On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism

#PUBLICATION NOTE

This edition of On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the edition published in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Volume 1, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.

#INTRODUCTION NOTE

This is a report delivered by Comrade Mao Zedong to a conference of militants of the Communist Party of China at Wayaobao, Shaanxi, China on the 27th of December, 1935. It was first published in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Volume 1, in 1950.

This report was delivered after the Wayaobao Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Party's Central Committee in December 1935. This meeting, one of the most important ever called by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, criticized the mistaken view in the Party that the Chinese national bourgeoisie could not be an ally of the worker and peasants in the common fight against Japan, and it decided on the tactics of a national united front. On the basis of the Political Bureau's decisions, Comrade Mao Zedong explained in detail the possibility and the importance of reestablishing a united front with the national bourgeoisie on the condition that there must be resistance to Japan. He stressed the decisive significance of the leading role to be played by the Communist Party and the Red Army in this united front. He pointed out the protracted character of the Chinese revolution, and criticized the narrow-minded closed-doorism and overhastiness with regard to the revolution which had long existed in the Party and which were the fundamental causes of the serious setbacks of the Party and the Red Army during the Agrarian Revolutionary War. At the same time, he called the Party's attention to the historical lesson of the defeat of the revolution in 1927 which had been caused by Chen Duxiu's Right-wing opportunism, and he showed that Jiang Jieshi would inevitably try to undermine the forces of the revolution. Thus, he enabled the Party to remain clear-headed in the new situation and to save the forces of the revolution from losses, in spite of Jiang Jieshi's endless intrigues and many armed attacks. In January 1935, at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, which was convened in Zunyi, Guizhou Province, a new Central Committee leadership headed by Comrade Mao Zedong had been established in place of the former «Left»-opportunist leadership. However, as that meeting took place during the Red Army's Long March, it had to confine itself to decisions on the most urgent military problems and on the organization of the Secretariat and the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee. Only when the Red Army had reached northern Shaanxi after the Long March was it possible for the Central Committee of the Party to deal systematically with the various problems of tactics in the political sphere. A most comprehensive analysis of these problems is given in this report by Comrade Mao Zedong.

#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!

#ON TACTICS AGAINST JAPANESE IMPERIALISM

#REPORT TO A CONFERENCE OF PARTY MILITANTS

#Mao Zedong

#27th of December, 1935

#★

#1. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION

Comrades!

A great change has now taken place in the political situation. Our Party has defined its tasks in the light of this changed situation.

What is the present situation?

Its main characteristic is that Japanese imperialism wants to turn China into a colony.

As we all know, for nearly 100 years, China has been a semi-colonial country jointly dominated by several imperialist powers. Owing to the Chinese people's struggle against imperialism and to conflicts among the imperialist powers, China has been able to retain a semi-independent status. For a time, the First World War gave Japanese imperialism the opportunity of dominating China exclusively. But the treaty surrendering China to Japan, the «21 Demands»,¹ signed by Yuan Shikai,² the arch-traitor of that time, was inevitably rendered null and void as a result of the Chinese people's fight against Japanese imperialism and of the intervention by other imperialist powers. In 1922, at the Washington Nine-Power Conference called by the United States, a treaty³ was signed which once again placed China under the joint domination of several imperialist powers. But, before long, the situation changed again. The 18th of September Incident of 1931⁴ began the present stage of Japan's colonization of China. As Japanese aggression was temporarily limited to the four north-eastern provinces,⁵ some people felt that the Japanese imperialists would probably advance no farther. Today, things are different. The Japanese imperialists have already shown their intention of penetrating south of the Great Wall and occupying all China. Now they want to convert the whole of China from a semi-colony shared by several imperialist powers into a colony monopolized by Japan. The recent Eastern Hebei Incident⁶ and diplomatic talks⁷ are clear indications of this trend of events, which threatens the survival of the whole Chinese people. This faces all classes and political groups in China with the question of what to do. Resist? Surrender? Or vacillate between the two?

Now let us see how the different classes in China answer this question.

The workers and the peasants are all demanding resistance. The Revolution of 1924-27, the Agrarian Revolution from 1927 to the present day, and the anti-Japanese tide since the 18th of September Incident of 1931 have all proved that the working class and peasantry are the most resolute forces in the Chinese revolution.

The small bourgeoisie is also demanding resistance. Have not the student youth and the urban small bourgeoisie already started a broad anti-Japanese movement?⁸ This section of the Chinese small bourgeoisie took part in the Revolution of 1924-27. Like the peasants, they are small producers in their economic status, and their interests are irreconcilable with those of imperialism. Imperialism and the Chinese counter-revolutionary forces have done them great harm, driving many into unemployment, bankruptcy, or semi-bankruptcy. Now, faced with the immediate danger of becoming slaves to a foreign nation, they have no alternative but to resist.

But how do the national bourgeoisie, the comprador and feudal classes, and the Nationalist Party of China face up to this question?

The big local tyrants and evil gentry, the big warlords, and the big bureaucrats and compradors have long made up their minds. They maintain, as they have done all along, that revolution of whatever kind is worse than imperialism. They have formed a camp of traitors, for whom the question of whether to become slaves of a foreign nation simply does not exist, because they have already lost all sense of nationality and their interests are inseparably linked with imperialism. Their chieftain is Jiang Jieshi.⁹ This camp of traitors are deadly enemies of the Chinese people. Japanese imperialism could not have become so blatant in its aggression were it not for this pack of traitors. They are the lackeys of imperialism.

The national bourgeoisie presents a complicated problem. This class took part in the Revolution of 1924-27, but, terrified by the flames of revolution, it later deserted to the enemy of the people, the Jiang Jieshi clique. The question is whether there is any possibility that this class will undergo a change in the present circumstances. We think there is. For the national bourgeoisie is not the same as either the feudal or the comprador class; there is a difference between them. The national bourgeoisie is less feudal than the feudal class and not so comprador as the comprador class. The section having more ties with foreign capital and the Chinese landed interests forms the Right wing of the national bourgeoisie; and we shall not, for the moment, consider whether it can change or not. The problem lies with those sections which have few or no such ties. We believe that, in the new situation in which China is threatened with being reduced to a colony, these sections may change their attitude. The change will be marked by vacillation. On the one hand, they dislike imperialism, and, on the other, they fear thorough revolution, and they vacillate between the two. This explains why they took part in the Revolution of 1924-27 and why, in the end, they went over to Jiang Jieshi's side. In what respect does the present period differ from 1927, when Jiang Jieshi betrayed the revolution? China was then still a semi-colony, but now it is on the way to becoming a colony. Over the past nine years, the national bourgeoisie has deserted its ally, the working class, and made friends with the feudal and comprador classes, but has it gained anything? Nothing, except the bankruptcy or semi-bankruptcy of its industrial and commercial enterprises. Hence, we believe that, in the present situation, the attitude of the national bourgeoisie can change. What will be the extent of the change? The general characteristic of the national bourgeoisie is to vacillate. But at a certain stage of the struggle, one section (the Left wing) may join in, while another section may vacillate toward neutrality.

Whose class interests does the 19th Route Army led by Cai Tingkai¹⁰ and others represent? Those of the national bourgeoisie, the upper small bourgeoisie, and the rich peasants and small feudal lords in the countryside. Did not Cai Tingkai and his associates once fight bitterly against the Red Army? Yes, but they subsequently concluded an anti-Japanese and anti-Jiang alliance with the Red Army. In Jiangxi, they had attacked the Red Army, but, later, in Shanghai, they fought the Japanese imperialists; later still, in Fujian, they came to terms with the Red Army and turned their guns against Jiang Jieshi. Whatever course Cai Tingkai and his associates may take in the future, and despite their Fujian People's Government's adherence to old practice in failing to mobilize the people to struggle, it must be considered beneficial to the revolution that they turned their guns, originally trained on the Red Army, against Japanese imperialism and Jiang Jieshi. It marked a split within the Nationalist camp. If the circumstances following the 18th of September Incident could cause this group to split away, why cannot the present circumstances give rise to other splits in the Nationalist Party? Those Party members who hold that the whole feudal and bourgeois camp is united and permanent and will not change under any circumstances are wrong. They not only fail to appreciate the present grave situation, they have even forgotten history.

Let me speak a little more about the past. In 1926 and '27, during the time when the revolutionary army advanced on Wuhan, captured it, and marched into Henan, Tang Shengzhi and Feng Yuxiang¹¹ took part in the revolution. In 1933, Feng Yuxiang cooperated for a time with the Communist Party in forming the Anti-Japanese Allied Army in Chaha'er Province.

Take another striking example. Did not the 26th Route Army which, together with the 19th Route Army, had attacked the Red Army in Jiangxi, stage the Ningdu Uprising¹² in December 1931 and become part of the Red Army? The leaders of the Ningdu Uprising, Zhao Bosheng, Dong Zhentang, and others, have become steadfast comrades in the revolution.

The anti-Japanese operations of Ma Zhanshan¹³ in the three north-eastern provinces represented another split in the ruling class camp.

All these instances indicate that splits will occur in the enemy camp when all China comes within the range of Japanese bombs, and when the struggle changes its normal pace and suddenly surges forward.

Now, comrades, let us turn to another aspect of the question.

Is it correct to object to our view on the ground that China's national bourgeoisie is politically and economically flabby, and to argue that it cannot possibly change its attitude in spite of the new circumstances? I think not. If weakness is the reason for its inability to change its attitude, why did the national bourgeoisie behave differently in 1924-27, when it did not merely vacillate toward the revolution, but actually joined it? Can one say that the weakness of the national bourgeoisie is a new disease, and not one that accompanies it from the very womb? Can one say that the national bourgeoisie is weak today, but was not weak in 1924-27? One of the chief political and economic characteristics of a semi-colonial country is the weakness of its national bourgeoisie. That is exactly why the imperialists dare to bully them, and it follows that one of their characteristics is dislike of imperialism. Of course, so far from denying it, we fully recognize that it is the very weakness of the national bourgeoisie that may make it easy for the imperialists, feudal lords, and compradors to entice them with the bait of some temporary advantage; hence their lack of revolutionary thoroughness. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that, in the present circumstances, there is no difference between the national bourgeoisie and the feudal and comprador classes.

Therefore, we emphatically assert that, when the national crisis reaches a crucial point, splits will occur in the Nationalist camp. Such splits have revealed themselves in the vacillation of the national bourgeoisie and the emergence of such anti-Japanese figures as Feng Yuxiang, Cai Tingkai, and Ma Zhanshan, who have become popular for a time. Basically, these splits are unfavourable to the counter-revolution and favourable to the revolution. Their possibility is increased by China's uneven political and economic development, and the consequent uneven development of the revolution.

Comrades, so much for the positive side of the question. Now, let me take up the negative side, namely, the fact that certain elements among the national bourgeoisie are often past masters at deceiving the people. Why? Because, apart from the genuine supporters of the people's revolutionary cause, this class includes many who temporarily appear as revolutionaries or semi-revolutionaries, and who thus acquire a deceptive status which makes it difficult for the people to see through their lack of revolutionary thoroughness and their false trappings. This increases the responsibility devolving on the Communist Party to criticize its allies, unmask the fake revolutionaries, and gain the leadership. To deny the possibility that the national bourgeoisie may vacillate and join the revolution during great upheavals amounts to abandoning, or at any rate to minimizing, our Party's task of contending for leadership. For, if the national bourgeoisie were exactly the same as the feudal lords and compradors and had the same vile and traitorous visage, there would be little or no problem of contending with it for leadership.

In making a general analysis of the attitude of the Chinese feudal class and the bourgeoisie in times of great upheaval, we should also point to another aspect, namely, that even the feudal and comprador camp is not completely united. The reason is that China is a semi-colonial country for which many imperialist powers are contending. When the struggle is directed against Japanese imperialism, then the lackeys of the United States or Britain, obeying the varying tones of their masters' commands, may engage in veiled or even open strife with the Japanese imperialists and their lackeys. There have been many instances of such dog-fights, and we shall not dwell on them. We will only mention the fact that Hu Hanmin,¹⁴ a Nationalist politician once detained by Jiang Jieshi, has recently added his signature to the Six-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation,¹⁵ which we have advanced. The warlords of the Guangdong and Guangxi cliques,¹⁶ who back Hu Hanmin, are also opposing Jiang Jieshi, under the deceitful slogans of «Recover our lost territory!», and «Resist Japan and at the same time suppress the bandits!»¹⁷ (as against Jiang Jieshi's slogan of «First suppress the bandits, then resist Japan!»). Is this not rather strange? No, it is not strange at all, but merely a particularly interesting example of a fight between large and small lackeys, between well-fed and ill-fed running dogs. It is not a big rift, but neither is it small; it is at once an irritating and painful contradiction. But such fights, such rifts, such contradictions are of use to the revolutionary people. We must turn to good account all such fights, rifts and contradictions in the enemy camp and turn them against our present main enemy.

Summing up the question of class relations, we may say that the fundamental change in the situation, namely, the Japanese invasion of China south of the Great Wall, has changed the relationship among the various classes in China, strengthening the camp of national revolution and weakening that of counter-revolution.

Now, let us discuss the situation in the camp of China's national revolution.

First, the Red Army. As you know, comrades, for almost a year and a half ,the three main contingents of the Chinese Red Army have carried out great shifts of position. The Sixth Army Group led by Ren Bishi¹⁸ and other comrades began to shift to Comrade He Lung's area¹⁹ in August last year, and, in October, we ourselves started to shift position.²⁰ In March this year, the Red Army in the Sichuan-Shaanxi Border Area²¹ began its shift. All three Red Army contingents have abandoned their old positions and moved to new regions. These great shifts have turned the old areas into guerrilla zones. The Red Army has been considerably weakened in the process. From this aspect of the overall situation, we can see that the enemy has won a temporary and partial victory, while we have suffered a temporary and partial defeat. Is this statement correct? I think it is. For it is a statement of fact. However, some people (Zhang Guotao,²² for instance) say that the Central Red Army²³ has failed. Is that correct? No. For it is not a statement of fact. In approaching a problem, a Marxist should see the whole as well as the parts. A frog in a well says: «The sky is no bigger than the mouth of the well.» That is untrue, for the sky is not just the size of the mouth of the well. If it said, «A part of the sky is the size of the mouth of a well», that would be true, for it tallies with the facts. What we say is that, in one respect, the Red Army has failed (that is, failed to maintain its original positions), but, in another respect, it has won a victory (that is, in executing the plan of the Long March). In one respect, the enemy won a victory (that is, in occupying our original positions), but, in another respect, they have failed (that is, failed to execute their plan of «encirclement and suppression» and of «pursuit and suppression»). That is the only appropriate formulation, for we have completed the Long March.

Speaking of the Long March, one may ask: «What is its significance?» We answer that the Long March is the first of its kind in the annals of history, that it is a manifesto, a propaganda force, a seeding machine. Since Pangu divided Heavens from the Earth and the «Three Sovereigns» and «Five Emperors»²⁴ reigned, has history ever witnessed a long march such as ours? For 12 months, we were under daily reconnaissance and bombing from the skies by scores of planes, while, on land, we were encircled and pursued, obstructed and intercepted by a huge force of several hundred thousand soldiers, and we encountered untold difficulties and dangers on the way; yet, by using our two legs, we swept across a distance of more than 20'000 li [10'000 kilometres] through the length and breadth of 11 provinces. Let us ask, has history ever known a long march to equal ours? No, never. The Long March is a manifesto. It has proclaimed to the world that the Red Army is an army of heroes, while the imperialists and their lackeys, Jiang Jieshi and his like, are impotent. It has proclaimed their utter failure to encircle, pursue, obstruct, and intercept us. The Long March is also a propaganda force. It has announced to some 200'000'000 people in 11 provinces that the road of the Red Army is their only road to liberation. Without the Long March, how could the broad masses have learned so quickly about the existence of the great truth which the Red Army embodies? The Long March is also a seeding machine. In the 11 provinces, it has sown many seeds which will sprout, leaf, blossom, and bear fruit, and will yield a harvest in the future. In a word, the Long March has ended with victory for us and defeat for the enemy. Who brought the Long March to victory? The Communist Party. Without the Communist Party, a long march of this kind would have been inconceivable. The Communist Party of China, its directors, its cadres, and its militants, fear no difficulties or hardships. Whoever questions our ability to lead the revolutionary war will fall into the morass of opportunism. A new situation arose as soon as the Long March was over. In the Battle of Zhiluozhen, the Central Red Army and the North-Western Red Army, fighting in fraternal solidarity, shattered the traitor Jiang Jieshi's «encirclement and suppression» campaign against the Shaanxi-Gansu Border Area²⁵ and thus laid the cornerstone for the task undertaken by the Central Committee of the Party, the task of setting up the national headquarters of the revolution in north-western China.

This being the situation with regard to the main body of the Red Army, what about the guerrilla warfare in the southern provinces? Our guerrilla forces there have suffered some setbacks, but have not been wiped out. In many places, they are reasserting themselves, growing, and expanding.²⁶

In the Nationalist areas, the workers' struggle is now moving beyond the factory walls, and, from being an economic struggle, is becoming a political struggle. A heroic working-class struggle against the Japanese and the traitors is now in intense ferment, and, judging by the situation, it will erupt before long.

The peasants' struggle has never ceased. Harassed by aggression from abroad, by difficulties at home, and by natural disasters, the peasants have unleashed widespread struggles in the form of guerrilla warfare, mass uprisings, and famine riots. The anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare now going on in the north-eastern provinces and eastern Hebei²⁷ is their reply to the attacks of Japanese imperialism.

The student movement has already grown considerably and will certainly go on doing so. But this movement can sustain itself and break through the martial law imposed by the traitors and the policy of disruption and massacre practised by the police, the secret service agents, the scoundrels in the educational world, and the fascists only if it is coordinated with the struggles of the workers, peasants, and soldiers.

We have already dealt with the vacillation of the national bourgeoisie, the rich peasants, and small feudal lords and the possibility that they may actually participate in the anti-Japanese struggle.

The minority nationalities, and especially the people of Inner Mongolia, who are directly menaced by Japanese imperialism, are now rising up in struggle. As time goes on, their struggle will merge with that of the people in northern China and with the operations of the Red Army in the North-West.

All this indicates that the revolutionary situation is now changing from a localized into a nationwide one and that it is gradually changing from a state of unevenness to a certain degree of evenness. We are on the eve of a great change. The task of the Party is to form a revolutionary national united front by combining the activities of the Red Army with all the activities of the workers, the peasants, the students, the small bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie throughout the country.

#2. THE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT

Having surveyed the situation with regard to both the counter-revolution and the revolution, we shall find it easy to define the Party's tactical tasks.

What is the fundamental tactical task of the Party? It is none other than to form a broad revolutionary national united front.

When the revolutionary situation changes, revolutionary tactics and methods of leadership must change accordingly. The task of the Japanese imperialists, the collaborators, and the traitors is to turn China into a colony, while our task is to turn China into a free and independent country with full territorial integrity.

To win independence and freedom for China is a great task. It demands that we fight against foreign imperialism and the domestic counter-revolutionary forces. Japanese imperialism is determined to bludgeon its way deep into China. As yet the domestic counter-revolutionary forces of the big feudal and comprador classes are stronger than the people's revolutionary forces. The overthrow of Japanese imperialism and the counter-revolutionary forces in China cannot be accomplished in a day, and we must be prepared to devote a long time to it; it cannot be accomplished by small forces, and we must therefore accumulate great forces. In China, as in the world as a whole, the counter-revolutionary forces are weaker than before and the revolutionary forces stronger. This estimate is correct, representing one aspect of the matter. At the same time, it must be pointed out that the counter-revolutionary forces in China and in the world as a whole are stronger than the revolutionary forces for the time being. This estimate is also correct, representing another aspect of the matter. The uneven political and economic development of China gives rise to the uneven development of its revolution. As a rule, revolution starts, grows, and triumphs first in those places in which the counter-revolutionary forces are comparatively weak, while it has yet to start or grows very slowly in those places in which they are strong. Such has long been the situation for the Chinese revolution. It can be predicted that the general revolutionary situation will grow further at certain stages in the future, but that the unevenness will remain. The transformation of this unevenness into a general evenness will require a very long time, very great efforts, and the Party's application of a correct line. Seeing that the revolutionary war led by the Communist Party of the Council Union²⁸ took three years to conclude, we must be prepared to devote to the already protracted revolutionary war led by the Communist Party of China the longer time necessary to dispose of the domestic and foreign counter-revolutionary forces finally and thoroughly. The kind of impatience that was formerly displayed will never do. Moreover, sound revolutionary tactics must be worked out; we will never achieve great things if we keep on milling around within narrow confines. This does not mean that, in China, things have to be done slowly; no, they must be done boldly, because the danger of national subjugation does not allow us to slacken for a moment. From now on, the revolution will certainly develop much faster than before, for both China and the world are approaching a new period of war and revolution. For all that, China's revolutionary war will remain a protracted one; this follows from the strength of imperialism and the uneven development of the revolution. We say that the present situation is one in which a new high tide in the national revolution is imminent and in which China is on the eve of a great new nationwide revolution; this is one characteristic of the present revolutionary situation. This is a fact, and it represents one aspect of the matter. But we must also say that imperialism is still a force to be earnestly reckoned with, that the unevenness in the development of the revolutionary forces is a serious weakness, and that, to defeat our enemies, we must be prepared to fight a protracted war; this is another characteristic of the present revolutionary situation. This, too, is a fact, and represents another aspect of the matter. Both characteristics, both facts, teach and urge us to revise our tactics and change our ways of disposing our forces and carrying on the struggle to suit the situation. The present situation demands that we boldly discard all closed-doorism, form a broad united front, and guard against adventurism. We must not plunge into decisive battles until the time is ripe and unless we have the necessary strength.

Here, I shall not discuss the relation of adventurism to closed-doorism, or the possible dangers of adventurism as events unfold on a larger scale; that can be left for later. For the moment, I shall confine myself to explaining that united front tactics and closed-door tactics are diametrically opposed.

The former requires the recruiting of large forces for the purpose of surrounding and annihilating the enemy.

The latter means fighting single-handed in desperate combat against a formidable enemy.

The advocates of united front tactics say, if we are to make a proper estimate of the possibility of forming a broad revolutionary national united front, a proper estimate must be made of the changes that may occur in the alignment of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces in China resulting from the attempt of Japanese imperialism to turn China into a colony. Without a proper estimate of the strong and weak points of the Japanese and Chinese counter-revolutionary forces and of the Chinese revolutionary forces, we shall be unable fully to understand the necessity of organizing a broad revolutionary national united front, or to take firm measures to break down closed-doorism, or to use the united front as a means of organizing and rallying millions of people and all the armies that are potentially friendly to the revolution for the purpose of advancing to strike at our main target, namely, Japanese imperialism and its lackeys, the Chinese traitors, or to use this tactical weapon of ours to strike at the main target before us, but instead we shall aim at a variety of targets, so that our bullets will hit not the main enemy, but our lesser enemies or even our allies. This would mean failure to single out the main enemy and waste of ammunition. It would mean inability to close in and isolate them. It would mean inability to draw to our side all those in the enemy camp and on the enemy front who have joined them under compulsion, and those who were our enemies yesterday, but may become our friends today. It would in fact mean helping the enemy, holding back, isolating, and constricting the revolution, and bringing it to a low ebb and even to defeat.

The advocates of closed-door tactics say the above arguments are all wrong. The forces of the revolution must be pure, absolutely pure, and the road of the revolution must be straight, absolutely straight. Nothing is correct except what is literally recorded in Holy Writ. The national bourgeoisie is entirely and eternally counter-revolutionary. Not an inch must be conceded to the rich peasants. The yellow trade unions must be fought tooth and nail. If we shake hands with Cai Tingkai, we must call him a counter-revolutionary at the same moment. Was there ever a cat that did not love fish or a warlord who was not a counter-revolutionary? Intellectuals are three-day revolutionaries whom it is dangerous to recruit. It follows therefore that closed-doorism is the sole wonder-working magic, while the united front is an opportunist tactic.

Comrades, which is right, the united front or closed-doorism? Which indeed is approved by Marxism-Leninism? I answer without the slightest hesitation — the united front and not closed-doorism. Three-year-olds have many ideas which are right, but they cannot be entrusted with serious national or world affairs, because they do not understand them yet. Marxism-Leninism is opposed to the «infantile disorder» found in the revolutionary ranks. This infantile disorder is just what the confirmed exponents of closed-doorism advocate. Like every other activity in the world, revolution always follows a tortuous road and never a straight one. The alignment of forces in the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary camps can change, just as everything else in the world changes. The Party's new tactics of a broad united front start from the two fundamental facts that Japanese imperialism is bent on reducing all China to a colony and that China's revolutionary forces still have serious weaknesses. In order to attack the forces of the counter-revolution, what the revolutionary forces need today is to organize millions upon millions of the masses and move a mighty revolutionary army into action. The plain truth is that only a force of such magnitude can crush the Japanese imperialists and the traitors and collaborators. Therefore, united front tactics are the only Marxist-Leninist tactics. The tactics of closed-doorism are, on the contrary, the tactics of the regal isolationist. Closed-doorism just «drives the fish into deep waters and the sparrows into the thickets», and it will drive the millions upon millions of the masses, this mighty army, over to the enemy's side, which will certainly win the enemy's acclaim. In practice, closed-doorism is the faithful servant of the Japanese imperialists and the traitors and collaborators. Its adherents' talk of the «pure» and the «straight» will be condemned by Marxist-Leninists and commended by the Japanese imperialists. We definitely want no closed-doorism; what we want is the revolutionary national united front, which will spell death to the Japanese imperialists and the traitors and collaborators.

#3. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC²⁹

If our government has until now been based on the alliance of the workers, the peasants, and the urban small bourgeoisie, from now on, it must be so transformed as to include also the members of all other classes who are willing to take part in the national revolution.

At the present time, the fundamental task of such a government should be to oppose the annexation of China by Japanese imperialism. It will have a broader representation, so that it may include those who are interested only in the national revolution and not in the agrarian revolution, and even, if they so desire, those who may oppose Japanese imperialism and its lackeys, though they are not opposed to the European and US imperialists, because of their close ties with the latter. Therefore, as a matter of principle, the programme of such a government should be in keeping with the fundamental task of fighting Japanese imperialism and its lackeys, and we should modify our past policies accordingly.

The special feature on the revolutionary side at present is the existence of a well-tempered Communist Party and Red Army. This is of crucial importance. Great difficulties would arise if they did not exist. Why? Because the traitors and collaborators in China are numerous and powerful and are sure to devise every possible means to wreck the united front; they will sow dissension by means of intimidation and bribery and by manoeuvring among various groupings, and will employ their armies to oppress and crush, one by one, all those weaker than themselves who want to part company with them and join us in fighting Japan. All this would hardly be avoidable if the anti-Japanese government and army were to lack this vital factor, that is, the Communist Party and the Red Army. The revolution failed in 1927 chiefly because, with the opportunist line then prevailing in the Communist Party, no effort was made to expand our own ranks (the workers' and peasants' movement and the armed forces led by the Communist Party), and exclusive reliance was placed on a temporary ally, the Nationalist Party. The result was that, when imperialism ordered its lackeys, the feudal and comprador classes, to spread their numerous tentacles and draw over first Jiang Jieshi and then Wang Jingwei, the revolution suffered defeat. In those days, the revolutionary united front had no mainstay, no strong revolutionary armed forces, and so, when the defections came thick and fast, the Communist Party was forced to fight single-handed and was powerless to foil the tactics of crushing their opponents one by one, which were adopted by the imperialists and the Chinese counter-revolutionaries. True, we had the troops under He Long and Ye Ting, but they were not yet politically consolidated, and the Party was not very skilled in leading them, so that they were finally defeated. The lesson we paid for with our blood was that the lack of a hard core of revolutionary forces brings the revolution to defeat. Today, things are quite different. Now, we have a strong Communist Party and a strong Red Army, and we also have the base areas of the Red Army. Not only are the Communist Party and the Red Army serving as the initiator of a national united front against Japan today, but, in the future, too, they will inevitably become the powerful mainstay of China's anti-Japanese government and army, capable of preventing the Japanese imperialists and Jiang Jieshi from carrying through their policy of disrupting this united front. However, we must be very vigilant, because the Japanese imperialists and Jiang Jieshi will undoubtedly resort to every possible form of intimidation and bribery and of manoeuvring among the various groupings.

Naturally, we cannot expect every faction of the broad national united front against Japan to be as firm as the Communist Party and the Red Army. In the course of their activities, some bad elements may withdraw from the united front under the influence of the enemy. However, we need not fear the loss of such people. While bad elements may drop out under the enemy's influence, good people will come in under ours. The national united front will live and grow as long as the Communist Party and the Red Army live and grow. Such is the leading role of the Communist Party and the Red Army in the national united front. The Communists are no longer political infants and are able to take care of themselves and to handle relations with their allies. If the Japanese imperialists and Jiang Jieshi can manoeuvre in relation to the revolutionary forces, the Communist Party can do the same in relation to the counter-revolutionary forces. If they can draw bad elements in our ranks over to their side, we can equally well draw their «bad elements» (good ones from our point of view) over to our side. If we can draw a larger number over to our side, this will deplete the enemy's ranks and strengthen ours. In short, two fundamental forces are now locked in struggle, and, in the nature of things, all the forces in between will have to line up on one side or the other. The Japanese imperialists' policy of subjugating China and Jiang Jieshi's policy of betraying China will inevitably drive many people over to our side — either directly into joining the ranks of the Communist Party and the Red Army or into forming a united front with us. This will come about unless we pursue closed-door tactics.

Why change the «workers' and peasants' republic» into a «people's republic»?

Our government represents not only the workers and peasants, but the whole nation. This has been implicit in our slogan of a workers' and peasants' democratic republic, because the workers and peasants constitute 80 to 90% of the population. The Ten-Point Programme³⁰ adopted by the Sixth National Congress of our Party embodies the interests of the whole nation and not of the workers and peasants alone. But the present situation requires us to change our slogan, to change it into one of a people's republic. The reason is that Japanese invasion has altered class relations in China, and it is now possible not only for the small bourgeoisie, but even for the national bourgeoisie to join the anti-Japanese struggle.

The people's republic will definitely not represent the interests of the enemy classes. On the contrary, it will stand in direct opposition to the feudal and comprador classes, the lackeys of imperialism, and will not count them among the people. In the same way, Jiang Jieshi's «National Government of the Republic of China» represents only the wealthiest, but not the common people, whom it does not count as part of the nation. As 80 to 90% of China's population is made up of workers and peasants, the people's republic ought to represent their interests first and foremost. However, by throwing off imperialist oppression to make China free and independent and by throwing off feudal oppression to free China from semi-feudalism, the people's republic will benefit not only the workers and peasants, but other sections of the people, too. The sum total of the interests of the workers, peasants, and the rest of the people constitutes the interests of the whole Chinese nation. The comprador and the feudal classes also live on Chinese soil, but, as they have no regard for the national interests, their interests clash with those of the majority. This small minority are the only ones that we break with and are clashing with, and we therefore have the right to call ourselves the representatives of the whole nation.

There is, of course, a clash of interests between the working class and the national bourgeoisie. We shall not be able to extend the national revolution successfully unless the working class, the vanguard of the national revolution, is accorded political and economic rights and is enabled to direct its strength against imperialism and its lackeys, the traitors. However, if the national bourgeoisie joins the anti-imperialist united front, the working class and the national bourgeoisie will have interests in common. In the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, the people's republic will not expropriate private property other than imperialist and feudal private property, and, so, far from confiscating the national bourgeoisie's industrial and commercial enterprises, it will encourage their development. We shall protect all national capitalists who do not support the imperialists or the Chinese traitors. In the stage of democratic revolution, there are limits to the struggle between labour and capital. The labour laws of the people's republic will protect the interests of the workers, but will not prevent the national bourgeoisie from making profits or developing their industrial and commercial enterprises, because such development is bad for imperialism and good for the Chinese people. Thus, it is clear that the people's republic will represent the interests of all strata opposed to imperialism and the feudal forces. The government of the people's republic will be based primarily on the workers and peasants, but will also include representatives of the other classes which are opposed to imperialism and the feudal forces.

But is it not dangerous to let the representatives of such classes join the government of the people's republic? No. The workers and peasants are the fundamental masses of the republic. In giving the urban small bourgeoisie, the intellectuals, and other sections of the population who support the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal programme the right to have a voice in the government of the people's republic and to work in it, the right to vote and stand for election, we must not allow the interests of the workers and peasants, the fundamental masses, to be violated. The essential part of our programme must be the protection of their interests. With their representatives comprising the majority in this government and with the Communist Party exercising leadership and working within it, there is a guarantee that the participation of other classes will present no danger. It is perfectly obvious that the Chinese revolution at the present stage is still a bourgeois-democratic and not a proletarian-socialist revolution in nature. Only the counter-revolutionary Trotskijites³¹ talk such nonsense as that China has already completed its bourgeois-democratic revolution and that any further revolution can only be socialist. The Revolution of 1924-27 was a bourgeois-democratic revolution, which was not carried to completion, but failed. The Agrarian Revolution, which we have led since 1927, is also a bourgeois-democratic revolution, because it is directed not against capitalism, but against imperialism and feudalism. This will remain true of our revolution for quite a long time to come.

Basically, the workers, the peasants, and the urban small bourgeoisie are still the motive forces of the revolution, but now there may be the national bourgeoisie as well.

The change in the revolution will come later. In the future, the democratic revolution will inevitably be transformed into a socialist revolution. As to when the transition will take place, that will depend on the presence of the necessary conditions, and it may take quite a long time. We should not hold forth about transition until all the necessary political and economic conditions are present and until it is advantageous and not detrimental to the overwhelming majority of the people throughout China. It is wrong to have any doubts on this matter and expect the transition to take place soon, as some of our comrades did when they maintained that the transition in the revolution would begin the moment the democratic revolution began to triumph in key provinces. They did so, because they failed to understand what kind of country China is politically and economically and to realize that, compared with Russia, China will find it more difficult, and require much more time and effort, to complete its democratic revolution politically and economically.

#4. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

Finally, a word is necessary about the relation between the Chinese and the world revolution.

Ever since the monster of imperialism came into being, the affairs of the world have become so closely interwoven that it is impossible to separate them. We Chinese have the spirit to fight the enemy to the last drop of our blood, the determination to recover our lost territory by our own efforts, and the ability to stand on our own feet in the family of nations. But this does not mean that we can dispense with international support; no, today international support is necessary for the revolutionary struggle of any nation or country. There is the old adage: «In the Spring and Autumn Era, there were no righteous wars.»³² This is even truer of imperialism today, for it is only the oppressed nations and the oppressed classes that can wage just wars. All wars anywhere in the world in which the people rise up to fight their oppressors are just struggles. The March and November Revolutions in Russia were just wars. The revolutions of the people in various European countries after the First World War were just struggles. In China, the Anti-Opium War,³³ the War of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom,³⁴ the Boxer War,³⁵ the Revolutionary War of 1911,³⁶ the Northern Expedition of 1926-27, the Agrarian Revolutionary War from 1927 to the present, and the present resistance to Japan and punitive actions against traitors — these are all just wars. Now, in the mounting tide of nationwide struggle against Japan and of worldwide struggle against fascism, just wars will spread all over China and the globe. All just wars support each other, while all unjust wars should be turned into just wars — this is the Leninist line.³⁷ Our war against Japan needs the support of the people of the whole world and, above all, the support of the people of the Council Union, which they will certainly give us, because they and we are bound together in a common cause. In the past, the Chinese revolutionary forces were temporarily cut off from the world revolutionary forces by Jiang Jieshi, and, in this sense we were isolated. Now, the situation has changed, and changed to our advantage. From now on, it will continue to change to our advantage. We can no longer be isolated. This provides a necessary condition for China's victory in the war against Japan and for victory in the Chinese revolution.