On the Situation

#PUBLICATION NOTE

This edition of On the Situation has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the following edition: A Circular on the Situation, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Vol. 4, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.

#INTRODUCTION NOTE

This is a circular drafted by Comrade Mao Zedong for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Yangjiakou, Mizhi, Shaanxi, China on the 20th of March, 1948. It was first published in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 4, in 1960.

Subsequently, the Central Committee moved from the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region to the Shanxi-Chaha'er-Hebei Liberated Area by way of the Shanxi-Suiyuan Liberated Area and in May 1948 reached Xibaipo Village, Pingshan County, western Hebei Province.

#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!

#ON THE SITUATION

#CIRCULAR OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

#Mao Zedong

#20th of March, 1948

#★

#1

In recent months, the Central Committee has concentrated on solving, in the new conditions, problems concerning specific policies and tactics for land reform, industry and commerce, the united front, Party consolidation, and the work in the new Liberated Areas; it has also combated Right-wing and «Left-wing» deviations within the Party, mainly «Left-wing» deviations. The history of our Party shows that Right-wing deviations are likely to occur in periods when our Party has formed a united front with the Nationalist Party and that «Left-wing» deviations are likely to occur in periods when our Party has broken with the Nationalist Party. At present, the «Left-wing» deviations consist chiefly in encroaching on the interests of the middle peasants and the national bourgeoisie; laying one-sided stress in the labour movement on the immediate interests of the workers; making no distinctions in the treatment of landlords and rich peasants; making no distinctions in the treatment of big, middle, and small landlords, or of landlords who are local tyrants and those who are not; not leaving the landlords the necessary means of livelihood as required by the principle of equal distribution; overstepping certain demarcation lines of policy in the struggle to suppress counter-revolution; not wanting political parties which represent the national bourgeoisie; not wanting the enlightened gentry; neglecting the tactical importance of narrowing the scope of attack in the new Liberated Areas (that is, neglecting to neutralize the rich peasants and small landlords); and lacking the patience to work step by step. During the past two years or so, these «Left-wing» deviations have occurred to a greater or lesser extent in all the Liberated Areas and in some cases have developed into serious adventurist tendencies. Fortunately, they are not very difficult to correct, in the main they have been corrected in the past few months, or are being corrected now. But directors at all levels must make strenuous efforts before deviations of this kind can be thoroughly corrected. The Right-wing deviations consist chiefly in overestimating the strength of the enemy, being afraid of large-scale US aid to Jiang Jieshi, being somewhat weary of the protracted war, having certain doubts about the strength of the world democratic forces, not daring to mobilize the masses fully in order to abolish feudalism, and being indifferent to impurities in the Party's class composition and style of work. Such Right-wing deviations, however, are not the main ones at present; they, too, are not difficult to correct. In recent months, our Party has made achievements in the war, in land reform, in Party consolidation, in ideological education in the army, in building new Liberated Areas, and in winning over the democratic political parties; and it has emphatically corrected, or is correcting, deviations that occurred in these fields of work. This will enable the entire revolutionary movement in China to advance along the path of sound development. Only when all the policies and tactics of the Party are on the correct path will it be possible for the Chinese revolution to win victory. Policy and tactics are the life of the Party; leading comrades at all levels must give them full attention and must never on any account be negligent.

#2

Certain democratic figures, who had believed that a so-called «third road» was still possible and had placed themselves midway between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party, because of certain illusions about the United States and Jiang Jieshi, and because of their scepticism as to whether our Party and the people had the strength to defeat all enemies at home and abroad, found themselves in a passive position in the face of the sudden Nationalist offensive; eventually, in January 1948, they accepted our Party's slogans and declared themselves against Jiang Jieshi and the United States and for unity with the Communist Party and the Council Union.¹ We should pursue a policy of uniting with these persons, while suitably criticizing their erroneous views. In the future, when the Central People's Government is formed, it will be necessary and beneficial to invite some of them to take part in the work of the government. It is characteristic of these persons that they have always been unwilling to have contact with the working people, are accustomed to life in the big cities, and hesitate to come to the Liberated Areas. Even so, the social basis they represent, the national bourgeoisie, has its importance and should not be ignored. Therefore, it is necessary to win them over. Our estimate is that, after we achieve bigger victories and capture a number of cities, like Shenyang, Beijing, and Tianjin, and after it becomes perfectly obvious that the Communist Party will win and that the Nationalist Party will lose, these persons may be willing to come to the Liberated Areas to work with us if they are invited to take part in the Central People's Government.

#3

We do not contemplate setting up the Central People's Government this year, because the time is not yet ripe. After the bogus «National Assembly» elects Jiang Jieshi President² later in the year and he is even more thoroughly discredited, after we score bigger victories and expand our territories, preferably after the capture of one or two of the country's largest cities, and after north-eastern China, northern China, Shandong, northern Jiangsu, Henan, Hubei, and Anhui are all linked together in one contiguous area, it will be entirely necessary to establish the Central People's Government. The time will probably be in 1949. At present, we are merging the Shanxi-Chaha'er-Hebei area, the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan area, and the Bohai area in Shandong under the direction of a single Party committee (the Northern China Bureau), a single government, and a single military command³ (the inclusion of the Bohai area may be delayed for a while). These three areas comprise the broad expanse north of the Longhai Railway, west of the Tianjin-Pukou Railway and the Bohai Gulf, east of the Datong-Puzhou Railway, and south of the Beijing-Suiyuan Railway. They are already linked together in one contiguous area with a total population of 50'000'000, and their merger will probably be completed soon. This will enable us to give strong support to the war on the southern front and transfer large numbers of cadres to the new Liberated Areas. The leading centre of the merged area will be at Shijiazhuang.⁴ The Central Committee is also preparing to move to northern China, and its Working Committee will merge with it.

#4

Our troops on the southern front have all had rest and consolidation from December to February; these troops comprise the nine brigades of the Shandong Army, seven brigades of the Northern Jiangsu Army, 21 brigades of the army in the area between the Yellow and Huai Rivers, ten brigades of the army in the Henan-Hubei-Shaanxi area, 19 brigades of the army in the area between the Yangzi, Huai, and Han Rivers, 12 brigades of the army in north-western China, and 12 brigades of the army in southern Shanxi and northern Henan. The only exception was the main force of the army under Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping in the area between the Yangzi, Huai, and Han Rivers, which had had no rest and consolidation, because Bai Chongxi concentrated his troops to attack the Dabie Mountains;⁵ it was not until the end of February that this force was able to send some of its units north of the Huai River for rest and consolidation. That was our first period of rest and consolidation on a large scale in the past 20 months of fighting. During that period, the methods we adopted were: pouring out grievances by the masses (the wrongs done to the working people by the old society and by the reactionaries), the «Three Checkups» (on class origin, performance of duty, and will to fight), and mass training (officers teaching soldiers, soldiers teaching officers, and soldiers teaching each other). By these methods, we developed high revolutionary enthusiasm among the commanders and fighters of the whole army; reformed or weeded out the landlords, rich peasants, and bad elements found in some army units; heightened discipline; clearly explained various policies in the land reform and the policies concerning industry and commerce and the intellectuals; developed the democratic style of work in the army; and raised the level of our military technique and tactics. As a result, our army has greatly enhanced its combat effectiveness. Except for that part of the army under Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, which is still having rest and consolidation, all our armies in succession have started new military operations since late February or early March and in two weeks have wiped out nine enemy brigades. Of our troops on the northern front, comprising the 46 brigades of the army in the North-East, 18 brigades of the army in the Shanxi-Chaha'er-Hebei area, and two brigades of the army in the Shanxi-Suiyuan area, the greater part fought through the winter, while a part was having rest and consolidation. Taking advantage of the freezing of the Liaohe River, our army in the North-East fought for three months, wiped out 8 brigades and won over one brigade, occupied Zhangwu, Faku, Xinlitun, Liaoyang, Anshan, Yingkou, and Sipingjie, and recaptured Jilin. This army has now begun its rest and consolidation. Afterward, it is to attack either Changchun or the enemy along the Beijing-Liaoning Railway. The army in the Shanxi-Chaha'er-Hebei area has had more than a month of rest and consolidation and is moving toward the Beijing-Suiyuan Railway. The army in the Shanxi-Suiyuan area is comparatively small, and its main task is to tie down Yan Xishan's troops. To sum up, we now have two fronts, the northern and the southern, with ten armies, large and small, comprising 50 columns of regular troops (each equivalent to a Nationalist reorganized division), or 156 brigades (each equivalent to a Nationalist reorganized brigade), each brigade (three regiments) averaging about 8'000 troops — making a total of more than 1'322'000 troops. In addition, there are more than 1'168'000 irregulars (of whom 800'000 are combat troops), including regional formations, regional troops, guerrilla detachments, rear-area military organizations, and military academies. Our entire army thus totals more than 2'491'000 troops. But before July 1946, we had only 28 columns of regular troops, or 118 brigades, each brigade (three regiments) averaging less than 5'000 troops — a total of 612'000; with the addition of more than 665'000 irregulars, the grand total was 1'278'000. It can be seen that our army has grown. The number of brigades has not increased much, but the number of troops in each brigade has increased very much. After 20 months of war, our combat effectiveness has also increased greatly.

#5

From July 1946 to the summer of 1947, the regular army of the Nationalist Party was composed of 93 divisions with 248 brigades; now, it has designations for 104 divisions with 279 brigades. Its dispositions are as follows. On the northern front, there are 29 divisions with 93 brigades, totaling about 550'000 troops (13 divisions with 45 brigades under Wei Lihuang in Shenyang, 11 divisions with 33 brigades under Fu Zuoyi in Beijing, and five divisions with 15 brigades under Yan Xishan in Taiyuan). On the southern front, there are 66 divisions with 158 brigades, totaling about 1'060'000 troops (38 divisions with 86 brigades under Gu Zhutong in Zhengzhou, 14 divisions with 33 brigades under Bai Chongxi in Jiujiang, and 14 divisions with 39 brigades under Hu Zongnan in Xi'an). On the second line, there are nine divisions with 28 brigades, totaling about 196'000 troops (four divisions with eight brigades in the north-western area, that is, the region west of Lanzhou; four divisions with ten brigades in the south-western area, that is, Sichuan, Xikang, Yunnan, and Guizhou Provinces; eight brigades in the south-eastern area, that is, the provinces south of the Yangzi River; and one division with two brigades in Taiwan). The reason the number of unit designations of the Nationalist regular army has increased is that, after large numbers of its troops had been wiped out by our army, and after they had turned from the strategic offensive to the strategic defensive, the Nationalist Party felt its shortage of troops acutely, and therefore upgraded or reorganized many local armed units and puppet troops into its regular army. Thus, on the northern front, three divisions with 14 brigades were added to Wei Lihuang's command and two divisions with six brigades to Fu Zuoyi's command; on the southern front, six divisions with nine brigades were added to Gu Zhutong's command and two brigades to Hu Zongnan's. The total increase was 11 divisions, or 31 brigades. As a result, the Nationalist army now has 104 divisions instead of 93, and 279 brigades instead of 248. But, in the first place, the six divisions with 29 brigades which we wiped out in recent months (up to the 20th of March) now exist only in name; there has been no time to rebuild or replenish them, and probably some can never be rebuilt or replenished. So, in fact, the Nationalist army now has only 98 divisions with 250 brigades, an increase of only five divisional designations and two actual brigades since last summer. In the second place, of the 250 brigades which actually exist, only 118 have not received crushing blows from our army. All the remaining 132 brigades have been wiped out by our army once, twice, or even thrice and then been replenished; or they have received one, two, or even three crushing blows from our army (in the case of a brigade, to wipe it out means to destroy it completely or destroy the greater part, while to deal it a crushing blow means to destroy one or more of its regiments, but not its main strength); and their morale and combat effectiveness are very low. Of the 118 brigades which have not yet received crushing blows, some are composed of recruits being trained at the second line and some are local armed units and puppet troops which have been upgraded or reorganized; their combat effectiveness is very low. In the third place, the Nationalist armed forces have declined in numbers also. Before July 1946, they had 2'000'000 regulars, 738'000 irregulars, 367'000 troops in the special arms, 190'000 troops in the navy and air force, and 1'010'000 troops in rear-service establishments and military academies — a total of 4'305'000. In February 1948, they had 1'810'000 regulars, 560'000 irregulars, 280'000 troops in the special arms, 190'000 troops in the navy and air force, and 810'000 troops in rear-service establishments and military academies — a total of 3'650'000. That means a decrease of 655'000 troops. In the 19 months from July 1946 to January 1948, our army wiped out altogether 1'977'000 Nationalist troops (the statistics for February and the first half of March have not been compiled, but the number is roughly 180'000). In other words, the Nationalist Party has lost, not only the more than 1'000'000 troops it recruited in the course of the war, but also a large number of its original troops. Under these circumstances, the Nationalist Party has adopted a policy opposite to ours, a policy not of bringing its brigades to full strength, but of cutting down the number of troops in each brigade and increasing the number of brigade designations. While in 1946, the average strength of a Nationalist brigade was approximately 8'000 troops, at present, it is only about 6'500. From now on, the area taken by our army will daily expand, and the Nationalist Party's sources of troops and food supplies will daily contract; we estimate that, by next spring, after another full year's fighting, our army and the Nationalist army will be roughly equal in numbers. Our policy is to go ahead steadily and strike sure blows, not to seek quick results; all we are trying to do is to wipe out, on the average, about eight brigades of the Nationalist regular army each month, or about 100 brigades a year. Actually, since last autumn, this number has been exceeded, and from now on, it can be still further exceeded. It should be possible to wipe out the entire Nationalist army in about five years (counting from July 1946).⁶

#6

At present, there are two sectors on the southern and northern fronts where the enemy still has a fairly large striking force and can wage offensive campaigns, temporarily placing our troops there in a difficult position. The first sector is in the Dabie Mountains, where the enemy has approximately 14 brigades which can be used as a striking force. The second is north of the Huai River, where the enemy has about 12 such brigades. In these two sectors, the Nationalist troops still hold the initiative (they hold the initiative in the sector north of the Huai River, because we have moved nine of our crack brigades to the north of the Yellow River for rest and consolidation, in preparation for use on other sectors). The enemy troops in all other theatres of war are in a passive position and are taking a beating. The theatres of war where the situation is particularly favourable to us are the North-East, Shandong, the North-West, northern Jiangsu, the Shanxi-Chaha'er-Hebei area, the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan area, and the vast area west of the Zhengzhou-Hankou Railway, north of the Yangzi, and south of the Yellow River.