On the New Stage

#PUBLICATION NOTE

This edition of On the New Stage has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the following editions:

• The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Vol. 2, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.
• On the New Stage, in Mao's Road to Power, First English Edition, Vol. 6, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 2004.

#INTRODUCTION NOTE

This is the report delivered by Comrade Mao Zedong on behalf of the Fifth Political Bureau to the Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Yan'an, Shaanxi, China on the 12th to 14th of October, 1938. It was first published in the Jiefang, No. 57 (25th of November, 1938).

The Plenary Session endorsed the line of the Political Bureau headed by Comrade Mao Zedong and was a very important one. In discussing the question of the role of the Communist Party of China in the national war, he helped all comrades clearly to understand and conscientiously to shoulder the Party's great and historic responsibility of leading the War of Resistance Against Japan. The Plenary Session decided on the line of persisting in the Anti-Japanese National United Front, but at the same time pointed out that there had to be struggle as well as unity within the united front and that the proposition, «Everything through the united front», which was put forward by Wang Ming, did not suit Chinese conditions. Thus, the error of accommodationism in regard to the united front was criticized; this problem was dealt with by Comrade Mao Zedong in Problems of War, Strategy, and the United Front, which was his concluding speech at the same Plenary Session. Affirming that it was extremely important for the whole Party to devote itself to organizing the people's armed struggle against Japan, the Plenary Session decided that the war zones and the enemy's rear should be the Party's main fields of work and repudiated the erroneous ideas of those who pinned their hopes of victory on the Nationalist armies and who would have entrusted the fate of the people to legal struggles under the reactionary Nationalist rule. This problem was dealt with by Comrade Mao Zedong in Problems of War, Strategy, and the United Front as well.

#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!

#ON THE NEW STAGE

#REPORT TO THE ENLARGED SIXTH PLENARY SESSION OF THE SIXTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

#Mao Zedong

#12th to 14th of October, 1938

#★

Comrades!

I am delivering a report to the Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of the Party's Sixth Central Committee on behalf of the Fifth Political Bureau. What do I intend to say? What I am going to say will be divided into the following parts:

• First, the period from the Fifth to the Sixth Plenary Sessions of the Party's Sixth Central Committee..
• Second, a summary of the 15-month War of Resistance Against Japan.
• Third, the new stage in the development of the National War of Resistance Against Japan and of the Anti-Japanese National United Front.
• Fourth, the urgent tasks of our whole nation at present.
• Fifth, protracted war and protracted cooperation.
• Sixth, China's war against aggression and the worldwide anti-fascist movement.
• Seventh, the role of the Communist Party of China in the national war.
• Eighth, the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China.

These are the problems I want to address.

Comrades, at our Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session, which is being held in critical circumstances of constant artillery fire throughout the country, and a threatening world war, what work do we want to accomplish? What is our purpose? We must definitely unite forever with all patriotic political parties and figures throughout China, overcome new difficulties, and mobilize new forces. At present, we must stop the enemy's offensive. In the future, we must carry out our counter-offensive, in order to reach the goal of driving out Japanese imperialism and establishing a republic of the «Three People's Principles». We must absolutely be free; we must absolutely be victorious — such is our aim, and such is also the overall orientation of my report.

#1. THE PERIOD FROM THE FIFTH TO THE SIXTH PLENARY SESSIONS OF THE PARTY'S SIXTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE

#1.1. THE CONVOCATION OF THE ENLARGED SIXTH PLENARY SESSION

It has been almost five years since the last Plenary Session of our Party's Central Committee, the Fifth Plenary Session convened in January 1934 in Jiangxi. Because the various members of the Central Committee were working in all sorts of different environments, inside China and abroad, we could not get together in one place. This time, except for a few comrades, the vast majority of the members of the Central Committee are present; moreover, many comrades who play leading roles in various places throughout the country are also present, so that this Plenary Session of ours has the largest number of participants of any meeting since the Sixth National Congress. Originally, we were preparing to hold the Seventh National Congress this year, but because of the war and the resulting tension, it has had to be postponed until next year.¹ The current situation has, however, raised a lot of problems, for which we must find clear solutions in order to strive for victory in the War of Resistance. Consequently, we have convened this Enlarged Plenary Session of the Central Committee.

#1.2. THE PERIOD FROM THE FIFTH TO THE SIXTH PLENARY SESSIONS

During the past five years, our Party has experienced many significant events. The biggest and most important are the transition from a situation of opposition between the various political parties, factions, and classes inside the country to the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and the transition from civil war to the War of Resistance Against Japan.

The reason why civil war took shape in the past lies in the unfortunate split in the united front between the Nationalist Party of China and the Communist Party of China that took place in 1927, which was caused by the historical circumstances at that time.

How did the policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front come about? It resulted from new historical circumstances. All of us have already clearly understood that, since the 18th of September Incident in 1931, the enemy of the Chinese nation, Japanese imperialism, has completed the first step of invading the four north-eastern provinces and has proceeded to prepare and carry out the second step of invading all of China. This unprecedented historical incident has brought about a change both in the domestic and in the international situation. First, it has changed and is still changing the domestic relations among all the strata, political parties, and groups; at the same time, it has changed and is still changing international relations. As a result, our Party, on the basis of these unprecedented historical developments and of the changed domestic and international relations, and following the path first adopted long ago in 1933 (on three conditions, to conclude agreements on waging a War of Resistance Against Japan with any elements of the Nationalist Party prepared to cooperate with us), raised this path to the new policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. Hence, we have published our declaration of August 1935, the December Resolution, the letter of August 1936 to the Nationalist Party, and the September Resolution on a Democratic Republic. Moreover, on this basis, we were further able to insist on the principle of a peaceful solution to the Xi'an Incident, which took place in December 1936, and to deliver, in February 1937, a concrete proposal for united resistance to Japan to the Third Plenary Session of the Nationalist Central Executive Committee. Last May, a provisional congress was held (entitled the Congress of Deputies of the Red Areas, participants were representatives of both Red and White areas and of the Red Army), which passed the Tasks of the Anti-Japanese National United Front During the Current Stage and approved the redesignation of the Red Army as part of the National Revolutionary Army, and the transformation of the Council Power into a democratic system. In this way, a change was effectively made from the state of civil war to a new period of beginning to establish the Anti-Japanese National United Front. At that time, the Nationalist Party also gradually altered its policy, moving gradually to a standpoint of united resistance to Japan. If there had been no change in the Nationalist Party's policy, it would have been impossible to establish the Anti-Japanese National United Front. At that time, national-salvation groups had been organized in many places, and other political parties and factions has also put forward demands to resist Japan. Because of the change in policy of both the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party, because of the leadership of Mr. Jiang Jieshi, because of the support of the military and the people of the whole country, and because of the coordination of other groups and political parties, the steps of Japanese imperialism to invade and destroy China encountered unprecedented resistance from the entire nation. After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on the 7th of July, 1937, the whole of China, under the united leadership of the national leader and supreme commander, President Jiang Jieshi, launched the sacred and righteous sound of cannons. All of China formed an unprecedented great anti-Japanese union in the form of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. In the second month after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, that is, in August 1937, our Party issued the Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation. In the meantime, the Eighth Route Army had completed its redesignation and had marched to North China to fight. On the 22nd of September, our Party published an open proclamation about going to save our country from national calamity on the basis of the «Three People's Principles» and the Nationalist Party's slogan of «unity in good faith». On the next day, the supreme leader of the Nationalist Party, the National Government, and the National Revolutionary Army, Mr. Jiang Jieshi, gave a talk in which he recognized the legal existence of the Communist Party and expressed his willingness to unite with it to save the country. Thereafter, the Anti-Japanese National United Front was fully established, with the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party as its basis. In December 1937, in order to consolidate and further develop the Anti-Japanese National United Front, our Party further published a manifesto stating that we were willing, not only to cooperate with the Nationalist Party to resist Japan, but also to cooperate in building the State. Soon after that, the Red Army guerrilla forces in the South were redesignated as the New Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army, and marched to the south of the lower reaches of the Yangzi River to fight. From this time forward, unity in resisting Japan has been progressing daily.

Comrades, this kind of change from the ten-year war between the two political parties to the renewed cooperation of the two political parties, and, moreover, a change that was executed under extremely difficult conditions, thereby laying the ground for the protracted cooperation between the two political parties, has been completed only after passing through many difficulties and setbacks. But thanks to the efforts of the Central Committee and the whole Party, they have been completed at last. The Communist International completely approves of our Party's new political line (see the resolution of the Communist International, published in the Xinhua Ribao [New China Daily] on the 8th of September). Moreover, for the sake of the victory of the Chinese nation, it has called on the Communist Parties and the proletariat of all countries in the world to support China's War of Resistance.

Comrades, if there had been no initiation, establishment, and consolidation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front on the basis of the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party, it would be impossible to launch such a great revolutionary War of Resistance Against Japan, to sustain it, and to strive for victory. Now, all the people of China and the world have understood that the Chinese nation has stood up! After being trodden upon, humiliated, invaded, and oppressed for the past 100 years, and especially after being in such an intolerable position of slavery since the 18th of September Incident, things have indeed changed. The people of all China, holding weapons in their hands, have marched to the battleground of the war of self-defence. The final victory of all China, namely, the dawn of freedom and emancipation for the Chinese nation, is already in sight.

We know that this current great national war of ours differs from all wars in the past history of China, because this war is a war that frees the Chinese nation from its semi-colonial status, from the destruction of the State, and from the extinction of the nation. Moreover, this war is taking place during the most progressive period in the history of the Chinese nation; at the same time, it is taking place in a period when Japanese imperialism is seeking a deadly road and heading for collapse, and also when progressive humanity throughout the world is preparing unprecedentedly broad and deep fighting forces to resist and defeat the despots, the German, Japanese, and Italian Fascists, and to strive for a bright future for the world. The combination of these three factors — the combination of the three factors that have China's progress and continued progress as a basis — will guarantee that our War of Resistance will, without a doubt, be victorious in the end, and that a free and liberated New China will definitely appear in East Asia and become an extremely important component part of the future bright world. Such a China will not only bring happiness to the 450'000'000 Chinese people, but will also bring happiness to all humanity.

#1.3. THE TASKS OF THE SIXTH PLENARY SESSION

This Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session is meeting at an important juncture of the War of Resistance, which is entering a new stage in its development; the Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session has assumed a significant historical task.

It is entirely correct that, after more than a year of courageous fighting in the anti-Japanese war, the entire country has achieved great unity and great progress, and has struck heavy blows at Japanese imperialism. Even though much territory was lost, at the same time, there were also many victories. This is an undeniable fact. As the war develops, primarily due to China's continuous progress, at the same time coupled with Japan's increased difficulties, and international support for us, the final victory will definitely belong to us, not to the enemy. This, too, can be predicted. Whoever fails to see the great achievements in the past and the victorious future will fall into the pit of pessimism and will be unable to extricate themself. But it is not enough to see only this aspect; the War of Resistance has another aspect, its negative aspect, which is the source of many of the difficulties before us. The conditions at present tell us that all of China's struggles, unity, progress, and victories of the past year have not been able to check the enemy's advance and do not have the force to counter-attack the enemy. Wuhan is at present under threat from the enemy; the enemy will also attack Guangzhou, Changsha, the North-East, and so on. Therefore, the people of our entire country are expecting the Communist Party to express its opinions. The new environment has posed a great many problems. Comrades, we must express our opinions and must solve the problems. Yes, our Party long ago expressed its opinions, and many fundamental problems have already been solved. But the new environment requires that we express new opinions and solve new problems.

What are the new problems?

How to add new forces on the present basis, tide over the difficulties, stop the enemy's attacks, and prepare our counter-attacks to reach the goal of driving the enemy out are the keys to current problems. These problems are being discussed and worried about by countless people in the whole country. Should we answer these questions? Beyond a doubt, we must.

These questions have arisen with reference to various aspects and generated many questions.

For example, what exactly has the 15 months' experience of the War of Resistance proved? Has this experience of 15 months proved that the War of Resistance is a protracted war or a lightning war? Is the strategic orientation to defeat the enemy in a protracted war or to defeat them in a lightning war? Will final victory belong to China or to the enemy? Does the War of Resistance offer a way out, or is compromise the way out? If the war is protracted, then what method should be used to sustain the protracted war and achieve final victory? Does the experience of the last 15 months provide a basis for clear answers to all these questions? Furthermore, can the basis of this past experience play a positive role in the new stage of the War of Resistance, allowing us to overcome new difficulties and achieve new victories? These are all important questions and belong to the same set of questions.

To take another example, how will the whole War of Resistance develop and change? What is actually the nature of the new stage? If we assume that Wuhan cannot be held, just what will the trend of the war be? What should be the direction of the future effort of the whole country, that is, the urgent task of the Chinese nation at the present time? What are the good methods that will enable us to tide over the difficult moments in the war? These are even more important problems, and they are problems of another kind.

To take another example, what will the future and the long-term prospects of Nationalist-Communist cooperation be like? What basis does the Communist Party have for talking about protracted cooperation? What is the method of the Communist Party for ameliorating the relation between the two political parties? As for what is called cooperation, not only in the War of Resistance, but also in national construction, what kind of State will actually be founded? What is the relation between the «Three People's Principles» and Communism? These are very important questions, too, and they comprise another set of questions.

To take yet another example, the world situation is so critical; what will its future trend be? What will be the positive and negative relations between China's War of Resistance Against Japan and the worldwide anti-Fascist movement? These are also important questions, and they are yet another kind of questions.

Furthermore, what is the role of the Communist Party of China in the national war? What should be the attitude of Communists when they are fighting to apply their Party's political orientation? What better methods does the Communist Party have for cooperating with different political parties, and for maintaining links with the people, in order to make the difficult situation evolve into a favourable situation? What are the internal relations within the Communist Party like? What are the good methods for uniting the whole Party, in order for it to play its great role during the War of Resistance, and in particular, during the present difficult situation? What will the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party actually be like? These are also important questions, and they are yet another set of questions.

Both inside and outside the Party, all these problems urgently demand a solution. For the last few months, we have been constantly encountering people who demanded answers to these questions.

Comrades, our country is a vast and complex country, and right now, this country finds itself in a life-and-death struggle against a powerful imperialist country. This struggle is now approaching a new stage in its development; it is in the period of transition to a new stage. Our Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session is being held during this time. The responsibility of the Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session is extremely heavy; we have to solve many problems.

#2. A SUMMARY OF THE 15-MONTH WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN

#2.1. WHAT HAS THE EXPERIENCE OF THE 15 MONTHS PROVED?

Let us start from the experience of the 15 months.

What has the experience of the 15 months of the War of Resistance given us? In my view, there are three main aspects. First, it has proved that the War of Resistance Against Japan is a protracted war and not a lightning war; consequently, the strategic orientation of the War of Resistance is protractedness and not quick decision. Second, it has proved that China's War of Resistance can achieve final victory, and that the view of the pessimists is unfounded. Third, it has proved that the single correct road for sustaining a protracted war and obtaining final victory, to which there is no alternative, lies in uniting the whole nation, striving to make progress, and relying on the masses of the people to overcome difficulties and achieve victory.

#2.2. THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN IS A PROTRACTED WAR AND NOT A LIGHTNING WAR, THE STRATEGIC ORIENTATION IS PROTRACTEDNESS AND NOT QUICK DECISION

When the War of Resistance began, many people, judging not from the fundamental comparison between the forces of the enemy and our own forces, but from certain one-time and superficial phenomena, imagined that the war would soon be resolved. For a time, the idea of a quick victory hovered around. Last year, however, on National Day (10th of October), President Jiang clearly pointed out: «This War of Resistance cannot be resolved in a year or so, but must go through extreme bitterness and hardship before we can win final victory.» We also pointed out at a very early stage the protracted nature of the War of Resistance Against Japan, and that it absolutely could not be resolved in a short time: «[...] the war will be very long, but, in the end, just the same, Japan will be defeated, only the sacrifices will be extensive and it will be a painful period for the whole world.»² «[...] it should be realized that the war will be an arduous and protracted war.»³ All these statements point out that the War of Resistance Against Japan is a protracted and not a lightning war, and that the strategic orientation is protractedness and not quick decision. The 15-month experience of the War of Resistance has completely proved their correctness.

Where is the reason for this to be found? It is to be found in the fact that the enemy is strong, and we are weak; that the enemy is in a dominant position, and we are in an inferior position; and that the enemy is an imperialist country, and we are a semi-colonial country.

We pointed out long ago that defeating Japanese imperialism requires three conditions. The first is progress by China, which is the fundamental and primary condition. The second is difficulties for Japan. The third is international support. Let us take a look at what these conditions have already been like during the 15 months of the War of Resistance. In a word, there is already a basis, but it is still very fear from reaching the necessary level.

Take the first condition (the fundamental and primary condition for defeating the enemy). As regards progress by China, after 15 months, there is indeed a basis, but only if there is continuous progress can the enemy finally be defeated. What we call progress by China includes every aspect — domestic politics, military affairs, political party affairs, mass movements, culture, education, and so on. The progress of these aspects has been very notable during the last 15 months. Nevertheless, we still cannot stop the enemy's attacks and execute our counter-attacks simply by using these already existing things. A counter-attack requires a period of preparation, as well as an effort by the whole nation, in which all the vital forces in our nation are mobilized broadly and profoundly. Only thus will a counter-attack and victory over the enemy become possible. Therefore, the doctrine of quick victory has no basis. It leaves out of account the particular characteristic that the enemy is strong and we are weak; it ignores the fact that the enemy is in a dominant position, while we are in an inferior position; and it ignores the fact that the enemy is an imperialist country, while we are a semi-colonial country. China possesses great hidden potential. If it is mobilized, it is sufficient to turn our defeat into victory, to turn weakness into strength, and to change fundamentally the relations between the enemy and ourselves. But this depends on our future efforts; it is not yet an established fact.

The same is true of the second condition, Japan's difficulties. During these 15 months, the enemy dispatched 1'000'000 troops; their casualties amounted to several hundred thousands, and their expenditures reached several hundred million yen; day by day, the edge was taken off their troops' spirit, and their finances and economy became impoverished. Various currents of world opinion have condemned them one after the other, and all of this is the result of Japan's brutal aggression and China's brave resistance. All these existing difficulties for the enemy are, however, still insufficient to stop their attacks and to benefit our counter-attack. We must wait until the enemy has greater difficulties and we have made greater progress; it is only then that the opportunity will come to counter-attack and defeat the enemy. Consequently, the doctrine of quick victory has no basis either in the enemy's situation. The experience of these 15 months has already proved this.

As regards the third condition, international support for us, we have not yet reached the most beneficial time. During the past 15 months, we have gained widespread support from world opinion. The Council Union and other democratic countries, on the basis of resolutions by the League of Nations, have already provided us with a lot of help, proving that we are not isolated. Nevertheless, we must see that the various countries in the international peace front find themselves in different circumstances. In capitalist countries, the people support us, but their governments adopt a neutral attitude to some degree. Their capitalists take advantage of the war to do business; moreover, they are sending large quantities of munitions, and of raw materials for munitions, to Japan. The socialist countries differ fundamentally from the capitalist countries, as has already been shown concretely with regard to support for China. But the international situation does not yet allow them to provide support beyond the present level. Therefore, we must definitely not expect too much from international support for the time being. It is undoubtedly quite wrong to abandon the orientation of self-reliance and place our hopes mainly on external support. The experience of these 15 months has proved that the only correct way is to rely primarily on ourselves, but at the same time not to relax our striving to obtain external support. On this point, our past experience has also negated the doctrine of quick victory.

In general, whether we look at the matter from the Chinese side, the enemy side, or the international side, our experience of the past 15 months has proved that the views predicting quick victory have absolutely no foundation. On the contrary, this experience has revealed the protracted and bitter nature of the war. Therefore, our strategic orientation absolutely cannot be a lightning war, but rather a protracted war. To defeat the enemy in a protracted war — this is the only correct orientation for the War of Resistance Against Japan. Those who did not believe in this orientation in the past have now received a clear lesson from experience, and they should not have any further doubts!

#2.3. FINAL VICTORY BELONGS TO CHINA, PESSIMISM IS ENTIRELY UNFOUNDED

Prior to the War of Resistance, the theory that «weapons decide everything» was very popular. It was believed that China was inferior in weapons to others and would surely lose the war if it were to fight, and that China would surely become another Ethiopia. Although outwardly, talk along these lines disappeared after the beginning of the war, secretly it continued to be prevalent. Whenever there is a critical moment in the war, such a view will manifest itself once again. It holds that China must stop fighting and carry on peace negotiations: China can fight no more, and if it continues the war, it will surely perish. We, however, take the opposite view. We consider that, although China is indeed inferior to others in weapons, weapons can be strengthened by human efforts, and, in the final analysis, victory or defeat in a war is decided mainly by people, rather than by things. The conclusion of a protracted war depends on the efforts of the whole nation. Assuredly, China can gradually overcome its own defects, enhance its own strength, turn the passive into the active, and turn the inferior situation into the superior situation. Meanwhile, the difficulties of the enemy must gradually increase, and, in the international context, aid to us must also gradually increase. Summing up all these factories, we will definitely be able to defeat Japanese imperialism in the end. President Jiang long ago declared: «Since the war has begun, the only way we have is to risk the life of the entire nation and sacrifice ourselves to the end; there is no reason to stop and compromise halfway through.» (His speech at Mount Lu in July 1937.) «This War of Resistance is unavoidable in the course of the national revolution. The war of the invaded nation against the invaders for independence and survival is very different from the usual war among participants of equal strength. Therefore, it does not depend on weapons and military preparation, but instead on a strong and unyielding revolutionary spirit and a strong and unshakable national consciousness.» (His open letter to the nation in December 1937.) The Communist Party of China also long since pointed out:

Japan's economy will crack under the strain of a long expensive occupation of China, and the morale of its forces will break under the trial of a war of innumerable but indecisive battles. The great reservoirs of human resources in the Chinese people will still be pouring troops ready to fight for their freedom into our front lines long after the tidal wave of Japanese imperialism has wracked itself on the hidden reefs of Chinese resistance.

All these and other factors will condition the war and will enable us to make the final and decisive attacks on Japan's fortifications and strategic bases and to drive Japan's army of occupation from China.²

[...] we are confident that, through the efforts of our Party and the whole people, the resistance already started will sweep aside all obstacles and continue to advance and develop. [...]

[...] Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan will be certain provided the masses in their millions are really organized in the national united front.³

All these statements have been borne out by the experience of the past 15 months. The absurd theories of pessimists and defeatists, who believe that China will be conquered because the enemy is too strong to be resisted, that China cannot afford such a war, that compromise is the only way out, and so on, have already been proved completely wrong.

What are the reasons? Because it is only one aspect of the reality that the enemy is strong and we are weak; the enemy still has weak points, and China still has strong points.

What, then, are the weak points of our enemy? First, it is a relatively small country, it does not have enough troops or financial capability, and it cannot afford a protracted drain on these resources. Because of its lack of military forces, and also because, in the face of China's resolute resistance, it must disperse and expand them, it will be impossible for Japan to occupy the whole of China. Moreover, even in the areas it does occupy, it can in reality hold only the big cities, the major roads, and some flat regions. The rest will still be under Chinese control. Second, the enemy's war is imperialist in character and is retrogressive. Its internal contradictions force it to carry out wars of aggression, and, moreover, forced it to adopt an extremely barbaric policy of pillage. As a result, Japan's war has, on the one hand, become a war of absolute confrontation against the Chinese people as a whole, forcing all Chinese, no matter of which class, political party, or faction, to unite together and fight the War of Resistance resolutely. On the other hand, it has also become a war of absolute confrontation against the broad masses of the people in Japan. The eventual consequence of the Japanese imperialists' putting all their troop supply and financial capacity into the war has been the gradual brewing of discontent among the people within the country and among the soldiers at the front. If the war continues to develop, there is no doubt that there will be a trend forcing the broad masses of its own people and of the ordinary soldiers to fight against the war itself in a resolute way. These have begun to be proved in the past 15 months. This point, which exists on the side of the enemy themself, is the most important factor, which will necessarily lead to their defeat. Third, it is precisely because the enemy's war is imperialist in character, or, to put it differently, because it aims to benefit itself at the expense of others, that it cannot fail to put it in a position of confrontation against those countries which have opposite interests. Apart from one or two fascist countries, all countries, and especially their peoples, all disapprove of Japan's war of aggression. Thus, Japan is obliged to reduce its sphere of international activities and is becoming more isolated day by day. This has also begun to be proved in the past 15 months.

Thus, the small size of Japan as a country, which causes its deficiency in military force and financial capability; the retrogressive character of Japan's war; and Japan's isolated international status — these three combined at the same time represent the innate weaknesses and difficulties of the Japanese war. Moreover, these weaknesses and difficulties are still developing every day. The capitulationists and pessimists are blind to all this; they do not see this at all, but instead see only one thing, namely, that the enemy is strong and we are weak. So, capitulationism and pessimism have no basis in the enemy's situation, and the policy of compromise can only be a policy of the destruction of the nation. We believe in the theory of final victory. Our views are based on abundant evidence in terms of the enemy's situation, and the experience of the past 15 months has begun to verify them.

What are our advantages? In the first place, we are a big country with a vast territory and abundant resources, a big population, and big military forces. Although the enemy has occupied our major big cities and lines of communication, we still have big areas of land to serve as our base areas in sustaining a protracted war of resistance and striving for final victory. Even in the enemy-occupied regions, we still have many base areas for guerrilla warfare. This characteristic is utterly different from those existing in small countries, such as Czechoslovakia and Belgium.⁴ This is our first advantage. In the second place, our War of Resistance Against Japan is unlike the wars in all the periods of Chinese history. Our war is a national-revolutionary war and a progressive war. Not only is the character of the war itself progressive, but this war is being waged on a progressive basis without parallel in China's past. China in the 1930s is different from China in any other historical period. We have a progressive people, progressive political parties, and a progressive army, unlike those in any other historical period. The national-revolutionary War of Resistance Against Japan that is being waged on this basis contains within itself great forces that can continue to develop and progress. This is the basis that we have on our side and that will enable us to sustain a protracted war and win final victory. The experience of the past 15 months has proved that the great, sacred national-revolutionary war that is being waged on the original progressive basis has already pushed forward progress in the whole of China. The old, corrupt national tradition is being destroyed, new national progressive forces are growing, and a great process of unification, progress, and development of the entire nation is moving forward to completion. China before the War of Resistance is different from China after the War of Resistance, and everyone with eyes can see this. Furthermore, it can already be predicted that China in the first stage of the War of Resistance (at present, this stage is still not over) will be different from China in the period after the War of Resistance. In the third place, moreover, our War of Resistance Against Japan is not isolated. Even though the capitalist countries are still maintaining many of their contradictory policies, and even though the international situation may temporarily affect the degree of assistance from other countries, China's War of Resistance Against Japan and the worldwide struggle against aggression and Fascism are inseparably linked. It is not only the Chinese who are waging war against Japanese aggression; the Europeans, Americans, Africans, Oceanians, and other Asians are also doing so. The sympathy and assistance from various nations all over the world in the past 15 months have given us this conviction. China, which depends mainly on self-reliance, can at the same time cooperate with the assistance of the world, because the world today is no longer the world of the past. Progressive humanity throughout the world has become one entity bound together by a common cause, and the enemy's attempt to isolate us can only be in vain.

Thus, we are a very big country, our war is progressive, and, in addition, we have international assistance, and these three things are all combined at the same time. These are all favourable conditions for us, and they not only exist, but are developing day by day. Here again, the capitulationists and defeatists are also blind. They see nothing of this and only see that we are a weak country, in an unfavourable situation, and a semi-colony. They murmur their nonsense, such as, «The War of Resistance will lead to the destruction of the nation» and «If we continue to fight, the nation will be destroyed». Among them, many bad elements, on the basis of such nonsense, are secretly carrying out their conspiracies of capitulation and compromise. We are quite different. On the basis of those things that have been proved correct during the experience of the past 15 months, we want to point out explicitly to the entire Party and the entire nation the strengths and weaknesses of our nation and our war, the favourable and unfavourable conditions. Moreover, we must point out that the advantages and favourable conditions are predominant in the war as a whole, call on the whole nation to fight hard, develop our strong points, strengthen our advantages, overcome our shortcomings and unfavourable conditions, and fight for final victory. To whom will victory belong in the end? We now give a definite answer: to China. On this basis, we determine our policies: are we going to fight a resolute war of resistance, or are we going to waver and compromise? We give a definite reply: there must never be wavering and compromise, the only way out is a resolute war of resistance. It is obvious that neither the loss of the four north-eastern provinces, the subjugation of Austria, nor the partition of Czechoslovakia came about because of a war of resistance. It is the same now. Under the many favourable conditions for China, the War of Resistance is bound to win, but if we choose the path of compromise, the destruction of the State and the extinction of the nation are unavoidable. For this reason, our one and only orientation is to oppose firmly the theory of compromise and defeatism, and to call on all the people to fight to the very end.

In sum, the contradiction between the facts that the enemy is strong and we are weak has determined the protracted character of the war, and the strategic orientation of a protracted war. We adhere to the theory of defeating the enemy in a protracted war, not a lightning war. The enemy is small, and we are big; the enemy's war is retrogressive, and ours is progressive; the enemy's international position is relatively isolated, and we are relatively capable of obtaining foreign support. These contradictions also determine the fact that final victory in the war will belong to us, and not to the enemy. This is the second summary of the experience of the War of Resistance during the past 15 months.

#2.4. THE ONLY WAY TO SUSTAIN A PROTRACTED WAR AND STRIVE FOR FINAL VICTORY IS TO UNITE THE ENTIRE NATION, STRIVE TO MAKE PROGRESS, AND RELY ON THE MASSES OF THE PEOPLE

The two fundamental points — that the War of Resistance Against Japan will be protracted, and that final victory will belong to China — have already been demonstrated by the experience in the past 15 months of the War of Resistance. But what are the concrete plans for sustaining a protracted war and winning final victory? Regarding this, there have been disagreements among our compatriots in the past Many think that it will be all right to go on in the old way. They do not pay attention to uniting the whole country and do not pay attention to progress in various matters, such as military affairs, politics, culture, political party affairs, and mass movements. They even go so far as to increase friction and obstruct progress. In the past, we have never approved of such ideas, but, instead, have considered that only the unity and progress of the whole nation and reliance on the masses of the people can sustain a protracted war and secure final victory. Otherwise, it will be impossible. In its Programme of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction, the Nationalist Party explicitly points out:

If we want to ensure victory in the War of Resistance and success in national construction, though this depends on the efforts of our Party comrades, it requires, above all, on hard work, the union of hearts, and sharing of the burden by the people of the whole country.

The Communist Party of China also pointed out a long time ago:

The key to victory in the war now lies in developing the resistance that has already begun into a war of total resistance by the whole nation. Only through such a war of total resistance can final victory be won. The Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation now proposed by our Party spells out concretely the way to win final victory in the War of Resistance.³

These views are absolutely correct; the experience of the past 15 months has proved it.

Since the beginning of the War of Resistance, all the mutually opposing classes, political parties, factions, and groups have been united; all the different regions and armies have been unified under the command of the National Government and the Military Affairs Commission. Without this unity and solidarity, it would have been impossible to sustain the War of Resistance during the past 15 months. And only because of the War of Resistance has it been possible to unite and rally around all sides. Such uniting as one constitutes the Anti-Japanese National United Front. But the experience of the past 15 months has also demonstrated to us the seriousness of the enemy's conspiracy to sabotage and the inadequacy of our internal unity. Why has the War of Resistance suffered so many setbacks? Why have we until now been unable to stop the enemy offensive and carry out our counter-offensive? Apart from the objective reasons, the inadequate strength of the united front and the fact that it has still not attained the necessary scope and solidity are the most important reasons. From this, we learn that only by further uniting and consolidating the whole nation, and strengthening and consolidating the Anti-Japanese National United Front, can we sustain a protracted war and win final victory. This is the first point, Second, the resistance in the past 15 months not only has pushed forward the unity of the whole nation, but has also exposed the various respects in which this unity is inadequate. Moreover, while pushing forward progress in the various aspects, such as military affairs, politics, culture, political party affairs, and mass movements, it also revealed the shortcomings in these respects. To sustain the protracted war and win final victory, we must mobilize all the vital forces in all social categories in the whole nation, and if we want to achieve this goal, it will be impossible to do so without striving to make progress in the spheres of military affairs, politics, culture, political party affairs, and mass movements. Without greater progress in these various aspects, we will not be able to mobilize all the vital forces in the whole nation, nor will we be able to make further progress in uniting the whole nation as one. Third, the War of Resistance during the past 15 months has also proved the greatness of the assistance from the masses of the people to the forces of the War of Resistance; at the same time, it has also demonstrated that the mobilization of the strength of the masses of the people has just begun, and, as a result of the failure to obtain extensive assistance from the masses of the people for the War of Resistance, it has suffered many setbacks. From this, we must draw the lesson that our compatriots must better understand the fundamental point that the War of Resistance depends on the masses of the people. By relying on the masses of the people, we will be able to overcome all difficulties and defeat all enemies, however powerful; if we are detached from the masses of the people, we will not be able to succeed in anything. China's progress in the future must be fully expressed in mobilizing the forces of the masses of the people.

In short, the only correct way to sustain a protracted war and win final victory lies in the firm and broad solidarity of the entire nation, in striving to advance by mobilizing the vital forces of the entire nation, and in relying on the masses of the people to overcome difficulties. This is our third conclusion.

Comrades, persist in the War of Resistance, persist in the protracted war, and strive for unity and progress — this is the fundamental lesson of the past 15 months of the War of Resistance, and it is also the overall orientation for the War of Resistance from this time forward. We can defeat the enemy, provided only that we and the entire nation adhere to this orientation and make extensive efforts over the long term. The War of Resistance Against Japan is developing toward a new stage, during which there are many new tasks, but this overall orientation will not change. The experience of the past 15 months constitutes the basis on which we will observe the new situation and put forward new tasks.

#3. THE NEW STAGE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN AND OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT

#3.1. THE STUDY OF THE LAWS OF THE WAR AND OF THE UNITED FRONT IS THE BASIS FOR POLITICAL DECISIONS

Comrades, after summing up past experience, the important question is to look at the tendency of the development of the present situation. How will the War of Resistance Against Japan and the Anti-Japanese National United Front evolve from the past basis? This is a question we must answer now; this is very important in solving our present problems. Because if we do not have a general estimate of the process of change and development of the War of Resistance Against Japan, we can only be entangled by the war and let the war tie us hand and foot, instead of putting the war under our control, making adjustments and arrangements, creating the necessary conditions for the war, leading the war in the direction we desire, and winning victory in the war. Therefore, we must understand the laws of the War of Resistance Against Japan, for only then can we exercise strategic guidance over it, and decide on all the strategies, tactics, policies, plans, and outlines which serve the war. The same is true of the Anti-Japanese National United Front; only when we have studied and understood its laws can we effectively push the united front onto the track of solid development and let it play its role as a pillar of victory in the war.

Let us first talk about the problem of war.

#3.2. SPECIFIC HISTORICAL CONDITIONS AND THE SUPERIORITY OR INFERIORITY OF THE SUBJECTIVE CAPACITY DETERMINE THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE WAR

Some wars in history have ended after a single stage. For example, the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 was over after the attack of the Japanese armies and the defeat and retreat of the Russian armies. Another example was the Second Italo-Ethiopian War, which came to an end after the attack by Italy and the defeat of Ethiopia. The same was true of the Northern Expedition in China, which began in 1926. This is one type. It is because, on the one hand, the strengths and weaknesses of the two sides, and, on the other hand, the superiority and inferiority of their leadership capacity make them no match for each other. This is the first category of war.

Wars of the second category end after two stages. Take the Franco-Russian War, for instance. Napoleon went from attack to retreat; Russia went from retreat to attack. There were two stages for both sides. In ancient China, the famous Battle of Red Cliff between the States of Wu and Wei, and the Battle of Feishui between the States of Qin and Jin, were like this. Although the two sides were different in strength and weakness, the weak side was good at using other good and favourable conditions and provided correct leadership. Thus, they followed the retreat with counter-offensives and defeated the enemy.

But there is still the third category of war, for instance, the Seven Years' War, the Eight Years' War, the Thirty Years' War, and the Hundred Years' War in foreign countries, or even the First World War in Europe 20 years ago, lasting four years (especially as manifested on the Western Front). All of these had three stages. Side A attacks, and Side B retreats; this is the first stage. Both sides are locked in stalemate, which lasts for quite a long time; this is the second stage. Side B launches a counter-offensive, and Side A retreats; this is the third stage. There have been many such wars in Chinese history, too. The characteristic of this kind of war is that there is a relatively long or very long stage of stalemate; this is also the consequence of the specific historical conditions and of the characteristics of the groups leading the war.

Which category does the Second Sino-Japanese War fall into? In my opinion, it falls into the third category. This is a result of the different historical conditions of the two sides and of the particular circumstances of the different leading groups of the war on the two sides.

#3.3. THE PROTRACTED CHARACTER OF THE SECOND SINO-JAPANESE WAR IS SHOWN IN THE THREE STAGES OF THE WAR

The protracted character of the Second Sino-Japanese War will be manifested in the three stages of the enemy's offensive, stalemate, and retreat, on the one hand, and our defensive, stalemate, and counter-offensive, on the other. Because the enemy is strong and we are weak (the enemy is in a superior position, we are in an inferior position; the enemy is an imperialist country, we are a semi-colonial country), the result is a first stage, during which the enemy attacks and we are on the defensive. If we do not speak of retreat, but rather of defence, this is to express the idea of retreat through a strategic mobile defence, an attitude of step-by-step resistance, instead of a sudden and clear-cut retreat. Nonetheless, under the specific conditions that the enemy is a small, backward country, which enjoys little assistance, while we are a big, progressive country, which receives much assistance, our heroic War of Resistance has also caused the enemy to suffer scattered difficulties and debilitating losses in the course of their offensive, so that they had to end their strategic offensive at a certain time and move to a stage of protecting and preserving their occupied territory militarily and attacking us politically and through economic blockade. During this period, though the enemy has been worn down, for the time being, they have not yet been worn down sufficiently to lead to their defeat. Although we are resolutely waging the War of Resistance and making progress in every respect, we are unable to change all at once to such an extent that we can launch a counter-offensive and drive the enemy out of our country. For all the above reasons, a second stage of stalemate between the two sides, or an intermediate stage, takes shape. Because during the second stage, the enemy's difficulties and our progress are increasing daily, and also taking into account the fact that the international situation is favourable to us and unfavourable to the enemy, these factors will eventually change the original situation, in which the enemy is strong and we are weak, and the enemy is in a superior position and we are in an inferior position. Eventually, it will develop into a situation which will become more and more disadvantageous to the enemy and favourable to us. First will come a period of equilibrium between us and the enemy, and then a period when we are superior. Then we can move on to the third stage of our counter-offensive.

The above views about the three stages constitute a prediction about the entire process of the war based on the contrast between the existing and possible future specific conditions on both sides. It is not yet a fact, but only a possible tendency. On the basis of our subjective efforts, we must create the necessary conditions for such a possible tendency, and then we can change the possible tendency into reality. Nevertheless, relying on the existing conditions, plus correct guidance and the great strenuous efforts of the entire nation, we will be able to turn this possible tendency into reality.

#3.4. PEOPLE WHO BELIEVE IN A QUICK VICTORY AND PEOPLE WHO BELIEVE IN NATIONAL SUBJUGATION ARE ALL OPPOSED TO THIS ESTIMATE

People who believe in a quick victory oppose the theory of three stages, and think that we can quickly start a counter-offensive, and that no intervening period is necessary. This is wrong. There are many difficulties in the War of Resistance Against Japan, we need a certain period of time in order to overcome these difficulties, and it is impossible to launch a counter-offensive quickly. The reason why they believe in a quick victory is that they underestimate the strength of the enemy, on the one hand, and overestimate our own strength, on the other hand.

Those who believe that the nation will be subjugated are also against the theory of three stages. They think that stalemate as well as counter-offensive are impossible and that China is only another Ethiopia. This is wrong. Unlike those who believe in a quick victory, they overestimate the strength of the enemy, but underestimate our own strength. They see only darkness before them. They acknowledge that China will be subjugated and that our resistance and efforts are useless. In their view, it is impossible to reach a stalemate between the enemy and ourselves, let alone a counter-offensive and the defeat of the enemy.

Thus, only if we oppose the theory of a quick victory, on the one hand, and the theory of national subjugation, on the other, can we persist in our theory of three stages. At present, it is more important to oppose the theory of national subjugation than to oppose the theory of a quick victory. There are still some people who support a protracted war in words, but are against the theory of three stages. This is not right either. Where is the protracted war reflected? It is manifested in the three stages of the war. If they support protracted war, but disapprove of the three stages, then protractedness is something abstract without any content or reality. Hence, they cannot provide any real strategic guidance or any real policy in the War of Resistance. Actually, this idea also belongs to the theory of a quick victory, and is simply disguised as a version of «protracted war».

#3.5. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF THE THREE STAGES AND THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

When the Battle of Lake Hasan took place, a portion of public opinion was overjoyed. They thought that, if war broke out between Japan and the Council Union, China could move to the counter-offensive without fighting a protracted war. According to this standpoint, the theory of the three stages naturally could not hold water, and our predictions would be wrong. This is a kind of thinking that depends mainly on foreign assistance and is one variety of the theory of a quick victory. Nonetheless, the international situation does not develop according to the subjective wishes of these people, but rather according to its own laws. The centre of the world is Europe, and Asia is an important part of the area surrounding it. The major countries of the peace front and the major fascist countries in the world are just now quarreling endlessly about the crisis of war in Europe, and the problems in Europe are all tangled up. No matter whether it is the eve of war between the Great Powers in Europe or war breaks out, the big and small countries of Europe will all put the resolution of the problems in Europe at the top of their agenda, so, for the time being, the problems in Asia must come second. Looking at the Second Sino-Japanese War from this perspective as well, the theory of a quick counter-offensive is not reasonable either. We must rely mainly on ourselves. Not only are we not afraid of the three stages, but we are about to create three stages. The three stages represent the pattern of the Second Sino-Japanese War. This is based not only on the balance of strength between the enemy and ourselves, but also on the international situation.

#3.6. THE STAGE OF STRATEGIC STALEMATE IS THE PIVOT OF THE WAR

The major characteristic of the three stages lies in the inclusion of a transitional middle stage. That is, first our resistance must try by every possible means to stop the enemy's offensive. If the enemy's offensive cannot be stopped in a certain period of time and in a certain region, there will not be three stages that are different in character. Second, when the stage of stalemate comes, we must try our best to prepare all the necessary conditions for our counter-offensive. If we cannot do this, we will not be able to proceed to the stage of the counter-offensive, it can only be a continuous stalemate, and there will be no three stages. Here, to those who believe in a quick victory, we definitely say that only if there is such a transitional stage can we unite the entire nation, overcome difficulties, foster new forces, and, in conjunction with the difficulties of the enemy and international aid, carry out a counter-offensive and drive the enemy out of our country. Otherwise, it is impossible. Looking at the problem from the standpoint of self-reliance, we will unavoidably come to this conclusion. To those who talk about national subjugation and are pessimistic, we confidently say that only this transitional stage is the pivot of the entire war. Whether China becomes a colony or is liberated depends, not on the loss of the big cities and important lines of communication in the first stage, but rather on the level of effort of the whole nation. The loss of big cities and important lines of communication is regrettable; it increases the enemy's strength and reduces our strength. But many of the things that have not been lost can still serve as our resources in defeating the enemy. It does no good to mourn the loss of treasures. The territory and the various active forces we preserved during the first stage, especially the progress in fields such as military affairs, politics, culture, political party affairs, and mass movements, are the most valuable things, and they are the basis for continued progress and preparation for a counter-offensive in the second stage. In spite of that, they are merely the basis for continued progress and preparation for a counter-offensive; they cannot determine the counter-offensive. What will determine the counter-offensive are the forces which are added in the second stage. The counter-offensive will be empty talk without the addition of great newly emerging forces.

#3.7. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THREE STAGES

The characteristics of the three stages of the War of Resistance Against Japan have already appeared. It is necessary to point out, in a general way, those that have not appeared, but can be predicted, for they have an important influence on the guidance of the war and on policymaking.

#3.7.1. THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE

What are the characteristics and important symbols of the first stage?

First, on the Chinese side: the formation of a national united front, the participation in the war by all the armies in the country, the resolute character of the War of Resistance, the publication by the Nationalist Party of the Programme of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction, the convocation of the People's Political Council, the acquisition of legal status by the Communist Party of China and other political parties, the emergence of guerrilla warfare, the progress of all the country's armies, the development of the mass movements, and so on. These are all major events which denote progress on the Chinese side. Meanwhile, however, there are many disadvantageous events and bad phenomena, such as, for instance, the loss of major cities, important communication lines, and major industries and businesses, the loss of territory and population, the imbalance of progress in the country (the progress in some regions is very slow), and the fact that, generally speaking, the political system has just begun to move toward democratization, the existence of Far Right elements and of corruption, the brewing of the tendency to compromise, and so on.

Second, on the enemy's side: the drain of military strength and financial capacity, the condemnation by international opinion, the worsening of military discipline, the relative decline of the army's fighting capacity, the development of dissatisfaction among the people in the country and the soldiers at the front, the defeat in the Battle of Lake Hasan, the difficulty in organizing a Chinese puppet army, and the incapacity of those that have been organized, and so on. These are all big events showing the enemy's difficulties. At the same time, however, there are things which show their capacity, namely, the firmness of their offensive, the persistence of their military forces, the enlargement of their occupied territory, the persistence of their political-organizational capacity, the strength of their secret services, and so on.

Third, on the international side: the growth of the movement to assist China, the increasing strength of the forces of the Council Union and its assistance to China — these are all things that favour China. Yet there are also other things: the development of the war in Europe, a certain tendency toward compromise between Britain and Japan, the assistance in military raw materials to our enemy by other countries — these are all disadvantageous to China.

Many of the above things concerning China, Japan, and the international situation are characteristics that have emerged in the past 15 months during the first stage of the War of Resistance.

#3.7.2. THE STRATEGIC STALEMATE

Supposing that Wuhan cannot be defended, many new thins will emerge in the war situation. Although the capture of Wuhan by the enemy in no sense represents the end of the old stage and the beginning of the new stage, from now on, when the enemy can still continue their offensive until they are forced to stop it, this period is still a transitional period from the first stage to the second one. In spite of that, after the loss of Wuhan becomes a fact, many new circumstances will manifest themselves.

After the loss of Wuhan, as well as during most of the new stage, the fundamental situation that can be predicted will be, on the one hand, more difficulties, but, on the other hand, more progress. This is the primary characteristic of the new stage.

The increased difficulties will manifest themselves in the following respects:

• Because of the loss of the main big cities and important lines of communication, the political power of the State and the battlefields will be separated geographically by the action of the enemy, and as a consequence, many problems will arise.
• Extreme difficulties in finances and in the economy.
• A certain degree of compromise between Britain and Japan (or, on the contrary, there may be further conflict between Britain and Japan if Japan insists on occupying China alone and threatening South-East Asia).
• If the enemy attacks Guangzhou, China's most important line of communication by sea may be cut off, and, as a result, international assistance may decrease temporarily or partially.
• There is the possibility of the formation of a national puppet regime and its possible influence on the Anti-Japanese National United Front.
• The possibility that some faction in the anti-Japanese camp may betray us, and an increase in the atmosphere of compromise.
• An increase in defeatism, friction, and so on.

These are all possible new events that may add new difficulties to the War of Resistance Against Japan. To predict these difficulties will help us to overcome them by preparation and planning.

Progress will be expressed in the following respects:

• The orientation of resolutely persisting in the War of Resistance put forward by President Jiang and the Nationalist Party, and their further political progress.
• Improvement of Nationalist-Communist relations, and the consolidation and enlargement of the Anti-Japanese National United Front.
• Progress in the work of reforming the army.
• The expansion and development of guerrilla warfare.
• Progress in the democratization of the State.
• Greater development of mass movements.
• Carrying out new wartime financial and economic policies.
• Raising the level of culture and education in the anti-Japanese war.
• The continuation of assistance from the Council Union and its possible increase, more friendly and intimate relations between China and the Council Union, and so on.

The entire second stage is the stage of stalemate; it is the preparatory stage for a Chinese counter-offensive. The length of this stage depends on the degree of change in the enemy's strength as well as our own and the evolution of the international situation. Nevertheless, we should prepare for a long war. If we can survive this hard and difficult journey, the smooth road to victory will come.

During the second stage, although the enemy and ourselves are strategically in a stalemate, there will still be extensive warfare. This will manifest itself chiefly in defence at the front by the main forces, but extensive guerrilla warfare will develop in the enemy's rear. By then, the guerrilla warfare in many strategically important regions will become very bitter, and we must start to prepare for such difficulties now.

#3.7.3. THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE

The concrete situation cannot be predicted. But by then, the preparations for our counter-offensive must have been completed; at the same time, the level of difficulties for the enemy will have greatly increased, and the international situation will greatly favour us. By then, the situation of the war will not be one of strategic defensive or strategic stalemate, but one of strategic counter-offensive; it will not be a strategic internal front, but a strategic external front. At that time, there must be great progress in our domestic politics and new military technology. Otherwise, a counter-offensive will be impossible.

#3.8. TO DEFEND WUHAN IS A QUESTION OF GAINING TIME, NOT ONE OF DEFENDING THE CITY TO THE DEATH

The purpose of the struggle to defend Wuhan is to drain the enemy, on the one hand, and win time, on the other, so that the work in the whole country will make progress, and not a last-ditch defence of a strongpoint. When the time comes that the war situation has proved that giving it up will be more favourable to us, we should adopt the principle of giving up territory to preserve our military strength. Therefore, we must avoid big and unprofitable decisive engagements. Strategically decisive engagements should not take place in the first and second stages. They will obstruct both persistence in the War of Resistance and the preparation for a counter-offensive. Hence, they must be avoided. It should be one of our orientations in a protracted war to avoid strategically decisive engagements and to try our best to fight decisive campaigns and battles under favourable conditions. To give up some of the cities which we cannot defend at certain times and under certain conditions is not only unavoidable, but is an active policy to lure the enemy in deep, disperse them, drain them, and wear them out. Under the general premise of persisting in the War of Resistance, without compromise or surrender, it is perfectly permissible, in accordance with the policy of a protracted war, to give up some strongpoints at proper times, and we should not be surprised at this.

#3.9. TO PROCEED FROM THE PRESENT STAGE TO THE STRATEGIC STALEMATE

This will benefit our preparation for a counter-offensive only when the enemy's offensive is stopped. But in order to achieve this objective, we must make a greater effort. Hence, it is still a process of struggle to proceed from the present to the time when the enemy has to stop their strategic offensive and change into defending their occupied territory, and the stage of stalemate will emerge, and there are many difficulties to be overcome before we can achieve this. Because after the capture of Wuhan, the enemy will not stop their offensive. It is certain that they still want to attack Xi'an, Yichang, Changsha, Hengzhou, Wuzhou, Beihai, Nanchang, Shantou, Fuzhou, and the nearby regions. If we want to stop the enemy's offensive, we must continue to carry out strategic mobile defensive warfare to confront this attempt of the enemy's, and make the greatest efforts to fight persistent wars to drain the enemy as much as we can without suffering any losses to the enemy, so that the enemy will be forced to stop their offensive and shift the war situation into the stage of a stalemate, which is beneficial to us.

#3.10. THE STRATEGIC STALEMATE WILL COME SOON

After the enemy has captured Wuhan, their weakness, resulting from an insufficient number of troops and the dispersal of their forces, will become even more apparent. If they still want to attack Xi'an, Yichang, Changsha, Hengzhou, Wuzhou, Beihai, Nanchang, Shantou, Fuzhou, and other places and occupy them by force, the extreme difficulties caused by the insufficiency and dispersal of their troops will surely reach their highest point during the period of this offensive. At this point, the phenomena of the stubborn resistance of our main forces at the front, and the threat of our guerrillas in the broad rear areas, when added to the insufficiency of the enemy's troops (they cannot be sufficient) and the dispersal of their troops (they cannot but be dispersed) will create great difficulties. This situation — on the enemy's side, insufficient forces and their dispersal, and on our side, defence at the front and threat to the enemy's rear — is to our great advantage and the enemy's great disadvantage. Of course, as far as the overall comparison between the enemy's strength and our own strength is concerned, the fundamental situation that the enemy is strong and in a superior position and we are weak and in an inferior position has not changed; this can be changed only through the extremely hard efforts of our entire nation in combination with the international conditions during a long stage of stalemate. But in their attack on Wuhan, the enemy's strong forces have been deployed even more extensively. On the one hand, this further deployment of their strong forces has caused us losses, but meanwhile, it has brought difficulties to the enemy themself. Since the morale of the enemy's strong forces (which are, at the same time, their insufficient and dispersed forces) will decline after further extensive deployment, this will inevitably cause their general strategic offensive to reach a peak. We recognize that there will be some remaining strength in the enemy's attack, and, according to our best and most appropriate estimates, this remaining strength is rather great. Hence, it is highly probable that they will attack places such as Xi'an, Yichang, Changsha, Nanchang, Wuzhou, and Fuzhou and their surrounding areas, and we must also be prepared for a possible attack on the whole of the Guangdong-Wuhan Railway and the Xi'an-Lanzhou Highway. In spite of that, this will only be a residual threat, compared with the overall strength of the enemy. In terms of its total national strength, Japan has to be on guard against the Council Union to the North, the United States to the East, Britain and France to the South, and the Japanese people inside Japan itself. It has only so much strength; there may be barely enough to be used in China. What is more, extensive wars that must be dealt with at the front and within its occupied territory still exist; the contradictions between Japan and the Council Union, between Japan and the United States, between Japan and Britain, and between Japan and France are increasing; the contradictions between the government and the people in the home country, between the officers and the soldiers at the front, and between the vast expenditures and the financial impoverishment are deepening. These are all things that will cause great concern for the enemy. We and the people of the whole country must see these things, not be shocked by the loss of major big cities and important lines of communication, assist the government in adjusting the war in the whole country, make dispositions for the battles along the Guangdong-Wuhan Railway and the Longhai Railway, along the Xi'an-Lanzhou Railway, and in other strategic regions, make dispositions for guerrilla warfare in the enemy's great rear area, seize the weak points where the enemy's forces are insufficient and dispersed, imposing greater losses on them, and causing them to disperse their troops even more, and making the war turn victoriously and definitely into a new stage of stalemate between the enemy and ourselves. This is the urgent task facing the whole nation at the moment.

#3.11. THE ENEMY'S STRENGTH IS GRADUALLY DECREASING, BUT OUR STRENGTH IS GRADUALLY INCREASING

Has the enemy's strength increased or not? Compared with their original strength, there is no increase? on the contrary, their strength has been greatly drained. During the past 15 months of war, their military forces suffered casualties of several hundred thousand, used up large quantities of weapons, ammunition, and materiel, suffered the destruction of several hundred aeroplanes and more than 100 warships, and spent several billion yuan on military expenses. This drain is unprecedented in Japanese history. The enemy will have to use up a great deal more strength before they are forced to stop the strategic offensive. As far as this is concerned, their ally Hitler has been greatly worried for some time. And yet, is there no increase in the enemy's military strength at all? Yes, there is. It consists in the occupation of the major big Chinese cities, important lines of communication, and some parts of the countryside. The enemy has taken over the markets from the other countries and from the Chinese capitalists, and has seized natural resources, means of production, and considerable numbers of troops from China. This is the only purpose of the Japanese war. Temporarily, it has added these things to itself. But the question is: Can these things compensate for the losses already suffered in the war? No, they cannot; all the «investment» used up in the war is already gone, and the enemy will have to pay for new productive investment if they want to get a return on it. Again, the question is: Leaving aside Japan's inability to make a productive investment, if it could, could it really recover its losses in the war? Once again, no. Because the large-scale war will still be there in the future, Japan will still suffer losses every day. So long as widespread guerrilla warfare exists in the enemy's rear, such as the current guerrilla warfare in North China, it will be very difficult for Japan to recoup its losses. Because of the constant war, not only will it be unable to get any compensation for its previous losses, but in addition, it will have to continue to pay for new losses. So long as we continue to pursue resolutely our War of Resistance, Japan's pitiful fate is largely assured. We say that, during the second strategic stage, that is, the stage of stalemate, Japan will gradually change from strong to weak, from superior to inferior. This continuous drain is one aspect of the situation, which is already decided.

Let us now talk about the Chinese side. In the final analysis, has China's strength increased or decreased? Our answer is that it has both decreased and increased. The reduction is in the quality and quantity of the original forces; it is shown in the drain of personnel and weapons in the military, and the loss of population, industry, land, and natural resources. This is one important aspect that makes us feel difficulties. Nevertheless, it does not mean that there is no increase. The increase is in new quality and quantity and is manifested in the unity of the whole country, the progress of the military, the progress of politics, the progress of culture, and the increase in the degree of consciousness and organization of the people. Although the main forces have retreated, the guerrilla war is moving forward. Although some places have been lost, other places have made progress. The problem is that the level of increase today is far from adequate. Today, it is not enough to stop the enemy's offensive, still less will it be sufficient to carry out our counter-offensive in the future. Consequently, there has arisen the necessity of exerting widespread and protracted efforts to increase the new forces. What is more, this increase means the greater mobilization of the vital forces in all strata of the whole nation and greater progress in all aspects of the political parties, the government, the army, and the people. This is entirely possible, relying on broad and protracted efforts now and in the future. Relying mainly on the growing forces nurtured by ourselves, combined with the increase in the difficulties of the enemy and the enhancement of the international assistance to us, the overall situation between the enemy and ourselves will be changed from the present situation, in which the enemy is superior and we are inferior, first to a balance between the enemy and ourselves, and then further to a situation in which we are superior and the enemy is inferior. This is a fundamental problem that can and must be resolved during the long stage of stalemate.

#3.12. THE ENEMY OCCUPIES THE CITIES AND WE OCCUPY THE COUNTRYSIDE, SO THE WAR IS PROTRACTED, BUT THE COUNTRYSIDE IS CAPABLE OF DEFEATING THE CITIES IN THE END

The question is as follows: Now that the enemy has occupied China's main cities and lines of communication, and bases themself on the cities to oppose us, while we base ourselves on the countryside to oppose the enemy, can the countryside defeat the cities? The answer is that it is difficult, but it can be done. The protracted character of the War of Resistance Against Japan results, not only from the fact that the enemy is an imperialist country, while we are a semi-colonial country, but also from the fact that this imperialist country has occupied our cities, and we have to withdraw to the countryside to resist it. Consequently, the war has a protracted character. Here, the theory of a quick victory is completely unfounded. At the same time, the problem of China's cities and countryside today is qualitatively different from that of the cities and the countryside in foreign capitalist countries. In capitalist countries, the cities rule the countryside in substance as well as in form, and once the head constituted by the cities is cut off, the four limbs of the countryside cannot continue to survive. It is impossible to conceive of a protracted peasant war in the countryside against the cities in countries such as Britain, the United States, France, Germany, Japan, and Italy. Such a thing is also impossible in a small semi-colonial country. In a big semi-colonial country like China, it would also have been very difficult several decades ago. Such a possibility has, however, now emerged in a big semi-colonial country such as China, but very obviously, three interrelated conditions are required.

The first condition is that it should be a semi-colonial country. In a semi-colony, although the cities have a leading function, they cannot rule the countryside completely, for the cities are too small and the countryside is too extensive, and the vast human and material resources are to be found in the countryside, rather than in the cities.

The second condition is that it should be a big country. If you lose part of it, there is still another part remaining. The enemy is controlling a big country with few troops, and if you add to this our resolute resistance, the enemy is forced into a situation where they experience the difficulties of having an insufficient military force and of having this force split up. Thus, not only do we get a main anti-Japanese base area, or the Great Rear Area, including, for example, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan, which the enemy cannot capture, but we also obtain large base areas for guerrilla activities in the enemy's rear — for example, northern, central, and southern China — which the enemy is unable to occupy completely.

The third condition is given by present circumstances. If China had been conquered militarily by an imperialist Great Power several decades ago, as England conquered India, we would scarcely have avoided becoming slaves without a country. But today, things are different, mainly because China has progressed: there are new political parties, new armies, and a new people, and this is the fundamental force for defeating the enemy. Less important is the retrogression of the enemy and the fact that the socio-economic process of development of Japanese imperialism has come to the brink of decline, and the development of Japanese capitalism has created and is creating its own gravediggers. Still less important is the change in the international situation and the fact that the old world is on the brink of death, and the new world has seen the light of dawn. I have already explained these points in detail in On Protracted War.

To sum up, in today's big semi-colonial countries, such as China, there exist many favourable conditions which will help us in organizing a resolute, protracted, and widespread war of resistance against the enemy who has occupied our cities. If we wage war on many interlocking fronts, encircle and isolate the cities, meanwhile gradually increasing our own strength over a long period, and so transform the relations between the enemy and ourselves; and if we coordinate these tactics with changes in the international situation — in this case, we will be able to drive out the enemy progressively and regain control of the cities. There is not the slightest doubt that it is difficult, even in China today, for the countryside to oppose the cities, because in general, the cities are concentrated, whereas the countryside is scattered. Since the enemy occupied our big cities and important lines of communication, our administrative areas and the battlefields have been separated geographically, and this has created many difficulties for us. This determines the protracted and bitter character of the War of Resistance Against Japan. Nevertheless, we must state that the countryside can defeat the cities because of the existence of the above-mentioned three interrelated conditions. In the conditions prevailing during the civil war, a very small portion of the countryside carried on a protracted war against the cities, even at a time when all the imperialist countries together were opposing Communism. Who would venture to say that, under the conditions of the national war, and, moreover, at a time when the imperialist camp is divided, the greater part of the Chinese countryside cannot carry on a protracted war against the enemy in the cities? There is not the slightest doubt that this is possible. Moreover, there is a great difference between the countryside today and the countryside at the time of the civil war. Not only is the area much bigger, but we still possess, in the Great Rear Area made up of provinces such as Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan, a number of cities and industrial enterprises, we still have contact with foreign countries, and we can still engage in construction. Relying on the maintenance of the Great Rear Area and on the construction of base areas for guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear, nurturing our forces over the long term, and weakening the enemy's forces, and, in addition, coordinating our actions with favourable future international conditions, we will be able to launch a counter-offensive and take back the cities. In his open letter to the citizens of December 1937, President Jiang pointed out: «The heart of China's protracted War of Resistance, the source of its final victory, is to be found neither in Nanjing nor in any other big cities, but lies in reality in the villages of the whole country and in the firmness of heart of the people.» This is absolutely correct; although the war is difficult, a victorious future awaits us.

#3.13. THE CRISIS OF COMPROMISE IS GRAVE, BUT IT CAN BE OVERCOME

We said a long time ago that some of the people who are affected by an irrational fear of Japan have been attempting all the time to shake the determination of the government in the War of Resistance and advocate so-called peaceful compromise. In the past, this tendency appeared after the fall of Nanjing, and now they are ready to start something again. This is a reflection of the enemy's conspiracy within the Anti-Japanese National United Front. This threat exists seriously, and our compatriots must pay full attention to it and not let the pro-Japanese faction take advantage of it to carry out their conspiracy. What the pro-Japanese elements are attempting and what the enemy is attempting is the same, and is necessarily concentrated on opposition to Jiang Jieshi and to the Communists. If they are allowed to take advantage and to carry out their conspiracy, the future of the War of Resistance will be called into question. Therefore, the whole nation should be on guard against the enemy's conspiracy and the threat of sowing dissension among ourselves, automatically and consciously oppose this conspiracy, and not relax our vigilance for a moment. Can this crisis be overcome? Yes, it can. After the Nationalist Party, the Communist Party, and all the patriots have united as one, made the necessary efforts, overcome the danger of compromise, expelled the daemons and ghosts who are helping the enemy, and resolutely pursued the War of Resistance, this is not only absolutely necessary, but absolutely possible as well. Because in the final analysis, the pro-Japanese faction does not have a great deal of strength, and the strength of the anti-Japanese faction is greater than that of the pro-Japanese faction.

#3.14. THE NEW SITUATION OF GUERRILLA WARFARE DURING THE STRATEGIC STALEMATE

During the new stage, while the main forces are defending the front, guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear will temporarily become the main form. Yet the guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear during the new stage of stalemate between ourselves and the enemy will be developing in a new form. Then what is the new form of guerrilla warfare? First, it will still develop extensively in vast areas. This is because we have a great deal of territory, and, as regards the enemy, their troops are insufficient and dispersed. So long as we can persist in the orientation of developing guerrilla warfare and guide it correctly, it is impossible for the enemy to fundamentally restrict our development. But, second, in some of the important strategic regions, for example, in North China and the lower reaches of the Yangzi River, we will meet with a savage offensive from the enemy, and it will be very difficult for us to maintain large contingents of troops in the plains. Accordingly, the hilly regions will become our main base areas, and the guerrilla troops in some regions will have to reduce their numbers temporarily. We should begin to prepare now for the arrival of this situation. At the moment, in order to support the fighting of the main forces at the front and prepare for the transition to the new stage, we should divide the guerrilla warfare generally into two regions. One is the region in which the guerrilla warfare has been fully developed, as in North China, where the main orientation is to consolidate the basis that has already been built to get ready to defeat the enemy's cruel attack in the new stage and sustain the base areas. The other is the region in which guerrilla warfare has not yet been fully developed or is just beginning to develop, for example, in Central China, where the main orientation is to develop guerrilla warfare as quickly as possible to avoid the difficulty in developing guerrilla warfare after the enemy swings back. In the future, in order to coordinate with the defence at the front, and to give the main forces a chance for rest and reorganization, in order to nurture our forces and prepare for the strategic counter-offensive, we must try our best to sustain guerrilla warfare to defend the base areas. During the long period of holding out, train our guerrilla troops into an active and strong army, pin down the enemy, and help the battle at the front. Generally speaking, guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear in the new stage will be much more difficult compared with the previous stage. We must first see this difficulty, admit this difficulty, and never lose our heads because of the easy development in the previous stage, since the enemy will surely turn back to attack the guerrilla forces. It can, however, be sustained. Every director working in the enemy's rear must have such self-confidence, because the condition of guerrilla warfare in a national war, no matter how strong the enemy is, is far better than that during a civil war. Here, winning over and disintegrating the puppet troops to isolate the Japanese bandits is a very important task.

#3.15. THE NEW STAGE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN IS SIMULTANEOUSLY THE NEW STAGE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT

The above remarks have been devoted entirely to the problem of the form of the War of Resistance Against Japan. In what follows, I am going to talk about the situation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front.

The time when the War of Resistance Against Japan has developed to a new stage is simultaneously the time when the Anti-Japanese National United Front has developed to a new stage. Because more difficulties will be encountered in the new stage than before, the Anti-Japanese National United Front should also adapt to accommodate this situation and show its great strength in fighting against all difficulties and defeating them. So that, during the present transitional period and in the new stage in the future, the Chinese national united front does not show its inability to deal with difficulties, but shows, instead, its great power in overcoming difficulties, we must earnestly consolidate as well as enlarge the united front. A protracted war can be sustained only with a lasting united front; the protracted character of the war and that of the united front can never be separated.

#3.16. THE NATIONALIST PARTY OF CHINA HAS A BRIGHT FUTURE

The Nationalist Party and the Communist Party form the basis of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, but of these two political parties, it is the Nationalist Party that is the most important and biggest one. Without the Nationalist Party, it would have been inconceivable to launch and sustain the War of Resistance. The Nationalist Party has its own glorious history, of which the main achievements are:

• The overthrow of the Qing Dynasty.
• The establishment of the Republic.
• Opposition to Yuan Shikai.
• The establishment of the «Three Great Policies» of alliance with Russia, cooperation with the Communist Party, and assistance to the peasants and workers.
• Carrying out the Great Revolution of 1926-27.

Today, it is once more leading the great War of Resistance Against Japan. It enjoys the historic heritage of the «Three People's Principles»; it has had two great leaders in succession — Dr. Sun Yixian and Mr. Jiang Jieshi; and it has a great number of loyal and patriotic members. All this should not be underestimated by our compatriots and constitutes the result of China's historical development.

In the conduct of the War of Resistance Against Japan and the establishment of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, the Nationalist Party occupies the position of leader and backbone. During the past 15 months, all the anti-Japanese political parties in the nation have made progress, and the progress of the Nationalist Party is also outstanding. It called together the Provisional Representative Assembly, issued the Programme of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction, summoned the Political Consultative Conference, began to organize the «Three People's Principles» Youth League, recognized the legal existence of all political parties and factions, and their joint participation in resistance to Japan and national construction, instituted democratic rights to a certain extent, carried out some reforms in military and political affairs, adapted foreign policy to meet the demands of the War of Resistance Against Japan, and so on. These are all major events with historic significance. Provided only that it acts in accordance with the great premise of persisting in the War of Resistance and maintaining the united front, one can foresee a bright future for the Nationalist Party.

Until the present, however, many people still have an incorrect perception of the Nationalist Party. They are suspicious of the future of the Nationalist Party. The issues which awaken their suspicion of the Nationalist Party are whether it can continue the War of Resistance, whether it can continue to progress, and whether it can become a national alliance in the War of Resistance Against Japan and in national construction. These three questions are closely linked and cannot be separated. Then what are our views? We think that the Nationalist Party has a bright future. On the basis of all the subjective and objective conditions, it can continue the War of Resistance, continue to progress, and become a national alliance in the War of Resistance Against Japan and in national construction.

The political orientation of all China and of the Nationalist Party has fundamentally been determined by the firmness of the enemy's offensive, the serious blows and looting inflicted by the enemy on every stratum in China, the anger of armies throughout the country against the enemy and their courage in the War of Resistance, the upsurge of the people's anti-Japanese movement throughout the country, the existence of a favourable international situation, and other facts.

First, any political party or faction, including the Nationalist Party, the Communist Party, and the other anti-Japanese political parties and groups, cannot do otherwise than to continue the War of Resistance. Whoever does not pursue the War of Resistance will have one way out — to become a Chinese traitor. There is no other way out but this.

Second, any political party or faction, so long as it continues the War of Resistance, must continue to make progress. It is true that political progress in our country is neither rapid nor universal, and as a result, we have suffered losses in the war. On the other hand, precisely because of the losses we have suffered, we cannot do otherwise than seek progress in politics, military affairs, culture, political party affairs, mass movements, and every other sphere in the future, so that we can resist the enemy and regain the lost territory. Whether it be the ruling party, the Nationalist Party, or any other political party or faction, they will all have to continue to make progress.

Third, one of the key links in national progress is the democratization of the organizational form of the Nationalist Party, in order that it may itself be transformed into a national alliance for resisting Japan and building the nation, and the best organizational form for the Anti-Japanese National United Front. Does this possibility exist? I think it does. Given the general trend of the War of Resistance Against Japan, if the Nationalist Party refuses to open its doors to the broad masses of the people, and to accept all patriotic political parties and factions, as well as patriotic figures, in a great organization, it will be impossible for it to fulfil the difficult task of continuing the War of Resistance and defeating the enemy. In its more than 50-year history, whenever the Nationalist Party has encountered a great revolutionary struggle, it has always changed itself into a national-revolutionary alliance. Two instances of this are the most striking and the most endowed with historic significance. In the first instance, from the founding of the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance to the Revolution of 1911 for the purpose of overthrowing the Qing Dynasty and setting up the Republic, Dr. Sun Yixian united all the anti-Manchu revolutionary political parties and factions (from the Regeneration Society to the Elder Brother Society). During this period, its members accomplished many heroic deeds; they worked ceaselessly and unremittingly and were full of vigour, and as a result, they were successful in the Revolution of 1911. The second time, from 1924 to '27, for the purpose of overthrown the imperialists and the Northern Warlords, they united with the workers and the Communist Party inside the country, and with the Union of Socialist Council Republics abroad, and established the well-known «Three Great Policies». As a result, they founded the Huangpu Military Academy, established the National Revolutionary Army, and won victory in the Northern Expedition. All of these things manifested, not only the development of the united-front policy of the Nationalist Party, but the development of the «Three People's Principles». Today is the third historic opportunity for the Nationalist Party to become a revolutionary national alliance, in order to fight against Japanese imperialism and establish a republic of the «Three People's Principles». It can and must change itself into a national alliance to resist Japan and build the nation. This great movement is already beginning. The Nationalist Party has recognized the legal existence of the Communist Party and the other political parties and factions, admitted the Eighth Route Army to the ranks of the National Revolutionary Army, and proclaimed explicitly in the Programme of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction:

In striving for victory in the War of Resistance and success in national construction, it is true that we must rely on the efforts of our Party members, but we must particularly rely on the hard work and unanimous sharing of the burden by all the people of the nation.

These facts, in addition to the convocation of the Political Consultative Conference and the organization of the «Three People's Principles» Youth League, have all shown the beginning of the Nationalist Party's efforts in turning itself into a national alliance for armed resistance and national reconstruction. The question now is: What attitude should the Communist Party adopt toward this movement of the Nationalist Party to enlarge its organization? Should we approve or disapprove? We say that, at any time, we will support the Nationalist Party in expanding or developing itself into a revolutionary national alliance. In 1924, when the Nationalist Party was reorganized, we adopted a policy of support. Today, when the national crisis is far more serious, we will do all we can to assist them. The reason is that the larger the friendly armies resisting Japan, the better, for the development and progress of the Communist Party alone is insufficient to repel Japanese imperialism. Although the Communist Party, which is the second most important and second strongest political party, has launched and persisted in the united front of all political parties and armies, and has in addition opened its doors wide to all revolutionary comrades, in order that all may strive to win victory in the anti-Japanese war, if the Nationalist Party, which is the most important and strongest political party, remained in its old state as in the past, it would be extremely harmful to the War of Resistance and to the united front. We would not be able to win victory in the War of Resistance, the whole nation would be in danger, and the Communist Party and the proletariat would not be able to escape this danger either. Consequently, the Communist Party not only will not oppose, but places strong hopes in and resolutely assists the efforts of the Nationalist Party to enlarge and consolidate its organization, carry out inner-party democracy, and change itself into a revolutionary national alliance, in order to benefit the continuation of the War of Resistance and win final victory.

#3.17. THERE ARE STILL OBSTACLES TO THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF THE NATIONALIST PARTY OF CHINA, AND IT MUST WORK HARD TO OVERCOME THEM BEFORE ANY PROGRESS CAN BE MADE

The bright future of the Nationalist Party exists, and its progress and development are possible. Mr. Jiang Jieshi and the majority of the Nationalist Party are leading the Nationalist Party and pushing it forward. As everyone knows, however, there are still a few Far Right elements in the Nationalist Party who are obstructing the speed and extent of the progress of their party. Because of the existence of these elements, and their collusion with many Far Right elements in society, they have created a counter-current in the mainstream of the national-revolutionary war and are stubbornly resisting the vessel of progress, forcefully obstructing the democratization of the country, the implementation of all the necessary progressive causes of the War of Resistance, the implementation of many of the very good orientations and methods proposed by Mr. Jiang Jieshi in his past declarations, talks, speeches, and orders, the application of the Nationalist Party's Programme of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction, the application of the laws and decrees of the National Government, and the development of the mass movements. These are all facts and are all major reasons why the progress of the Nationalist Party is neither rapid nor universal and why the War of Resistance has met with so many disadvantages. They are opposed to the progress and development of the Nationalist Party, and even advocate compromise. If these elements get the upper hand, the cause of national liberation in China will suffer a very great setback. Thus, we must pay serious attention to the matter. Nonetheless, we firmly believe that these Far Right forces cannot persist forever, that they have not obtained and are likely to obtain the upper hand. Such people are a counter-current and by no mains the main trend. Under the leadership of President Jiang, with the efforts of the majority of the Nationalist Party and the support of all the people of the country, this Far Right trend can be overcome. The Communist Party resolutely supports the progress of the Nationalist Party, and, as far as the Far Right elements obstructing progress are concerned, we hope that they will turn over a new leaf and make progress together with us. We hope that these people will change. «The faults of a good person are like the eclipses of the Sun and the Moon. They have their faults, and everyone sees them; they change again, and everyone looks up to them.»⁵ Actually, we have seen many Far Right elements making progress in the process of the War of Resistance. In the future, there are sure to be many more people awakened by the lessons of the War of Resistance and making progress together with the broad masses. This is the character of being able to change of the Far Right elements in the War of Resistance Against Japan. But there might also be a few people who will become even worse and are willing to be washed away by the gigantic waves of the War of Resistance. This is another aspect of their changeable nature. Toward people of this kind, we should show no pity at all.

#3.18. THE OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES AND FACTIONS ALSO HAVE A BRIGHT FUTURE

Under the general premise of persisting in the War of Resistance and maintaining the united front, all those political parties and factions that have joined the Anti-Japanese National United Front have a future of further development. We are willing to establish lasting cooperation with all of them and to help them as much as possible. This applies equally to the Third Party, the Youth Party, the National-Socialist Party, the National-Salvation Association, and any other groups, political parties, and factions. Clearly, when we say that, under the general premise of persistence in the War of Resistance and maintaining the united front, all political parties will have a bright future, this includes efforts to overcome the Far Right tendency in every political party. If there exists a Far Right tendency which will harm the War of Resistance and the united front, and it is allowed to develop, that will present a danger that we might forfeit our bright future. This applies in the same way to the Nationalist Party, the Communist Party, or any other political party; we must all pay full attention to it.

#3.19. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINA'S ANTI-JAPANESE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT

For reasons rooted in Chinese history, today's Anti-Japanese National United Front in China is different from any of the united fronts in foreign countries, such as the Spanish or French People's Fronts. Nor is it the same as the united fronts in Chinese history, such as the First National United Front. It has the characteristics of today's China. To understand these characteristics is of the very greatest significance as regards consolidating and enlarging the Anti-Japanese National United Front.

To sum up, there are eight in all, namely:

• The entire nation is resisting Japan.
• The protracted nature of the united front.
• The imbalance of the united front.
• The existence of political armies.
• The 15 years of experience.
• The fact that the majority of the people are still not organized.
• The «Three People's Principles».
• The new international circumstances.

#3.19.1. THE ENTIRE NATION IS RESISTING JAPAN

This characteristic determines the fundamental nature of our united front. On the one hand, the objective for which our united front was established and developed is to fight the invasion of our national territory by a foreign power, Japanese imperialism. On the other hand, our united front is a vast organization comprising all the different political parties, factions, classes, armies, and nationalities making up our nation. It is because it is directed against invasion by a foreign power that the components of this organization could be so extensive. Because the composition of this organization is so extremely broad, it has great strength; but at the same time, there is inevitably considerable friction between participants in this united front, and this must be properly adjusted before the goal of uniting against the foreign power can be achieved. These most fundamental characteristics of our united front — resistance to invasion by a foreign power as the political purpose, and the extremely large size of the components of the organization — are different from the French and Spanish People's Fronts, nor were they to be found during the First National United Front (Nationalist-Communist cooperation during the First Great Revolution). As a result, today's united front has developed many special contents and results. This is the first characteristic and strong point of today's united front, although, at the same time, its complex organization inevitably embodies some defects.

#3.19.2. THE PROTRACTED NATURE OF THE UNITED FRONT

The protracted nature of the united front results from the first characteristic. Since this united front makes use of national war to fight against Japanese imperialism, and since Japan is a strong imperialist power, this gives rise to the protracted character of the War of Resistance Against Japan and also to the protracted character of the united front. I will deal further with this in Section 5 of my report, for it is the point of departure for all our policies. This point, too, differs from the first period of Nationalist-Communist cooperation.

#3.19.3. THE IMBALANCE OF THE UNITED FRONT

For historical reasons, there is an imbalance of political power between all the political parties, factions, classes, and strata in the united front. At the same time, this imbalance is reflected in the distribution of regions. The Nationalist Party is the biggest and strongest political party; the Communist Party comes second; and the other political parties follow. This phenomenon has resulted in many special things.

#3.19.4. THE EXISTENCE OF POLITICAL ARMIES

Both the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party have their own armies — this is the result of the special historical conditions, and it is not a defect, but an advantage. The fact that the two political parties have their own armies creates the best possible basis for the two political parties to fulfil their responsibilities of division of labour and cooperation in the course of the anti-Japanese war, and there will also be more benefits in observing and emulating one another's work. This point is similar to the situation in Spain, but different from that in France, nor is it the same as in the first period of Nationalist-Communist cooperation. It is also one of the factors that make possible protracted cooperation between the two political parties.

#3.19.5. THE 15 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE

The conclusion from the four years of the first period of Nationalist-Communist cooperation in 1924-27, the nine-year split between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party in 1927-36, and now the period of renewed Nationalist-Communist cooperation — these 15 years of experience of cooperation, split, and again cooperation have taught a profound lesson to both the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party, to the other political parties and factions, and to the people of the whole country. The conclusion is that they should only cooperate, and not split. This is also one of the foundations for protracted cooperation. No other country in the world has had this kind of valuable experience, nor did we have it during the first period of Nationalist-Communist cooperation.

#3.19.6. THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE ARE STILL NOT ORGANIZED

This is a particular characteristic of China; the various countries in the West are not like this. It is a defect, because, as a result, the united front lacks an already existing organized mass basis. But at the same time, all the political parties can, on the basis of a division of labour, set out to organize the masses of the people. They should not always crowd together and create friction, for some of the as-yet unorganized masses are just waiting to be organized to meet the urgent demands of the War of Resistance.

#3.19.7. THE «THREE PEOPLE'S PRINCIPLES»

The «Three People's Principles» are the political basis of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. They are the basis, not only for cooperation against Japan, but also for cooperation to build the country. The Principle of Nationalism will lead this cooperation to strive for national liberation; the Principle of Democracy will lead this cooperation to the establishment of a thoroughly democratic State; and the Principle of People's Livelihood is even more capable of leading this cooperation for a very long time. The political programme and thought of the «Three People's Principles» guarantee the lasting character of the united front.

#3.19.8. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES

The political and economic conditions in the world today are different from those in the first period of Nationalist-Communist cooperation and in the period of civil war between the two political parties. Today, only some imperialist countries, such as Japan, Germany, and Italy, are against Nationalist-Communist cooperation and the Anti-Japanese National United Front. The other imperialist countries, because of the contradictions between them and Japan, are not at all opposed to our united front at present, but, on the contrary, adopt an attitude of help and support. All the progressive people in every country support and assist us, and the Council Union supports and assists us even more sincerely. This kind of new international environment has a great impact on our protracted cooperation.

#★ ★ ★

Only if we profoundly study and understand the above-mentioned characteristics can we adopt a proper attitude in politics and work. We should not deal with problems of policy and work by treating the head when the head aches and treating the foot when the foot hurts. Instead, we should solve the problems correctly on a scientific basis. Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan and the strengthening and enlargement of the Anti-Japanese National United Front require this kind of scientific basis.

#3.20. THE NEW SITUATION OF THE UNITED FRONT

In the new stage of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Anti-Japanese National United Front must appear with a new look in order to deal with the new prospect of the war. This new look refers to the extensive development and high degree of consolidation of the united front. The lessons of uniting for the War of Resistance in the past 15 months will make every political party understand the necessity of this kind of development and consolidation. As regards development, it is to enlarge the organizations of all the political parties and of the masses of the people. As regards consolidation, it means that every political party adopts new policies and methods of work to reduce the friction between one another, to achieve true and sincere unity, and to fight together to save the nation. There are many difficulties in the new stage of the War of Resistance. Only if every political party in the united front enlarges and develops its organization, and consolidates to a high degree its internal relations as well as the relations between different political parties, will it be possible to carry out the new political tasks, overcome new difficulties, and achieve the goal of stopping the enemy's offensive and preparing for our counter-offensive. This is the new situation of the united front in the new situation of the War of Resistance Against Japan. Thanks to the joint efforts of every political party, and the ardent support of the people of the whole country, it is absolutely possible that such a new situation will arise.

#4. THE URGENT TASKS OF OUR WHOLE NATION AT PRESENT

According to the summary of the War of Resistance in the past and the predictions regarding the current and new stages of the War of Resistance and the development of the united front, what should be the urgent tasks of our whole nation at present?

The general tasks should be: Persist in the War of Resistance and in the protracted war, and consolidate and enlarge the united front, in order to overcome the difficulties, stop the enemy's offensive, prepare forces, carry out our counter-offensive, and achieve our goal of driving the enemy out of our country in the end.

To take them separately, there are the following concrete tasks. Every component in the organization of the Anti-Japanese National United Front should support the government, and, moreover, under the leadership of the government, mobilize the entire nation to carry them out. Communist Party members should become models in carrying out these tasks.

#4.1. HIGHLY ENCOURAGE NATIONAL SELF-ESTEEM AND SELF-CONFIDENCE, PERSIST IN THE WAR OF RESISTANCE TO THE VERY END, OVERCOME DEFEATIST SENTIMENTS, AND OPPOSE THE ATTEMPT AT COMPROMISE

We reckon that, under the new situation in the War of Resistance, there must be some people among whom, because of the losses of major big cities and lines of communication, the financial and economic difficulties, and the delay in receiving international assistance, there arises and grows a defeatist sentiment regarding the future of the War of Resistance. What is more, the Japanese bandits, Chinese traitors, and pro-Japanese elements will surely take advantage of this sentiment and spread the atmosphere of peace and compromise, attempting to shake our determination to resist. Therefore, the first task of the whole nation is to display national self-esteem and self-confidence to a high degree, overcome the defeatist sentiment among some people, resolutely support the government's policy of continuing the War of Resistance, oppose any attempts at surrender and compromise, and persist in the War of Resistance to the very end. This task is more important than in any of the past periods.

For this aim, we must mobilize the newspapers, magazines, schools, propaganda organs, cultural and artistic societies, political bodies in the military, the masses of the people, and all other possible forces to carry out extensive propaganda and agitation among the officers and soldiers at the front, the service troops in the rear, the people in the occupied territories, and the masses of the people in the whole country. We must firmly carry out this policy as planned, advocate carrying the War of Resistance through to the end, oppose surrender and compromise, clean up defeatist sentiments, repeatedly point out the possibility and certainty of final victory, point out clearly that compromise means subjugation, but resistance is our only way out, and call on the entire nation to unite as one and to fear neither hardship nor death. We are determined to achieve freedom, win victory, and achieve the objective of the whole nation, united as one, carrying the War of Resistance through to the end.

For this purpose, all the propaganda and agitation should deal with the following aspects. On the one hand, use the models already created and being created in the national revolution (heroic resistance, giving one's life for the nation, the Battles of Pingxingguan and Tai'erzhuang, the «800 Brave Soldiers», the progress of guerrilla warfare, generous donations, the patriotism of the overseas Chinese, and so on), and make them known far and wide to the front and the rear region, within the country and abroad. On the other hand, we must expose, purge, and eliminate the negative characteristics which exist and grow within the national united front (tendencies toward compromise, defeatist sentiments, the phenomenon of corruption, and so on). On yet another hand, we must make public to the whole nation the specific examples of all the enemy's cruel and brutal behaviour, denounce them to the whole world, and achieve the objective of raising national consciousness and carrying forward national dignity and confidence. We must be aware that the deficiency of this kind of consciousness and confidence will greatly affect the main task of overcoming the difficulties and preparing for a counter-offensive.

#4.2. SUPPORT PRESIDENT JIANG, SUPPORT THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, SUPPORT NATIONALIST-COMMUNIST COOPERATION, OPPOSE FRICTION AND SPLITS, AND OPPOSE ANY CHINESE PUPPET GOVERNMENT

In the new situation, the enemy's policy is sure to concentrate on opposing Jiang Jieshi and Communism, setting up a nationwide puppet government, attempting to overthrow President Jiang and the National Government, and sabotaging Nationalist-Communist cooperation and national unity. To counter this enemy policy, the second task of the entire nation is to call on the whole country unanimously and truly to support President Jiang, the National Government, Nationalist-Communist cooperation, and national unity, and to oppose any of the enemy's deeds that will hurt these things. We must oppose the rule of China by any puppet government.

For this purpose, we must adjust Nationalist-Communist relations, adjust the relations between the central and local authorities, adjust the relations between the different resistance armies, and adjust the relations between the government and the people. Among these relations, we should encourage the spirit of justice and fair and mutual aid and love, reduce friction and disagreements, and oppose using difficulties to make trouble for the government. We must call on the whole nation to pay serious attention to «friction-mongering» by the enemy, the Chinese traitors, and the pro-Japanese elements, and their plots and conspiracies to create complaints and disagreements and to encourage friction among us. We must make sure that the prestige of President Jiang and the National Government is not affected, make sure that Nationalist-Communist cooperation and national unity become closer day by say, set up a firm and strong central authority that will continue the resistance in a difficult situation to confront the enemy and the puppet government, overcome difficulties, and prepare for the counter-offensive.

#4.3. INCREASE THE FIGHTING CAPACITY OF THE MAIN FORCES, DEFEND CENTRAL CHINA, SOUTH CHINA, AND THE NORTH-WEST, AND STOP THE ENEMY'S OFFENSIVE

In order to counter the enemy's current attack on Wuhan and their attempt to continue to attack South China and the North-West, the third task of the whole nation is to raise the fighting capacity of the main forces, reorganize the troops we now have, organize and recruit new troops, fight for the purpose of defending Central China, South China, and the North-West, and stop the enemy's offensive. To achieve this goal, our tasks are as follows:

• First, as regards China's main forces, they must develop mobile warfare accompanied by necessary and possible positional defence, resist the enemy bit by bit, and drain the enemy's strength.
• Second, we must set up possible military factories in the Great Rear Area, and also increase our manufacturing capacity, so as to provide the front with weapons and ammunition.
• Third, we must conscientiously carry out in the military national-revolutionary political work, carry out education in politics, culture, and entertainment, and raise the brave and enduring fighting spirit of the whole army.
• Fourth, we must improve the lives of the soldiers on the basis of the present material conditions, set up economic committees in the companies, and let the soldiers manage the mess.
• Fifth, we must encourage self-discipline, eliminate corporal punishment and insults, and encourage friendship and unity between officers and soldiers.
• Sixth, we must carry out fair trade, treat people politely, not collect grain by force, and not force people to become porters or soldiers; instead, we must use the method of political mobilization to solve the problems of grain, porters, and new recruits, in order to improve relations between the army and the people.
• Seventh, between the different armies at the front, and between the different armies at the front and in the rear, we should enhance the spirit of friendship and mutual aid, help and collaborate with one another in wartime, inspect and learn from one another in work, and eliminate such bad phenomena as looking on at one another and envying one another, in order to improve relations among different armies.
• Eighth, we should reorganize the troops we have now and reinforce them where there are vacancies; meanwhile, we should organize and recruit new troops and speed up education and training to help in the protracted war.

We should use all these methods to raise the fighting capacity of the main forces, fight to defend Central China, South China, and the North-West, and strive to stop the enemy's offensive and prepare our counter-offensive.

#4.4. DEVELOP GUERRILLA WARFARE EXTENSIVELY IN THE ENEMY'S REAR, ESTABLISH AND CONSOLIDATE OUR BASE AREAS, REDUCE THE ENEMY'S BASE AREAS, AND COORDINATE OUR FIGHTING WITH THAT OF THE MAIN FORCES

In light of the fact that the enemy's goal is to continue to attack us, while, at certain times, they will divert some of their troops to launch guerrilla attacks in an attempt to strengthen their occupied territory and make the Chinese counter-offensive very difficult, the fourth task of the whole nation is to develop guerrilla warfare in a broad area in the enemy's rear, to establish many base areas and consolidate the existing ones, to use them to restrict the area occupied by the enemy, to fight together with the main forces to halt the enemy's advance at present, and to fight to carry out the counter-offensive in coordination with the main forces in the future. One of the important characteristics of semi-colonial China's National War of Resistance Against Japan is the mass character and protractedness of guerrilla warfare. Without this kind of guerrilla warfare, we will not be able to pin down large numbers of enemy troops and forcefully assist the fighting of the main forces at the front to stop the enemy's offensive, nor will we be able to restrict the enemy's occupied territory within a certain region, so that they cannot occupy the entire area completely. We will not be able to set up many anti-Japanese strongholds in the enemy's rear, persist in guerrilla warfare, and further cooperate with the counter-offensive of the main forces. Hence, our tasks are as follows:

• First, we must develop guerrilla warfare broadly in all the areas in the enemy's rear, set up many base areas for guerrilla warfare, and strengthen those that have already been set up.
• Second, we must learn from the example in North China and leave behind or send enough regular troops to every strategic region in the enemy's rear, and use them as the backbone in sustaining protracted guerrilla warfare. These troops should gradually master the tactics of guerrilla warfare, strengthen their political work, develop mass movements, and establish base areas. Furthermore, they should help the people and guerrillas in the enemy's rear and gradually raise them to the path of the regular army and regular warfare.
• Third, every war zone and every enemy rear area must mobilize all adults, regardless of gender, and their enthusiasm in defending the nation and their native county. Apart from mobilizing them in large numbers to join the guerrillas not participating in production, and to serve as reinforcements for the regular army units left behind in the enemy's rear, we should organize them into semi-military people's anti-Japanese self-defence units. The people's anti-Japanese self-defence units should become the universal and regular militia system in every war zone and in the enemy's rear area. They are not withdrawn from production.
• Fourth, we must help the people to organize large numbers of guerrillas. These are withdrawn from production. Every county and district should have them, and they will become widespread small armies that make surprise attacks on the enemy and defend the localities.
• Fifth, we must set up political work in the guerrilla units and strengthen their political, cultural, and entertainment education to increase their fighting capacity.
• Sixth, we must set up correct military and political systems in the guerrilla units, carry out the policy of equal treatment for officers and soldiers, and of economic openness.
• Seventh, we must reform the bandit troops, let them join the anti-Japanese war, and eliminate the bandit units in our armies' rear which are being used by the enemy.
• Eighth, the supply of arms and ammunition in the guerrilla war is a very important problem. On the one hand, in the Great Rear Area, we must try our best to help the guerrillas; on the other hand, every base area for guerrilla warfare must try by every possible means to set up small military factories, to the point that they can make their own ammunition, rifles, and hand grenades, so that guerrilla warfare need not worry about the lack of arms and ammunition.
• Ninth, on the basis of the enemy's situation and our strategic requirements, divide up once again the war districts and political districts in the enemy's rear, so that they will suit the new war situations.
• Tenth, on the basis of strategic requirements, we must unify the leadership of the various units and administrative areas in the enemy's rear, in order to concentrate the forces resisting the enemy, and eliminate internal contradictions; but, at the same time, we should oppose the warlord behaviour of mutual annexation.

#4.5. RAISE THE LEVEL OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, SET UP A MECHANIZED CORPS, AND PREPARE STRENGTH FOR THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE

The main reason why the enemy could gradually enter deep into our country with an army smaller than ours, apart from political causes on our side, is our technological backwardness. In light of the enemy's strength and our weakness in this sphere, the fifth task of the whole nation is to raise the level of our military technology, increase the number of aeroplanes, cannons, thanks, and so on, and the number of persons trained to use them, in order to prepare strength for the counter-offensive. For this purpose, we would, on the one hand, start this work now, using the productive capacity that we have now, and which we can increase in the future, beginning with partial manufacture and repairs, and doing this work conscientiously. On the other hand, try by every possible means to import weapons of a new type from foreign countries and use them to improve gradually the equipment of the army and set up a real modern mechanized corps. Without any doubt, we should look at the problem from a realistic standpoint. At present, the weapons that are actually in use are large numbers of primitive weapons. Consequently, we should call on all the troops and the armed people in the country to believe that primitive weapons can also defeat the enemy, enhance their political spirit, improve their tactics, and develop guerrilla warfare to compensate for the lack of new technology. If we do not work especially hard on this aspect, we will be neglecting the practical problem at present and will not be able to overcome the current difficulties. In the future, in preparing for the strategic counter-offensive, this cannot be done unless we raise the new technology and build new-type armies. We should be aware that, without a sufficient number of troops equipped with modern technology, it is impossible to carry out the counter-offensive and regain our lost territory. Moreover, if we do not draw attention to this point and begin applying it seriously on a feasible scale, we will see only the present and forget the future, and will not be able to overcome the difficulties on our way to the future. In a country like China, which is rich in troop supply and material resources, provided only that the political conditions are improved, the method of mobilization is progressive, and there is help from foreign countries, it is never impossible to improve technological equipment gradually.

#4.6. CARRY OUT DEMOCRATIC POLICIES UNDER CENTRALIZED LEADERSHIP, ESTABLISH CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE, AND GIVE FULL PLAY TO THE UTMOST CAPACITY OF ANTI-JAPANESE POLITICAL POWER

The enemy is taking advantage of our weakness, not only in military matters, but also in the political sphere; they are taking advantage of the fact that our political system has not been democratized, so that it cannot establish close links with the broad masses of the people. In order to remedy this weakness, the sixth task of the whole nation is to establish a democratic political system under centralized leadership. If there is no progress in this respect, it will be impossible to win final victory over the Japanese bandits. Democratic politics is the locomotive that mobilizes all the vital forces of the nation. With this system, the enthusiasm of the people throughout the country for resisting Japan will be mobilized to an incalculable extent and will become an inexhaustible source of power. The completion of the great process of thorough unification and unity of our whole nation can take place only on the basis of the establishment of a democratic system. As regards this point, we should have plans based on reality in every field. Our tasks are as follows:

• First, the convocation of the People's Political Council has already taken the first step toward democratization of the State. Afterward, we should guarantee that the work of this council will proceed openly and smoothly, and that all its resolutions and decisions will be carried out. In addition, on the basis of the outline already approved by this council, we should conscientiously set up local political councils in every province and at every level to push forward democratic politics.
• Second, guarantee the full implementation of the people's freedom of speech, the press, assembly, association, and conscience, which are laid down in the Programme of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction. This kind of freedom is within the sphere of armed resistance and national reconstruction. Only if we fully guarantee this freedom will it contribute to bringing into play universally the forces of armed resistance and national reconstruction. The point here is to assure the implementation of the laws and decrees of the Central Government in every locality without any arbitrary local restrictions. The freedoms that should be restricted are only those which will harm the War of Resistance Against Japan and national reconstruction, for example, the freedoms of the Chinese traitors and the pro-Japanese elements. The freedoms of all other people should not be restricted.
• Third, put into effect as many democratic systems as possible from the war zones and the enemy's rear. For example, democratically elect the local governments at all levels before the appointment by the higher levels. Governments at every level in the war zones adopt the democratic-centralist system of committees. In addition, we should set up people's representative bodies at all levels. The governments in the war zones can add some necessary departments, change the form of government documents, eliminate embezzlers, the corrupt, and the incompetent, recruit people who are active in the War of Resistance Against Japan, and reduce salaries and encourage plain living, in order to adapt ourselves to the difficult, complex, and fluid environment in the war zones. Under the unified leadership of the Central Government, the local governments in the war zones have the right to issue special laws that apply only to the particular locality. All citizens regardless of gender in the war zones except for the Chinese traitors have the right to vote and to be elected. They all have freedom of speech, the press, assembly, association, and armed resistance to Japan. All anti-Japanese political parties and factions in the war zones have open and legal status. And so on and so forth. In the war zones, especially in the enemy's rear, it is impossible to sustain the long and bitter War of Resistance Against Japan without these political reforms.

All the above methods are for the purpose of linking the government closely with the people and increasing the strength of the government, so that it can play the greatest possible role in the War of Resistance Against Japan. Without a doubt, all local governments in the country should be under the leadership of the Central Government. They should not show any sign of disrespect toward the Central Government because of the geographic separation of the administrative areas by the enemy. The entire nation should implement the democratic system according to the laws of the Central Government, and, at the same time, the entire nation should unite around the Central Government.

#4.7. ENLARGE THE UNIFIED MASS MOVEMENT AND MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ASSIST THE WAR

The seventh task of the whole nation is to enlarge all kinds of mass movements, unify them, and make every effort to assist the war. Everything in this long and difficult War of Resistance Against Japan comes from the masses of the people. Without a widely developed, united, nationwide mass movement, it is impossible to sustain the war for a long period of time. This is especially the case in the war zones and in the enemy's rear. Just now, the War of Resistance Against Japan is meeting with new difficulties, and only by mobilizing the masses of the people can we overcome these difficulties. In the whole country, particularly in the war zones and in the enemy's rear, we should speedily do the following:

• First, guarantee the freedom of all anti-Japanese mass organizations and mass movements, and establish the legal status of these organizations and movements.
• Second, give material aid to the mass organizations and respect their independence.
• Third, earnestly set up all kinds of national-salvation leagues of workers, peasants, youth, women, merchants, professionals, intellectuals, and children, all of which must obtain the participation of the broad masses. Moreover, on the basis of region and profession, let them establish unified organizations.
• Fourth, mobilize the masses of the people and let them actively take part in all kinds of work in the War of Resistance by actively assisting the government and the army. This is particularly urgent and cannot be delayed in the war zones.

#4.8. IMPROVE THE PEOPLE'S LIVELIHOOD AND STIMULATE THE PEOPLE'S ENTHUSIASM IN THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AND IN PRODUCTION

In the past, we were very weak in dealing with the problem of improving the people's livelihood, and, consequently, we were unable to stimulate the enthusiasm of the broad masses of the working people for the War of Resistance and for production. This was extremely disadvantageous to perseverance in a protracted war. Therefore, in the future, the eighth task of the whole nation is to carry out the following policies, which are intended to improve the people's livelihood:

• First, give preferential treatment to dependents of anti-Japanese soldiers and to disabled anti-Japanese soldiers.
• Second, assist refugees from natural disasters and war, as well as unemployed workers in the war zones.
• Third, start an appropriate movement to reduce rent and interest in the war zones and in the enemy's rear.
• Fourth, redistribute grain and important daily necessities.
• Fifth, make an appropriate increase in wages, and improve the benefits of workers and employees.
• Sixth, admit the right of the workers and peasants to collective bargaining with their employers and landlords.
• Seventh, stop the insulting, beating, and cursing of the workers and apprentices by the employers, landlords, masters, and overseers.

These preliminary improvements in their lives should definitely increase the support of the workers and poor peasants for the government and their enthusiasm for joining the war and taking part in production. Not only will the mobilization and support for the war be greatly improved, but the quantity and quality of the industrial and agricultural production and the circulation of commerce will be greatly increased and raised, and the national financial budget will be satisfactorily resolved on the new agricultural, industrial, and commercial basis.

#4.9. IMPLEMENT NEW WARTIME FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES TO TIDE OVER THE DIFFICULTY IN THE WAR

After the fall of the major big cities and lines of communication, there will necessarily be great difficulties for the national economy and finances. Without new and effective methods, we cannot pull through this difficult moment in the war. Nevertheless, provided that we carry out the new policies and mobilize the strength of the people, we will be able to overcome any difficulties. Accordingly, the ninth task facing the whole nation is to carry out a new wartime financial and economic policy. Its main points are as follows:

• First, the purpose of the new policy is to guarantee all necessary supplies for the anti-Japanese armed forces, meet the people's demand for daily necessities, and fight against the enemy's economic blockade and economic sabotage.
• Second, reestablish national-defence industries in the interior of the country in a planned way, starting from the small-scale and most urgent branches, and gradually developing and improving them, and drawing in the capital of the government, the people, and foreign countries. In addition, mobilize the workers politically, guarantee their minimum material benefits, and improve the system of factory management, so as to increase productivity. This is not only necessary, but possible.
• Third, using a combination of political mobilization and government decrees, develop national agricultural and handicraft production, organize spring ploughing and autumn harvest campaigns, and thus cause the national agriculture and handicrafts to develop in a new guise. We should take care to protect agricultural implement, livestock, and handicraft workshops, and guarantee the economic self-sufficiency of the separated areas.
• Fourth, protect the free operation of private industrial and commercial enterprises, and, at the same time, pay attention to developing cooperative ventures.
• Fifth, on the basis of the principle that «those who have money contribute money», revise all the old taxes into a unified progressive tax and abolish the vexatious system of apportionment, in order to ease the burden on the people and increase public revenue.
• Sixth, using a combination of political mobilization and government decrees, collect contributions to national-salvation bonds and public grain for national salvation. In addition, mobilize the people to donate funds and grain for the combat troops to supplement their financial income.
• Seventh, fight in a planned way against the enemy's policy of issuing puppet currency and sabotaging the national currency; allow the separated districts to set up their own local banks and issue their own local paper currency.
• Eighth, strenuously encourage the movement for honesty and cleanliness, revise the methods for paying soldiers, and, on the basis of the minimum standard of living, establish a broadly equalitarian payment system.
• Ninth, the National Bank should start giving out low-interest loans to help develop the production and circulation of commodities.
• Tenth, restore and develop the postal and communication services in the war zones.

The above are only general indications. We must have the determination to reform the old system carefully and apply the new system, and persist in this. Only thus can we eliminate the new difficulties and sustain the protracted war. The heart of the matter lies in organizing the activism of the broad masses of common people and allowing them to contribute to the victory of the war. China's War of Resistance is proceeding under special circumstances. The major big cities and lines of communication have been occupied by the enemy, and the main support for the War of Resistance is the countryside and the peasants. The peasants have great strength to support the war, but we should carry out the necessary political and economic reforms. The various new policies we are talking about here are being proposed on the basis of this special situation.

#4.10. IMPLEMENT AN EDUCATIONAL POLICY OF NATIONAL RESISTANCE AND MAKE EDUCATION SERVE THE PROTRACTED WAR

Under the principle that everything must serve the war, we should make all the cultural and educational institutions meet the demands of the war. Hence, the tenth task of the whole nation is to carry out the following cultural and educational policies:

• First, reform the school system, eliminate courses that are neither urgent nor necessary, and change the system of management on the basis of the principle that teaching should focus on the courses that are needed for the war, and bring into play the students' enthusiasm in their studies.
• Second, establish, enlarge, and strengthen all kinds of cadre schools to educate large numbers of anti-Japanese cadres.
• Third, extensively develop education for the masses of the people, organize a variety of continuation schools, literacy movements, drama movements, singing movements, and sports movements, and publish all kinds of popular local newspapers at the front and in the enemy's rear, so as to raise the national culture and consciousness of the people.
• Fourth, organize free primary education, in order to educate the next generation in our national spirit.

All the above should be carried out through a combination of political mobilization and government decrees. The emphasis should be on mobilizing the people to educate themselves, but the government should give proper guidance, regulation, and possible material assistance. It is far from sufficient to fulfil the great task of raising the national culture and consciousness simply to depend on a few schools and newspapers run by the government with a limited budget. Ever since the War of Resistance began, the educational system has been undergoing changes. Especially in the war zones, striking progress has been made. In spite of that, there have still been no changes in the overall system adequate to the demands of the War of Resistance. This is not a good thing. The great War of Resistance must be accompanied by a great educational movement for the War of Resistance. The phenomenon of a lack of cooperation between the two must be eliminated as soon as possible.

#4.11. STRIVE TO OBTAIN INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE AND CONCENTRATE ALL OUR STRENGTH TO FIGHT AGAINST JAPANESE IMPERIALISM

Starting from the principles of protracted war and of concentrating all our strength to fight against Japanese imperialism, we cannot neglect organizing all possible foreign aid. Therefore, the eleventh task at present is as follows:

• First, resolutely oppose the views of some people who advocate the so-called policy of following the German and Italian line, for this is in fact a kind of procedure for preparing to surrender to the enemy.
• Second, strive to increase the material aid to us from the democratic countries and the Council Union, and, at the same time, do our utmost to induce all countries in the League of Nations to approve the resolution imposing sanctions against Japan.
• Third, set up certain agencies to systematically collect information regarding the atrocities of enemy armies, prepare specific documents and reports, and publicize them abroad to awaken the attention of the whole world, and induce them to take action to punish the Japanese Fascists.
• Fourth, select representatives from all political parties, factions, and popular bodies, organize them into international propaganda groups, and let them travel from country to country to awaken the sympathy of the people and governments of every country, and induce them to cooperate with the diplomatic activities of our government.
• Fifth, protect all foreigners in China whose countries are sympathetic to us, and their peaceful business and missionary activities.
• Sixth, take care to protect the interests of the overseas Chinese, and, moreover through the efforts of the overseas Chinese, push forward in every country the movement to oppose Japan and aid China.

We must do all these things energetically, regardless of the level of assistance from these countries, of whether it may temporarily not have increased or even partially decreased, or of whether the resolution of the League of Nations remains just a few good-sounding words. In accordance with the protracted nature of the War of Resistance, our foreign policy orientation should also be focused on the long term, emphasizing not our immediate interests, but aid in the future. Such a far-sighted view is essential.

#4.12. ESTABLISH A UNITED FRONT AGAINST AGGRESSION CONSISTING OF THE CHINESE AND JAPANESE SOLDIERS AND PEOPLES AND OF THE OPPRESSED NATIONS OF KOREA, TAIWAN, AND ELSEWHERE TO FIGHT TOGETHER AGAINST JAPANESE IMPERIALISM

The war of aggression by Japanese imperialism does not threaten only the Chinese people. At the same time, it threatens all the soldiers and people of Japan and the oppressed nations of Korea and Taiwan. If we want to cause the Japanese invasion to fail, the broad masses of the people and the soldiers of the two great nations of China and Japan and the oppressed nations of Korea and Taiwan should undertake vast and persistent common efforts, and establish a joint united front against the invasion. In pursuit of this objective, the twelfth task facing the whole nation is as follows:

• First, put forward this orientation of a united front against the invasion to the great masses of the people and the soldiers in the four countries, and call on them to fight for it.
• Second, the government should issue a decree to the effect that all the officers and soldiers in the anti-Japanese armies and the anti-Japanese guerrilla units should learn the necessary number of appropriate Japanese words. Senior political departments should prepare and send out Japanese-language teachers to different armies to teach, starting from a few words to being able to lecture Japanese officers and soldiers on some principles. Teach all the anti-Japanese officers and soldiers to make verbal propaganda to all the enemy soldiers and junior officers, supplemented by written and visual propaganda. Gradually help them to change by persuasion, make them agree to setting up a joint united front against the invasion, and turn the 1'000'000-strong invading Japanese army into an army friendly to us, which will withdraw from China and overthrow Japanese Fascism.
• Third, respect and give lenient treatment to enemy captives, educate them, and, through them, influence the others to work hard for the establishment of a united front against the invasion.
• Fourth, find a way to organize anti-invasion cultural workers in Japan to come to China and join this struggle.
• Fifth, protect the honest Japanese residents in China.
• Sixth, teach the great masses of the people and the soldiers. One the one hand, we should raise our national dignity. On the other hand, we should correct some of the wrong ideas in the army as well as among the people, distinguish between Japanese imperialism and the Japanese people, between the enemy officers and the enemy soldiers, and between the enemy senior officers and the enemy junior officers.

After we have carried out the above orientation and methods, and made extensive and resolute efforts, this united front against the invasion can be established. China's victory will depend mainly on the increase in its own strength; but, at the same time, the enemy's difficulties and international aid must be obtained to supplement this. As regards the enemy's difficulties, apart from the gradual drain resulting from our persistence in the protracted war, and the gradual isolation of the enemy resulting from our strenuous diplomatic activity, the policy of building a joint united front against the invasion together with the Japanese soldiers and people and with the Korean and Taiwanese nations is a part that cannot be omitted. The longer the Japanese war of aggression lasts, the more likely there will be a basis to set up such a united front.

#4.13. UNITE ALL CHINA'S NATIONALITIES AND STAND TOGETHER AGAINST JAPAN

Our Anti-Japanese National United Front does not only consist of all the political parties, factions, and classes in the country; it also includes all the nationalities in the country. In response to the enemy's conspiracy to split all the nationalities in our country, which has already been carried out and will continue to be carried out, the thirteenth task at the moment is to unite all the nationalities as one and resist the Japanese bandits together. For this purpose, we must pay attention to the following points:

• First, give the Mongolian, Hui, Tibetan, Miao, Yao, Yi, Fan, and all other nationalities equal rights with the Han. Under the principle of joint resistance to Japan, they have the right to manage their own affairs, while, at the same time, uniting with the Han to establish a unified State.
• Second, in the regions where various minority nationalities live together with the Han, the local governments should set up committees made up of members of the local minority nationalities as one department of the provincial and county governments. These committees manage the affairs concerning them, mediate in relations among different nationalities, and have some seats in the provincial and county governments.
• Third, respect the culture, religion, and customs of all the minority nationalities. Not only should we not force them to learn to read and write Chinese, we should also support and assist them in developing their own culture and education in their own languages and using their own writing systems.
• Fourth, correct the existing Han chauvinism and encourage the Han to deal with all other nationalities on an equal basis, so that all the nationalities will daily become more friendly and close with one another. At the same time, forbid any insulting and contemptuous language, literature, and behaviour directed against them.

As regards the above policy, on the one hand, the various minority nationalities should unite among themselves and strive to bring about its realization, and, on the other hand, the government should immediately carry it out. Only thus can the relations among all the nationalities in the country be thoroughly improved, and the goal of uniting to fight against the intruders be truly achieved. The old hesitant and slow method will not work.

#4.14. RIGOROUSLY CARRY OUT THE MOVEMENT TO SUPPRESS TRAITORS AND STRENGTHEN BOTH THE FRONT AND THE REAR

In the new situation, the Chinese traitors, enemy spies, Trotskijites, and pro-Japanese elements will surely be even more rampant than before and carry out their conspiracies of rumour-mongering, insults, division, and sabotage. Hence, the fourteenth task at present lies in applying the following methods to resolutely carry out the movement to suppress traitors:

• First, awaken the vigilance of all soldiers and the whole people at the front as well as in the rear, and watch closely the activities of Chinese traitors, enemy spies, Trotskijites, and pro-Japanese elements. In accordance with the laws of the government, execute them without the slightest mercy.
• Second, be careful to protect State secrets. Execute for high treason those renegades who leak State secrets.
• Third, add a chapter on treason to every school textbook and carry out education to raise the level of vigilance.
• Fourth, set up counter-espionage departments at all levels to manage the work of counter-espionage in the military; set up counter-espionage groups in the mass organizations and people's self-defence units. Emphasize education in counter-espionage among the national police forces, so that, under the close watch of the people, these traitors and spies have nowhere to hide. Ever since the War of Resistance began, we have suffered countless losses because of these traitors and spies. The officers and soldiers at the front are amazed at the large number of Chinese traitors and the magnitude of the losses caused by them to the war effort, and long ago unanimously demanded such a policy. Even in the rear, the leaking of State secrets and guiding in of the cruel bombardments by enemy aeroplanes have already awakened the anger and hatred of the whole nation. If the traitors and spies are not eliminated in the course of the protracted War of Resistance, we can hardly expect this war to be victorious.

To mobilize the national-revolutionary vigilance of the broad masses of the people, forcefully carry out the above tasks for combating treason, and turn it into a vast movement is a serious task that is indispensable for winning final victory. We should point out that the movement to suppress traitors must take care to distinguish between the ringleaders and the subordinates, between the conscious participants and those who have been deceived, and between those who are resolute and those who are wavering. They should be treated differently, the former more severely, the latter more lightly. In addition, we should pay attention to winning the latter over and persuading them to turn toward the good. We must absolutely not treat everyone in the same way. We must also pay attention to the reliability of evidence, not make use of interrogation by torture, and be strictly on guard against frame-ups. The goal of the movement to suppress traitors is to eliminate real traitors and spies, and this goal can be attained only through correct policies and methods.

#4.15. DEVELOP THE NATIONALIST PARTY, THE COMMUNIST PARTY, AND ALL ANTI-JAPANESE POLITICAL PARTIES, STRENGTHEN THE UNITED FRONT, AND SUPPORT THE PROTRACTED WAR

All the urgent tasks dealt with above require that the various political parties of the Anti-Japanese National United Front promote national progress, so as to carry them out resolutely under the unified leadership of President Jiang. It is impossible to attain this goal without developing the organizational capacity of all the political parties participating in the united front. The present strength of all political parties without exception is too small, and to develop greatly the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party in particular is an urgent task at present. In this task of development, every political party should support and assist the development of the other political parties, instead of envying and obstructing one another. We must be aware that, so long as it is an anti-Japanese political party, the development of any political party will benefit the War of Resistance Against Japan. Without a doubt, the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party constitute the basis of the united front, and, of these two political parties, the Nationalist Party is the backbone. We recognize this fact. Therefore, we firmly support President Jiang and the National Government and Nationalist Party under his leadership. Moreover, we call on the whole nation to give him their unanimous support. To recognize and support this backbone, but, at the same time, to develop every political party, are related and not conflicting policies.

In terms of the membership, I think that the Nationalist Party should expand to over 5'000'000, while the Communist Party and the other political parties combined should expand to over 1'000'000. In a great nation with a population of 450'000'000 people, during the great period of the War of Resistance, it is not only necessary, but entirely possible, to attract several million outstanding elements to join these anti-Japanese political parties. If this really happens, the Anti-Japanese National United Front will be expanded, and, as a result, will be further consolidated, and there will be ample guarantees for carrying out all the tasks to defeat the enemy. We will not need to worry anymore about achieving the fundamental objective of sustaining the protracted war and protracted cooperation, in order to expel the Japanese invaders and build a New China of the «Three People's Principles».

#5. PROTRACTED WAR AND PROTRACTED COOPERATION

Let us now focus on the question of the protracted characteristics of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and give those who are especially concerned about Nationalist-Communist relations, and who have already had many questions, a complete answer. This has great significance in terms of strengthening and enlarging the Anti-Japanese National United Front, strengthening and expanding Nationalist-Communist cooperation, smoothly carrying out the current urgent tasks, and tiding over a difficult moment in the war.

This problem includes the following points:

• The protracted character of the war determines the protracted character of cooperation.
• Cooperation during the war determines cooperation after the war.
• The content of and main conditions for protracted cooperation.
• The «Three People's Principles» and Communism.
• The organizational form of protracted cooperation.
• The policy of mutual assistance and mutual accommodation in protracted cooperation.
• The question of a democratic republic.

All these are questions that many people are concerned about, and we must give clear answers to all of them.

#5.1. THE PROTRACTED CHARACTER OF THE WAR DETERMINES THE PROTRACTED CHARACTER OF COOPERATION

Because the War of Resistance Against Japan is protracted, the entire Anti-Japanese National United Front can and must also be protracted. In this process, cooperation between the two major political parties — the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party — also can and must be protracted. This is the starting point for all our policies. Therefore, whatever happens, our policy is to demand a protracted national united front and protracted cooperation. Whatever happens, we demand unanimous support for a unified government and oppose friction and splits. Only such policies will help us to pull through the difficulties of the war, face up to the enemy's sabotage, beat back Japanese imperialism, and, finally, after the war is over, carry out the task of building a New China. This is fundamentally different from the period of Nationalist-Communist cooperation in 1924-27. At that time, it was short-term cooperation; this time, it is long-term cooperation.

#5.2. COOPERATION DURING THE WAR DETERMINES COOPERATION AFTER THE WAR

What we call protracted cooperation means cooperation, not only during the war, but also after the war. The War of Resistance Against Japan is protracted, and the cooperation during the war can already be described as protracted. Yet it is not enough that we hope to continue this cooperation; we definitely must continue this cooperation. What guarantees do we have? The guarantee is that cooperation during the war determines cooperation after the war. The major political parties in the Anti-Japanese National United Front — the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party — must share the difficulties as well as a common fate and strive to make progress. Moreover, only after protracted efforts can they defeat Japanese imperialism; otherwise, they cannot. When the war is over, these two political parties, which have shared adversities and made progress together, will have a basis for continued cooperation. It can already be predicted that domestic and international conditions then will be more favourable for cooperation. Without a doubt, cooperation during the war must have different contents during different periods, and cooperation after the war will have even more new contents. But the cooperation during the war will determine that they can cooperate after the war. This is not a groundless prediction.

#5.3. THE CONTENT OF AND MAIN CONDITIONS FOR PROTRACTED COOPERATION

Protracted cooperation means a protracted national united front. Every class, from capitalists to workers; every political party, from the Nationalist Party to the Communist Party; every nationality, from the Han nationality to the small nationalities, like the Miao and the Yao; every army, from the Central Army to the Eighth Route Army; every government, from the National Government to the Government of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region — with the sole exception of the national traitors — all of these are included, and, moreover, are always included. In the national united front during the protracted war, some people certainly cannot survive the hard struggle, and when personal interest surpasses the national interest, they will become national traitors. Thus, the national united front must continuously exclude these national traitors. Yet, after their exclusion, it still remains the national united front. The reason lies in the major conditions of protracted cooperation and in the first instance in the barbaric and protracted character of the war. Because the barbarism of the enemy's war gravely threatens the survival of every class of the whole nation, this forces the upper classes to resist Japan together with the other classes. It is inevitable that some people among the upper classes will withdraw from the anti-Japanese front, but broadly speaking, the remainder of the upper classes are oppressed and have no way out but to revolt. Besides, because this barbaric war is protracted, it determines that cooperation will also be protracted. These facts constitute one aspect that determines protracted cooperation.

Yet there is the second aspect, which requires all the parties to the cooperation, first of all, the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party, to adopt correct policies and conduct necessary work. What kind of policies and work? They should be the policies and work that are decided and carried out on the basis of protracted war and protracted cooperation. They should be the policies and work that take account of the present as well as the future, this class as well as that class, this political party as well as that political party, this army as well as that army, and this nationality as well as that nationality. Otherwise, the policies are wrong, the work is poorly done, everything is in a mess from within the united front itself, and the cooperation will not last long.

So, on the one hand, the barbarism and protractedness of the enemy's war, and, on the other hand, the correct policies and necessary work in the united front, will ensure that the Chinese national united front not only should be, but also can be, protracted. It is a national front and not a people's front. It includes Nationalist-Communist cooperation during and after the war, instead of Nationalist-Communist cooperation that is expected to split and lead to a civil war after this war is over.

#5.4. THE «THREE PEOPLE'S PRINCIPLES» AND COMMUNISM

The «Three People's Principles» are the political basis of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and of Nationalist-Communist cooperation. But what is the relation between the «Three People's Principles» and Communism? What kind of attitude should Communist Party members adopt toward the «Three People's Principles»? Even down to the present day, some people are still not clear about this, so it is necessary to explain the matter once again.

Already in May 1937, at our Party's National Conference, we adopted the following outline on resolutely carrying out the «Three People's Principles»:

Does the Communist Party agree with the «Three People's Principles»? Our answer is: Yes, we do. The «Three People's Principles» have undergone changes in the course of their history. The revolutionary «Three People's Principles» of Dr. Sun Yixian won the people's confidence and became the banner of the victorious Revolution of 1924-27 because they were resolutely applied as a result of his cooperation with the Communist Party. In 1927, however, the Nationalist Party turned on the Communist Party (the party purge and the anti-Communist war) and pursued an opposite policy, losing the people's confidence, bringing the revolution down in defeat, and endangering the nation; consequently, the people lost confidence in the «Three People's Principles». Now that there is an extremely grave national crisis and the Nationalist Party cannot continue to rule in the same old way, the people of the whole country and the patriots within the Nationalist Party are urgently demanding cooperation between the two political parties. Consequently, it is completely in keeping with the historical requirements of the Chinese revolution that the essence of the «Three People's Principles» should be revived and restored, and that the two political parties should resume their cooperation, in accordance with the Principle of Nationalism, or the struggle for national independence and liberation, the Principle of Democracy, or the attainment of internal democracy and freedom, and the Principle of People's Livelihood, or the promotion of the people's welfare, and they should lead the people to put these principles resolutely into practice. This ought to be clearly grasped by every member of the Communist Party. Communists will never abandon their ideal of socialism and communism, which they will attain by going through the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The Communist Party of China has its own political and economic programme. Its maximum programme is socialism and communism, which is different from the «Three People's Principles». Even its programme for the period of the democratic revolution is more thoroughgoing than that of any other political party in China. But the Communist Party's programme for the democratic revolution and the programme of the «Three People's Principles» as proclaimed by the Nationalist Party's First National Congress are fundamentally not in conflict. Therefore, far from rejecting the «Three People's Principles», we are ready staunchly to put them into practice; moreover, we ask the Nationalist Party to implement them together with us, and we call upon the whole nation to put them into effect. We hold that the Communist Party, the Nationalist Party, and the people of the whole country should unite and fight for these three great objectives of national independence, democracy and freedom, and the people's livelihood.⁶

On the 22nd of September last year, in the declaration on the establishment of Nationalist-Communist cooperation by our Party's Central Committee, we stressed:

Dr. Sun Yixian's «Three People's Principles» being what China needs today, our Party is ready to fight for their complete realization.⁷

Why does a Communist Party adopt such an attitude? Clearly, nationalism, democracy, and the people's livelihood are precisely the general objectives that the Communist Party wants to realize in the national-democratic stage of the revolution. They are also the general objectives that the people of the whole country want to realize instead of the things that are demanded by a certain political party alone. If you will just have a look at the documents and programmes of the Communist Party since its founding, you will understand this. Therefore, in the past, not just during the first period of Nationalist-Communist cooperation in 1924-27, our Communist Party resolutely carried out the «Three People's Principles». Even after the unfortunate breakup of the cooperation between the two political parties in 1927, none of our deeds violated the «Three People's Principles». At that time, we were firmly opposed to imperialism, and this was in conformity with the Principle of Nationalism; we carried out the political system of congresses of people's deputies, and this corresponded to the Principle of Democracy; and we also applied the agrarian system of «Land to the tillers», which corresponded to the Principle of People's Livelihood. At that time, none of our actions went beyond the fundamental concept of private property of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. In order to thoroughly carry out this task of the democratic stage, all Communist Party members should, without the slightest doubt, in accordance with their own consistent revolutionary general principles, and their own resolutions and declarations, earnestly and sincerely carry out the «Three People's Principles», together with the Nationalist Party of China, the other political parties in the country, and the whole people. Whoever does not loyally believe in and carry out the «Three People's Principles» says one thing and means another, or thinks in one way and behaves in another, and is not a loyal Marxist. In China, all loyal Marxists have at the same time the two responsibilities of current practical tasks and great future ideals. Furthermore, we must be aware that only when the present tasks are fulfilled as thoroughly as possible will we have the basis for developing into the future period of great ideals. These great ideals are communism, which is the perfect social system for humanity. Dr. Sun Yixian once believed that only when it was realized could the social problems of the future be resolved. Our present practical tasks are the «Three People's Principles». This is the fundamental task in the current stage of «seeking equal international status, equal political status, and equal economic status». It is the common demand of the Nationalist Party, the Communist Party, and the people of the whole country. Therefore, just as they study Communism, Communist Party members should carefully study the «Three People's Principles». They should study the «Three People's Principles» from a Marxist standpoint, study how the «Three People's Principles» can be concretely applied, study how to use the genuine «Three People's Principles» to teach the masses of the people, so that they will proceed from understanding to active application, and fight hard to defeat Japanese imperialism and build a New China of the «Three People's Principles».

#5.5. THE ORGANIZATIONAL FORM OF PROTRACTED COOPERATION

To guarantee protracted cooperation, we must also solve the problem of the organizational form of this cooperation. We have already refuted the doctrine of a single political party. No matter whether in terms of past history, the present tasks, or the nature of Chinese society, the doctrine of a single political party is groundless. It can never be carried out and will never work. It violates the great objective of uniting as one to resist Japan and rebuild the nation; it produces much harm, but no benefit. Well, then, does the coexistence of all political parties and their mutual union in the Anti-Japanese National United Front require a kind of common organization? Yes, it does. The absence of such a unified common organization will be disadvantageous to resistance against Japan, and even more disadvantageous to protracted cooperation. Hence, every political party should study it carefully and find a common unified organizational form that best fits in with protracted cooperation. Let us now consider this.

Because of the historical particularities of Chinese politics and economics, as well as of the various political parties, it appears from today's perspective that the Anti-Japanese National United Front may have the following three organizational forms:

• In the first kind, the Nationalist Party itself becomes a national alliance. Every political party joins the Nationalist Party, while maintaining its own independence, but this is different from the first period of Nationalist-Communist cooperation. If the Nationalist Party agrees that Communists can join it, what should be our attitude? First, we approve of this method, because it is one of the best unified organizational forms of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and will benefit armed resistance and national reconstruction. Not only the Communist Party, but also any other anti-Japanese political party or faction, can join the Nationalist Party. If the Nationalist Party approves, we will certainly never object. If the matter is handled in this way, we may adopt a method different from that in the cooperation in 1924. To begin with, all those Communist Party members who join the Nationalist Party should do so openly, and a list of their names should be handed over to the leading bodies of the Nationalist Party. Second, do not accept any Nationalist Party members into the Communist Party. If there are some people who want to join, they should be persuaded not to do so, taking into account the situation as a whole. Third, if our Communist Youth League members are allowed to join the «Three People's Principles» Youth League with the approval of the Nationalist Party, we would do the same thing, not organizing underground branches in the League, and not admitting non-Communists into our Youth League. With this method, everybody will live in peace, and this will be beneficial, rather than harmful. This is the first kind of organizational form of the united front.
• The second kind of organizational form of the united front is that all the political parties together organize a national alliance and support Mr. Jiang Jieshi as the supreme leader of this alliance. Every political party will send its representatives on an equal basis to form central as well as various local joint committees to work hard to carry out the common programme and deal with matters of common interest. This is another very good organizational form, of which we approve. We proposed it long ago, but unfortunately, it has not been adopted.
• The third kind of organizational form of the united front is the present method. There are no written rules, nothing is fixed, but when something occurs, the political parties discuss it together to solve the problems concerning them all. But this organizational form is not sufficiently close, and many problems cannot be properly and promptly solved. For instance, the application of many overall policies and the adjustment of friction at the lower levels are all delayed because there is no fixed organization, so these problems persist. Hence, this method is not advantageous for protracted cooperation. Nevertheless, if the first and second methods are impossible, this method will have to be continued temporarily.

In sum, the problem of the organizational form of protracted cooperation during the protracted war is an important issue. We strongly support a kind of unified form, which will benefit protracted cooperation.

#5.6. THE POLICY OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND MUTUAL ACCOMMODATION IN PROTRACTED COOPERATION

We have said already that a protracted war requires a protracted united front. This is the starting point for all our policies. Consequently, in their work and their relations with allied political parties, Communist Party members should pay attention everywhere and at all times to this protractedness. They should resolutely and bravely perform all work which will benefit protracted cooperation and absolutely never do anything which will harm protracted cooperation.

Here, there arises the problem of mutual assistance and accommodation among different political parties. As regards mutual assistance, for example, every political party wants to develop and strengthen itself, but apart from developing and strengthening itself, every political party should support and assist the development and strengthening of its allied political parties. What kind of attitude should Communist Party members adopt toward the development and strengthening of the Nationalist Party? In a word, to support and assist it. The reasons are that the development and strengthening of the Nationalist Party will benefit the War of Resistance Against Japan, benefit the whole nation, and, consequently, benefit the working people and the Communist Party as well, as I have already said. Now that the Nationalist Party is organizing the «Three People's Principles» Youth League, what attitude should Communists take toward this? Without a doubt, we will adopt the attitude of support and assistance. We hope that the «Three People's Principles» Youth League will develop extensively on the basis of Mr. Jiang Jieshi's declaration about it, and that its development will have a bright future. Precisely because of our support and assistance, we hope that there will be some revisions and adjustments of certain articles in its present rules. Otherwise, good motives will not necessarily lead to good results. The «Three People's Principles» Youth League should become a unified organization for all the masses of the youth throughout the country to unite and save the nation. It should absorb individual young people and the youth of every political party, faction, and group, so that it becomes a vast body in which the entire younger generation will receive education and training for the national revolution. Therefore, organizationally, it should be democratized; politically, it should bring into play the initiative of the masses of the youth. This is our attitude toward and understanding of the «Three People's Principles» Youth League.

Mutual aid is not mutual harm. Hurting others to benefit oneself is wrong in terms of individual morality, and even more wrong in terms of national morality. Therefore, unreasonable friction, even going so far as to arrest and kill people, is absolutely wrong under any circumstances. Communist Party members must absolutely never treat our allied political parties in this way. Moreover, if our allied political parties treat us like this, we will never remain silent. It is only right and fair to oneself as well as to others if a serious attitude is adopted in dealing with irrational actions. To point out one another's mistakes is virtue between friends, and it is also the style that should be encouraged between political parties.

Are there any mutual accommodations in the united front? Yes, there are. We once made some political concessions, that is, we stopped confiscating the land, reorganized the Red Army, and changed the government system in the Red areas. These were a kind of political concessions, a necessary step in order to set up the united front and to unite all the people to fight against the enemy together. Our allied political parties made some concessions, too, such as recognizing the legal status of the Communist Party, and so on. This kind of policy of mutual accommodation for the purpose of united resistance to Japan and protracted cooperation is very good and very correct. Only those who are politically muddle-headed or people with something else in their minds could say that the Communist Party capitulated to the Nationalist Party or the other way around.

Now we also advocate that all the political parties in the united front will not recruit members, organize branches, or carry out secret work inside the other political parties. We consider that such a policy is necessary. Naturally, it is different now from in the past. Previously, in the period of civil war, apart from the open war between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party, they both used secret means to conduct activities to sabotage each other. After the reestablishment of cooperation, there certainly should not be any motives or actions for sabotaging each other, but the method of secretly recruiting party members and organizing branches in the other's political party must also be terminated, in order to reassure both sides. Only this is compatible with the goal of protracted cooperation in a protracted war. Now we formally declare to our Nationalist comrades: We will halt all activity to recruit Party members and organize branches in your party, and we will continue this policy no matter what kind of common organizational forms the united front may take. But meanwhile, we hope that you will do the same. After the two sides have come to an agreement, if any lower-ranking party members violate it, the leading bodies of the violating party are responsible for dealing with the matter.

Apart from this, in communications between the comrades from the two sides, they should adopt the attitudes of modesty, respect, and discussion instead of arrogance, contempt, and arbitrary action, so as to improve bilateral relations. This is also necessary.

Communist Party members should be the first to carry out all these things which we have said. Even though some people on the other side may not have treated us in accordance with the same policy, methods, and attitude, we will proceed with our policy. After we have done so for some time, those on the other side who fail to understand for a time will be able to see.

Communist Party members should persist in their standpoints regarding all the national and people's causes. From beginning to end, they should walk consistently in the direction of defeating the Japanese bandits and building a New China. Whoever violates this standpoint and orientation no longer qualifies as a Communist. But Communist Party members must also have the spirit of mutual aid and accommodation; they must have the spirit of respecting our allied political parties and solving problems with the comrades of our allied political parties by negotiating with a modest and amicable attitude. Wherever there are comrades of our allied political parties, we should resolve the relevant problems through negotiations with them, instead of being arbitrary and dictatorial. Without this spirit, we will not be able to strengthen unity and solidarity, nor will it be possible to achieve the national and people's cause and the objective of defeating the Japanese invaders and building a New China. Consequently, we should never regard the necessary policy of mutual accommodation as negative behaviour. Not only is mutual aid positive, but mutual accommodation is positive as well, for necessary accommodation is the indispensable condition for strengthening cooperation between the two political parties and seeking better unity and greater progress.

#5.7. THE QUESTION OF A DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Although our Party published the Resolution on a Democratic Republic as early as September 1936, and although the comrades of the Central Committee have repeatedly explained this matter, many people outside our Party still do not understand our proposal. This is a question related to the future of the War of Resistance. What will be the outcome of the War of Resistance? In the last analysis, what does armed resistance and national reconstruction mean in the view of the Communist Party? What kind of country do we want to build? This is a real question. To explain it again will help to strengthen the confidence of all the political parties and factions in protracted cooperation.

What kind of country do we want to build? To answer in a single sentence, we want to build a Republic of the «Three People's Principles».

What we call a democratic republic is actually the Republic of the «Three People's Principles»; its nature is the same as that of the «Three People's Principles». According to Dr. Sun Yixian, it will be a country «that seeks equal international status, equal political status, and equal economic status».

First, this country will adhere to the Principle of Nationalism. It will be an independent country, which will not tolerate any foreign interference, and, at the same time, will not interfere in any foreign countries. That is to say, China's semi-colonial status will be changed, and it will become independent. At the same time, no matter how strong and prosperous it has become, it will never become imperialist, but rather have peaceful relations in a spirit of equality with all the friendly countries that respect China's independence, on the basis of peaceful coexistence and mutual benefit. As regards the nationalities within the country, it will give them equal rights and set up a unified government based on the principle of voluntary association.

Second, this country will adhere to the Principle of Democracy. All the people in the country will have equal political status, and all the government officials and civil servants will be elected by the people. The political system will be one of democratic centralism. A national assembly and local assemblies made up of the people's deputies will be established. Regardless of class, gender, nationality, religion, and cultural level, all citizens over the age of 18 years old except criminals will have the right to vote and to stand for election. The State will give the people freedom of speech, the press, assembly, association, conscience, residence, and movement, and will further protect them politically and materially.

Third, this country will adhere to the Principle of People's Livelihood. It will not deny private property, yet it will guarantee that workers have jobs and their working conditions are improved, that peasants have land and that heavy taxes and high rent and interest rates are abolished, that students can go to school and poor people will have a chance to receive education, and that all the other classes have work to do and can show their talents. In a word, the State will see to it that everybody has clothing, food, education, and work.

What we call a democratic republic is such a country, a genuine Republic of China of the «Three People's Principles». It is not a Council Republic, or is it socialist.

Against whom must we fight if China wants to become such a country? We must fight against Japanese imperialism. Japanese imperialism has deprived us of our independence, and we must demand our independence from it. Japanese imperialism treats us as slaves, and we must demand freedom from it. Japanese imperialism makes us starve and freeze, and we must demand food and clothing from it. How shall we make these demands? At gunpoint. In short, when we have driven out Japanese imperialism, we shall have an independent, free, happy, new Republic of China of the «Three People's Principles».

#6. CHINA'S WAR AGAINST AGGRESSION AND THE WORLDWIDE ANTI-FASCIST MOVEMENT

#6.1. CHINA AND THE REST OF THE WORLD CANNOT BE SEPARATED

China is already closely linked with the world. The Second Sino-Japanese War is part of the Second World War, and the victory of China's War of Resistance Against Japan cannot be considered independently, apart from the rest of the world. In the new stage of the War of Resistance, it is possible that part of foreign aid may be temporarily reduced. This increases the significance of China's self-reliance. At all times, China must depend primarily on self-reliance. But China is not and never can become isolated. The fact that China is closely linked with the world is also our standpoint, and it must be our standpoint. We are not and never can be isolationists. China could not have been isolated a long time ago, and now that a global imperialist power has intervened in China by war, all the people of China are concerned about the relations between China and the rest of the world. They are particularly concerned about the changes in the situation in Europe. Therefore, it is quite meaningful for us to analyse the current international situation.

#6.2. THE SECOND WORLD WAR TO REDIVIDE THE WORLD HAS ALREADY BEGUN

The nature of capitalist imperialism is not only in contradiction with the broad masses of the people in the imperialist countries, but also in contradiction with the colonial, semi-colonial, and socialist countries, and, moreover, there are contradictions among the various imperialist countries themselves. The sharpest expression of this latter type of contradictions in history was the First World War 20 years ago. The consequence of that war between two imperialist blocs was the birth of a new international situation. As a result of the new political and economic developments in the world after that war, the world has been brought again to the brink of a new world war. After the invasion of the four north-eastern provinces by the Japanese bandits in the East, and Hitler's rise to power in the West, a new war to redivide the world has already begun. The slogan, «Fascism is war», is absolutely correct. Under these circumstances, on the one hand, Japan, Germany, and Italy have set up a front for invasion, carrying out invasions on a large scale. On the other hand, the democratic countries are preparing for a war in the name of peace to protect the advantages they have already obtained, but as yet, they have not been willing to use violence to stop the invaders. In particular, the British policy of appeasement has helped the invaders. Under these circumstances, China's four north-eastern provinces were first sacrificed, then Ethiopia was conquered by Italy, and then the arrogance of the rebel army in Spain was encouraged. China is again facing a new large-scale invasion by the Japanese bandits, and then very recently, Austria and Czechoslovakia were sacrificed to Hitler one after the other. 600'000'000 people in the entire world have been drawn into this war, and its scope has been extended to Asia, Africa, and Europe. This is the current situation of the new world war.

#6.3. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WORLD WAR AT PRESENT

As a result, on the one hand, of the resolute determination of the fascist countries — Japan, Germany, and Italy — to carry out invasions, and, on the other hand, of the reluctance of the democratic countries to impose sanctions by force, especially the British policy of appeasement, the current situation of the new world war exhibits characteristics different from those of the First World War, namely, the invasion of the neutral countries first and the adoption of different forms of war. China, Ethiopia, Spain, Austria, and Czechoslovakia are either dependent or small countries. Japan, Germany, and Italy first chose these fat little morsels and swallowed them. In their invasions of these neutral countries, the invaders used three particular forms of war:

• The first kind was that of Japan's war against China and Italy's war against Ethiopia. These were open and large-scale wars, yet they were carried out without a declaration of war, thus opening up a new era in the history of war. The purpose of using this method of undeclared war lies in the fact that the invaders, taking advantage of the reluctance of the democratic countries to impose sanctions, and particularly Britain's policy of appeasement, temporarily avoided direct clashes, thus facilitating their operations to capture the neutral countries first.
• The second kind is the form of the invasion of Spain by Italy and Germany. They adopted the method of assisting a rebel army. This is a repetition of an old method in history, of which there were examples in the past.
• The third kind is the form Hitler used to invade Austria and Czechoslovakia; there was no appearance of war (there was not shooting), but there was the essence of war. He sent out big and strong military forces, and they occupied all of Austria and part of Czechoslovakia. Later, he brought the rest of Czechoslovakia under his control. This is the best method for subjugating the people of a country without fighting a war.

The adoption of these three methods results entirely from the fact that, on the one hand, the aggressors themselves do not have sufficient strength, so it is wise to avoid direct conflict with the Great Powers. Consequently, they use clever methods of waging war, in an attempt to first make themselves stronger, while simultaneously the Great Powers are being weakened, after which they will fight against them. On the other hand, it was the result of the fact that none of the democratic countries was willing to stop the aggressors, and especially of British cowardice and appeasement. In reality, this kind of policy assisted the aggressors, and made it easier for them to invade the neutral countries.

#6.4. BRITISH APPEASEMENT WILL LEAD THE FASCIST COUNTRIES TO WAGE WARS ON AN EVEN LARGER SCALE

Just now, the British Conservative cabinet headed by Neville Chamberlain is gradually carrying out its policy of the so-called cooperation of the four Great Powers. After the Munich Agreement, it is possible that the political situation in Europe may temporarily take a turn for the worse. The policies of the majority of the British Conservative Party have always been based on the principle of rejecting the Council Union and appeasing Germany and Italy, because they fear the strength and prosperity of the Council Union and fear that they themselves may become involved in the war too soon. They fear the movements of their own people and the independence movements in the colonies, and they had long ago resolved to sacrifice Spain, Austria, and Czechoslovakia to fulfil their goal of excluding the Council Union and appeasing Germany and Italy. In the past, because of the lack of unity within the Conservative Party itself, the active policy of the French People's Front, and the criticism by both domestic and international public opinion, they did not succeed in this. Now, taking advantage of the reluctance of the people of Britain and of all Europe to fight a new war, and of the Far Right Flandin faction in France, under Hitler's threat of violence, the Munich Agreement was signed. This agreement is the consequence of British appeasement. If Britain does not change its policy, it will inevitably lead the fascist countries to launch military adventures on an even larger scale. Although war between the Great Powers may not break out immediately, the process, restricted for the time being to the invasion of neutral countries, is still continuing. In the end, it will certainly lead all the Great Powers into an unprecedentedly cruel war. There can be no doubt as to this future prospect. The inevitable result of Chamberlain's policy will be like «lifting a rock only to drop it on one's own toes».

#6.5. THE MAJORITY OF HUMANITY THROUGHOUT THE WORLD IS GRADUALLY BEING MOBILIZED

As regards all the capitalist countries, because of the general economic crisis, capitalism has entered a dead end from which there is no escape. The war involving 600'000'000 people affects the whole world, and new and larger wars are threatening humanity. As regards the socialist countries, on the other hand, everything looks bright, progressive, strong, and prosperous. In the contrast between these two opposites, the majority of humanity have gradually found the direction to protect and liberate themselves. They are gradually uniting on an unprecedentedly large scale and in unprecedented depth and are preparing to fight. The First World War, the strength and prosperity of the socialist countries in the past 20 years, the decline of the capitalist countries, the wars of aggression by the fascist countries in the past six or seven years, China's great War of Resistance Against Japan, the people's war in Spain, even Chamberlain's policy of appeasement, and so on, gradually taught Britain, France, other countries, and the people of the whole world a lesson. These events made them understand that organizing and fighting is the only way out, that only by uniting as one all the people in the world who are seeking liberation for themselves, only if there is a united front between the people of the world and the oppressed nations will there be a way out. This great process of mobilizing, organizing, and arming the people of the world in a united front is moving forward, but it can succeed only after great and arduous efforts. The Fascist war threat and Chamberlain's appeasement will, in the end, encounter great resistance. This is undoubtedly also a future prospect; it is an inevitable consequence of both the Fascist threat and Chamberlain's appeasement.

#6.6. COOPERATION BETWEEN THE CHINESE RESISTANCE TO THE WAR OF AGGRESSION AND THE WORLDWIDE ANTI-FASCIST MOVEMENT

Everyone is aware of what has happened in the past. To some extent, all the democratic countries are aiding China, mainly because of their peoples' sympathy for China. The aid of the Council Union is especially active. Now, because of the deep penetration by the Japanese bandit offensive, the contradictions between Britain, the United States, France, and the Council Union, on the one side, and Japan, on the other, have deepened. Although Britain may practise appeasement in the East as it has in the West, in an attempt to more or less preserve its commerce with the Japanese-occupied territories, and under the illusion that Japan will reduce it threat to South-East Asia, compromise to some extent with Japan, a fundamental compromise will be very difficult, at least for the time being. This is because of the Japanese policy of unilateral occupation, as a result of which the problem of the East differs to some degree from the problem of the West in terms of the specific current situation. The deep penetration of the Japanese offensive has deepened the contradictions between Japan and the United States, the friendship between the Council Union and China is increasing, and there is a possibility of further closeness between China, the United States, and the Council Union. Nonetheless, we must, first, not forget the difference between the capitalist countries and the socialist countries. Second, we must not forget the difference between the government and the people in the capitalist countries. This, it is even more important not to forget the differences between the present and the future, and we should not expect too much from the former. We should strive to win every possible aid at present, and, to some extent, this is not only a possibility, but a reality. But it is not appropriate to expect too much. The coordination between the Chinese national-liberation movement and foreign aid is mainly coordination in the future with the progressive nations and the people's anti-Fascist movements in the entire world. While taking self-reliance as the primary policy, we should not abandon the effort to win foreign aid. Such should be the basis on which we place ourselves.

#7. THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA IN THE NATIONAL WAR

#7.1. THE NATURE OF THE QUESTION

Comrades, the prospects ahead of us are bright. Not only is it necessary for us to defeat Japanese imperialism and build a New China, but we are certainly capable of achieving these aims. However, there is a difficult road ahead between the present and the bright future. In the struggle for a New China, the Communist Party of China and the whole people must fight the Japanese aggressors in a planned way and can defeat them only through a protracted war. We have already said a good deal about the various problems relating to the war. We have summed up the experience gained since its outbreak and appraised the present situation, defined the urgent tasks confronting the whole nation and explained the reasons for sustaining a protracted war by means of a protracted national united front against Japan and the methods for doing so, and we have analysed the international situation. What problems then remain? Comrades, there is one more problem, namely, what role the Communist Party of China should play in the national war, or how Communists should understand their own role, strengthen themselves, and close their ranks, in order to be able to lead this war to victory and not to defeat.

#7.2. PATRIOTISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

Can a Communist, who is an internationalist, at the same time be a patriot? We hold that they not only can be, but must be. The specific content of patriotism is determined by historical conditions. There is the «patriotism» of the Japanese aggressors and of Hitler, and there is our patriotism. Communists must resolutely oppose the «patriotism» of the Japanese aggressors and of Hitler. The Communists of Japan and Germany are defeatists with regard to the wars being waged by their countries. To bring about the defeat of the Japanese aggressors and of Hitler by every possible means is in the interests of the Japanese and the German people, and the more complete the defeat, the better. This is what the Japanese and German Communists should be doing and what they are doing. For the wars launched by the Japanese aggressors and Hitler are harming their own people as well as the people of the world. China's case is different, because it is the victim of aggression. Chinese Communists must therefore combine patriotism with internationalism. We are at once internationalists and patriots, and our slogan is: «Fight to defend the homeland against the aggressors.» For us, defeatism is a crime, and to strive for victory in the War of Resistance is an inescapable duty. For only by fighting in defence of the homeland can we defeat the aggressors and achieve national liberation. And only by achieving national liberation will it be possible for the proletariat and other working people to achieve their own emancipation. The victory of China and the defeat of the invading imperialists will help the people of other countries. Thus, in wars of national liberation, patriotism is applied internationalism. For this reason, Communists must use their initiative to the full, march bravely and resolutely to the battle front of the war of national liberation, and train their guns on the Japanese aggressors. Not the slightest pessimism is permitted. It is imperative that we exert ourselves to the utmost to assist all friendly political parties and armies. For this reason, immediately after the 18th of September Incident in 1931, our Party issued its call to resist the Japanese aggressors by a war of national defence, and later proposed a national united front against Japan, ordered the Red Army to reorganize as part of the anti-Japanese National Revolutionary Army and to march to the front, and directed Party members to take their place in the forefront of the war and defend the homeland to the last drop of their blood. These are good patriotic actions and, far from running counter to internationalism, are its application in China. Only those who are politically muddle-headed or have ulterior motives talk nonsense about our having made a mistake and abandoned internationalism.

#7.3. COMMUNISTS SHOULD SET AN EXAMPLE IN THE NATIONAL WAR

For the above reasons, Communists should show a high degree of initiative in the national war, and show it concretely, that is, they should play an exemplary vanguard role in every sphere. Our war is being waged under adverse circumstances. The reason for the emergence of such adverse circumstances lies in the fact that, up until this moment, the extensive dynamic forces of our nation have only just begun to be mobilized. National consciousness, national self-respect, and national self-confidence are not sufficiently developed among the broad masses, the majority of the people are unorganized, China's military power is weak, the economy is backward, the political system is undemocratic, corruption and pessimism exist, and a lack of unity and solidarity is to be found within the united front; these are among the adverse circumstances. Therefore, Communists must consciously shoulder the great responsibility of uniting the entire nation, so as to put an end to all such undesirable phenomena. Here, the exemplary vanguard role of the Communists is of vital importance. Communists in the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies should set an example in fighting bravely, carrying out orders, observing discipline, doing political work, and fostering internal unity and solidarity. In their relations with friendly political parties and armies, Communists should take a firm stand of unity for resistance to Japan, uphold the programme of the united front, and set an example in carrying out the tasks of resistance; they should be true in word and resolute in deed, free from arrogance and sincere in consulting and cooperating with the friendly political parties and armies, and they should be models in inter-party relations within the united front. Every Communist engaged in government work should set an example of absolute integrity, of freedom from favouritism in making appointments, and of hard work for little remuneration. Every Communist working among the masses should be their friend and not a boss over them, an indefatigable teacher and not a bureaucratic politician. At no time and in no circumstances should a Communist place their personal interests first; they should subordinate them to the interests of the nation and of the masses. Hence, selfishness, slacking, corruption, seeking the limelight, and so on, are most contemptible, while selflessness, working with all one's energy, wholehearted devotion to public duty, and quiet hard work will command respect. Communists should work in harmony with all progressives outside the Party and endeavour to unite the entire people to do away with whatever is undesirable. It must be realized that Communists form only a small section of the nation, and that there are large numbers of progressives and activists outside the Party with whom we must work. It is entirely wrong to think that we alone are good and no one else is any good. As for people who are politically backward, Communists should not slight or despise them, but should befriend them, unite with them, convince them, and encourage them to go forward. The attitude of Communists toward any person who has made mistakes in their work should be one of persuasion in order to help them change and start afresh and not one of exclusion, unless they are incorrigible. Communists should set an example in being practical as well as far-sighted. For only by being practical can they fulfil the appointed tasks, and only far-sightedness can prevent them from losing their bearings in the march forward. Communists should therefore set an example in study; at all times, they should learn from the masses as well as teach them. Only by learning from the people, from actual circumstances, and from the friendly political parties and armies, and by knowing them well, can we be practical in our work and far-sighted as to the future. In a long war and in adverse circumstances, the dynamic energy of the whole nation can be mobilized in the struggle to overcome difficulties, defeat the enemy, and build a New China only if the Communists play an exemplary vanguard role to the best of their ability together with all the advanced elements among the friendly political parties and armies and among the masses.

#7.4. UNITE THE WHOLE NATION AND COMBAT ENEMY AGENTS IN ITS MIDST

The one and only policy for overcoming difficulties, defeating the enemy, and building a New China is to consolidate and expand the Anti-Japanese National United Front and mobilize the dynamic energy of the whole nation. However, there are already enemy agents playing a disruptive role within our national united front, namely, the traitors, Trotskijites, and pro-Japanese elements. Some of them publicly feign opposition to Japan, but secretly support Japan. Communists must always be on the lookout for them, expose their criminal activities with factual evidence, and warn the friendly political parties and armies and the people not to be duped by them. Communists must sharpen their political vigilance toward these enemy agents. They must understand that the expansion and consolidation of the national united front is inseparable from the exposure and weeding out of enemy agents. It is entirely wrong to pay attention only to the one side and forget the other.

#7.5. EXPAND THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND PREVENT INFILTRATION BY ENEMY AGENTS

To overcome the difficulties, defeat the enemy, and build a New China, the Communist Party must expand its organization and become a great political party with a mass character by opening its doors to the masses of workers, peasants, and young activists who are truly devoted to the revolution, who believe in the Party's principles, support its policies, and are willing to observe its discipline and work hard. Here, no tendency toward closed-doorism should be tolerated. But at the same time, there must be no slackening of vigilance against infiltration by enemy agents. The Japanese imperialist secret services are ceaselessly trying to disrupt our Party and to smuggle undercover traitors, Trotskijites, pro-Japanese elements, immoral elements, and careerists into its ranks in the guise of activists. Not for a moment must we relax our vigilance and our strict precautions against such persons. We must not close our doors for fear of enemy agents, our set policy being boldly to expand our Party. But while boldly enlarging our membership, we must not relax our vigilance against enemy agents and careerists who will avail themselves of this opportunity to sneak in. We shall make mistakes if we only pay attention to the one side and forget the other. The only correct policy is: «Expand the Party boldly, but do not let a single undesirable in.»

#7.6. MAINTAIN BOTH THE UNITED FRONT AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE PARTY

If there were only one class and one political party in China, then there would no longer be the need for a united front. The united front is predicated on the existence of two or more classes and political parties. It is only by firmly maintaining the national united front that the difficulties can be overcome, the enemy defeated, and a New China built. Moreover, this policy must be adhered to over a long period of time. This is beyond all doubt. At the same time, every political party and group in the united front must preserve its ideological, political, and organizational independence; this holds good for the Nationalist Party, the Communist Party, or any other political party or group. In inter-party relations, the Principle of Democracy in the «Three People's Principles» permits both the union of all political parties and groups and the independent existence of each. To speak of unity alone while denying independence is to abandon the Principle of Democracy, and to this neither the Communist Party nor any other political party would agree. There is no doubt that independence within the united front is relative and not absolute, and that to regard it as absolute would undermine the general policy of unity against the enemy. But this relative independence must not be denied; ideologically, politically, and organizationally, each political party must have its relative independence, that is, relative freedom. Also, the general policy of unity against the enemy would be undermined if this relative freedom were denied or voluntarily abandoned. This should be clearly understood by all members of the Communist Party as well as of the friendly political parties.

The same is true of the relationship between the class struggle and the national struggle. It is an established principle that, in the War of Resistance, everything must be subordinated to the interests of resistance. Therefore, the interests of the class struggle must be subordinated to, and must not conflict with, the interests of the War of Resistance. But classes and the class struggle are facts, and those people who deny the fact of class struggle are wrong. The theory which attempts to deny this fact is utterly wrong. We do not deny the class struggle, we adjust it. The policy of mutual help and mutual concessions which we advocate is applicable, not only to political party relations, but also to class relations. Unity against Japan requires an appropriate policy of adjustment in class relations, a policy which does not leave the working people without political and material safeguards, but also gives consideration to the interests of the rich, thereby meeting the demands of solidarity against the enemy. It is bad for the War of Resistance to pay attention only to the one side and neglect the other.

#7.7. CONSIDER THE SITUATION AS A WHOLE, THINK IN TERMS OF THE MAJORITY, AND WORK TOGETHER WITH OUR ALLIES

In leading the masses in struggle against the enemy as part of the united front, Communists must consider the situation as a whole, think in terms of the majority of the people, and work together with their allies. They must grasp the principle of subordinating the needs of the part to the needs of the whole. If a proposal appears feasible for a partial situation, but not for the situation as a whole, then the part must give way to the whole. Conversely, if the proposal is not feasible for the part, but is feasible in the light of the situation as a whole, again the part must give way to the whole. This is what is meant by considering the situation as a whole. Communists must never separate themselves from the majority of the people or neglect them by leading only a few progressive contingents in an isolated and rash advance, but must forge close links between the progressive elements and the broad masses. This is what is meant by thinking in terms of the majority. Wherever there are democratic political parties or individuals willing to cooperate with us, the proper attitude for Communists is to talk things over with them and work together with them. It is wrong to indulge in arbitrary decisions and peremptory actions and to ignore our allies. All these are things that cannot be ignored in the art of leadership and the spirit of Communist work. A good Communist must be good at considering the situation as a whole, good at thinking in terms of the majority, and good at working with their allies. We have had serious shortcomings in this respect, and we must still give the matter attention.

#7.8. CADRE POLICY

The Communist Party of China is a political party leading a great revolutionary struggle in a nation several hundred million strong, and it cannot fulfil its historic task without a large number of directors and cadres who combine ability with political integrity. In the last 17 years, our Party has trained a good many competent directors, so that we have a framework of cadres in military, political, cultural, Party, and mass work; all honour is due to the Party and to the nation for this achievement. But the present framework is not yet strong enough to support the vast edifice of our struggle, and it is still necessary to train capable people on a large scale. Many activists have come forward, and are continuing to come forward, in the great struggle of the Chinese people. We have the responsibility for organizing and training them and for taking good care and making proper use of them. Cadres are a decisive factor, once the political line is determined.⁸ We should not forget this truth. Here, it is imperative to rely on the original cadre basis, but not to be complacent about it. Therefore, it is our fighting task to train large numbers of new cadres in a persistent and planned way.

Our concern should extend to non-Party cadres as well as to Party cadres. There are many capable people outside the Party whom we must not ignore. The duty of every Communist is to rid themself of aloofness and arrogance and to work well with non-Party cadres, give them sincere help, have a warm, comradely attitude toward them, and enlist their initiative in the great cause of resisting Japan and reconstructing the nation. It is wrong to be conceited and to look down on other people.

We must know how to judge cadres. In judging the strengths and weaknesses and the good and bad qualities of a cadre, we must not just observe their performance, but also their nature. We must not confine our judgement to a short period or a single incident in a cadre's life, but should consider their life and work as a whole. This is the main method of judging cadres. Here, carelessness or arbitrariness cannot solve the problem.

We must know how to use cadres well. In the final analysis, leadership involves two main responsibilities: to work out ideas, and to use cadres well. Such things as drawing up plans, making decisions, giving orders and directives, drafting announcements, writing books, and delivering speeches are all in the category of «working out ideas». To put the ideas into practice, we must weld the cadres together and encourage them to go into action; this comes into the category of «using the cadres well». Taken together, these two things are known in Chinese custom as «employing people in the administration». Throughout our national history, there have been two sharply contrasting lines on the subject of the use of cadres, one being to «appoint people on their merit», and the other to «appoint people by favouritism». The former is the honest and the latter the dishonest way. Today, when we talk about the question of making use of cadres, it is from a revolutionary standpoint, fundamentally different from that of ancient times, and yet there is no getting away from this standard of «appointing people on their merit». It was utterly wrong in the past, and is still utterly wrong today, to be guided by personal favouritism, to reward sycophants, and to punish the honest and upright. The criterion the Communist Party should apply in its cadre policy is whether or not a cadre is resolute in carrying out the Party line, keeps to Party discipline, has close ties with the masses, has the ability to find their bearings independently, and is active, hard-working, and unselfish. This is what «appointing people on their merit» means. The cadres policy of Zhang Guotao was the exact opposite. Following the line of «appointing people by favouritism», he gathered personal favourites around himself to form a small clique and harboured ulterior motives. His petty factionalism had a long and deep history. But it was this cadre policy of his which treated the individual instead of the political principles of the Party as the centre, which turned to its opposite in achieving its goals once all the cadres left him; in the end, only Zhang Guotao remained, and he turned traitor to the Party and decamped. This is an important lesson for us. The political and economic backwardness of a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society, as reflected inside the Party, is the sources of the evil tendencies of individualism, self-aggrandizement, and factionalism. Taking warning from this and from similar historical lessons, and upholding the organizational line and cadre policy of Lenin and Stalin, the Central Committee and the directors at all levels must make it their major responsibility to adhere to the honest and fair way in cadre policy and reject the dishonest and unfair way, and so consolidate the unity of the Party.

We must know how to take good care of cadres. The cadres who have emerged through the moulding of the Party and hard struggle are the treasure of the nation and the pride of the whole Party, and they should be respected and taken care of by all Party comrades. The directors, on the other hand, have the responsibility of taking good care of them by various concrete methods. The ways of taking good care of cadres are as follows:

• First, give them guidance. This means allowing them a free hand in their work, so that they have the courage to assume responsibility and are not afraid of making mistakes, and, at the same time, giving them timely and appropriate directives concerning the situation, orientation, and methods of work, so that, guided by the Party's political line, they are able to make full use of their initiative.
• Second, raise their level. This means educating them by giving them the opportunity to study, so that they can enhance their theoretical understanding and their working ability.
• Third, check up on their work — not every day, but at the right moments — and help them sum up their experience, carry forward their achievements, correct their mistakes, and build on their achievements. To assign work without checking up and to take notice only when serious mistakes are made — that is not the way to take care of cadres.
• Fourth, remould them. This means, in general, use the method of persuasion with cadres who have made mistakes or have incorrect ideas, and help them correct their mistakes. The method of struggle should be confined to those who make serious mistakes and nevertheless refuse to accept guidance. Here, patience is essential. In cases of mistakes which do not involve major principles, but must be pointed out or they will not be overcome, it is wrong lightly to label people «opportunists», accuse them of having «small-bourgeois consciousness», and so on, or to lightly to begin «waging struggles» against them.
• Fifth, help them with their difficulties. When cadres are in difficulty as a result of illness, straitened means, or domestic or other troubles, we must be sure to give them as much care as possible. The leading bodies of the Party should show warm and kind comradely concern toward them. It is wrong to adopt an apathetic and cold attitude. In cases of illness, they must be given treatment and nursed back to health. As for overwork, try to make them compatible with the requirements of work. Even in the case of domestic troubles, to the extent possible, efforts should be made to find a solution.

To give priority to the cadres in all these areas to the extent permitted by material resources and the environment has great significance for realizing the goal of enhancing the work spirit of the cadres and uniting the whole Party.

This is how to take good care of cadres.

#7.9. PARTY DISCIPLINE

The Party's experience of struggle during the past 17 years, particularly since the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, demonstrates the necessity of continuing to uphold iron discipline inside the Party, the Eighth Route Army, and the New Fourth Army. Discipline is the guarantee that the line will be carried out. Without discipline, the Party will be unable to lead the masses and the army to victory. In the past, as a result of overcoming Zhang Guotao's serious violations of discipline, the smooth pursuit of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and the War of Resistance were assured. In the future, this order must also be firmly upheld. Only thus will it be possible to unite the whole Party, overcome new difficulties, and obtain new victories. Here, we must affirm anew the fundamental principles of Party discipline, namely:

• First, the individual is subordinate to the organization.
• Second, the minority is subordinate to the majority.
• Third, he lower level is subordinate to the higher level.
• Fourth, the entire membership is subordinate to the Central Committee.

These articles of discipline constitute the concrete application of the Party's system of democratic centralism. Whoever violates them violates democratic centralism, disrupts Party unity, and undermines the Party's revolutionary struggle. Because of this, the various leading bodies at the different levels of the Party should provide the necessary education on discipline to the whole Party and particularly to new Party members in accordance with these fundamental principles. Past experience proves that some people violate Party discipline through not knowing what it is, while others, like Zhang Guotao, violate it knowingly and take advantage of many Party members' ignorance to achieve their treacherous purposes. Hence, it is necessary to educate members in Party discipline, so that the militants will not only observe discipline themselves, but will exercise supervision over the directors, so that they, too, observe it, thus preventing the recurrence of cases like Zhang Guotao's. Party discipline is compulsory in nature. But, at the same time, it must be formulated on the basis of the political vigilance of Party militants and cadres. It is by no means commandism. If we are to ensure the development of inner-Party relations along the right lines, besides the four most important articles of discipline mentioned above, we must work out a set of fairly detailed Party Rules, which will serve to unify the actions of the leading bodies at all levels.

#7.10. PARTY DEMOCRACY

In the present great struggle, the Communist Party of China demands that all its leading bodies and all its militants and cadres should give the fullest expression to their initiative, which alone can ensure victory. This initiative must be demonstrated concretely in the ability of the leading bodies, the cadres, and the Party militants to work creatively, in their readiness to assume responsibility, in the exuberant vigour they show in their work, in their courage and ability to raise questions, voice opinions, and criticize defects, and in the comradely supervision that is maintained over the leading bodies and the directors. Otherwise, «initiative» will be an empty thing. But the exercise of such initiative depends on the spread of democracy in Party life. It cannot be brought into play if there is not enough democracy in Party life. Only in an atmosphere of democracy can large numbers of able people be brought forward. Ours is a country in which small-scale production and the paternal system prevail, and taking the country as a whole, there is as yet no democratic life; consequently, this state of affairs is reflected in our Party by insufficient democracy in Party life. This phenomenon hinders the entire Party from exercising its initiative to the full. Similarly, it has led to insufficient democracy in the united front and in the mass organizations. For these reasons, education in democracy must be carried on inside the Party, so that members can understand the meaning of democratic life, the meaning of the relationship between democracy and centralism, and the way in which democratic centralism should be put into practice. Only in this way can we really extend democracy within the Party and at the same time avoid ultra-democracy and the individualism which destroys discipline.

It is also essential to extend democracy in our Party organizations in the army to the degree necessary to stimulate the initiative of the Party members and increase the combat effectiveness of the troops. However, there cannot be as much democracy in the Party organizations in the army as in the local Party organizations. Both in the army and in the local organizations, inner-Party democracy is meant to strengthen discipline and increase combat effectiveness, not to weaken them. The Party branches, too, should also benefit from the consolidation of Party discipline and the enhancement of the Party's combat effectiveness, and not the reverse.

The extension of democracy in the Party should be seen as an essential step in its consolidation and development, and as an important weapon enabling it to be most active in the great struggle, to prove equal to its tasks, create fresh strength, and surmount the difficulties of the war.

#7.11. OUR PARTY HAS CONSOLIDATED ITSELF AND GROWN STRONG THROUGH THE STRUGGLE ON TWO FRONTS

Broadly speaking, in the last 17 years, our Party has learned to use the Marxist-Leninist weapon of ideological struggle against incorrect ideas within the Party on two fronts — against Right-wing opportunism and against «Left-wing» opportunism in the ideological, political, and organizational spheres.

Before the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee,⁹ our Party fought Chen Duxiu's Right-wing opportunism and Comrade Li Lisan's «Left-wing» opportunism. It made great progress thanks to the victories achieved in these two inner-Party struggles. After the Fifth Plenary Session, there were two further historic inner-Party struggles, namely, the struggles at the Zunyi Meeting and in connection with the expulsion of Zhang Guotao.

The Zunyi Meeting corrected serious errors of a «Left»-opportunist character — errors of principle committed in the fight against the enemy's fifth «encirclement and suppression» campaign — and united the Party and the Red Army; it enabled the Central Committee of the Party and the main forces of the Red Army to bring the Long March to a triumphant conclusion, to advance to a forward position in the resistance to Japan and to carry out the new policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. By combating Zhang Guotao's Right-wing opportunism, the Pasi and Yan'an Meetings (the fight against the Zhang Guotao line began at the Baxi Meeting¹⁰ and ended at the Yan'an Meeting¹¹) succeeded in bringing all the Red forces together and in strengthening the unity of the whole Party for the heroic struggle against Japan. Both kinds of opportunist mistakes arose during the revolutionary civil war, and their characteristic was that they were errors related to the war.

What are the lessons which have been derived from these two inner-Party struggles? They are:

• The tendency to «Left-wing» impetuosity, which disregards both the subjective and the objective factors, is extremely harmful to revolutionary war and, for that matter, to any revolutionary movement — it was among the serious errors of principle which were manifested in the struggle against the enemy's fifth «encirclement and suppression» campaign, and which arose from ignorance of the characteristics of China's revolutionary war. It should be pointed out that the errors made then were not errors in the general line, but serious errors of principle, involving the implementation of the general line in the tactics and pattern of the war.
• The opportunism of Zhang Guotao, however, was Right-wing opportunism in the revolutionary war and was a combination of retreatist line, warlordism, and anti-Party activity. It was only with the overcoming of this brand of opportunism that large number of cadres and Party members in the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army, people of intrinsically fine quality and with a long record of heroic struggle, were able to free themselves from its toils and return to the correct line of the Central Committee.
• Striking results were achieved in the great organizational work of the ten years of the Agrarian Revolutionary War — in army building, government work, mass work, and Party building. Had it not been for the support rendered by such organizational work to the heroic fighting at the front, we could not have kept up the bitter struggle against Jiang Jieshi. However, in the latter part of that period, serious errors of principle were made in the Party's policy concerning cadres and organization, errors which showed themselves in the tendency toward sectarianism, in punitiveness, and in the policy of ideological struggle carried to excess. They were due both to our failure to eliminate the vestiges of the former Li Lisan line and to the political mistakes in matters of principle committed at the time. These errors, too, were corrected at the Zunyi Meeting, and the Party was thus able to make the turn to a correct cadres policy and to correct organizational principles. As for Zhang Guotao's organizational line, it violated all Party principles, disrupted Party discipline, and carried factional activity to the point of opposition to the Party, the Central Committee, and the Communist International. The Central Committee did everything possible to overcome Zhang Guotao's iniquitous and erroneous line and to frustrate his anti-Party activity, and also tried to save Zhang Guotao himself. But as he stubbornly refused to correct his mistakes and resorted to double-dealing, and subsequently even betrayed the Party and threw himself into the arms of the Nationalist Party, the Party had to take firm measures and expel him. This disciplinary action won the support, not only of all Party members, but of all people loyal to the cause of national liberation. The Communist International also endorsed the decision and denounced Zhang Guotao as a deserter and renegade.

These lessons, these achievements, have furnished us with the prerequisites for uniting the whole Party, for strengthening its ideological, political, and organizational unity, and for successfully waging the War of Resistance. Our Party has consolidated itself and grown strong through the struggle on the two fronts.

#7.12. THE PRESENT STRUGGLE ON TWO FRONTS

From now on, it is of paramount importance to wage a political struggle against Right-wing pessimism in the War of Resistance, although it is still necessary to keep an eye on «Left-wing» impetuosity. On questions of the united front and of Party and mass organization, we must continue the fight against the «Left-wing» tendency toward closed-doorism if we are to achieve cooperation with the various other anti-Japanese political parties and groups, expand the Communist Party, and broaden the mass movement. At the same time, we must take care to combat the Right-opportunist tendency toward cooperation and expansion which are unconditional in character, or otherwise they will both be hindered and be turned into capitulationist cooperation and unprincipled expansion.

Ideological struggle on the two fronts must suit the concrete circumstances of each case, and we must never approach a problem subjectively or permit the bad old habit of «sticking labels» on people to continue.

In the struggle against deviations, we must give serious attention to opposing two-faced behaviour. As Zhang Guotao's career shows, the greatest danger of such behaviour is that it may develop into factional activity. To comply in public but oppose in private, to say yes and mean no, to say nice things to a person's face but play tricks behind their back — these are all forms of double-dealing. Only by sharpening the vigilance of Party cadres and militants against such behaviour can we strengthen Party discipline.

#7.13. STUDY

Generally speaking, all Communist Party members who can do so should study the theory of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, study our national history, and study current movements and trends; moreover, they should help to educate members with less schooling. The cadres in particular should study these subjects carefully, while members of the Central Committee and senior cadres should give them even more attention. No political party can possibly lead a great revolutionary movement to victory unless it possesses revolutionary theory and a knowledge of history and has a profound grasp of the practical movement.

The theory of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin is universally applicable. We should regard it, not as a dogma, but as a guide to action. Studying it is not merely a matter of learning terms and phrases, but of learning Marxism-Leninism as the science of revolution. It is not just a matter of understanding the general laws derived by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin from their extensive study of real life and revolutionary experience, but of studying their standpoint and methodology in examining and solving problems. Only this guide to action, that is, this standpoint and methodology, constitutes revolutionary science and the only correct policy which leads us to recognize the objects of the revolution and guide the revolutionary movement Our Party's mastery of Marxism-Leninism is now rather better than it used to be, but is still far from being extensive or deep. In this regard, we are inferior to some fraternal parties abroad. Ours is the task of leading a great nation of several hundred million in a great and unprecedented struggle. For us, therefore, the spreading and deepening of the study of Marxism-Leninism present a big problem demanding an early solution, which is possible only through concentrated effort. Following on this Plenary Session of the Central Committee, I hope to see an all-Party emulation in study, which will show who has really learned something, and who has learned more and learned better. Our work has not been done too badly. But if we do not deepen our study of theory, we will not be able to do an even better job, and only if we do an even better job will we be victorious. Therefore, the study of theory is a condition for victory. So far as shouldering the main responsibility of leadership is concerned, our Party's fighting capacity will be much greater and our task of defeating Japanese imperialism will be more quickly accomplished if there are 100 or 200 comrades with a grasp of Marxism-Leninism which is systematic and not fragmentary, genuine and not hollow.

Another of our tasks is to study our historical heritage and use the Marxist methodology to sum it up critically. Our national history goes back several thousand years and has its own laws of development, particular, characteristics, and innumerable treasures. But in these matters, we are mere schoolchildren. Modern China has grown out of the China of the past; we are Marxist in our historical approach and must not lop off our history. We should sum up our history from Confucius to Sun Yixian and take over this valuable legacy. This is important for guiding the great movement of today. Being Marxists, Communists are internationalists, but we can put Marxism into practice only when it is integrated with the specific characteristics of our country and acquires a definite national form. The great strength of Marxism-Leninism lies precisely in its integration with the concrete revolutionary practice of all countries. There is no such thing as abstract Marxism, but only concrete Marxism. What we call concrete Marxism is Marxism that has taken on a national form, that is, Marxism applied to the concrete struggle in the concrete conditions prevailing in China, and not abstract Marxism. For the Communist Party of China, it is a matter of learning to apply the theory of Marxism-Leninism to the specific circumstances of China. For the Chinese Communists who are part of the great Chinese nation, flesh of its flesh and blood of its blood, any talk about Marxism in isolation from China's characteristics is merely Marxism in the abstract, Marxism in a vacuum. Hence, to apply Marxism concretely in China so that its every manifestation has an indubitably Chinese character, that is, to apply Marxism in the light of China's specific characteristics, becomes a problem which it is urgent for the whole Party to understand and solve. Foreign stereotypes must be abolished, there must be less singing of empty, abstract tunes, and dogmatism must be laid to rest; they must be replaced by the fresh, lively Chinese style and spirit, which the common people of China love. To separate international content from national form is the practice of those who do not understand the first thing about internationalism. We, on the contrary, must link the two closely. In this matter there are serious errors in our ranks, which should be conscientiously overcome.

What are the characteristics of the present movement? What are its laws? How is it to be directed? These are all practical questions. To this day, we do not yet understand everything about Japanese imperialism, or about China. The movement is developing, new things have yet to emerge, and they are emerging in an endless stream. To study this movement in its entirety and in its development is a great task claiming our constant attention. Whoever refuses to study these problems seriously and carefully is no Marxist, but a combination of Don Quixote and Ah Q. How shall we study? We should use the Marxist method — dialectical materialism. With whom shall we study? We have many teachers — the workers, peasants, urban small bourgeois, big capitalists, landlords, Japanese imperialism, and the whole world. They are all the objects of our study and, at the same time, our teachers. We should learn something, negative or positive, from them.

Complacency is the enemy of study. We cannot really learn anything until we rid ourselves of complacency. Our attitude toward ourselves should be «to be insatiable in learning», and toward others, «to be tireless in teaching».

#7.14. UNITY AND VICTORY

A great struggle requires great strength. It is our established political orientation to unite the whole forces and to mobilize all the dynamic forces of the whole nation to join this struggle. Unity within the Communist Party of China is the fundamental prerequisite for uniting the whole nation to win the War of Resistance and build a New China. After the Zunyi Meeting and the correction of Zhang Guotao's mistakes, our Party has now entered the period of the greatest unity since the convocation of its Sixth National Congress. Now, within our Party, there is unanimity of opinion, both within the Central Committee and in the whole Party, whether it be regarding the political line, strategy, estimate of the current situation, or formulation of our tasks. This unanimity of opinion on political principles is the fundamental condition for unity. With regard to the mutual relations between Party militants, cadres, and leaders, which are customarily called personal matters, we have also learned many correct and appropriate methods. We have created an atmosphere of working together with one accord under correct political principles and established better mutual relations. Because of the vastness of the territory, the complexity of the circumstances, and the differences among the various departments, it is difficult to avoid having different views, and there should be different views. The true practice of inner-Party democracy permits the putting forward and discussion of all sorts of different views. It is also precisely the democratic method which assures an exchange of views and leads to the summarizing of these views to form a conclusion, thereby bringing about a unified political orientation of the whole Party. Here, we have also gradually learned the Marxist method of looking at questions in an objective and all-sided way, but not with subjectivity, prejudice, wilfulness, or partiality. This also assures the unity of the Party. We Marxists are scientists. The style of conceit and wilfulness is useless. 17 years of tempering have taught the Communist Party of China many ways of attaining internal unity, and ours is now a much more seasoned Party. All these things can assure the unity of the Central Committee and the whole Party. Thus, we are able to form a powerful nucleus for the whole people in the struggle to win victory in the War of Resistance and to build a New China. Comrades, so long as we are united, we can certainly reach this goal.

#8. THE SEVENTH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

Now, I will talk about the last issue, the question of convening the Seventh National Congress.

Comrades, for reasons determined by the circumstances, it has already been ten years since our Party's Sixth National Congress in 1928. The 1937 December Meeting of the Political Bureau decided to prepare for the Seventh Congress, but the preparatory work has not yet been concluded, and consequently, it will be difficult to hold it this year. The present Enlarged Plenary Session should discuss the question of speeding up this preparatory work and decide to convene the Congress in the not-too-distant future. The political significance of this congress will be great. It will sum up the experience of the past, especially the experience of the War of Resistance throughout the country, and of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. It will discuss the domestic and international political situation. It will discuss how to take another step forward in uniting the entire nation, uniting the Nationalist Party, the Communist Party, and the other political parties, and further enhancing and enlarging the Anti-Japanese National United Front. It will discuss the policies, methods, and plans for winning final victory in the War of Resistance, in the context of a protracted war and protracted cooperation. It will discuss how to mobilize the working class and the working people throughout the country to take part more actively in the War of Resistance. Furthermore, we should discuss how the Party, in the new stage, will further unite and strengthen itself, and consolidate its links with the Nationalist Party, the other political parties, and the people of the whole country, in order to carry out smoothly the general orientation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. Apart from these political and organizational problems, the Seventh Congress should elect the Seventh Central Committee, elect numerous leading comrades enjoying the highest prestige in the entire Party to the Central Committee, and strengthen the leadership over the work of the whole Party. Comrades, the significance of this congress is so great hat, when this Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session is over and you go back to your posts, you must, on the basis of efforts at greatly enlarging and strengthening the Party, according to democratic methods, choosing the proper time to hold the elections, so that the best Party cadres and militants and those most trusted by the Party members and the masses will have the opportunity to be elected as delegates to this congress. As a result, the Seventh Congress will be able to gather together the Party's best representatives in one hall, thereby guaranteeing the success of this congress. We are confident that this national congress will definitely be able to succeed, and to inflict on the Japanese imperialist aggression the most solemn, serious, and forceful answer. Let Japanese imperialism tremble before our National Congress and tumble into the Eastern Sea. The Chinese nation will definitely be victorious.

That is all for my report.