade Mao Zedong wrote this article in 1936, it was exactly 15 years since the founding of the Communist Party of China in July 1921. ↩
Editor's Note: Chen Duxiu was originally a professor at Beijing University and became famous as an editor of the Xin Qingnian [New Youth]. He was one of the founders of the Communist Party of China. Owing to his reputation at the time of the 4th of May Movement and owing to the Party's immaturity in its initial period, he became General Secretary of the Party. In the last period of the Revolution of 1924-27, the Right-wing thinking in the Party represented by Chen Duxiu developed into a line of capitulationism. Comrade Mao Zedong observed that the capitulationists at that time «voluntarily gave up the Party's leadership of the peasant masses, urban small bourgeoisie, and middle bourgeoisie, and in particular gave up the Party's leadership of the armed forces, thus causing the defeat of the revolution». (The Present Situation and Our Tasks) After the defeat of 1927, Chen Duxiu and a handful of other capitulationists lost faith in the future of the revolution and became liquidators. They took the reactionary Trotskijite standpoint and together with the Trotskijites formed a small anti-Party group. Consequently, Chen Duxiu was expelled from the Party in November 1929. He died in 1942. ↩
Editor's Note: The «Left-wing» opportunism of Li Lisan, generally known as the «Li Lisan line», refers to the Second «Left»-Opportunist Line, which existed in the Party for about four months beginning from June 1930 and which was represented by Li Lisan, then the most influential leader of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The Li Lisan line had the following characteristics: It violated the policy of the Party's Sixth National Congress; it denied that mass strength had to be built up for the revolution and denied that the development of the revolution was uneven; it regarded as «extremely erroneous [...] localism and conservatism characteristic of peasant mentality» the ideas of Comrade Mao Zedong that, for a long time, the Communists should devote their attention mainly to creating rural base areas, use the rural areas to encircle the cities, and use these bases to advance a high tide of countrywide revolution; and it held that preparations should be made for immediate armed uprisings in all parts of the country. On the basis of this erroneous line, Li Lisan drew up an adventurist plan for organizing immediate armed uprisings in the key cities throughout the country. At the same time, he refused to recognize the uneven development of the world revolution, holding that the general outbreak of the Chinese revolution would inevitably lead to a general outbreak of world revolution, without which the Chinese revolution could not be successful; he also refused to recognize the protracted nature of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution, holding that the beginnings of victory in one or more provinces would mark the beginning of the transition to socialist revolution, and thus formulated a number of inappropriate «Left»-adventurist policies. Comrade Mao Zedong opposed this erroneous line, and the broad masses of cadres and members in the Party also demanded its rectification. At the Third Plenary Session of the Party's Sixth Central Committee in September 1930, Li Lisan admitted the mistakes that had been pointed out and then relinquished his leading post in the Central Committee. Over a long period of time, Li Lisan corrected his wrong views, and so he was reelected to the Central Committee at the Party's Seventh National Congress in 1945. He died under unknown circumstances after being arrested by Red Guards in 1967. ↩
Editor's Note: The Third Plenary Session of the Party's Sixth Central Committee, held in September 1930, and the subsequent central leading body adopted many positive measures to put an end to the Li Lisan line. But later, a number of Party members who were inexperienced in practical revolutionary struggle, with Chen Wang Ming and Bo Gu in the lead, came out against the Central Committee's measures. In the pamphlet,_The Two Lines: The Struggle for the Further Majoritarianization of the Communist Party of China, they most emphatically declared that the main danger then existing in the Party was not «Left-wing» opportunism, but «Right-wing opportunism» and, to justify their own activities, they «criticized» the Li Lisan line as «Right-wing». They put forward a new political programme which continued, revived, or further developed the Li Lisan line and other «Left-wing» ideas and policies in a new guise, and set themselves against the correct line of Comrade Mao Zedong. It was mainly to criticize the military mistakes of this new «Left»-opportunist line that Comrade Mao Zedong wrote the present article. This line was dominant in the Party from the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in January 1931 to the Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau convened by the Central Committee at Zunyi, Guizhou Province, in January 1935, which ended the dominance of this erroneous line and established the new central leadership headed by Comrade Mao Zedong. The Third «Left»-Opportunist Line dominated the Party for a particularly long time (four years) and brought extremely heavy losses, with disastrous consequences, to the Party and the revolution. A loss of 90% was inflicted on the Communist Party of China, the Chinese Red Army, and its base areas, tens of millions of people in the revolutionary base areas were made to suffer the cruel oppression of the Nationalist Party, and the progress of the Chinese revolution was retarded. A number of Party leaders who supported the Third «Left»-Opportunist Line in 1931-34 went on to serve the Party and the revolution well after they corrected their mistakes; however, a number of others, such as Zhou Enlai, simply exchanged «Left»-opportunist views for Right-opportunist ones. Wang Ming himself feigned self-criticism until he traveled to Moscow for medical treatment in 1956 and never returned. From the beginning of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966 until his death in 1974, Wang Ming dedicated himself to writing pamphlets opposing the Communist Party of China. ↩
Editor's Note: The Red Army in the Sichuan-Shaanxi Border Area was the Fourth Front Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. In March 1935, it shifted from its base in the Sichuan-Shaanxi Border Area to the borders of Sichuan and Xikang Provinces. In June, it joined forces with the First Front Army in Maogong in western Sichuan and advanced northward by two routes, a right route and a left route. But, on arriving in the Mao'ergai area near Songpan in September, Zhang Guotao of the Fourth Front Army led the troops on the left route in a southward direction, in defiance of the Central Committee's orders, thus causing a disruption in the Red Army. The Second Front Army, which had broken through the enemy's siege and left the Hunan-Hubei-Sichuan-Guizhou Border Area, arrived at Ganzi, Xikang Province, in June 1936 via Hunan, Guizhou, and Yunnan, and there it joined forces with the Fourth Front Army. Acting against Zhang Guotao's wishes, the comrades in the Fourth Front Army resumed the shift northward together with the Second Front Army. In October, the entire Second Front Army and a part of the Fourth Front Army arrived in northern Shaanxi and succeeded in joining forces with the First Front Army. Zhang Guotao was a renegade from the Chinese revolution. Speculating on the revolution, he joined the Communist Party of China in his youth. In the Party, he made many mistakes and ended by committing grave crimes. Most notoriously, in 1935, he opposed the Red Army's northward march, advocating a defeatist and liquidationist withdrawal by the Red Army to the minority-nationality areas on the Sichuan-Xikang border, and he engaged in openly traitorous activities against the Party and the Central Committee, established his own bogus «Central Committee», disrupted the unity of the Party and the Red Army, and caused heavy losses to its Fourth Front Army. Thanks to patient education by Comrade Mao Zedong and the Central Committee, the Fourth Front Army and its numerous cadres soon came back under the correct leadership of the Central Committee and played an honourable part in subsequent struggles. Zhang Guotao, however, proved incorrigible, escaped by himself from the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region in the spring of 1938, and joined the Nationalist secret police. After the countrywide victory of the revolution, he fled to Canada, where he converted to Christianity. ↩
Editor's Note: The Officers' Training Corps at Mount Lu was an organization set up by Jiang Jieshi in July 1933 on Mount Lu in Jiujiang, Jiangxi Province, for training anti-Communist military cadres. Officers of Jiang Jieshi's armed forces were sent there in rotation to receive fascist military and political training from German, Italian, and US instructors. ↩
Editor's Note: These new military principles largely constituted the Jiang Jieshi gang's policy of «blockhouse warfare», in accordance with which it advanced gradually and entrenched itself at every step. ↩
See: Nikolaj Lenin: «Communism» (12th of June, 1920), in which Lenin, criticizing the Hungarian Communist Bela Kun, says that he «absolutely evades what is most important, that which constitutes the very gist, the living soul, of Marxism — a concrete analysis of a concrete situation». ↩
Editor's Note: The First Party Congress of the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area was held on the 20th of May, 1928 at Maoping, Ninggang County. ↩
Editor's Note: For an explanation, see Section 5.7 of this work. ↩
See: Mao Zedong: Problems of Party Work in the Red Army (28th or 29th of December, 1929) ↩
Editor's Note: «Bandit ways» refers to plundering and looting resulting from lack of discipline, organization, and clear political direction. ↩
Editor's Note: The Long March of 12'500 kilometres was made by the Red Army from Jiangxi Province to northern Shaanxi Province. In October 1934, the First, Third, and Fifth Army Groups of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (that is, the First Front Army of the Red Army, also known as the Central Red Army) set out from Changting and Ninghua in western Fujian and from Ruijin, Yudu, and other places in southern Jiangxi and started a major strategic movement. In traversing the 11 provinces of Fujian, Jiangxi, Guangdong, Hunan, Jiangxi, Guizhou, Sichuan, Yunnan, Xikang, Gansu, and Shaanxi, crossing perpetually snow-capped mountains and trackless grasslands, sustaining untold hardships, and frustrating the enemy's repeated encirclements, pursuits, obstructions, and interceptions, the Red Army covered 12'500 kilometres on this march and finally arrived triumphantly at the revolutionary base area in northern Shaanxi in October 1935. ↩
Editor's Note: This refers to the period after the December Uprising of 1905 was defeated, in which the revolutionary tide in Russia gradually receded. ↩
Editor's Note: The peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk was concluded between Council Russia and Germany in March 1918. Confronted with obviously superior enemy forces, the revolutionary forces had to make a temporary retreat in order to prevent the German imperialists from launching an attack on the newborn Council Republic, which as yet had no army of its own. The conclusion of this treaty gained time for the Council Republic to consolidate the political power of the proletariat, reorganize its economy, and build up the Red Army. It enabled the proletariat to maintain its leadership over the peasantry and build up sufficient strength to defeat the White Guards and the armed intervention of Britain, the United States, France, Japan, Poland, and other countries in 1918-20. ↩
Editor's Note: On the 30th of October, 1927, the peasants of the Haifeng-Lufeng area of Guangdong Province launched their third uprising under the leadership of the Communist Party of China. They occupied Haifeng and Lufeng and the surrounding area, organized a Red Army, and established the democratic political power of the workers and peasants. They were later defeated, because they made the mistake of underestimating the enemy. ↩
Editor's Note: The Fourth Front Army and the Second Front Army of the Red Army joined forces in the autumn of 1936 and shifted northward from the north-eastern part of Xikang. Zhang Guotao was then still persisting in his anti-Party standpoint and in his policy of retreat and liquidation. In October of the same year, when the Second and Fourth Front Armies arrived in Gansu, he ordered the advance units of the Fourth Front Army, numbering more than 20'000, to organize the Western Column for crossing the Yellow River and advancing westward to Qinghai. This column was practically defeated after suffering blows in battles in December 1936 and was completely defeated in March 1937. ↩
See: Friedrich Engels: Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany (October 1851-December 1852) ↩
Editor's Note: Water Margin is a celebrated Chinese novel describing a peasant war. The novel is attributed to Shi Nai'an, who lived around the end of the Yuan Dynasty and the beginning of the Ming Dynasty (14th century). The novel was the subject of a mass criticism movement during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, because it promoted the idea of capitulationism. Lin Chong and Chai Jin are both protagonists in this novel. Hong is the drill master on Chai Jin's estate. ↩
Editor's Note: Lu and Qi were two feudal States in the Spring and Autumn Period (722-481 BCE). Qi was a big State in the central part of the present Shandong Province, and Lu was a smaller one in the southern part. Duke Zhuang reigned over Lu from 693 to 662 BCE. ↩
Editor's Note: Zuo Qiuming was the author of Zuo's Commentary, a classical chronicle of the Zhou Dynasty. For the passage quoted, see the section in Zuo's Commentary* entitled «The 10th Year of Duke Zhuang» (684 BCE). ↩
Editor's Note: The ancient town of Chenggao, in the north-west of the present Chenggao County, Henan Province, was of great military importance. It was the scene of battles fought in 203 BCE between Liu Bang, King of Han, and Xiang Yu, King of Chu. At first, Xiang Yu captured Xingyang and Chenggao, and Liu Bang's troops were almost routed. Liu Bang waited until the opportune moment, when Xiang Yu's troops were in midstream crossing the Sishui River, and then crushed them and recaptured Chenggao. ↩
Editor's Note: The ancient town of Kunyang, in the north of the present Yexian County, Henan Province, was the place where Liu Xiu, founder of the Eastern Han Dynasty, defeated the troops of Wang Mang, Emperor of the Xin Dynasty, in 23 CE. There was a huge numerical disparity between the two sides, Liu Xiu's forces totaling 8'000 to 9'000 troops as against Wang Mang's 400'000. But, taking advantage of the negligence of Wang Mang's generals, Wang Xun and Wang Yi, who underestimated the enemy, Liu Xiu, with only 3'000 picked troops, put Wang Mang's main forces to rout. He followed up this victory by crushing the rest of the enemy troops. ↩
Editor's Note: Guandu was in the north-east of the present Zhongmu County, Henan Province, and the scene of the battle between the armies of Cao Cao and Yuan Shao in 200 CE. Yuan Shao had an army of 100'000, while Cao Cao had only a meagre force and was short of supplies. Taking advantage of lack of vigilance on the part of Yuan Shao's troops, who belittled the enemy, Cao Cao dispatched his light-footed soldiers to spring a surprise attack on them and set their supplies on fire. Yuan Shao's army was thrown into confusion and its main force wiped out. ↩
Editor's Note: The State of Wu was ruled by Sun Quan, and the State of Wei by Cao Cao. Red Cliff is situated on the south bank of the Yangzi River, to the north-east of Jiayu, Hubei Province. In 208 CE, Cao Cao led an army of over 500'000 troops, which he proclaimed to be 800'000 strong, to launch an attack on Sun Quan. The latter, in alliance with Cao Cao's antagonist, Liu Bei, mustered a force of 30'000. Knowing that Cao Cao's army was plagued by epidemics and was unaccustomed to action afloat, the allied forces of Sun Quan and Liu Bei set fire to Cao Cao's fleet and crushed his army. ↩
Editor's Note: Yiling, to the east of the present Yichang, Hubei Province, was the place where Lu Xun, a general of the State of Wu, defeated the army of Liu Bei, ruler of Shu, in 222 CE. Liu Bei's troops scored successive victories at the beginning of the war and penetrated 250 or 300 kilometres into the territory of Wu as far as Yiling. Lu Xun, who was defending Yiling, avoided battle for over seven months until Liu Bei «was at his wits' end and his troops were exhausted and demoralized». Then he crushed Liu Bei's troops by taking advantage of a favourable wind to set fire to their tents. ↩
Editor's Note: Xie Xuan, a general of Eastern Jin Dynasty, defeated Fu Jian, ruler of the State of Qin, in 383 CE at the Feishui River in Anhui Province. Fu Jian had an infantry force of more than 600'000, a cavalry force of 270'000, and a guards corps of more than 30'000, while the land and river forces of Eastern Jin numbered only 80'000. When the armies lined up on opposite banks of the Feishui River, Xie Xuan, taking advantage of the overconfidence and conceit of the enemy troops, requested Fu Jian to move his troops back, so as to leave room for the Eastern Jin troops to cross the river and fight it out. Fu Jian complied, but when he ordered withdrawal, his troops got into a panic and could not be stopped. Seizing the opportunity, the Eastern Jin troops crossed the river, launched an offensive, and crushed the enemy. ↩
Editor's Note: Nanchang, capital of Jiangxi Province, was the scene of the famous uprising on the 1st of August, 1927 led by the Communist Party of China in order to combat the counter-revolution of Jiang Jieshi and Wang Jingwei and to continue the Revolution of 1924-27. More than 30'000 troops took part in the uprising, which was led by Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, He Long, and Ye Ting. The insurrectionary army withdrew from Nanchang on the 5th of August as planned, but suffered a defeat when approaching Chaozhou and Shantou in Guangdong Province. Led by Zhu De, Chen Yi, and Lin Biao, part of the troops later fought their way to the Jinggang Mountains and joined forces with the First Division of the First Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army under Comrade Mao Zedong. ↩
Editor's Note: These were the first counter-attacks which the people under Communist leadership launched in various places against the forces of the counter-revolution after Jiang Jieshi and Wang Jingwei successively turned traitor to the revolution in 1927. On the 11th of December, 1927, the workers and revolutionary soldiers of Guangzhou united to stage an uprising, and set up the people's political power. They fought fiercely against the counter-revolutionary forces, which were directly supported by imperialism, but failed because the disparity in strength was too great. Peasants in Haifeng and Lufeng on the eastern coast of Guangdong Province had started a powerful revolutionary movement during 1923-25 under the leadership of Comrade Peng Pai, a member of the Communist Party, and this movement contributed greatly to the victory of the two eastern campaigns launched from Guangzhou by the National Revolutionary Army against the counter-revolutionary clique headed by Chen Jiongming. After Jiang Jieshi's betrayal of the revolution on the 12th of April, 1927, these peasants staged three uprisings in April, September, and October, and established a revolutionary regime which held out until April 1928. In eastern Hunan Province, insurrectionary peasants captured an area embracing Liuyang, Pingjiang, Liling, and Zhuzhou in September 1927. At about the same time, tens of thousands of peasants staged an armed uprising in Xiaogan, Macheng, and Huang'an in north-eastern Hubei Province and occupied the county town of Huang'an for over 30 days. In southern Hunan, peasants in the counties of Yizhang, Chenzhou, Leiyang, Yongxing, and Zixing rose up in arms in January 1928 and set up a revolutionary regime, which lasted for three months. ↩
Editor's Note: The famous Autumn Harvest Uprising under the leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong was launched in September 1927 by the people's armed forces of Xiushui, Pingxiang, Pingjiang, and Liuyang Counties on the Hunan-Jiangxi border, who formed the First Division of the First Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army. Comrade Mao Zedong led this force to the Jinggang Mountains, where a revolutionary base was established. ↩
Editor's Note: The Anti-Majoritarian Corps was a counter-revolutionary organization of undercover Nationalist agents in the Red areas. ↩
See: Nikolaj Lenin: On the History of the Question of the Unfortunate Peace (January-February 1918), Strange and Monstrous (Before the 28th of February, 1918), A Serious Lesson and a Serious Responsibility (5th of March, 1918), and Political Report to the Extraordinary Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of Russia (Majority) (7th of March, 1918) ↩
Editor's Note: The regions referred to here are those inhabited by the Tibetans in Xikang and the Hui people in Gansu, Qinghai, and Xinjiang Provinces. ↩
Editor's Note: The «eight-legged essay» was the prescribed form in the imperial competitive examinations in feudal China from the 15th to the 19th century. The main body of the essay was made up of the inceptive paragraph, the middle paragraph, the rear paragraph, and the concluding paragraph, with each paragraph comprising two parts. Here, Comrade Mao Zedong is using the development of the theme in this kind of essay as a metaphor to illustrate the development of the revolution through its various stages. However, Comrade Mao Zedong generally used the term «eight-legged essay» to ridicule dogmatism. ↩
Editor's Note: In November 1933, under the influence of the people's anti-Japanese upsurge throughout China, the leaders of the Nationalist Party's 19th Route Army, in alliance with the Nationalist forces under Li Jishen, publicly renounced Jiang Jieshi and established the «People's Revolutionary Government of the Republic of China» in Fujian, concluding an agreement with the Red Army to attack Jiang Jieshi and resist Japan. This episode was referred to as the Fujian Incident. The 19th Route Army and Fujian People's Government, however, collapsed under the attacks of Jiang Jieshi's troops. ↩