Problems of Party Work in the Red Army

#PUBLICATION NOTE

This edition of Problems of Party Work in the Red Army has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the following editions:

• On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Vol. 1, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.
• Draft Resolution of the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in the Fourth Red Army, in Mao's Road to Power, First English Edition, Vol. 3, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 1995.

#INTRODUCTION NOTE

This is a resolution drafted by Comrade Mao Zedong at Gutian, Fujian, China on the 28th or 29th of December, 1929 for the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of China in the Fourth Field Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. It was first published in the 1944 Chinese Edition of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong.

The construction of the Chinese people's armed forces was a difficult process. The Chinese Red Army (which became the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies of the Chinese National Revolutionary Army during the War of Resistance Against Japan and the Chinese People's Liberation Army during the People's War of Liberation) was created on the 1st of August, 1927, during the Nanchang Uprising, and by December 1929 had been in existence for over two years. During this period, the Communist Party organization in the Red Army learned a great deal and gained quite a rich store of experience in the course of combating various mistaken ideas. The resolution summed up this experience. It enabled the Red Army to build itself entirely on a Marxist basis and to eliminate all the influences of armies of the old type. It was carried out, not only in the Fourth Field Army, but also in all other units of the Red Army successively; in this way, the whole Chinese Red Army became a genuine army of the people in every respect. In the 49 years after their founding in 1927, the Chinese people's armed forces made tremendous developments and innovations in their Party activities and political work, which came to present a very different picture, but the fundamental line remained the same as that laid down in this resolution until the army was usurped and abused to carry out the October 1976 counter-revolutionary State coup that restored capitalism in China.

#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!

#PROBLEMS OF PARTY WORK IN THE RED ARMY

#RESOLUTION OF THE NINTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA IN THE FOURTH ARMY OF THE CHINESE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' RED ARMY

#Mao Zedong

#28th or 29th of December, 1929

#★

#1. ON THE PROBLEM OF CORRECTING MISTAKEN IDEAS IN THE PARTY

There are various non-proletarian ideas in the Communist Party organization in the Fourth Red Army which greatly hinder the application of the Party's correct line. Unless these ideas are thoroughly corrected, the Fourth Army cannot possibly shoulder the tasks assigned to it in China's great revolutionary struggle. The source of such incorrect ideas in this Party organization lies, of course, in the fact that its basic units are composed largely of peasants and other elements of small-bourgeois origin; yet the failure of the Party's leading bodies to wage a concerted and determined struggle against these incorrect ideas and to educate the members in the Party's correct line is also an important cause of their existence and growth. In accordance with the spirit of the September letter of the Central Committee, this Congress hereby points out the manifestations of various non-proletarian ideas in the Party organization in the Fourth Army, their sources, and the methods of correcting them, and calls upon all comrades to eliminate them thoroughly.

#1.1. ON THE PURELY MILITARY STANDPOINT

The purely military standpoint is very highly developed among a number of comrades in the Red Army. It manifests itself as follows:

• These comrades regard military affairs and politics as opposed to each other and refuse to recognize that military affairs are only one means of accomplishing political tasks. Some even say: «If you are good militarily, naturally you are good politically; if you are not good militarily, you cannot be any good politically» -- this is to go a step further and give military affairs a leading position over politics.
• They think that the task of the Red Army, like that of the White Army, is merely to fight. They do not understand that the Chinese Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution. Especially at present, the Red Army should certainly not confine itself to fighting; besides fighting to destroy the enemy's military strength, it should shoulder such important tasks as doing propaganda among the masses, organizing the masses, arming them, helping them to establish revolutionary political power, and setting up Party organizations. The Red Army fights not merely for the sake of fighting, but in order to conduct propaganda among the masses, organize them, arm them, and help them to establish revolutionary political power. Without these objectives, fighting loses its meaning and the Red Army loses the reason for its existence.
• Hence, organizationally, these comrades subordinate the departments of the Red Army doing political work to those doing military work, and put forward the slogan: «Let Army Headquarters handle outside matters.» If allowed to develop, this idea would involve the danger of estrangement from the masses, control of the government by the army, and departure from proletarian leadership -- it would be to take the path of warlordism like the Nationalist army.
• At the same time, in propaganda work, they overlook the importance of propaganda teams. On the question of mass organization, they neglect the organizing of councils of soldiers' deputies in the army and the organizing of the local workers and peasants. As a result, both propaganda and organizational work are abandoned.
• They become conceited when a battle is won and dispirited when a battle is lost.
• Selfish departmentalism -- they think only of the Fourth Army and do not realize that it is an important task of the Red Army to arm the local masses. This is cliquism in a magnified form.
• Unable to see beyond their limited environment in the Fourth Army, a few comrades believe that no other revolutionary forces exist. Hence their extreme addiction to the idea of conserving strength and avoiding action. This is a remnant of opportunism.
• Some comrades, disregarding the subjective and objective conditions, suffer from the malady of revolutionary impetuosity; they will not take pains to do minute and detailed work among the masses, but, riddled with illusions, want only to do big things. This is a remnant of adventurism.¹

The sources of the purely military standpoint are:

• A low political level. From this flows the failure to recognize the role of political leadership in the army and to recognize that the Red Army and the White Army are fundamentally different.
• The mentality of mercenaries. Many prisoners captured in past battles have joined the Red Army, and such elements bring with them a markedly mercenary worldview, thereby providing a basis in the lower ranks for the purely military standpoint.
• From the two preceding causes there arises a third, over confidence in military strength and absence of confidence in the strength of the masses of the people.
• The Party's failure actively to attend to and discuss military work is also a reason for the emergence of the purely military standpoint among a number of comrades.

The methods of correction are as follows:

• Raise the political level in the Party by means of education, destroy the theoretical roots of the purely military standpoint, and be clear on the fundamental difference between the Red Army and the White Army. At the same time, eliminate the remnants of opportunism and adventurism and break down the selfish departmentalism of the Fourth Army.
• Intensify the political training of officers and soldiers and especially the education of ex-prisoners. At the same time, as far as possible, let the local governments select workers and peasants experienced in struggle to join the Red Army, thus organizationally weakening or even eradicating the purely military standpoint.
• Mobilize the local Party organizations to criticize the Party organizations in the Red Army and the bodies of mass political power to criticize the Red Army itself, in order to influence the Party organizations and the officers and soldiers of the Red Army.
• The Party must actively attend to and discuss military work. All the work must be discussed and decided upon by the Party before being carried out by the rank and file.
• Draw up Red Army rules and regulations which clearly define its tasks, the relationship between its military and its political apparatus, the relationship between the Red Army and the masses of the people, and the powers and functions of the councils of soldiers' deputies and their relationship with the military and political organizations.

#1.2. ON ULTRA-DEMOCRACY

Since the Fourth Army of the Red Army accepted the directives of the Central Committee, there has been a great decrease in the manifestations of ultra-democracy. For example, Party decisions are now carried out fairly well; and no longer does anyone bring up such erroneous demands as that the Red Army should apply «democratic centralism from the bottom to the top» or should «let the lower levels discuss all problems first, and then let the higher levels decide». Actually, however, this decrease is only temporary and superficial and does not mean that ultra-democratic ideas have already been eliminated. In other words, ultra-democracy is still deep-rooted in the minds of many comrades. Witness the various expressions of reluctance to carry out Party decisions.

The methods of correction are as follows:

• In the sphere of theory, destroy the roots of ultra-democracy. First, it should be pointed out that the danger of ultra-democracy lies in the fact that it damages or even completely wrecks the Party organization and weakens or even completely undermines the Party's fighting capacity, rendering the Party incapable of fulfilling its fighting tasks and thereby causing the defeat of the revolution. At the same time, it actually helps prolong the reactionary life of the ruling class. Next, it should be pointed out that the source of ultra-democracy consists in the small bourgeoisie's individualistic aversion to discipline (small-peasant production in the countryside and small-scale capitalism in the cities). When characteristic is brought into the Party, it develops into ultra-democratic ideas politically and organizationally. These ideas are utterly incompatible with the fighting tasks of the proletariat. Objectively, ultra-democracy is really a kind of counter-revolutionary idea. Unless we work hard to correct it and to prevent it from developing freely, people with such ideas will certainly take the road of counter-revolution.
• In the sphere of organization, ensure democracy under centralized guidance. It should be done on the following lines: First, the leading bodies of the Party must give a correct line of guidance and find solutions when problems arise, in order to establish themselves as centres of leadership. Second, the higher bodies must be familiar with the life of the masses and with the situation in the lower bodies, so as to have an objective basis for correct guidance. Third, no Party organization at any level should make casual decisions in solving problems. Once a decision is reached, it must be firmly carried out. Fourth, all decisions of any importance made by the Party's higher bodies must be promptly transmitted to the lower bodies and the Party militants. The method is to call meetings of militants or general membership meetings of the Party branches or even of the columns² (when circumstances permit) and to assign people to make reports at such meetings. Fifth, the lower bodies of the Party and the Party militants must discuss the higher bodies' directives in detail in order to understand their meaning thoroughly and decide on the methods of carrying them out.

#1.3. ON THE DISREGARD OF ORGANIZATIONAL DISCIPLINE

Disregard of organizational discipline in the Party organization in the Fourth Army manifests itself mainly as follows:

#1.3.1. FAILURE OF THE MINORITY TO SUBMIT TO THE MAJORITY

For example, when a minority finds its motion voted down, it becomes very annoyed or does not sincerely carry out the Party decisions. All such behaviour is a manifestation of this type of mistake.

The methods of correction are as follows:

• At meetings, all participants should be encouraged to voice their opinions as fully as possible. The rights and wrongs in any controversy should be clarified without compromise or glossing over. In order to reach a clear-cut conclusion, what cannot be settled at one meeting should be discussed at another, provided there is no interference with the work.
• One requirement of Party discipline is that the minority should submit to the majority. If the view of the minority has been rejected, it must support the decision passed by the majority. If necessary, it can bring up the matter for reconsideration at the next meeting, but apart from that, it must not act against the decision in any way.

#1.3.2. CRITICISM MADE WITHOUT REGARD TO ORGANIZATIONAL DISCIPLINE

Inner-Party criticism is a weapon for strengthening the Party organization and increasing its fighting capacity. In the Party organization of the Red Army, however, criticism is not always of this character, and sometimes turns into personal attack. As a result, it damages the Party organization as well as individuals. This is a manifestation of small-bourgeois individualism. The method of correction is to help Party members understand that the purpose of criticism is to increase the Party's fighting capacity in order to achieve victory in the class struggle and that it should not be used as a means of personal attack.

Many Party members make their criticisms not inside, but outside, the Party. The reason is that the general membership has not yet grasped the political importance of the Party organization (its meetings and so forth), and sees no difference between criticism inside and outside the organization. The consequences of this fact alone will be enough to lead the Party onto the road of destruction. The method of correction is to educate Party members, so that they understand the importance of Party organization and make their criticisms of Party committees or comrades at Party meetings. This is the only way to fundamentally eliminate all irresponsible criticism that has an adverse influence on the masses and disregards organizational discipline.

#1.3.3. SPECIAL TREATMENT OF SOME PARTY MEMBERS

Some Party members do not come to Party branch meetings or small-group meetings, do not present work reports even if they come to the meetings, and detach themselves in many ways from ordinary Party members on the pretext that they are busy. The fact is that they do not want to get close to the masses, and also fear the criticism of the masses. The result is that they become separated from the masses and from the Party. As to this matter, persons responsible for the work of Party branches, instead of rectifying the situation, have shown signs that they are intimidated by these «special» Party members.

The causes of this phenomenon are as follows:

• The Red Army has always suffered from a major mistake, namely, that Party bodies pay very little attention to the discussion of work relating to military affairs. Consequently, they do not urge comrades responsible for military affairs regularly to submit plans for military affairs (such as training, management, battle, and other plans) and reports to Party meetings. As a result, discussions in the Party are divorced from military affairs and comrades responsible for military affairs also forget that they should be guided by the Party and report to the Party. As a result, the military work of the Red Army has become a special sphere of work that is not understood by Party bodies and ordinary Party members. This is not merely a major obstacle to the task of the militarization of the Party, it will also separate the Party from military affairs, creating the danger of the Party being unable to guide military affairs.
• Because of the above-mentioned major serious mistakes concerning the Party's tasks, some comrades responsible for military affairs have become a special category in the Party. At the same time, many comrades responsible for other work have also turned into special persons who do not want to come to Party branch meetings and do not speak even if they come. This is one reason why the life of Party branches in the Red Army is as abnormal and unhealthy as it is at present.

The methods of correction are as follows:

• Party meetings at various levels (from Party branches to the Front Committee) must all put plans for and reports on military work on the agenda for discussion and decision.
• All Party members, regardless of their spheres of responsibility, must attend general meetings of Party branches and small-group meetings and submit work reports, and may be absent only for good reasons.

#1.4. ON ABSOLUTE EQUALITARIANISM

Absolute equalitarianism became quite serious in the Red Army at one time. After many struggles, it has certainly declined to a large extent, but there still exist many remnants. Here are some examples:

• On the matter of allowances to wounded soldiers, there were objections to differentiating between light and serious cases, and the demand was raised for equal allowances for all.
• When officers rode on horseback, it was regarded, not as something necessary for performing their duties, but as a sign of inequality.
• Absolutely equal distribution of supplies was demanded, and there was objection to somewhat larger allotments in special cases.
• In the hauling of rice, the demand was made that all should carry the same load on their backs, irrespective of age or physical condition.
• Equality was demanded in the allotment of billets, and the Headquarters would be abused for occupying larger rooms.
• Equality was demanded in the assignment of fatigue duties, and there was unwillingness to do a little more than the next person. It even went so far that when there were two wounded persons, but only one stretcher, neither could be carried away, because each refused to yield priority to the other.

Absolute equalitarianism, as shown in these examples, is still very serious among officers and soldiers of the Red Army.

Absolute equalitarianism, like ultra-democracy in political matters, is the product of a handicraft and small-peasant economy -- the only difference being that the one manifests itself in material affairs, while the other manifests itself in political affairs.

The method of correction: We should point out that, before the abolition of capitalism, absolute equalitarianism is a mere illusion of peasants and small-scale proprietors, and that, even under socialism, there can be no absolute equality, for material things will then be distributed on the principle of «from each according to their ability, to each according to their work», as well as on that of meeting the needs of the work. The distribution of material things in the Red Army must be more or less equal, as in the case of equal pay for officers and soldiers, because this is required by the present circumstances of the struggle. But absolute equalitarianism beyond reason must be opposed, because it is not required by the struggle; on the contrary, it hinders the struggle.

#1.5. ON SUBJECTIVISM

Subjectivism exists to a serious degree among some Party members in the Red Army, causing great harm to the analysis of the political situation, the guidance of the work, and the Party organization. The reason is that subjective analysis of a political situation and subjective guidance of work inevitably result either in opportunism or in adventurism. As for subjective criticism, loose and groundless talk or suspiciousness, such practices inside the Party often breed unprincipled disputes and undermine the Party organization.

Another point that should be mentioned in connection with inner-Party criticism, apart from subjectivism, is that some comrades ignore the major issues and confine their attention to minor points when they make their criticism. They do not understand that the main task of criticism is to point out political and organizational mistakes. As to personal shortcomings and minor technical points, unless they are related to political and organizational mistakes, there is no need to be overcritical and to embarrass the comrades concerned. Moreover, once such criticism develops, there is the great danger that the Party members will concentrate entirely on minor faults, and everyone will become timid and overcautious and forget the Party's political tasks. Like subjectivism, technical and apolitical criticism in the Party organization in the Red Army will certainly lead to (and has already led to) the worst consequences.

The main method of correction is to educate Party members so that a political and scientific spirit pervades their thinking and their Party life. To this end, we must:

• First, teach Party members to apply the Marxist-Leninist method in analysing a political situation and appraising the class forces, instead of making a subjective analysis and appraisal.
• Second, direct the attention of Party members to socio-economic research, so as to determine the tactics of struggle and methods of work, and help comrades to understand that, without investigation of actual conditions, they will fall into the pit of fantasy and adventurism.
• Third, in inner-Party criticism, guard against subjectivism, arbitrariness, and the vulgarization of criticism; statements should be based on facts and criticism should centre on politics.

#1.6. ON INDIVIDUALISM

The tendency towards individualism in the Red Army Party organization manifests itself as follows:

• Retaliation. Some comrades, after being criticized inside the Party by a soldier comrade, look for opportunities to retaliate outside the Party, and one way is to beat or insult the comrade in question. There are many such cases. They also seek to retaliate within the Party. «You have criticized me at this meeting, so I'll find some way to pay you back at the next.» Such retaliation arises from purely personal considerations, to the neglect of the interests of the class and of the Party as a whole. Such people are only aware of their own existence. Its target is not the enemy class, but individuals in our own ranks. It is a corrosive which weakens the organization and its fighting capacity.
• «Small-group» mentality. Some comrades consider only the interests of their own small group and ignore the general interest. Although on the surface this does not seem to be the pursuit of personal interests, in reality it exemplifies the narrowest individualism and has a strong corrosive and centrifugal effect. «Small-group» mentality used to be rife in the Red Army, and although there has been some improvement as a result of criticism, there are still survivals and further effort is needed to overcome it in the course of struggle.
• The «employee» mentality. Some comrades do not understand that the Party and the Red Army, of which they are members, are both instruments for carrying out the tasks of the revolution. They do not realize that they themselves are makers of the revolution, but think that their responsibility is merely to their individual superiors or to higher-level Party bodies and not to the revolution. This passive mentality of an «employee» of the revolution is also a manifestation of individualism. It explains why there are not very many militants who work unconditionally for the revolution. Unless it is eliminated, the number of militants will not grow and the heavy burden of the revolution will remain on the shoulders of a small number of people, much to the detriment of the struggle.
• Pleasure-seeking. In the Red Army, there are also quite a few people whose individualism finds expression in pleasure-seeking. They always hope that their unit will march into big cities. They want to go there, not to work, but to enjoy themselves. The last thing they want is to work in the Red areas, where life is hard. The consequence of pleasure-seeking is that these people only care about personal interests and not about collective interests or the interests of the revolution as a whole.
• Passivity. Some comrades become passive and stop working whenever anything goes against their wishes. This is mainly due to lack of education about the tasks of the class, though sometimes it is also due to objective reasons resulting from the leadership's improper conduct of affairs, assignment of work, or enforcement of discipline.
• The desire to leave the army. The number of people who ask for transfers from the Red Army to local work is on the increase. The reason for this does not lie entirely with the individuals, but also with: first, the material hardships of life in the Red Army; second, exhaustion after long struggle; and, third, the leadership's improper conduct of affairs, assignment of work, or enforcement of discipline.

In its social origin, individualism is a reflection within the Party of small-bourgeois and bourgeois ideas.

The method of correction is primarily to strengthen education, so as to rectify individualism ideologically. Next, it is to conduct affairs, make assignments, and enforce discipline in a proper way. In addition, ways must be found to improve the material life of the Red Army, and every available opportunity must be utilized for rest and rehabilitation in order to improve material conditions. In our educational work, we must explain that, in its social origin, individualism is a reflection within the Party of small-bourgeois and bourgeois ideas.

#1.7. ON THE IDEOLOGY OF ROVING REBEL BANDS

The political ideology and method of action planning of roving rebel bands has emerged in the Red Army, because the proportion of lumpen-proletarian elements is large, and because there are great masses of lumpen-proletarians in China, especially in the southern provinces.

This ideology manifests itself as follows:

• Some people want to increase our political influence only by means of roving guerrilla actions, but are unwilling to increase it by undertaking the arduous task of building up base areas and establishing the people's political power.
• In expanding the Red Army, some people follow the line of «hiring soldiers and buying horses» and «recruiting deserters and accepting mutineers»,³ rather than the line of expanding the local Red Guards and the local troops and thus developing the main forces of the Red Army.
• Some people lack the patience to carry on arduous struggles together with the masses, and only want to go to the big cities to eat and drink to their hearts' content.

All these manifestations of the ideology of roving rebels seriously hamper the Red Army in performing its proper tasks; consequently, its eradication is an important objective in the ideological struggle within the Red Army Party organization. It must be understood that the ways of roving rebels of the Huang Chao,⁴ Li Chuang,⁵ or Hong Xiuquan⁶ type are not permissible under present-day conditions.

The methods of correction are as follows:

• Intensify education, criticize incorrect ideas, and eradicate the ideology of roving rebel bands.
• Intensify education among the basic sections of the Red Army and among recently recruited captives to counter the lumpen-proletarian worldview.
• active workers and peasants experienced in struggle into the ranks of the Red Army, so as to change its composition.
• Create new units of the Red Army from among the masses of fighting workers and peasants.

#1.8. ON THE REMNANTS OF ADVENTURISM

The Party organization in the Red Army has already waged relatively great struggles against adventurism, but not yet to a sufficient extent. Therefore, though many adventurist ideas and actions have been overcome, remnants of this ideology still exist in the Red Army. In its social origins, adventurism is a combination of lumpen-proletarian and small-bourgeois ideology.

The manifestations of the remnants of adventurism are:

• Blind action regardless of subjective and objective conditions.
• Inadequate and irresolute application of the Party's policies for the cities.
• Slack military discipline, especially in moments of defeat.
• Acts of house-burning by some units.
• The practices of shooting deserters and of inflicting corporal punishment, both of which smack of adventurism.

The methods of correction are as follows:

• Eradicate adventurism ideologically.
• Correct adventurist behaviour through rules, regulations, and policies.

#2. ON THE PROBLEM OF PARTY ORGANIZATION

The problem of the Party organization in the Red Army is now in an extremely grave period. In particular, the quality of Party members is so poor and the organization so lax that they very greatly affect the leadership of the Red Army and the implementation of policies. The Congress has made a special detailed analysis of this problem, and adopted decisions on it. Comrades should stand by the spirit of the Congress and work hard to transform the Party organization. Success can be achieved only if the Party organization is truly capable of assuming the Party's political tasks.

#2.1. ON THE PARTY'S ORGANIZATIONAL LINE

The line for training Party members takes combatant soldiers as its main object. At the same time, non-combatant soldiers, such as labourers and orderlies, should not be neglected either.

One of the important principles of the Party organization in the army is to set up a branch in every company and a small group in every squad. In case the number of Party members is too small among the troops and it is impossible to set up a small group in every squad, platoons may temporarily serve as the unit to set up small groups which assign group members to various squads in a planned manner. It must, however, be clearly understood that this is a transitional method.

The original method for setting up small groups in the Red Army, which consists in mixing cadres and militants, intellectuals and labourers, is very correct. But the various elements, whose work and capacities are different, have not yet been well integrated in a planned way. In the future, more attention should be paid to this point. It is impermissible simply to organize cadres into small groups.

#2.2. ON THE PROBLEM OF LAXITY IN PARTY ORGANIZATION

The present status of the Party organization in the Fourth Army is as follows:

• It has been too easy to join the Party. Many people who are not qualified as Party members have also been pulled into the Party. Officers, in particular, are all dragged into the Party without any conditions whatsoever. As a result, the Party's quality has become very poor.
• The Party headquarters at all levels have resolved problems, but completely forgotten the task of educating comrades in their work. There are extremely few meetings of an educational nature, such as assemblies of militants, joint meetings of Party secretaries and members responsible for propaganda and organization, joint meetings of Party committees and groups, branch meetings, and assemblies of Party members at the levels of columns and detachments.
• General laxity in discipline. Especially when one is responsible for important work and cannot be replaced by others, one can muddle through making mistakes and not be called to order. If one person is treated in this way, others have to be treated likewise. So, discipline becomes generally lax.
• As all officers are Party members, the consequence is that the staff members of all military and political bodies pay very little attention to the work of their social professions, and all believe that the work of their social professions is the same as Party work and that the two cannot be separated. For example, work conferences on military affairs at various levels and work conferences on political affairs at various levels are almost non-existent, and it is held that all affairs can be easily decided by the Party. There is almost no mention of the fact that Party members should play core roles in social and professional work.
• The relations between lower- and higher-level bodies are not close. The reports from lower-level bodies are seldom approved, replied to, or dealt with by directives from higher-level bodies. Higher-level bodies rarely send people to attend the meetings of lower-level bodies. This is certainly due to the imperfections of the organization of the higher-level bodies, but the unenthusiastic attitude of higher-level bodies toward work is also one of the reasons why lower-level bodies receive no directives, or no detailed directives. This is the case especially regarding directives on practical work. For example, when an army unit issues work directives on guerrilla warfare and so on, it generally gives no specific directives. There are certain army units that do not even give general directives.
• Many branch assemblies and small-group meetings are not held on time.

The methods of correcting these errors are as follows:

• The old basis should be rigorously eliminated. For instance, all those who have held mistaken political views, take opium, enrich themselves, or gamble, and who refuse to mend their ways despite repeated warning, should be expelled from the Party, regardless of whether they are cadres or not.
• The qualifications for new Party members joining in the future are as follows: first, they should have no errors in their political views (including class-consciousness); second, they should be loyal; third, they should have the spirit of sacrifice and be capable of working actively; fourth, they should not be bent on enriching themselves; and, fifth, they should not take opium or gamble. Only those who meet these five qualifications may be presented for Party membership. Those who recommend them should first investigate whether those they are introducing genuinely meet these qualifications. When they have been recommended and joined the Party, new Party members should be told in detail about branch life (including the secret work) and about key points that Party members must observe. The introducers should take considerable responsibility for those they recommend. Branches should appoint people to talk to those who will soon join the Party and review their qualifications for joining the Party.
• The Party headquarters at all levels do not exist merely to resolve problems and direct the practical work. They also have the weighty responsibility of educating comrades. All sorts of conferences for educating comrades, as well as other educational methods, such as training courses and discussion meetings, should be organized in a planned way.
• Discipline should be strictly enforced, and all manifestations of laxity in discipline abolished.
• The nature of Party members' social and professional work should be distinguished from that of their Party work. Every Party member (except professional revolutionaries, who have important or special tasks inside the Party) must have one social profession. At the same time, they should do Party work in their social profession.
• The attitude to work of Party headquarters at all levels should be more active than before. The lower levels should present more thorough analyses to the higher levels, and the higher levels should conduct thorough discussions of these reports and make specific replies, and also do their best to send people to attend the meetings at the lower levels. Neither shortage of staff members, weak capacity for work, nor insufficient work time can be used as a pretext to cover up their own lack of enthusiasm and neglect of this work.
• Branch committees and Party headquarters above the branch level should decide every month the material to be discussed by branch assemblies and small-group meetings in a planned way, determine the time of meetings, and closely supervise and promote the holding of these meetings.

#2.3. ON HOW TO CREATE INTEREST ON THE PART OF PARTY MEMBERS IN ATTENDING MEETINGS

The reasons for the lack of interest on the part of Party members in attending meetings are as follows:

• Not understanding the significance of the meetings. The first important purpose of branch meetings is to solve problems. All problems relating to the struggle and to internal affairs must be resolved through concentrated discussions at meetings. Those who do not attend meetings or do not actively express their opinions at the meetings they attend lack understanding of the political significance of meetings, or, in other words, lack interest in the struggle. All those who are enthusiastic about the struggle are definitely eager to come to the meetings and to speak at them. The second purpose is to educate comrades. Meetings not only resolve problems, but, in the process of solving problems, require us to observe the context of problems and study the directives from higher levels, thus stimulating the mental capacities of comrades. Giving a political and relevant character to meetings will give a political and relevant character to every comrade's head. If every comrade is given a political and relevant character, the Party's fighting capacity will become much greater. This is the educational significance of meetings. The fact that Party members in the Red Army do not understand this significance is the first reason why they dislike going to meetings or show little interest even if they go.
• The interest in discussions declines as decisions are adopted, but never applied, and the requests made of higher levels are not responded to for a long time.
• Responsible persons do not prepare properly in advance. They fail to prepare agendas, understand the contents and contexts of the issues, or prepare any comments on ways to resolve the issues.
• The chairpersons casually stop Party members from speaking. When Party members occasionally digress from the subjects under discussion, they are stopped immediately, so they feel frustrated and become silent. When they make mistakes in their speeches, they are not only stopped, but derided.
• A feudal style, rigid and devoid of any liveliness, is applied in conducting meetings. Attending meetings is like being imprisoned.

The methods of correction are as follows:

• Meetings should be given a political and relevant character.
• Comrades, especially new Party members or Party members who lack enthusiasm in work, should be reminded often of the great significance of meetings.
• Decisions should not be adopted in a careless and rash way, and once decisions are decided upon, they should be carried out resolutely.
• Higher-level bodies should be prompt in answering questions from the lower levels. Putting off replies for too long may cause loss of enthusiasm.
• Responsible persons should prepare agendas beforehand and make items of the agenda concrete. Prior research of the content and context of problems should be conducted carefully, and some thought should be given in advance to ways of resolving them.
• Chairpersons should adopt good practices in conducting meetings. They ought to guide the tide of the masses' discussion to focus on a certain problem. But digressions that constitute significant developments should not be stopped in a discouraging fashion; on the contrary, the gist of these developments should be grasped and introduced to all, and new agenda items should be formulated. These are the only ways to make meetings interesting, truly to resolve problems, and truly to realize the educational significance of meetings.
• Feudal procedures for conducting meetings must be abolished. The meeting place of a Communist Party should reflect the positive, lively, and straightforward spirit of the proletariat and incorporate it into the pattern of meetings.

#2.4. ON THE YOUTH ORGANIZATION IN THE RED ARMY AND ITS WORK

In the army, the interests of youth cannot be distinguished from those of adults, and the Communist Youth League does not have special objectives for its work. Moreover, the Party's methods for setting up small groups, taking the squad as the unit, is most advantageous for the struggle. Consequently, there is no need to set up small groups of the League within Party branches.

Since those Party members who are young have sentiments different from those of adult members, they need to receive special education, apart from receiving the Party's general education. Furthermore, because winning over the masses of young workers and peasants is one of the Party's important tasks, there must be special organizations to carry out this work. Consequently, a Party branch should single out those Party members who are under 20 years old (except special cases, such as being responsible for important Party tasks) to form a youth work conference. Such conferences may be held regularly by brigades as a unit in a planned way, but the detachments and columns themselves should also decide on the times to hold such meetings in light of their respective conditions.

In order to plan for the education of young Party members, for methods of winning over the masses of young workers and peasants, and to guide youth work conferences, the Front Committee and column committees may set up five-member commissions on youth work, and each detachment committee and branch committee should have one youth commissioner working under the leadership of Party headquarters at various levels.

#2.5. ON THE RELATION BETWEEN POLITICAL COMMISSARS AND INNER-PARTY WORK

In principle, the Party secretaries of the two levels of brigades and columns do not serve concurrently as political commissars. But, in units that are short of staff members, they may serve on the two posts at the same time temporarily. Higher-level Party headquarters may, on the basis of their observation of the situation and under appropriate conditions, appoint political commissars who are not Party secretaries to be special representatives of the Party. These special representatives have the task of leading the Party's work at specific levels.

#2.6. ON THE PROBLEM OF THE SUPREME PARTY HEADQUARTERS OF THE DIRECTLY ATTACHED UNITS

All directly attached units of the army and various columns may organize Party committees as their highest Party headquarters. The number of committee members ranged from five to seven.

#2.7. ON THE PROBLEM OF THE PARTY AND THE YOUTH LEAGUE IN THE SOLDIERS' ASSOCIATIONS

The soldiers' associations of companies do not form Party and Youth League organizations, and the work is directed by branch committees. The soldiers' associations of columns should set up Party and League organizations under the leadership of column Party committees.

#3. ON THE PROBLEM OF INNER-PARTY EDUCATION

The most urgent issue within the Party organization in the Red Army is the issue of education. The strengthening and expansion of the Red Army and the fulfilment of the tasks of the struggle must all start with inner-Party education. Without raising the inner-Party political level and eliminating various deviations within the Party, it is absolutely impossible to strengthen and expand the Red Army, and even more impossible to shoulder the important tasks of the struggle. Therefore, systematically carrying out inner-Party education, and correcting the past situation of having no plans and letting ideas take their own course, is one of the Party's major tasks. The Congress decides to use the following materials and methods to educate Party members. The leading bodies of the Party should hold more detailed discussions and then proceed to carry out this task.

The materials are as follows:

• Political analysis.
• Discussion of notices from higher-level leading bodies.
• The organizational basics.
• Correction of the eight mistaken ideas in the Party organization in the Red Army.
• Tactics and methods of mass work.
• Socio-economic research in the guerrilla zones.
• Study of Marxism-Leninism.
• Study of social science and political economy.
• The question of the present and future stages of the revolution.

All the above ten items, except some (such as the study of Marxism-Leninism), which are, in fact, applicable only to cadres, are applicable to Party militants.

The methods are as follows:

• Party newspapers.
• Political newsletters.
• Editing various types of pamphlets for educating comrades.
• Training courses.
• Organized assignment of reading.
• Reading books and newspapers out loud to illiterate Party members.
• One-on-one talks.
• Criticism.
• Small-group meetings.
• Branch assemblies.
• Joint meetings of branch committee members and group commanders.
• Assemblies of activists above the level of group commander, taking columns as the unit.
• Assemblies of activists above the level of branch committee secretaries in the army as a whole.
• Assemblies of Party members, taking the column as the unit.
• Joint meetings of secretaries, committee members responsible for propaganda work, and committee members responsible for organizational work, taking columns as the unit.
• Joint meetings of secretaries, committee members responsible for propaganda work, and committee members responsible for organizational work above the level of detachment in the whole army.
• Political seminars.
• Appropriate assignment of Party members to participate in actual work.

#4. ON THE PROBLEM OF RED ARMY PROPAGANDA WORK

#4.1. SIGNIFICANCE

The task of Red Army propaganda work is to expand political influence and win over the broad masses. Only by accomplishing this propaganda task can the overall tasks of the Red Army, such as organizing the masses, arming the masses, establishing bodies of political power, destroying the reactionary forces, and promoting the revolutionary upsurge be fulfilled. The propaganda work of the Red Army is therefore first-priority work for the Red Army. To neglect this work is to abandon the main tasks of the Red Army and amounts to helping the ruling class to weaken the force of the Red Army.

#4.2. PRESENT STATUS

The shortcomings in the content of propaganda are as follows:

• No specific political programme has been issued. (The political programmes issued in the past, such as the «Four-Character Proclamation»,⁷ were not specific.)
• Propaganda and agitation regarding the daily struggles of the masses have been neglected.
• The achievements of the urban poor have been neglected.
• Propaganda addressed to the masses of women has been neglected.
• There is inadequate propaganda addressed to the masses of the youth.
• There is inadequate propaganda addressed to the lumpen-proletariat.
• There is all too little propaganda aimed at disrupting the armed organizations of the landlord class (such as the militia, the Pacification Corps, and the Protection Corps).
• Propaganda does not take account of time and place.

The shortcomings in the methods of propaganda are as follows:

• Inadequacies of the propaganda teams: First, the number of propaganda team members has declined from five for each brigade to three. Some brigades only have one or two propaganda team members, some only have one, and a few units have none at all. Second, the backgrounds of propaganda team members are highly deficient. There are captives, cooks, grooms, and opium addicts. Some people suspected of desertion have been disarmed and forced into the propaganda teams; some have been sent to propaganda teams after they proved incapable of serving as clerks; some are thrust into propaganda teams because they are disabled and are rejected by other work units. Propaganda teams at present have quite simply become rejection centres and are completely incapable of carrying out their tasks. Third, almost all officers and soldiers reject the propaganda teams (at the same time, the dissatisfaction of ordinary people results from the fact that the backgrounds of team members are too bad, and the achievements of their work are too few). «Idlers» and «pedlars of fake plasters» are the names given to propaganda team members by the ordinary people. Fourth, the propaganda teams do not have enough funds. Fifth, there are no plans for the education of propaganda team members. At the same time, the supervision of their work is also inadequate. Consequently, the work of the propaganda teams is really done any old way, and no one cares whether they do it or not.
• Leaflets, proclamations, manifestos, and the like are old and outdated, and the methods of distributing and mailing them are incorrect.
• Wall newspapers are seldom put up. The political newsletters have very brief content, are rarely published, and have small characters that are barely readable.
• Revolutionary folk songs are quite simply non-existent.
• Only a few pictorials are published.
• There is almost no propaganda theatre.
• No clubs that serve the dual purpose of entertaining the soldiers and getting close to the masses of workers and peasants have been set up.
• Verbal propaganda is poor in quantity and quality.
• Red Army discipline is a kind of practical propaganda to the masses. Now, discipline is lax in comparison with the past, and this has a bad influence on the masses.
• Putting back the doors taken down to sleep on, bundling up the straw used for bedding, sweeping the floors, talking politely, paying fairly for what you buy, returning everything you borrow, and compensating for damage are all forms of Red Army propaganda work. At present, these things, too, are done inadequately.
• There are few mass rallies, and those held are not well organized.
• The methods for propaganda addressed to the soldiers of the White armies are not good.

#4.3. METHODS OF CORRECTION

Regarding the content of propaganda:

• A specific political programme should be published and called the Political Programme of the Red Army.
• Propaganda should be in harmony with the fighting spirit of the masses. Apart from issuing general slogans regarding the uprising, there should also be slogans related to daily life that are appropriate in places where the fighting spirit of the masses is low, which can be used to mobilize for daily struggles and link them to the slogans about uprisings.
• The urban poor (the middle and small merchants and the students) are a considerable force in the process of the democratic revolution. To neglect to win over this force is the same as handing it over to the evil gentry and the bourgeoisie. In the future, in-depth propaganda work should be conducted among the masses of middle and small merchants and of students in the cities with the purpose of winning them over.
• Women comprise one half of the population. The economic status of working women and the fact of their being specially oppressed prove, not only that women urgently need revolution, but also that they are a decisive force in the success or failure of the revolution. In the future, there should be practical slogans for women, and widespread propaganda should be carried out among them.
• The masses of working youth make up over 30% of the population. They are also the bravest and most resolute in the struggle. Therefore, propaganda aimed at winning over the masses of the youth is a significant task in propaganda work as a whole.
• If the broad masses of lumpen-proletarians in China stand on the side of the revolutionary classes, they become instruments of the revolution. If they stand on the side of the reactionary classes, they become instruments of the counter-revolution. So, to win over the masses of lumpen-proletarians from under the influence of the reactionary classes is one of the tasks of the Party's propaganda. In conducting propaganda work, the different lifestyles and characters of various groups of such masses should be noted, and different forms of propaganda should be carried out accordingly.
• Destroying the armed organizations of the landlord class and winning over the masses under their influence is one of the conditions for the victory of the agrarian revolution in the countryside. In the future, special attention should be paid to the propaganda work among the members of the militia, the Pacification Corps, and the Protection Corps.
• Wherever one goes, one should have propaganda and agitation slogans appropriate to that place. Furthermore, there should also be different slogans that are formulated for different times (for example, the Autumn Harvest Festival, both New Year's Festivals, the war between Jiang Jieshi and the Guangxi clique, and the struggle between Jiang Jieshi and Wang Jingwei).

Regarding the methods of propaganda:

• The significance of the propaganda teams of the Red Army is that they are important instruments of the propaganda work of the Red Army. If the propaganda teams are not well organized, a large part of the propaganda work of the Red Army is wasted. Therefore, the problem of reorganizing and educating propaganda teams is one of the tasks to which the Party must devote greater efforts at present. The first step in this work is to correct, from a theoretical standpoint, the attitude of looking down on propaganda work and the propaganda teams, which is widespread among officers and soldiers. From now on, strange names, such as «idlers» and «pedlars of fake plasters», should be abolished. As to the organization of the propaganda teams, the detachments constitute units, and troops directly under the army or columns constitute units. Every unit organizes a propaganda team with one director, one deputy director, 16 propagandists, one porter (carrying propaganda materials), and two persons running errands. The propagandists of each team are divided into several branches (the number of branches is determined by the number of brigades or other units and bodies). Every branch has one branch director and three propagandists. The propaganda teams of all detachments are under the command of the detachment political commissars. When various brigades are scattered in the course of guerrilla warfare, every brigade should dispatch a propaganda team branch to accompany them in their work under the command of the brigade political commissar. The propaganda teams of directly attached troops are under the leadership of the director of the propaganda sections of the political department. All propaganda teams of the whole columns are led by the propaganda sections of the political departments of the columns. The propaganda teams of the whole army are led by the propaganda section of the army political department. The expenses of the propaganda teams are paid by the political departments, and sufficient funds should be provided. Ways to transform the composition of propaganda team members include, apart from asking local government bodies to select and send progressive elements to join the Red Army propaganda teams, outstanding elements (as far as possible, not squad commanders) from the soldiers of various armed units may be chosen as propaganda team members. The political departments should frequently make plans for educating the propaganda teams, specifying educational materials, methods, times, teachers, and so on, in an active effort to improve the quality of the propaganda team members.
• The old leaflets, newsletters, manifestos, and other propaganda materials should be reviewed, and new ones should be drafted quickly. The appropriateness and effectiveness of the distribution of propaganda materials must be an important aspect of the problem of propaganda methods. Whether to mail propaganda materials by inserting them in packages for mailing, or by stamping propaganda and agitation slogans on the packages, is a matter to which the political bodies should pay attention and which should be dealt with properly.
• Wall newspapers are one of the important methods of carrying out propaganda among the masses. The army and the columns serve as the units for running wall newspapers. The propaganda sections of the political departments are responsible for them, and the name of all the newspapers should be Current Affairs Newsletter. The contents are: first, international and domestic political news; second, the situation of the mass struggle in the guerrilla zones; and, third, the situation of the work of the Red Army. There should be at least one issue every week. The newspapers should all be written on large sheets of paper and do not need to be mimeographed. Each time, as many pages as possible should be produced. In editing and printing the political newsletter, attention should be paid to the following points: first, it should be put out quickly; second, it should be rich in content; and, third, the characters should be a bit bigger and clearer.
• The various political departments are responsible for collecting and editing revolutionary folk songs that express the different sentiments of the masses. The editorial committee of the army political department has the responsibility for supervising, promoting, and researching this work.
• The artistic unit of the propaganda section of the army political department should be fully developed and should publish lithographed or mimeographed pictorials. In order to strengthen the artistic unit of the army, the painting talents of the whole army should be concentrated and work together.
• Propaganda theatre is the most concrete and most effective method of propaganda, and all propaganda teams of various departments and various directly attached troops should establish theatrical propaganda units to organize and direct the propaganda theatre toward the masses.
• With the company as the unit, soldiers' associations may set up their own clubs.
• Propaganda teams should have verbal propaganda units and written propaganda units to research and lead verbal and written propaganda methods.
• The «Three Main Rules of Discipline» must be strictly observed.
• The political departments and propaganda teams should hold various kinds of mass rallies in a planned and organized way. The order of rallies, speakers, subjects of speeches, and speaking times should be decided in advance.
• Propaganda directed at the White soldiers and lower-ranking White officers is extremely important. In the future, attention should be paid to the following methods: First, the language of propaganda should be simple and concise, to enable them to finish reading in an instant, and should be epigrammatic, so as to leave an impression on them. Second, apart from writing, in a planned way, slogans appropriate to the reality of certain armed units along the two sides of roads where the enemy often passes, leaflets should be stored with the Party headquarters and mass organizations along the roads and be distributed to the enemy troops ingeniously when they pass. Third, the names of enemy officers and soldiers and the numbers of the enemy units to which they belong may be learned from the captured officers and soldiers and from the inspection of the mail. Propaganda materials should then be mailed to them, or letters should be written to them. Fourth, lenient treatment of captured enemy soldiers is an extremely effective method for conducting propaganda directed at enemy troops. Methods of lenient treatment of captured soldiers include: first, that there should be no body searches for money and other objects, and that the past practice of body searches of captured soldiers for money and other objects by Red Army soldiers should be resolutely abolished; second, captured soldiers should be warmly and enthusiastically welcomed, so as to make them feel happy in their minds, and any verbal or physical humiliation of the captured soldiers should be opposed; third, captured soldiers should enjoy the same material treatment as the old soldiers; and, fourth, if they do not want to stay, they will be let go with travel expenses paid after they have been exposed to propaganda, so that they may spread the influence of the Red Army in the White Army; the practice of forcibly keeping those who are unwilling to stay in order to satisfy the greed for more soldiers should be opposed. All these four points are entirely applicable to captured officers, except in special circumstances. Fifth, providing medical treatment for wounded enemy soldiers is also a very effective method for conducting propaganda directed toward the enemy troops. The medical treatment of wounded enemy soldiers and the money issued to them should be exactly the same as those of the wounded Red Army soldiers. Advantage should be taken of all possible circumstances to send the enemy wounded back to the enemy army after they are given medicine and money. The treatment of the wounded enemy officers is also the same.

#5. ON THE PROBLEM OF THE POLITICAL EDUCATION OF SOLDIERS

#5.1. MATERIALS

Textbooks should be very artistically compiled on the following topics, to be used as educational materials for soldiers:

• Analysis of the current political situation and the tasks and plans of the Red Army.
• Various aspects of the agrarian revolution.
• Armed organizations and their tactics.
• The reasons for developing the «Three Main Rules of Discipline».
• Roll-call slogans for mornings and evenings.
• The literacy movement.
• How to carry out mass work.
• Item-by-item explanations of Red Army slogans.
• The correction of various deviations.
• The Soviet Red Army.
• The present and future stages of the revolution.
• Comparison between the Red Army and the White armies.
• Comparison between the Communist Party and the Nationalist Party.
• Revolutionary stories.
• Stories about social evolution.
• Hygiene.
• Basic knowledge of the geography, politics, and economy of the guerrilla zones.
• Revolutionary songs.
• Pictorials and newspapers.

#5.2. METHODS

Attending political courses:

• The courses are divided into ordinary, special, and cadres' courses. There are two kinds of ordinary courses: When the whole detachment is in one place, the detachment constitutes the unit for attending courses, and the political commissars of the detachments serve as course directors. The political commissars of the companies serve as teachers of different courses. Apart from combatant soldiers, who should take the courses, messengers, orderlies, permanent labourers, grooms, and cooks should all attend the courses. The objective of the ordinary courses is to enable ordinary soldiers to gain elementary political knowledge.
• A special course is formed with the detachment as the unit by selecting through examination 50 soldiers from various brigades who have some degree of literacy and a little basic political knowledge. Detachment political commissars serve as head teachers, and brigade political commissars teach various classes. The objective of special courses is to produce talented people with political knowledge higher than that taught in ordinary courses, so that in the future they may be promoted to serve as lower-ranking cadres.
• Cadres' courses are formed with the column as the unit. Troops directly attached to armies may also constitute a unit. Cadres' courses are composed of company commanders, deputy company commanders, squadron commanders and deputy squadron commanders, junior officers at all levels, and other designated persons. The objective is to raise the existing political level of the lower-ranking cadres to enable them to lead the masses and to become middle-ranking cadres in the future. The teachers are the political commissars, the directors of the column political departments, the column commanders, and other capable persons.
• Committees on political education should be organized with detachments as the unit. The organizers are those political commissars and military commanders of detachments who are capable of acting as political instructors. The political commissars of detachments should be the directors. The task is to discuss various issues about the political education of soldiers within the detachments.
• Political education among the troops directly attached to armies and various columns should be conducted by the committees on political education organized by the political propaganda sections of the army and various columns.
• The methods of teaching are: first, stimulating methods (abolish stuffing methods); second, proceed from near to far; third, proceed from the easy to the difficult; fourth, speak in popular language (new words should be explained in an easily understandable way); fifth, speak clearly; sixth, speak with humour; seventh, gesture to assist speaking; eighth, review previously learned concepts; ninth, prepare study guides; tenth, cadres' courses should adopt the form of discussions.

Speeches at roll call in the mornings and evenings should be limited to no more than half an hour at a time. They should report political news, criticize daily life, and explain the political slogans of the week.

Speeches at assemblies should be held once a week for detachments and once every two weeks for columns; those for the whole army are flexible. The content of every speech must be decided, speakers must be appointed, and the times of speeches must be apportioned through discussion between political work bodies and military work bodies. Everyone must attend all talks, except those on duty. Lower-level political bodies must report to higher-level political bodies about the influence of the content of each speech on the masses.

One-on-one talks must be conducted with the following types of people: those who have erroneous tendencies; those who have been punished; wounded soldiers; sick soldiers; new soldiers; captured soldiers; those who do not like their work; and those who are ideologically vacillating. Before holding talks, the psychology and environment of the objects of talks should be researched. During the talks, one should take a comradely stand, and speak to the person sincerely. After the talks, the gist and impact of the talks must be recorded.

As to recreational activities, the following should be carried out with the company as the unit in order to strengthen the work of the entertainment departments of the soldiers' associations: hide and seek, and so on; football; music; martial arts; drag performances; and old operas. Every propaganda team should set up a propaganda theatre troupe. The equipment expenses of recreational activities are paid with public funds (the expenses of brigades are approved by the political departments of the columns).

In order to improve treatment, we must resolutely abolish corporal punishment, abolish insults and curses, give preferential treatment to wounded soldiers, and restore the system of issuing 0,4 silver yuan every month for straw shoes.

How to conduct special education for new and captured soldiers:

• Inform new and captured soldiers of the customs of life in the Red Army, such as the following: first, equality between the lives of officers and soldiers (there are only differences of duty, but no class differences between officers and soldiers, the officers do not form an exploiting class, and the soldiers do not form an exploited class); second, the «Three Main Rules of Discipline» and their rationale; third, the significance and functions of the soldiers' associations; fourth, the economic systems in the Red Army (economic resources, managerial and economic organizations, economic transparency, and the system of inspection by soldiers); fifth, the management of company messes, sub-messes, and their surpluses by economic committees; sixth, abolishing corporal punishment and insults; and, seventh, lenient treatment of captured soldiers.
• Explain in outline the history of the Red Army.
• The guiding principles of the Red Army should be explained in detail to captured soldiers: first, the differences between the Red Army and the White Army; second, the differences between the Red Army and the bandits; and, third, the three great tasks of the Red Army, that is, to mobilize, to fight, and to produce.
• Explain the organizational systems of the Red Army.
• Explain basic political knowledge, such as the following: first, the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party; second, the aggression against China by the three big imperialist countries of Britain, Japan, and the United States; third, the fighting among the various warlord cliques under imperialist leadership; fourth, redistribution of land; fifth, the Council Power; and, sixth, the Red Guards.

#6. ON THE PROBLEM OF SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR YOUNG SOLDIERS

The political departments of various columns are responsible for compiling literacy textbooks for the youth (using as reference materials the primary-school textbooks of the Commercial Press, The Common People's 1'000-Character Textbook, the textbooks compiled by the Longyan Cultural Society, and so on).

Every column should set up an internal school for young soldiers with three to four classes. Every detachment forms one class and every directly attached unit has one class. The number of students for each class should not exceed 25 persons. The director of the political department should be the principal of the school, and the director of the propaganda section should be the dean. Each class has a head teacher and should complete 90 hours of instruction as one semester.

Paper, pen, ink, and other supplies shall be purchased with public funds and issued to students for free.

#7. ON THE PROBLEM OF ABOLISHING CORPORAL PUNISHMENT

#7.1. ON THE EFFECTS OF USING CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN THE RED ARMY

The units that have the severest beatings are hated by soldiers the most and have the most numerous deserters. The most obvious examples are the following:

• A certain officer of the Eighth Detachment of the Third Column liked to beat people. As a result, not only did all the dispatchers and cooks run away, but the quartermaster sergeant and the adjutant also ran away.
• For a time, there was a company commander in the 25th Brigade of the Ninth Detachment who took extreme pleasure in hitting people and was called the «Blacksmith» by the masses. Consequently, the soldiers felt that they had no way out and were full of resentment and hate. Only when this company commander was transferred elsewhere were the soldiers liberated.
• The beatings in the Third Company of the Special Task Detachment led to the desertion of four cooks, a director of the special task force, and two squad commanders with long experience of struggle. One of the squad commanders by the name of Xie Wencheng left behind a letter before he went away, explaining that he was not a counter-revolutionary and fled only because he could no longer stand the oppression.
• In the early period of the founding of the Fourth Column, the column commanders transferred from the Second and Third Columns were bent on beating soldiers brutally. As a result, the soldiers deserted one after another, and finally these officers themselves could not maintain their foothold there and had to leave the Fourth Column.
• The Second Column has more deserters than any other column. Although there is more than one cause, one of the most important is that the majority of lower-ranking officers of the Second Column have the worst habit of beating people up. In the Second Column, there have been three cases of suicide (one platoon commander and two soldiers). This is the biggest blemish on the Red Army and has the gravest significance. It must be acknowledged that this results from the particular prevalence of the practice of beating people in the Second Column. The outcry of the ordinary soldiers in the Red Army now is: «Officers not only beat soldiers, they beat them to death!» Such expressions of the anger, resentment, and hatred of the masses truly deserve our most serious attention.

#7.2. ON THE ORIGIN OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT AND THE REASONS FOR ABOLISHING IT

In order to maintain their feudal exploitation, the feudal classes have to use the cruelest punishment as a tool to suppress the resistance and rebellion of the oppressed. This is the reason why corporal punishment is a product of the feudal era. As the economy develops and progresses to the capitalist system, Liberalism must be put forward to promote the individuality of the masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers, to strengthen their working and fighting capacity, and to create the conditions for capitalist development. Therefore, all capitalist States have generally abolished corporal punishment, and the strange phenomenon of beating people has long ceased to exist in their armies. As the economy develops toward the birth of socialism, and the class struggle intensifies, the worker and peasant classes overthrow the political power of the ruling class and the exploitation based on this power. Only by mobilizing the forces of the broad masses of their own classes can they win victory in this struggle. The Council Power is the political power of the most progressive classes. No remnants of feudalism should exist under it. Therefore, not only has the Council Union long since eliminated corporal punishment in the Red Army, but all of its laws strictly prohibit the use of corporal punishment. The Fourth Army of the Chinese Red Army is a product of a China that still has not eliminated the feudal system. Its main components are in large part transformed elements from feudal and warlord armies. The general ideas and habits of the feudal system are still widespread among ordinary officers and soldiers. So, the habit of beating people and the conventional idea that discipline can be instilled only through fear of beating are still similar to the habits of the feudal warlord armies. Although the slogan of officers not beating soldiers and the stipulations of the soldiers' associations on the right to complain were put forward a long time ago, they are simply not effective. Consequently, distances between officers and soldiers have been created, the spirits of officers and soldiers have been depressed, the number of deserters is increasing daily, resentment and hatred permeate the army, and incidents of suicide have even occurred. This situation runs completely counter to the Red Army's fighting tasks. If it is not corrected quickly, there will be indescribable dangers.

#7.3. METHODS OF CORRECTION

We must resolutely abolish corporal punishment.

A movement for abolishing corporal punishment should be launched. This movement should be carried out among both officers and soldiers, so as to disseminate widely the significance of the saying that «to abolish corporal punishment serves precisely to assist the struggle» among the masses of officers and soldiers. Only thus can officers be made to feel, not only that they will still be able to lead the soldiers after the abolition of corporal punishment, but that this abolition can further benefit management and training. On the side of the soldiers, they will not become more insubordinate because of the abolition of corporal punishment; on the contrary, their fighting spirit will be higher as a result of this abolition. The elimination of the misunderstandings between officers and soldiers will lead to conscientious acceptance of management, training, and general discipline.

After the abolition of corporal punishment, some wrongdoing may occasionally occur because of past habits. We should, therefore, strengthen our sense of duty and try to give play to the spirits of persuasion and voluntary observance of discipline in order to overcome this feudal system, which is most contradictory to our fighting tasks. a few instances of wrongdoing should never be a pretext for covering up the habit of beating people derived from the feudal system. All those who oppose the abolition of corporal punishment under the pretext of occasional wrongdoing, or go slow in the movement to abolish corporal punishment, are objectively obstructing the development of the revolutionary struggle and are in fact assisting the ruling class.

The legal procedures of the Red Army in abolishing corporal punishment are as follows:

• The rules and regulations of the Red Army on punishment shall be amended.
• The supreme military and political bodies shall jointly issue a notice abolishing corporal punishment and promulgate new rules and regulations of the Red Army on punishment.
• After the notice is issued, the military and political bodies should, on the one hand, convene meetings of officers to explain thoroughly the reasons for abolishing corporal punishment and to enable all the officers to support the important reform embodied in the notice and try hard to implement it in their units.
• On the other hand, the soldiers' associations should convene conferences of soldiers' deputies to support this reform and to demand conscientious observance of discipline in the future. In addition, the disciplinary sanctions by the masses should be strict for the purpose of achieving good results after the abolition of corporal punishment.

#8. ON THE PROBLEM OF GRANTING LENIENT TREATMENT TO WOUNDED SOLDIERS

#8.1. ON THE SUFFERING OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK SOLDIERS AND ITS IMPACT

The medical units of all the forces of the whole army are not well established, with few medical officers and little medicine, insufficient stretchers and equipment, and few and incompetent staff members. Therefore, at times, many wounded and sick soldiers cannot obtain adequate treatment or even general preliminary treatment.

The military and political bodies of the whole army have not paid enough attention to wounded and sick soldiers. For example:

• Utmost efforts have not been made to develop medical units, and, moreover, absolutely no attention has been paid to this issue. Meetings of all kinds rarely discuss the issue of health.
• Officers fail to do all they possibly can to comfort wounded and sick soldiers at all times, such as bringing them tea, covering them with quilts, and visiting them frequently. These and other habits are almost non-existent in the Red Army. The officers adopt an attitude of ignoring wounded and sick soldiers or even of loathing them.
• During marches, officers and even soldiers show absolutely no sympathy toward wounded soldiers who fall out of ranks. Not only do they fail to find ways to help the wounded, but they angrily curse them or drive them away ruthlessly.

Supplies and funds for seriously wounded and sick soldiers are insufficient. Seven or eight days after being wounded, the soldiers still have no clothes into which to change. The wounded officers have money for recuperation, but wounded soldiers have none.

The shortcomings of the Jiaoyang Red Army Hospital are as follows:

• It is in a state of anarchy.
• It has a severe shortage of medical officers and medicine.
• Its medical officers sell medicine illegally.
• It is unhygienic.
• It lacks winter clothes.
• It has too few nurses.
• It has poor food supplies.
• It lacks living space.
• It has a poor relationship with the local masses.

All this makes wounded and sick soldiers regard the Hospital as a prison and dislike staying in the rear.

The above-mentioned ill treatment of wounded and sick soldiers has the following impact:

• Soldiers are dissatisfied with the Red Army. The opinion that «the Red Army is fine, so long as one isn't wounded or sick» is very prevalent among the entire body of soldiers and lower-ranking officers.
• The discontent of soldiers and officers will further increase the misunderstandings between them.
• Soldiers and officers are all afraid of being wounded, thus weakening the fighting capacity of the Red Army.
• There are more deserters.
• The masses of workers and peasants are influenced, and their courage to join the Red Army is diminished.

#8.2. METHODS OF CORRECTION

Military and political bodies should never behave as they did in the past and pay no attention to the issue of health, and future meetings should discuss the issue of health.

The organization of medical units should be made particularly sound. Competent staff should be recruited, and those who are not wanted elsewhere should not be stuffed into medical units. The number of staff members should be increased to provide adequate care. The problem of lack of doctors and medicine should be resolved by all means. With regard to doctors, attention should be paid to urge them to examine patients carefully and to avoid rashness.

Officers, especially those at company level, who are close to the soldiers, should frequently visit wounded soldiers, bring them tea to drink, and cover them with quilts at night. If they feel cold, solutions should be found for them, such as borrowing from others or increasing clothes for them. The above methods of taking care of the wounded should become a system, and everyone should carry it out, for this is the best method to win support from the masses.

Concerning wounded soldiers who fall behind the ranks during marches:

• They are not allowed to be cursed furiously or sneered at.
• They should be kindly persuaded and not forced aside with one push when asking them to make way.
• No matter which forces or units they are in and whether they are combatants or non-combatants, all those who fall behind the ranks because of sickness or injuries should be taken care of by sending a person over. If they are seriously wounded or sick, the best efforts should be made to hire helpers to carry them.
• In every march, the rear guard should be patient and bring up the wounded and sick soldiers who have fallen behind and carry back guns and ammunition for them whenever necessary.

In issuing pocket money to wounded soldiers, consideration should be given to the severity of their wound or sickness. More money should be given to the seriously wounded or sick than to the slightly wounded or sick. The very seriously wounded or sick should be given money for recuperation in light of their condition, regardless of whether they are officers, soldiers, or labourers.

Concerning the issue of clothes and quilts for wounded and sick soldiers, besides those provided by the units in the best way they can, requests for donations should be initiated among officers and soldiers in all units. This not only serves to increase the pocket money of the wounded, but is also a good method for awakening the spirit of mutual aid and assisting those in hardship.

The many shortcomings of the Jiaoyang Red Army Hospital in the rear should be corrected systematically. Furthermore, a request for donations (clothes, quilts, cash, and grain) should be launched among the masses of workers and peasants in western Fujian to strengthen the link between the masses of workers and peasants, on the one hand, and the Red Army, on the other hand.

#9. ON THE PROBLEM OF THE RELATION BETWEEN THE MILITARY SYSTEM AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE RED ARMY

Before the establishment of high-level local political bodies, the political and military bodies of the Red Army work on an equal footing under the guidance of the Front Committee.

The relationship between the Red Army and the masses should be as follows:

• All items that have significance for the whole army, such as the issuance of political programmes, should be put out by the military and political bodies jointly.
• Before the establishment of local political bodies, the guidance and supervision of mass work, such as mass propaganda, mass organization, the establishment of political power, confiscation, administration of justice, punishment, fundraising, and disaster relief shall be the responsibility of the political department.
• In areas where no political bodies have been established, the political department of the Red Army should substitute itself for local political bodies until such bodies are established. In areas where local political bodies have already been established, the principle of enabling the local political bodies to handle all matters independently and of consolidating the faith of the masses in them should be adhered to. Only in areas where local political bodies are not well established, and on issues that concern both the Red Army and the localities, may the method of handling matters jointly by local political bodies and the political department of the Red Army be employed.
• Assisting the establishment and development of local armed forces is the responsibility of the political department, and assisting peacetime military training and wartime combat command of local armed forces is the responsibility of headquarters. In both cases, the channel passing through local political bodies needs to be used as much as possible, and direct handling should be avoided as much as possible.

Inside the Red Army, the military and political systems have independent channels for dealing with personnel and administration. When they have contact, such as transfer of personnel and exchange of information, they should interact through official letters on an equal footing.

With regard to courtesy and administration of military discipline, both the military and political systems in their mutual relations should abide by the principle of submitting themselves to the working class, and should not go slow or disobey orders in any way on the pretext that the systems are different.

On matters such as supplies, hygiene, marches, combat, and taking up quarters, the political system should be under the command of the military system. On matters concerning political education and mass work, the military system should be under the command of the political system. But the only way the command is by direct guidance of the subordinate units in the opposite system (the general affairs section or the adjutant's office).

All matters concerning the guidance of fundraising and the determination and spending of funds for political work in the Red Army are under the jurisdiction of the political department and should not be interfered with by military bodies. (The procedure of withdrawing funds is that the political department makes direct contact with the military supplies section.) The expenditures for the Party headquarters should be apportioned by the political department.

Regarding all orders of military bodies, apart from those that must be countersigned by the political commissar, the director of the political department does not need to sign them. All orders of political bodies are executed by the political department independently, and the political commissar does not need to countersign them.