On the Chongqing Negotiations

#PUBLICATION NOTE

This edition of On the Chongqing Negotiations has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the following editions:

• On the Chungking Negotiations, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Vol. 4, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.
• Report on the CPC-KMT Negotiations Delivered in the Auditorium of the Yan'an Party School, in Mao's Road to Power, First English Edition, Vol. 9, Routledge, New York and London, 2023.

#INTRODUCTION NOTE

This is a report delivered by Comrade Mao Zedong at a meeting of cadres in Yan'an, Shaanxi, China on the 17th of October, 1945. It was first published in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 4, in 1960.

The report was delivered after Comrade Mao Zedong returned from Chongqing, where he had held negotiations with Jiang Jieshi for a month and a half. The result of the negotiations was the signing by the Communist Party of China and the Nationalist Party of China of the «Summary of Conversations», also known as the «10th of October Agreement». In the summary, Jiang Jieshi had to feign agreement with the «fundamental policy of peace and national reconstruction» put forward by the Communist Party of China and accept «protracted cooperation on the basis of peace, democracy, solidarity, and unity [...] resolute avoidance of civil war and the building of a New China, independent, free, prosperous, and powerful» and «democratization of political life, nationalization of troops, and equality and legality of political parties as ways and means absolutely essential for achieving peace and national reconstruction». He also had to agree to bring the Nationalist Party's political tutelage to a speedy conclusion, convene a Political Consultative Conference, «guarantee the freedoms of person, belief, speech, the press, assembly, and association as enjoyed by the people in all democratic countries in peacetime, and abolish or amend existing laws and decrees according to this principle», abolish the secret services, «strictly prohibit all institutions other than those of the judiciary and police from making arrests, conducting trials, and imposing punishment», «release political prisoners», «actively carry out local self-government and conduct general elections from the lower level upward», and so on. The Jiang Jieshi government, however, stubbornly refused to recognize the legal status of the people's army and the democratic governments in the Liberated Areas and, on the pretexts of «unifying the military command» and «unifying government administration», insolently tried to eliminate altogether the people's army and the Liberated Areas led by the Communist Party of China; consequently, no agreement could be reached on this question. The following are excerpts from the «Summary of Conversations» concerning the negotiations on the problem of the armed forces and political power in the Liberated Areas; in the «Summary» the so-called «Government» refers to Jiang Jieshi's Nationalist government.

On the nationalization of troops. The Communist Party of China proposed that, with a view to unifying the military command, the Government should effect an equitable and rational reorganization of the armed forces of the whole country, draw up a programme for carrying it out in stages, make a fresh delimitation of the military zones, and establish a conscription and replenishment system. The Communist Party of China stated that, given such a programme, it was ready to reduce the anti-Japanese troops under its command to 24 divisions or to a minimum of 20 divisions and to take prompt action to demobilize its anti-Japanese troops now distributed in the eight areas of Guangdong, Zhejiang, southern Jiangsu, southern Anhui, central Anhui, Hunan, Hubei, and Henan (not including northern Henan). The troops to be reorganized would be gradually withdrawn from the above areas to assemble in the Liberated Areas north of the Longhai Railway and in northern Jiangsu and northern Anhui. The Government stated that the programme for the reorganization of troops on a countrywide basis was under way and that the Government was willing to consider the reorganization of the anti-Japanese troops led by the Communist Party of China into 20 divisions, if the issues coming up in the present negotiations could all be settled. As to the question of the stationing of these troops, it stated further that the Communist Party of China could submit plans for discussion and decision. The Communist Party of China proposed that the Communist Party and its local military personnel should participate in the work of the National Military Council and its various departments, that the Government should preserve the existing personnel system and commission the existing personnel as officers of various ranks in the reorganized units, that officers not receiving appointment after reorganization should be assigned to different areas for training, and that a fair and reasonable system for filling vacancies and a plan for political education should be adopted. The Government indicated that it had no objection to these proposals and was willing to discuss details. The Communist Party of China proposed that all the militia members in the Liberated Areas should be organized into local self-defence corps. The Government indicated that such organization could be considered only where local conditions would so require or permit. In order to formulate concrete plans in regard to all the questions mentioned in this section, both sides agreed that a sub-committee of three be formed, with one representative each from the Board of Military Operations of the National Military Council, the Ministry of War, and the 18th Army Group.

On local governments in the Liberated Areas. The Communist Party of China proposed that the Government should recognize the legal status of the popularly elected governments at all levels in the Liberated Areas. The Government indicated that, since Japan had surrendered, the term «Liberated Area» should have become obsolete and that government administration throughout the country should be unified. The initial formula advanced by the Communist Party of China was that the provincial and administrative areas were to be delimited afresh in the light of the existence of 18 Liberated Areas and that, for the sake of unifying government administration, it would submit a list of all the popularly elected government personnel at various levels for reappointment by the Government. The Government indicated that, as President Jiang had stated to Mr. Mao, the Central Government, after the unification of the military command and government administration throughout the country, would give consideration to the administrative personnel nominated by the Communist Party of China. The Government would consider retaining a due proportion of the administrative personnel who had served in the areas recovered during the War of Resistance, taking account of their record of ability and service, irrespective of party affiliation. Thereupon, a second formula was proposed by the Communist Party of China, asking the Central Government to appoint nominees of the Communist Party of China as chairpersons and members of the provincial governments of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the five provinces of Rehe, Chaha'er, Hebei, Shandong, and Shanxi, and to appoint the Communist Party's nominees as deputy chairpersons and members of the six provincial governments of Suiyuan, Henan, Jiangsu, Anhui, Hubei, and Guangdong (because, in the aforesaid 11 provinces, there were extensive Liberated Areas or sections thereof). The Communist Party of China also requested the appointment of its nominees as deputy mayors of the four special municipalities of Beijing, Tianjin, Qingdao, and Shanghai and the participation of its nominees in the administration of the north-eastern provinces. After many discussions on this matter, the Communist Party of China modified the aforesaid proposals by requesting the appointment of its nominees as chairpersons and members of the provincial governments of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the four provinces of Rehe, Chaha'er, Hebei, and Shandong, as deputy chairpersons and members of the two provincial governments of Shanxi and Suiyuan and as deputy mayors of the three special municipalities of Beijing, Tianjin, and Qingdao. In reply, the Government stated that, while the Communist Party of China might nominate those of its members who had rendered distinguished service during the War of Resistance and who possessed administrative ability to the Government for appointment, the Communist Party would not be sincerely endeavouring to achieve unity of military command and government administration if it should insist upon nominating a chairperson or deputy chairperson or members of any specific provincial government. The Communist Party of China then said it would withdraw its second suggestion and proposed a third formula. It suggested that general elections be held under the existing popularly elected governments at all levels in the Liberated Areas, and members of all other political parties as well as people in different walks of life would be welcome to return to their native places to take part in the elections to be held under the supervision of persons designated by the Political Consultative Conference. A popular election was to be held in any county where more than half the districts and townships had already held popular elections. Likewise, a popular election was to be held in any province or administrative area where more than half the counties had already held popular elections. In the interest of unity of government administration, the names of all the officials so elected in the provincial, administrative area, and county governments should be submitted to the Central Government for appointment by confirmation. The Government replied that this formula of government confirmation of appointments in provinces and areas was not in the interest of unity of government administration. The Government might, however, consider holding popular elections for county officials, but popular elections for the provincial governments could be held only after the promulgation of a National Constitution, when the status of the province would have been defined. For the time being, only those provincial government officials who had been appointed by the Central Government should proceed to take up their posts, so that conditions in the recovered areas might be restored to normal at the earliest possible moment. At this point, a fourth formula was proposed by the Communist Party of China, namely, that the status quo in all the Liberated Areas should temporarily be maintained until the constitutional provision for the popular election of provincial governments had been adopted and put into effect and that, for the time being, an interim arrangement be worked out in order to guarantee the restoration of peace and order. The Communist Party of China stated that meanwhile, this particular problem might be submitted to the Political Consultative Conference for settlement. The Government insisted that unity of government administration must be carried out first, because this problem, if left unsolved, might become an obstacle to peace and reconstruction, and it expressed the hope that a concrete formula with regard to this matter could be agreed upon soon. The Communist Party of China agreed to hold further discussions.

#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!

#ON THE CHONGQING NEGOTIATIONS

#REPORT TO A MEETING OF CADRES IN YAN'AN

#Mao Zedong

#17th of October, 1945

#★

Comrades:

Let us talk about the present situation. First, about the Chongqing negotiations. That is what our comrades are interested in. This time, the negotiations between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party at Chongqing have lasted 43 days. As you all know, the results have already been published in the newspapers.¹ The representatives of the two political parties are continuing to negotiate.

The negotiations have been held against the background of a new situation. The two political parties held many negotiating sessions during the War of Resistance, but none of them bore any fruit. This time, however, agreement has been reached on some points, whereas there has been no agreement on other points. A compromise will be necessary in the end, but this will take some time.

The agreed-upon points are ones that were not settled previously. But the agreements reached are still only on paper. Words on paper are not equivalent to reality. Facts have shown that a very great effort must still be made before they can be turned into reality.

Anyway, the negotiations have borne fruit. During the negotiations, some comrades, both in Yan'an and Chongqing, have been pessimistic. They think that there is no hope for peace and compromise, and that a civil war will break out. This idea is shared by some foreigners. Nonetheless, the results have shown that hope does exist. Others are too optimistic. They believe that an agreement will soon be reached and that everything can be resolved based only on our willingness. Many comrades in both Yan'an and the Great Rear Area think this way. These two ideas are not correct. It has already been proved and will continue to be proved by the facts. Let us talk about the agreements on the principles of peace and unity, for example. The Nationalist Party has accepted the principles of peace and unity, recognized certain democratic rights of the people, and agreed that civil war should be averted and that the two political parties should cooperate in peace to build a New China. On these points, agreement has been reached. There are other points on which there is no agreement. The question of the Liberated Areas has not been solved, and that of the armed forces has not really been solved either. The Nationalist Party is negotiating with us, on the one hand, and is vigorously attacking the Liberated Areas, on the other hand. Not counting the forces surrounding the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, 800'000 Nationalist troops are already directly engaged in these attacks. Wherever there are Liberated Areas, fighting is going on or being prepared.

The very first article of the «10th of October Agreement» is on «peace and national reconstruction»; don't these words on paper contradict reality? Yes, they do. That is why we say it still requires effort on our part to turn what is on paper into reality. Why does the Nationalist Party mobilize so many troops to attack us? Because long ago, it made up its mind to wipe out the people's forces, to wipe us out. Best of all, it would like to wipe us out quickly or, failing that, to worsen our situation and improve its own. This is a contradiction between the wishes of the Nationalist Party and the wishes of the people throughout the world. Peace, though written into the Agreement, has not in, fact, been realized. Who knows what will happen in the future? In places like the Shangdang area in Shanxi Province, there is fighting on a fairly large scale. The Shangdang area, rimmed by the Taihang, Taiyue, and Zhongitao Mountains, is like a tub. This tub contains fish and meat, and Yan Xishan sent 13 divisions to grab it. Our policy also was set long ago — to give tit for tat, to fight for every inch of land. This time, we gave tit for tat, fought, and made a very good job of it. In other words, we wiped out all 13 divisions. Their attacking forces had 38'000 soldiers, and we employed 31'000 soldiers. Of their 38'000 soldiers, 35'000 were destroyed, 2'000 fled, and 1'000 scattered.² Such fighting will continue. They want desperately to grab our Liberated Areas. This seems hard to explain. Why are they so anxious to grab? Isn't it good for the Liberated Areas to be in our hands, in the hands of the people? Yes, but that is only what we think, what the people think. If they thought so, too, there would be unity and we would all be «comrades». But they won't think this way; they will oppose us stubbornly. They can't see why they shouldn't oppose us. It is quite natural that they should attack us. For our part, we can't see why we should let them seize our Liberated Areas. It is also quite natural that we should counter-attack. When two «can't-see-whys» come together, they fight. Since there are two «can't-see-whys», why have they negotiated? And why have they concluded the «10th of October Agreement»? In this world, things are complicated and are decided by many factors. We should look at problems from different aspects, not from just one. In Chongqing, some people think that Jiang Jieshi is unreliable and deceitful and that negotiations with him can lead nowhere. So I was told by many people I met, including some members of the Nationalist Party. I told them that what they said was justified and well-founded and that we were firmly convinced by 18 years of experience³ that this would be the case. The Nationalist Party and the Communist Party are sure to fail in their negotiations, sure to start fighting, and sure to break with each other, but that is only one aspect of the matter. Another aspect is that many other factors are bound to make Jiang Jieshi have misgivings. Among these factors, the three main ones are the might of the Liberated Areas, the opposition to civil war by the people in the Great Rear Area, and the international situation. In our Liberated Areas, there are 100'000'000 people, 1'000'000 troops, and 2'000'000 people's militia members, a force no one dares to belittle. Our Party's place in the nation's political life is no longer what it was in 1927, nor what it was in 1937. The Nationalist Party, which has always refused to recognize the equal status of the Communist Party, is now forced to do so. Our work in the Liberated Areas has already influenced all China and the whole world. The people in the Great Rear Area desire peace and need democracy. When in Chongqing, I had a profound sense of the warm support given us by the broad masses of the people. They are dissatisfied with the Nationalist government and place their hopes on us. Many capitalists are dissatisfied because of the economic crisis. They called on me and asked me to talk to them, and they also invited me to dinner. Some college professors, even including some from the Central University, said that they no longer wished to teach in Chongqing. I tried to persuade them to continue there, but they seemed impatient. Some people from cultural, theatrical, and film circles said that they did not want to perform anymore. I again tried to persuade them, but they still expressed their unwillingness, and some even cried. They had hoped that, by my visit there, I would generally bring about peace and resolve everything. I told them that I had come to be examined. Who are the examiners? You and the Chinese people at large. I am afraid that I cannot fulfil your expectations. How I wish everything would be settled. Yet, I told them, things are not determined only by me or by the Communist Party. If only other parts of China were like the Liberated Areas! There is real freedom in the Liberated Areas, where one can teach or work as long as one is willing to go there. But I was just a guest in Chongqing, and I was invited there for the negotiations. That is also the case for many foreigners. The US government did a good job fighting against Japan, but it is very reactionary and supports Jiang Jieshi against the Chinese people. That being said, you should not take it for granted that all foreigners are reactionaries. I also met many foreigners, including Americans, such as journalists, air force fighters, economists, and even embassy personnel, all of whom sympathize with us and are enthusiastic about the negotiations. The broad masses of the people in foreign countries are dissatisfied with the reactionary forces in China and sympathize with the Chinese people's forces. They also disapprove of Jiang Jieshi's policies. We have many friends in all parts of the country and of the world; we are not isolated. As to the foreign governments, the only one that has signed an equal treaty with China and treats us as equals is the Council Government.

Is the Sino-Soviet Treaty beneficial to China? It is very beneficial to the Chinese people. In the very beginning, some people from the Nationalist Party of China and the US government happily thought that the Sino-Soviet Treaty would be good for the Nationalist Party and isolate the Communist Party. Nevertheless, after only a bit more than a month, they changed their attitude. One Nationalist general said: «The Sino-Soviet Treaty gave them a shot, a shot of malaria rather than a shot of blood, making them feel alternately hot and cold.» Those are not my words, but the words of a Nationalist. Today, I won't speak any more about this point. This year, in every Liberated Area, Yan'an included, on the anniversary of the November Revolution, we should celebrate the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty and call for its earnest implementation. Under the terms of the treaty, China is forbidden to join any anti-Soviet alliance. The Jiang Jieshi government, as the legal government of China, signed this treaty. It is best that the Jiang Jieshi government signed this treaty, because all previous anti-Soviet talk came from this reactionary clique. After the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, it is impossible for Jiang Jieshi to wage the kind of large-scale Anti-Communist civil war that he did in 1927. This is the general trend. Things have changed under the treaty, and the initiation of a civil war cannot now be decided merely by Jiang Jieshi. The subjective desire of Jiang Jieshi is to maintain his dictatorship and destroy the Communist Party, but many objective difficulties stand in his way. Therefore, he has to be a little realistic. Those who oppose civil war in China and stand for peace and democracy include not only the people in our Liberated Areas, but also the masses in the Great Rear Area and throughout the world. The outbreak of a civil war in China would have a direct bearing on the entire world. Moreover, our Party is not the same as it was in 1927. Our status has improved. Previously, our Party was not recognized as a legal equal, but now it has been recognized, which can be clearly seen from the Agreement. This is the first time that the Communist Party has been recognized as a legal political party and treated as an equal. Moreover, the work of the Communist Party in both the Liberated Areas and the rest of China has impacted the whole world. In this situation, Jiang Jieshi is being realistic, and we are realistic, too. He was realistic in inviting us and we were realistic in going to negotiate with him. We arrived in Chongqing on the 28th of August. On the evening of the 29th, I told Wang Shijie that the country had needed peace and unity ever since the 18th of September Incident in 1931.⁴ We had asked for peace and unity, but they had not materialized. Peace and unity materialized only after the Xi'an Incident of 1936⁵ before the outbreak of the War of Resistance on the 7th of July, 1937. During the eight years of that war, we fought together against Japan, and that was the main factor. But civil war never stopped; there were continuous frictions, big and small. To say that there was no civil war is deception and does not square with facts. In the past eight years, we repeatedly expressed our willingness to negotiate. At our Party's Seventh Congress, we declared that «we are willing to resume negotiations with the Nationalist authorities as soon as they are willing to renounce their present erroneous policies and agree to democratic reforms».⁶ We call this the policy of «washing faces». We wanted the Nationalists to «wash their faces» when, in the negotiations, we declared that, first, China needs peace, and, second, China needs democracy. Jiang Jieshi could find no reason to object and had to agree. On the one hand, the policy of peace and the agreements on democracy published in the «Summary of Conversations» are words on paper and not yet reality; on the other hand, they have been determined by a variety of forces. The forces of the people in the Liberated Areas, the forces of the people in the Great Rear Area, the international situation — the general trend has forced Jiang Jieshi to be a little more realistic and the Nationalist Party to accept these things. Thus, the Agreement is not necessarily a deception on the part of the Nationalist Party.

The above is what I want to say to the comrades about the present situation. Its development shows many contradictions. In the negotiations between the Nationalist Party and our Party, why is there agreement on some questions and not on others? Why does the «Summary of Conversations» speak of peace and unity, while fighting is actually going on? Some comrades just can't understand such contradictions. Some comrades can't understand why we should be willing to negotiate with Jiang Jieshi, who has always been Anti-Communist and against the people. Was our Party right or wrong in deciding at its Seventh Congress that we were willing to negotiate with the Nationalists, provided they changed their policy? It was absolutely right. The Chinese revolution is a long one and victory can only be won step by step. China's future depends on our exertions. The situation will remain in flux for six months or so. We must redouble our efforts to make it develop in a direction favourable to the people of the whole country. What I have said is meant to answer these questions.

Some comrades have asked why we should concede eight Liberated Areas.⁷ It is a great pity to concede these eight areas, but it is better to do so. Why is it a pity? Because these Liberated Areas have been created and arduously built up by the people, with sweat and blood. Therefore, we must explain matters clearly to the people and make appropriate arrangements in the areas we are going to concede. Why should we concede those areas? Because otherwise, the Nationalists will not feel easy. They are going back to Nanjing, but some Liberated Areas in the South are right by their beds or in their corridor. So long as we are there, they will not be able to sleep easily and will therefore fight for those places at all costs. Our concession on this point will help frustrate the Nationalist Party's plot for civil war and win us the sympathy of the numerous Centrist elements at home and abroad. All the means of propaganda in China, except the New China News Agency, are now controlled by the Nationalist Party. They are all rumour factories. Concerning the current negotiations, they have spread the rumour that the Communist Party just wants territory and will make no concessions. Our policy is to protect the fundamental interests of the people. Subject to the principle of not damaging the fundamental interests of the people, it is permissible to make certain concessions in exchange for peace and democracy, which the people of the whole country need. In our past dealings with Jiang Jieshi, we also made concessions, and even larger ones. In 1937, to bring about the nationwide War of Resistance, we voluntarily dropped the name, «Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Government», changed the name of our Red Army to «National Revolutionary Army», and altered our policy of confiscating the land of the landlords to one of reducing rent and interest. This time, by conceding certain areas in the South, we have completely exploded the Nationalist Party's rumours before the people of all China and the whole world. It is the same with the problem of armed forces. Nationalist propaganda has been saying that the Communist Party is just scrambling for guns. But we have said we are ready to make concessions. First, we proposed cutting our present armed strength to 48 divisions. As the Nationalist Party has 263 divisions, this means our strength would be about 1/6 of the total. Later, we proposed a further reduction to 43 divisions, about 1/7 of the total. The Nationalist Party then said they would reduce to 120 divisions. We said we would reduce by the same proportion to 24 or even 20 divisions, which would still be only 1/7 of the total. In the Nationalist army, the proportion of officers as compared to soldiers is unduly large and the complement of a division is under 6'000. By their standard, we could form 200 divisions out of our 1'200'000 soldiers. But we are not going to do so. Therefore, the Nationalist Party can say nothing more and all their rumours are bankrupt. Does this mean that we are going to hand over our guns to the Nationalist Party? Not that either. If we hand over our guns, won't the Nationalist Party have too many? The arms of the people, every gun and every bullet, must all be kept, must not be handed over. About the recognition of the rest of the Liberated Areas in the South, will the Nationalist Party recognize their existence? We proposed this question as many as five times in the past, and there will still be arguments back and forth in the future. Since fighting for every inch of land is our principle, why have we conceded almost every inch of land? You may feel puzzled. In fact, fighting for every inch of land is just a slogan. We are not actually able to hold those areas, so why shouldn't we be generous and voluntarily withdraw? We even should withdraw from some of these places as soon as possible! Take Guangdong, for example. General Wang Zhen took a long and tortuous route, but finally arrived there. But not long after he arrived, the Japanese invaders surrendered! He had to return. This shouldn't have been a big matter. But what an arduous way he and his army traversed from Yan'an to Guangdong and then to Hubei! The Nationalist troops attacked them all the way. Some of the troops blocked them from the front, while others chased them from behind. Nonetheless, they didn't stop us. We moved ahead unhindered, as if we were the Monkey King in Heaven. Finally, we retreated north of the Yangzi River. Arduous as it was, we won a great victory. In the negotiations, we also conceded some of the Liberated Areas in Hunan and eastern Zhejiang, for example. Although Gu Zhutong's troops stood in our way of retreat in Zhejiang, we finally arrived near Shanghai, rather than being forced to cross the Yangzi River. Calculating these gains and losses in a holistic way, we find that the gains of giving up these areas outweigh the losses. The principle of fighting for every inch of land still works, because our losses in one place are soon compensated for in another place. We lost one inch in one place, but we gained one foot in another place. Therefore, we gained 11 inches!

How to give «tit for tat» depends on the situation. Sometimes, not going to negotiations is tit-for-tat; and sometimes, going to negotiations is also tit-for-tat. We were right not to go before, and also right to go this time; in both cases, we have given tit for tat. We did well to go this time, for we exploded the rumour spread by the Nationalist Party that the Communist Party did not want peace and unity. They sent three successive telegrams to invite us, and we went. But they were totally unprepared, and we had to make all the proposals. As a result of the negotiations, the Nationalist Party has accepted the general policy of peace and unity. That's fine. If the Nationalist Party launches civil war again, it will put itself in the wrong in the eyes of the whole nation and the whole world, and we shall have all the more reason to smash its attacks by a war of self-defence. Now that the «10th of October Agreement» has been concluded, our task is to uphold the Agreement, to demand that the Nationalist Party honour it, and to continue to strive for peace. If they fight, we will wipe them out completely. This is the way things are: if they attack and we wipe them out, they will have that satisfaction; wipe out some, some satisfaction; wipe out more, more satisfaction; wipe out the whole lot, complete satisfaction. China's problems are complicated, and our brains must also be a little complicated. If they start fighting, we fight back, fight to win peace. Peace will not come unless we strike hard blows at the reactionaries who dare to attack the Liberated Areas.

Now, a few more words about our work. Some comrades present will be leaving for the front, while others will stay here to study and work. I have suggestions for all of you. Many, full of enthusiasm, are vying with each other for the opportunity to go to work at the front, and this active and fervent spirit is very valuable. We will give them send-offs, but rest assured that these are not the same «send-offs» as those given by the Nationalist Part to Wang Zhen. But there are also a few comrades who have mistaken ideas, who don't think of the many difficulties to be overcome, but believe that everything will be plain sailing at the front and that they will have an easier time than in Yan'an. Are there people who think that way? I believe there are. Some comrades want to go to the North-East to recuperate rather than to work. I think it is better to recuperate in Yan'an than in other places. I went to Chongqing, but I prefer Yan'an. I advise such comrades to correct their ideas. If one goes, it is to work. What is work? Work is struggle. There are difficulties and problems in those places for us to overcome and solve. We go there to work and struggle to overcome these difficulties. A good comrade is one who is more eager to go where the difficulties are greater. The work in those places is hard. Hard work is like a load placed before us, challenging us to shoulder it. Some loads are light, some heavy. Some people prefer the light to the heavy; they pick the light and leave the heavy to others. That is not a good attitude. (Of course, I am referring to people who are able to pick the heavy load, not children, the disabled, and so on.) Some comrades are different; they leave ease and comfort to others and carry the heavy loads themselves; they are the first to bear hardships, the last to enjoy comforts. They are good comrades. We should all learn from their Communist spirit.

Many local cadres will be leaving their native places for the North-East. All comrades going to the North-East should be mentally prepared, once there, to take root, blossom, and bear fruit. Not too long ago, the Jiefang Ribao [Liberation Daily] published an article entitled, To Take Root and Blossom in a Locality (28th of August). This article is good and should be broadcast. Many southern-born cadres who joined the Eighth Route Army took root and blossomed in Yan'an, and now they are also going to the North-East to take root, blossom, and bear fruit. We Communists are like seeds and the people are like the soil. Wherever we go, we must unite with the people, take root, and blossom among them. Wherever our comrades go, they must build good relations with the masses, be concerned for them, and help them overcome their difficulties. We must unite with the masses; the more of the masses we unite with, the better. We must go all out to mobilize the masses, expand the people's forces, and, under the leadership of our Party, defeat the aggressor and build a New China. This is the policy laid down by the Party's Seventh Congress.⁸ We must strive to carry it out. China depends on the Communist Party and the people to run its affairs. We have the will and the way to achieve peace and democracy. Provided we unite even more closely with the whole people, China's affairs can be run well. Wherever our comrades go, they should shoulder the heavy load rather than the light load, and choose the smaller portion of food rather than the bigger portion. Comrades who act in this way are the best comrades, the best Communists, who deserve respect and admiration.

For those who are staying here, I also have some words. I hear that some comrades needed to be persuaded to stay here. Some comrades ask: «Why am I being asked to stay here to study, while others are allowed to work and eat for a better life? Why am I being kept in Yan'an, while others can go to the North-East?» Of course, going to the front is a revolutionary requirement, and it is good that some comrades are active and fervent in choosing to go to the front. Still, Yan'an also needs comrades. If we now were to hold a vote to decide whether to abolish the Central Committee, the North-Western Bureau, and the Border Region Government, I am afraid none of you present would raise your hand. The work of the Central Committee, the North-Western Bureau, and the Border Region Government also needs to get done. Therefore, not everyone should leave for the front. Otherwise, who would do the work here? So, I have to decide whether you stay or leave. Some people say that the die has already been cast and the Central Committee is about to leave. Why not leave before the Central Committee? I am telling you that the die has not yet been cast, so the Central Committee will not leave. When will the Central Committee leave? We will not leave until a situation exists in which it is better to move than not to move. Now, it is better not to leave, even though leaving would be very easy. «The tortoise in the front makes way, and the tortoise in the back follows.» This will help those left behind. Since tens of thousands have tested the road, isn't it easy for the Central Committee to follow that path and leave? Nevertheless, we still need comrades and cadres to work here in the Central Committee, the North-Western Bureau, the Border Region Government, and their subordinate bodies. Therefore, I advise those who are staying to focus on their work here.

The Chinese revolution is a protracted struggle, and victory must be won gradually. It is unrealistic for us to swallow the whole of China in just one mouthful. The results of the negotiations depend on how well we fight. In about half a year, the situation will still be full of unrest. We must fight to achieve a situation that generally favours the people of the whole country. There are still many obstacles and difficulties along the road of revolution. Our Party's Seventh Congress assumed that the difficulties would be many, for we preferred to assume there would be more difficulties rather than less. Some comrades do not like to think much about difficulties. But difficulties are facts; we must recognize as many difficulties as there are and should not adopt a «policy of non-recognition». Such a policy of non-recognition can only be applied to the traitor Wang Kemin and his ilk. Traitors like that should be beheaded. Unfortunately, however, one cannot behead difficulties. We must recognize difficulties, analyse them, and combat them. I hope that all our comrades, whether they are leaving for the front or staying behind, will all look at things in this way, and avoid looking at problems one-sidedly.

The world after the Second World War has a bright future. This is the general trend. Does the failure of the Five Power Conference of Foreign Ministers in London⁹ mean that a Third World War is about to break out? No. Just think, how is it possible for a Third World War to break out right after the end of the Second World War? The capitalist and the socialist countries will yet reach compromises on a number of international matters, because compromise will be advantageous.¹⁰ The proletariat and the people of the whole world are firmly opposed to a war against Yan'an, Yugoslavia, the Council Union, and Communism. In the past 30 years, two world wars have been fought. Between the First and Second World Wars, there was an interval of more than 20 years. In the 500'000 years of human history, it is only in the last 30 years that world wars have been fought. After the First World War, the world made great progress. After the Second World War, the world is sure to make even faster progress. Following the First World War, the Council Union was born and scores of Communist Parties were founded — they did not exist before. After the end of the Second World War, the Council Union is much stronger, the face of Europe is changed, the political consciousness of the proletariat and the people of the world is much higher, and the progressive forces throughout the world are more closely united. Therefore, a Third World War can be avoided, the bluster of the reactionaries can be frustrated, and the world can become progressive and bright. Our China is also undergoing rapid and drastic change. The general trend of China's development is certainly for the better, not the worse. The world is progressing, the future is bright, and no one can change this general trend of history. We should carry on constant propaganda among the people on the facts of world progress and the bright future ahead, so that they will build their confidence in victory. At the same time, we must tell the people and tell our comrades that there are no straight roads in the world; we must be prepared to follow a road which twists and turns and not try to get things on the cheap. It must not be imagined that, one fine morning, all the reactionaries will go down on their knees of their own accord. There are still many difficulties ahead which we must not overlook. In a word, while the prospects are bright, the road has twists and turns. By uniting with the entire people in a common effort, we can certainly overcome all difficulties and win victory.