On the Guerrilla Tactics of the Red Army

#PUBLICATION NOTE

This edition of On the Guerrilla Tactics of the Red Army has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the following editions:

• Quoted in A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Vol. 1, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.
• A Letter From the Front Committee to the Central Committee, in Mao's Road to Power, First English Edition, Vol. 3, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk and London, 1995.

#INTRODUCTION NOTE

This is a letter drafted by Comrade Mao Zedong in Ruijin, Jiangxi, China for the Front Committee of the Communist Party of China in the Fourth Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China dated the 5th of April, 1929. It was first published in the 1941 collection Since the Sixth Congress.

#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!

#ON THE GUERRILLA TACTICS OF THE RED ARMY

#LETTER FROM THE FRONT COMMITTEE TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

#Mao Zedong

#5th of April, 1929

#★

#To the Central Committee

On the 3rd of April, at Ruijin, we received your letter dated the 7th of February, which had been forwarded to us by the Fujian Provincial Committee.¹ The Central Committee's letter makes too pessimistic an appraisal of the objective situation and our subjective forces. The Nationalist Party's three «suppression» campaigns against the Jinggang Mountains was the high water mark reached by the counter-revolutionary tide. But there it stopped, and since then the counter-revolutionary tide has gradually receded while the revolutionary tide has gradually risen. Although our Party's fighting capacity and organizational strength have been weakened to the extent described by the Central Committee, they will be rapidly restored, and the passivity among comrades in the Party will quickly disappear as the counter-revolutionary tide gradually ebbs. The masses will certainly come over to us. The Nationalist Party's policy of massacre only serves to «drive the fish into deep waters»,² as the saying goes, and reformism no longer has any mass appeal. It is certain that the masses will soon shed their illusions about the Nationalist Party. In the emerging situation, no other political party will be able to compete with the Communist Party in winning over the masses. The political line and the organizational line laid down by the Party's Sixth National Congress³ are correct, that is, the revolution at the present stage is democratic and not socialist, and the present task of the Party in the big cities is to win over the masses and not to stage immediate armed uprisings. Nevertheless, the revolution will develop swiftly, and we should take a positive attitude in our propaganda and preparations for armed uprisings. In the present chaotic situation, we can lead the masses only by positive slogans and a positive attitude. Only by taking such an attitude can the Party recover its fighting capacity. We feel that the Party committed the error of adventurism in the past, and now it has a rather marked liquidationist tendency in some places. The Party branches in the localities that we have passed through in western Fujian and southern Jiangxi had very low combat morale and had lightly let go many opportunities for battle. The masses are vast, and also revolutionary, but the Party branches are not taking the lead. The examples of western Fujian and southern Jiangxi make us wonder whether there are similar phenomena elsewhere. So, we have to oppose the evil tendency toward adventurism and commandism, but we must also energetically guard against the tendency toward liquidationism and immobilism. Proletarian leadership is the sole key to victory in the revolution. Building a proletarian foundation for the Party and setting up Party branches in industrial enterprises in key districts are important organizational tasks for the Party at present; but, at the same time, the major prerequisites for helping the struggle in the cities and hastening the rise of the revolutionary tide are specifically the development of the struggle in the countryside, the establishment of council power in small areas, and the creation and expansion of the Red Army. Therefore, it would be wrong to abandon the struggle in the cities and to sink into rural guerrillaism, but, in our opinion, it would also be wrong for any of our Party members to fear the growth of peasant strength lest it should outstrip the workers' strength and harm the revolution. For, in the revolution in semi-colonial China, the peasant struggle must always fail if it does not have the leadership of the workers, but the revolution is never harmed if the peasant struggle outstrips the forces of the workers. The Sixth Congress has pointed out the mistake of neglecting the peasant revolution. In this letter from the Central Committee, the idea «develop a vast struggle everywhere in the rural areas» represents the only correct view.

To preserve the Red Army and mobilize the masses, the Central Committee asks us to divide our forces into very small units and disperse them over the countryside and to withdraw Zhu De and Mao Zedong from the army, so concealing the major targets. This is an unrealistic view. In the winter of 1927-28, we did plan to disperse our forces over the countryside, with each company or battalion operating on its own and adopting guerrilla tactics in order to mobilize the masses while trying not to present a target for the enemy; we have tried this out many times, but have failed every time. The reasons are:

• Firstly, most of the fighters in the main force of the Red Army come from other areas and have a background different from that of the local Red Guards.
• Secondly, division into small units results in weak leadership and organization and inability to cope with adverse circumstances, which easily leads to defeat.
• Thirdly, the units are liable to be crushed by the enemy one by one.
• Fourthly, the more adverse the circumstances, the greater the need for concentrating our forces and for the directors to be resolute in struggle, because only thus can we have internal unity against the enemy. Only in favourable circumstances is it advisable to divide our forces for guerrilla operations, and it is only then that the directors need not stay with the ranks all the time, as they must in adverse circumstances.

This last time, when we left the Jinggang Mountains and marched toward southern Jiangxi and western Fujian, because our troops were centralized, and the attitudes of the leading body (the Front Committee) and the directors (Zhu De and Mao Zedong) were unwavering, not only was the enemy unable to do anything to us, but their losses were greater than their gains, and our gains were greater than our losses. Our two victories in Ningdu and Tingzhou Counties completely wiped out the combat effectiveness of the local tyrants, the brigades of Guo Fengming and Liu Shiyi, resulting in the current mass mobilization in southern Jiangxi and western Fujian. Without the centralization of the army and sound leadership, this could not have been done. The tactics we have derived from the struggle of the past three years are indeed different from any other tactics, ancient or modern, Chinese or foreign. With our tactics, the masses can be mobilized for struggle on an ever-broadening scale, and no enemy, however powerful, can cope with us. Ours are guerrilla tactics. They consist mainly of the following points:

• Divide our forces to mobilize the masses, concentrate our forces to deal with the enemy.
• The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue.
• To extend stable base areas,⁴ employ the policy of advancing in waves; when pursued by a powerful enemy, employ the policy of circling around.
• Mobilize the largest numbers of the masses in the shortest possible time and by the best possible methods.

These tactics are just like casting a net; at any moment, we should be able to cast it or draw it in. We cast it wide to win over the masses and draw it in to deal with the enemy. Such are the tactics we have used for the past three years. When we were in the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area, once we had pulled the forces together and defeated the enemy, we were able to scatter and work for two to three weeks (in several big teams, and then each big team could again be subdivided), until the enemy once more marshaled their forces to attack us, at which point we would get together again to defeat the enemy, then scatter again to work. This time, when the enemy pursued us, we used the spiral guerrilla tactics and went through a vast area and mobilized vast masses. Whenever we came to a place, we would stay a minimum of half a day and a maximum of five days. First, we conducted propaganda on a large scale. (The press propaganda team and verbal propaganda teams, under the Political Department, are based on the company; two teams per company and three people per team. Along the march and wherever we went, propaganda was immediately conducted everywhere.) Then, we distributed money and commodities (grain, clothing, and tools owned by big feudal lords and reactionary elements), and we went ahead with organizing Party branches, underground trade unions, and underground peasant associations). Our methods of mass work have greatly improved. The Red Army now is not purely a fighting force; its main function is, rather, to mobilize the masses. To fight is only a means to mobilize the masses. The time we spend on fighting as compared with the time we spend on mass work stands in a proportion of 1:10. The army today is different from that in the days of Ye Ting and He Long. The only occupation of Ye Ting's and He Long's army was to fight. This would not work today. It would not have survived. At no time can the Red Army survive without a united leading organization for the Party and the army; otherwise, it will fall into anarchy and will certainly fail.

At present, the Party's leading body is the Front Committee, with Mao Zedong as Secretary, and the military commanding body is the Headquarters, with Zhu De as Commander-in-Chief. If the Central Committee needs Zhu and Mao for other assignments, please send us capable replacements for them. We think that Comrade Liu Bocheng can take over the military post and Comrade Yun Daiying can take over the Party and political work. If they can both come, they will be able to do better work than we can. Last June, in a letter from the Central Committee, it was mentioned that Comrade He Long would be sent here to inspect our work, but we don't know why he hasn't yet arrived. Now, it is very convenient to come here from Fujian. We hope that you will send people to inspect our work at any time.

Since Liu Shiyi's and Guo Fengming's brigades were wiped out, it may be said that we have no more enemies in western Fujian and southern Jiangxi. The armies of Jiang Jieshi and the Guangxi warlords are approaching each other in the vicinity of Jiujiang, and a big battle is imminent. The resumption of mass struggle, coupled with the spread of contradictions among the ruling reactionaries, makes it probable that there will soon be a high tide of revolution. As for how our work should be arranged under these circumstances, we feel that, so far as the southern provinces are concerned, the armed forces of the compradors and feudal lords in Guangdong and Hunan Provinces are too strong, and that, in Hunan, moreover, we have lost almost all our mass following, inside as well as outside the Party, because of the Party's adventurist mistakes. In the three provinces of Fujian, Jiangxi, and Zhejiang, however, the situation is different. First, militarily, the enemy is weakest there. In Zhejiang, there is only a small provincial force under Jiang Bocheng.⁵ In Fujian, although there are five groups of enemy troops totaling 14 regiments in all, Guo Fengming's troops have already been smashed; the troops under Chen Guohui and Lu Xingbang⁶ are bandits of small fighting capacity; the two brigades of marines stationed along the coast have never seen action and their fighting capacity is undoubtedly not high; Zhang Zhen⁷ alone can put up some sort of a fight, but, according to an analysis made by the Fujian Provincial Committee, even he has only two relatively strong regiments. In addition, Fujian is now in a state of complete chaos, confusion, and disunity. In Jiangxi, there are 16 regiments under the two commands of Zhu Peide⁸ and Xiong Shihui;⁹ they are stronger than the armed forces of either Fujian or Zhejiang, but far inferior to those of Hunan. Secondly, fewer adventurist mistakes have been made in these three provinces. We are not clear about the situation in Zhejiang, but the Party's organizational and mass basis is somewhat better in Jiangxi and Fujian than in Hunan. Take Jiangxi, for example. In northern Jiangxi, we still have some basis in De'an, Xiushui, and Tonggu; in western Jiangxi, the Party and the Red Guards still have some strength in Ninggang, Yongxin, Lianhua, and Suichuan; in southern Jiangxi, the prospects are still brighter, as the Second and Fourth Regiments of the Red Army are steadily growing in strength in the counties of Ji'an, Yongfeng, and Xingguo; and, what is more, the Red Army under Fang Zhimin has by no means been wiped out. All this places us in a position to close in on Nanchang. We hereby recommend to the Central Committee that, during the period of prolonged warfare among the Nationalist warlords, we should contend with Jiang Jieshi and the Guangxi clique for Jiangxi Province and also for western Fujian and western Zhejiang. In these three provinces, we should enlarge the Red Army and create an independent regime of the masses, with a time limit of one year for accomplishing this plan.

During this one year, we must lay the foundations for the struggle of the proletariat in Shanghai, Wuxi, Ningpo, Hangzhou, Fuzhou, Xiamen, and other places, so that they can lead the peasant struggles in Zhejiang, Jiangxi, and Fujian. The Jiangxi Provincial Committee must be soundly established, and efforts must be made to build a basis among the workers in Nanchang, Jiujiang, Ji'an, and on the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railway.

We came to Tingzhou on the 14th of March, after we had defeated Guo Fengming's brigade and shot him. Then, we found out about the rift between Jiang Jieshi and the Guangxi clique, and how a chaotic struggle within the Nationalist Party will soon come. As for our present arrangements, we have decided that, during the initial stage of the fighting within the Nationalist Party, with the 20-odd counties of western Fujian and southern Jiangxi as our sphere of action, we should mobilize the masses with our guerrilla tactics, in order that the masses may openly establish an independent regime. We must deepen the agrarian revolution and establish worker-peasant political power, and then join this regime to the one in the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area to form a strong force, which will be the basis for future development. Therefore, we did not go down to Hangyong or to Longyan. After working in Tingzhou for 17 days, we came to Ruijin on the 1st of April. We plan to enter and occupy Yudu on the 8th of April. When we get to Yudu, we will call a big meeting to discuss our action plans with the Southern Jiangxi Special Committee and with Comrade Luo Shounan sent by the Military Department of the Central Committee. The masses in western Fujian and southern Jiangxi are extremely well disposed. Several thousand had come together to seize grain from the local tyrants at Changting, Xinqiao, Hetian, and other places. At Tingzhou, we organized 20 underground peasant associations and five underground trade unions, and also established a trade-union federation. The Party organization has doubled in size. One Red Guard unit was also organized, but, since it could not stand on its own, it has followed the Red Army to Ruijin. The first body of political power was a provisional revolutionary committee, appointed by the Political Department. After several trade unions and peasant associations had been organized, an assembly of representatives was called together to elect the formal revolutionary committee. Both the provisional and the formal revolutionary committees issued political programmes. On arriving in Ruijin, we planned for four days' work. The army was scattered to work in Rentian, Xijiang, and Jiubao, and, in each place, each team was divided into sub-teams. The Headquarters is in the county capital. The masses of Ruijin have risen up like a raging fire to welcome us. They have fought very bravely against the feudal lords. Unfortunately, there was formerly no organization, not a single comrade, and no local leading organizations. Since the work was done in a rush, it was not well done, especially in the county town. After we get to Yudu, we will spend about one week there working in the county capital and the four cities. Later, we may march toward Ningdu and Guangchang, or toward Wan'an and Taihe, depending on the circumstances. We will engage in guerrilla warfare for a while in southern Jiangxi before we move to western Fujian. Then, we will take on the remnants of Guo Fengming's, Lu Xingbang's, and Chen Guohui's units. The Fujian Provincial Committee must make efforts to prepare for this.

As for the situation in the army, except for a small portion, which has been left in the Border Area, we have with us in the main force of the Fourth Army a total of 3'600 soldiers and 1'100 guns. We lost 200 guns and 600 soldiers at Dayu, Xinfeng, and Xunwu (most of the soldiers lost contact during the fighting). Only a few score guns and a little more than 100 soldiers were actually taken by the enemy. The shocking reports in the newspapers were all enemy lies. After the Ningdu and Tingzhou battles, we have not only recovered, but also gained a little. The army is now organized as the First, Second, and Third Columns, each of which is in charge of two detachments (equivalent to two battalions), and each detachment is in charge of three groups (equivalent to companies). Each column has about 500 guns and over 1'200 soldiers. When we divide the forces to wage guerrilla warfare, we use the columns as units, spread them out, and then divide them again into detachments. It is very convenient to divide the forces and bring them back together again. 800 soldiers and 500 guns from Comrade Peng Dehuai's Fifth Army came to the Jinggang Mountains. Of those, 600 soldiers and 400 guns are now at Ruijin. They have been reorganized as the Fifth Column of the Fourth Army. Comrade Peng Dehuai is now in command, with the title of Deputy Army Commander. Within the next few days, we need to return to the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area to rally the old troops, to restore political power, and to restore contact with southern Jiangxi, which is still under the Front Committee. Political departments have been established. The army has a political department, and each column has its own political department, within which there are the secretariat, propaganda, organization (which includes sections for staff members, peasants, and Party affairs), and political security divisions. At the levels of detachments and companies, there are Party representatives. We plan to abolish the Party representatives at levels higher than columns and have only the head of the political departments. At Tingzhou, we have had new clothes made for the whole army, and each soldier was given four yuan as allowance. Provisions are no problem, and morale is high. Two other armies from eastern Jiangxi and Lichuan (near Guangchang) want to join us. One consists of 500 soldiers who have defected from Jin Handing with more than 300 guns. They have been reorganized as the Fourth Column, with Tian Guiqing as its commander. The other one is composed of over 300 bandits with more than 200 guns. They had been battered from all sides and could not find a way out. Now, they have been reorganized as an independent battalion with Hu Zhusheng as its commander. Both of these armies will arrive in Ningdu after the 14th of April to be reorganized and trained. The Second and Fourth Regiments of the Jiangxi Red Army are now stationed in Xingguo and have good contact with us. The Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area has been defeated once, but now is the opportunity for its recovery. In that area, there are, in addition to Wang Zuo's forces, with 200 guns, which belong to the Fourth Red Army, the Red Guard units of the six counties of Ninggang, Yongxin, Lianhua, Suichuan, Lingxian, and Chaling, with a total of 800 guns. At a time when the warlords are engaged in chaotic warfare and are incapable of paying attention to other matters, these two units can not only defend themselves, but also move outward. When Comrade Peng Dehuai leads his army back there, they will be even more capable of this. The Secretary of the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area Special Committee is Comrade Deng Qianyuan. In Hunan, since the uprising failed last March, the basis of the Party has been completely wiped out under the reign of adventurism. The arms of the peasants have also been seized by the evil gentry, and the masses suppressed. Last August, when the Red Army attacked Bing County, we organized three county committees at Zixing, Rucheng, and Guidong, three armed Red Guard units of the peasants, and a Special Committee over them with Du Xiujing as its Secretary. But, according to a recent report, they have again been sacrificed to adventurism. In Liling, since last spring's uprising, when the Party organization was broken up and the armed forces wiped out, they have obtained 70 guns from the Fourth Army during the summer and were fully recovered by fall at Huangtuling at the juncture of Youxian and Liling. This proves how difficult it is for a small armed force to survive independently.

The commanding body of the Party in the Red Army is the Front Committee appointed by the Central Committee. The letter from the Central Committee dated the 4th of June, 1928 said:

As for the commanding body for the front, the Central Committee considers that it is necessary to organize a committee. The appointees are as follows: Mao Zedong, Zhu De, one worker comrade, one peasant comrade, and the local Party secretary of wherever the Front Committee may be located, with Mao Zedong as Secretary. In addition, a Trade Union Committee must be set up, with the worker comrade on the Front Committee as its Secretary, as well as an Army Committee, with Zhu De as its Secretary. The members of the Army and Trade Union Committees will be determined by the Front Committee. The limits of jurisdiction will be determined according to the circumstances. The work within all areas of jurisdiction will be supervised by the Front Committee. When the Front Committee is in Jiangxi, it will be under the leadership of the Jiangxi Provincial Committee; when in Hunan, it will come under the Hunan Provincial Committee. The Provincial Committee in question, upon receiving reports from the Front Committee, should respond immediately and submit both the Front Committee's reports and the Provincial Committee's responses to the Central Committee promptly.

We feel that this directive from the Central Committee concerning organization is entirely appropriate and meets the needs of the struggle. The Red Army, which transcends local characteristics, should not be subjected to the leadership of the county and special committees, nor even of one particular provincial committee. The Fifth Army in Pingjiang and Liuyang, and the Fourth Army in Hunan and the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area, have been defeated many times under the command of localism. The Red Army, which transcends locality, must be under the direct command of the Central Committee. Only thus can it adapt itself to the needs of the revolutionary environment and not suffer harm from the evil influence of localism.

Since August 1928, we have submitted three reports to the Central Committee. One was a long letter written by Mao Zedong after our defeat in the Border Area, discussing questions such as the independent regime and the policies of the Hunan Provincial Committee, to be forwarded by the Hunan Provincial Committee. The original draft of the first letter has been lost.¹⁰ Another was a report from the Front Committee, written last November just after we first received your June letter, and just before the Red Army had to return to the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area. It contained a historical account of the struggle in the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area and also discussed policies and plans concerning the setting up of independent regimes, and was forwarded by the Hunan and Jiangxi Provincial Committees.¹¹ The original draft of this letter is still here, and I am enclosing a copy of it again. The third was a letter sent from the Front Committee at Changting on the 20th of March, to be submitted to you via the Fujian Provincial Committee.¹² Have you received it? Another copy is enclosed. For three years, we have not received a single one of the publications of the Central Committee until we got to Tingzhou, where we finally saw The Young Pioneer, Nos. 3 and 4, The Chinese Worker, No. 3, The People's Voice, No. 2, published in Beijing, and The Outpost, No. 2, put out by Tingzhou comrades in Shanghai. In the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area, because of the enemy blockade, we were unable to read any newspapers for two to three months. Since last September, we have been able to buy newspapers from Ji'an and Changsha, but it is still very difficult. Since we came to southern Jiangxi and western Fujian, the convenience of the postal services allows us to read newspapers every day from Nanjing, Shanghai, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Zhangzhou, Nanchang, and Ganzhou. Since we have come to Ruijin County, we can read He Jian's official paper and Changsha's Republican Daily. It is like being able to see the sky again through the clouds, and our joy is indescribable! We hope that the Central Committee will write to us once a month, and we will submit at least one report to the Central Committee every month. We also hope that you will find a way to send us Central Committee publications.