On Policy

#PUBLICATION NOTE

This edition of On Policy has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the following editions:

• On Policy, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Vol. 2, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.
• Directive of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Policy in the Current Situation, in Mao's Road to Power, First English Edition, Vol. 7, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk and London, 2005.

#INTRODUCTION NOTE

This is an inner-Party directive drafted by Comrade Mao Zedong for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Yan'an, Shaanxi, China on the 25th of December, 1940. It was first published in full in Mao's Road to Power, Vol. 7, in 2005.

#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!

#ON POLICY

#DIRECTIVE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

#Mao Zedong

#25th of December, 1940

#★

#1

Since the conclusion of the agreement between Japan and Wang Jingwei, the receipt of loans from the United States and of Soviet aid, and the initiation of the struggle against capitulationism by our Party, the present crisis of capitulation has been overcome. Although the danger of capitulation may arise again in the future, the War of Resistance prevails in the current situation. Consequently, our military and Party personnel should not stress anti-capitulationist propaganda at present as much as we did in the past. To do otherwise would not only be distasteful to the Nationalist Party, but would also give rise to misunderstandings among the people and the friendly armies.¹

#2

As the Nationalist Party is still pursuing a dual policy of anti-Communism and resistance to Japan, we, too, therefore, continue to adhere to a dual policy of unity and struggle. In opposing Communism, the Nationalist Party, apart from strengthening high-handed measures in the areas under its control, will inevitably launch military attacks against our forces in Central China. They have also built a great wall in the North-West, creating a blockade against us. We must therefore fight against their attacks in Central China and their blockade in the North-West. In particular, we must wage a resolute struggle of self-defence against their military offensives and smash them. The following reasons must be emphasized in opposing the other side's efforts to force us to withdraw north of the Yellow River within a specified time:

• It has been decided that our troops south of the Yangzi River will be transferred to north as a conciliatory gesture.
• Because of the serious natural calamities in North China, some of the units there must move south to obtain food. The transfer of troops from Central China to North China would be tantamount to starving them to death.
• The areas of manoeuvre for the guerrilla war need to be expanded; to confine these forces to one area would necessarily lead to their annihilation.
• Since most of the armed units in Central China are organized by the people to defend their native localities, it would be extremely difficult for them to relocate. Besides, all such organizations have been organized in accordance with instructions given in President Jiang Jieshi's speech at Mount Lu (that all localities, whether southern or northern, and all people, whether old or young, have the responsibility to resist Japan and save the nation) and in the various public notices to compatriots in the enemy-occupied areas, so they are by no means without legal basis.
• As the entire New Fourth and Eighth Route Armies are pinning down half the enemy forces and have been praised by the people of the country for their outstanding service to the nation, they should by right be rewarded, not punished.
• The armed units in southern Anhui have already moved north as ordered. The units north of the Yangzi River have real difficulties moving and are not deliberately defying orders.
• The cause of «friction» lies in the anti-Communist orders issued by the Nationalist Party (the «Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Political Parties», and so on) and in the anti-Communist activities launched by the pro-Japanese faction (Shi Yousan is proof) and does not come from our Party and our armies.
• It is highly unfair to give insufficient pay and provisions to the soldiers and to authorize too small an army (only three divisions for 500'000 soldiers). It is even more unreasonable to force the New Fourth Army and the guerrilla troops to relocate to the North. As for not having been issued military provisions for a long period of time and not knowing where our troops will be located, this is truly incomprehensible, and we therefore request continued issuance of pay.
• The personnel of the New Fourth Army left behind in areas formerly controlled by it, such as southern Jiangxi, northern Fujian, western Fujian, the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area, the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Area, the South Hunan Border Area, and the Hubei-Henan Border Area, are all being massacred and have not the slightest protection.
• The relocation of the troops in Central China to the North will delight only the Japanese bandits and will be disadvantageous to persisting in the War of Resistance and to the defence of Central China.

The above ten major reasons must be pointed out at every opportunity, in order to resist the evil Nationalist policy of squeezing us into a narrow area north of the Yellow River and creating pretexts.¹

#3

In the present high tide of anti-Communist attacks, the policy we adopt is of decisive importance. But many of our cadres fail to realize that the Party's present policy must be very different from its policy during the Agrarian Revolutionary War. It has to be understood that in no circumstances will the Party change its united-front policy for the entire period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, and that many of the policies adopted during the ten years of the Agrarian Revolutionary War cannot just be duplicated today. In particular, many «Far Left» policies of the latter period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War are not merely totally inapplicable today in the War of Resistance, but were wrong even then, arising as they did from the failure to understand two fundamental points — that the Chinese revolution is a bourgeois-democratic revolution in a semi-colonial country, and that it is a protracted revolution. For example, there was the thesis that the Nationalist Party's fifth «encirclement and suppression» campaign and our counter-campaign constituted the decisive battle between counter-revolution and revolution; there was the economic elimination of the capitalist class (the «Far Left» policies on labour and taxation) and of the rich peasants (by allotting them poor land); the physical elimination of the landlords (by not allotting them any land); the attack on the intellectuals; the «Left-wing» deviation in the suppression of counter-revolutionaries; the monopolizing by Communists of the bodies of political power; the focusing on Communism as the objective in popular education; the «Far Left» military policy (of attacking the big cities and denying the role of guerrilla warfare); the adventurist policy of launching armed uprisings in the work in the White areas; and the policy within the Party of attacks on comrades through the abuse of disciplinary measures. These «Far Left» policies were manifestations of the error of «Left-wing» opportunism, or exactly the reverse of the Right-wing opportunism of Chen Duxiu in the latter period of the First Great Revolution. It was all alliance and no struggle in the latter period of the First Great Revolution, and all struggle and no alliance (except with the fundamental sections of the peasantry) in the latter period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War — truly striking demonstrations of the two extremist policies. Both extremist policies caused great losses to the Party and the revolution.

Today, our Anti-Japanese National United Front policy is neither all alliance and no struggle nor all struggle and no alliance, but combines alliance and struggle. Specifically, it means:

• All people favouring resistance (that is, all anti-Japanese workers, peasants, soldiers, students, intellectuals, and businesspeople) must unite in the Anti-Japanese National United Front.
• Within the united front, our policy must be one of independence and initiative, that is, both unity and independence are necessary.
• As far as military strategy is concerned, our policy is guerrilla warfare waged independently and with the initiative in our own hands within the framework of a unified strategy; guerrilla warfare is fundamental, but no chance of waging mobile warfare should be lost when the conditions are favourable.
• In the struggle against the anti-Communist Right-wingers, our policy is to make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few, and crush our enemies one by one; to wage struggles on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint; to strike at and draw in and draw in again after striking at; to be tough, but not to the extent that it breaks the united front; and to be soft, but not to the extent that we give up our positions.
• In the enemy-occupied and Nationalist areas, our policy is, on the one hand, to develop the united front to the greatest possible extent, and, on the other, to have well-selected cadres working underground. With regard to the forms of organization and struggle, our policy is to have well-selected cadres working underground for a long period, to accumulate strength, and to bide our time.
• With regard to the alignment of the various classes within the country, our fundamental policy is to develop the Left-wing forces, win over the Centrist forces, isolate the anti-Communist Right-wing forces, and attack the pro-Japanese forces.
• With respect to the anti-Communist Right-wingers, ours is a revolutionary dual policy of uniting with them, insofar as they are still in favour of resisting Japan, and of isolating them, insofar as they are determined to oppose the Communist Party. Moreover, the Right-wingers have a dual character with regard to resistance to Japan, and our policy is to unite with them, insofar as they are still in favour of resistance, and to struggle against them and isolate them, insofar as they vacillate (for instance, when they collude with the Japanese aggressors and show reluctance in opposing Wang Jingwei and other traitors). As their opposition to the Communist Party has also a dual character, our policy, too, should have a dual character; insofar as they are still unwilling to break up Nationalist-Communist cooperation altogether, it is one of alliance with them, but insofar as they are high-handed and launch armed attacks on our Party and the people, it is one of fighting against them and isolating them. We make a distinction between such people with a dual character and the traitors and pro-Japanese elements.
• Even among the traitors and pro-Japanese elements, there are people with a dual character, toward whom we should likewise employ a revolutionary dual policy. Insofar as they are pro-Japanese, our policy is to struggle against them and isolate them, but insofar as they vacillate, our policy is to draw them nearer to us and win them over. We make a distinction between such ambivalent elements and the out-and-out traitors like Wang Jingwei, Wang Yitang,² and Shi Yousan.³
• The pro-Japanese big landlords and big bourgeoisie who are against resistance must be distinguished from the pro-British and pro-US big landlords and big bourgeoisie who are for resistance; similarly, the ambivalent big landlords and big bourgeoisie who are for resistance but vacillate, and who are for unity but are anti-Communist, must be distinguished from the national bourgeoisie, the middle and small landlords, and the enlightened gentry, the duality of whose character is less pronounced. We build our policy on these distinctions. The diverse policies mentioned above all stem from these distinctions in class relations.
• We deal with imperialism in the same way. The Communist Party opposes all imperialism, but we make a distinction between Japanese imperialism, which is now committing aggression against China, and the imperialist powers which are not doing so now; between German and Italian imperialism, which are allies of Japan and have recognized «Manzhouguo», and British and US imperialism, which are opposed to Japan; and between the Britain and the United States of yesterday, which followed a Munich policy in East Asia and undermined China's resistance to Japan, and the Britain and the United States of today, which have abandoned this policy and are now in favour of China's resistance. Our tactics are guided by one and the same principle: to make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few, and crush our enemies one by one. Our foreign policy differs from that of the Nationalist Party. The Nationalist Party claims: «There is only one enemy, and all the rest are friends»; it appears to treat all countries other than Japan alike, but in fact, it is pro-British and pro-US. On our part, we must draw certain distinctions: first, between the Council Union and the capitalist countries; second, between Britain and the United States, on the one hand, and Germany and Italy, on the other; third, between the people of Britain and the United States and their imperialist governments; and, fourth, between the policy of Britain and the United States during their East Asian Munich period and their policy today. We build our policy on these distinctions. In direct contrast to the Nationalist Party, our fundamental line is to use all possible foreign aid, subject to the principle of independent prosecution of the war and reliance on our own efforts, and not, as the Nationalist Party does, to abandon this principle by relying entirely on foreign aid or hanging on to one imperialist bloc or another.

To correct the lop-sided views of many Party cadres on the question of tactics and their consequent vacillations between «Left» and Right, we must help them to acquire an all-round and integrated understanding of the changes and developments in the Party's policy, past and present. The «Far Left» standpoint is creating trouble and is still the main danger to the Party. In the Nationalist areas, there are many people who cannot seriously carry out the policy of having well-selected cadres working underground for a long period, of accumulating strength, and of biding our time, because they underestimate the gravity of the Nationalist Party's anti-Communist policy. At the same time, there are many others who cannot carry out the policy of expanding the united front, because they over-simplify matters and consider the entire Nationalist Party to be quite hopeless and are therefore at a loss what to do. A similar state of affairs exists in the Japanese-occupied areas.

In the Nationalist areas and the anti-Japanese base areas, the Right-wing views, which were once prevalent to a serious extent, have now been fundamentally overcome; those who held such views used to stress alliance to the exclusion of struggle and overestimate the Nationalist Party's inclination to resist Japan, and they therefore blurred the difference in principle between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party, rejected the policy of independence and initiative within the united front, appeased the big landlords and big bourgeoisie and the Nationalist Party, and tied their own hands instead of boldly expanding the anti-Japanese revolutionary forces and conducting resolute struggle against the Nationalist Party's policy of opposing and restricting the Communist Party. But since the winter of 1939, a «Far Left» tendency has cropped up in many places as a result of the anti-Communist «friction» engineered by the Nationalist Party and of the struggles we have waged in self-defence. This tendency has been corrected to some extent, but not altogether, and it still finds expression in concrete policies in many places. It is therefore most necessary for us to examine and define our concrete policies now.

As the Central Committee has already issued a series of directives on concrete policies, now only a few points are given here by way of summary.

#3.1. THE BODIES OF POLITICAL POWER

The «three-in-one» combination, under which Communists have only 1/3 of the seats in the bodies of political power and many non-Communists are drawn into participation, must be carried out resolutely. In areas like northern Jiangsu, where we have just begun to establish anti-Japanese democratic political power, the proportion of Communists may be even less than 1/3. The representatives of the small bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie, and the enlightened gentry who are not actively opposed to the Communist Party must be drawn into participation, both in the government and in the people's representative bodies, and those Nationalist Party members who do not oppose the Communist Party must also be allowed to participate. Even a small number of Right-wingers may be allowed to join the people's representative bodies. On no account should our Party monopolize everything. We are not destroying the dictatorship of the big comprador bourgeoisie and the big landlord class in order to replace it with a one-party dictatorship of the Communist Party.

#3.2. LABOUR POLICY

The livelihood of the workers must be improved if their enthusiasm in the fight against Japan is to be fully mobilized. But we must strictly guard against being «Far Left»; there must not be excessive increases in wages or excessive reductions in working hours. Under present conditions, the eight-hour workday cannot be universally introduced in China, and a ten-hour workday should still be permitted in certain branches of production. In other branches of production, the workday should be fixed according to the circumstances. Once a contract between labour and capital is concluded, the workers must observe labour discipline and the capitalists must be allowed to make some profit. Otherwise, factories will close down, which will neither help the war nor benefit the workers. Particularly in the rural areas, the living standards and wages of the workers should not be raised too high, or it will give rise to complaints from the peasants, create unemployment among the workers, and result in a decline in production.

#3.3. LAND POLICY

It must be explained to Party members and to the peasants that this is not the time for a thorough agrarian revolution and that the series of measures taken during the Agrarian Revolutionary War cannot be applied today. On the one hand, our present policy should stipulate that the landlords shall reduce rent and interest, for this serves to mobilize the enthusiasm of the fundamental peasant masses for resistance to Japan, but the reductions should not be too great. In general, ground rent should be reduced by 25%, and if the masses demand a greater reduction, the tenant-farmer may keep up to 60 or 70% of their crop, but not more. The reduction in interest on loans should not be so great as to render credit transactions impossible. On the other hand, our policy should stipulate that the peasants shall pay rent and interest and that the landlords shall retain their ownership of land and other property. Interest should not be so low as to make it impossible for the peasants to obtain loans, nor the settlement of old accounts be such as to enable the peasants to get back their mortgaged land for free.

#3.4. TAX POLICY

Taxes must be levied according to income. Except for the very poor, who should be exempt, all people with an income shall pay taxes to the State, which means that the burden shall be carried by more than 80% of the population, including the workers and peasants, and not be placed entirely on the landlords and the capitalists. Arresting people and imposing fines on them as a means of financing the army must be forbidden. We may use the existing Nationalist system of taxation with appropriate alterations until we have devised a new and more suitable one.

#3.5. ANTI-ESPIONAGE POLICY

We must firmly suppress the confirmed traitors and anti-Communists, or otherwise we shall not be able to protect the anti-Japanese revolutionary forces. But there must not be too much killing, and no innocent person should be incriminated. Vacillating elements and reluctant followers among the reactionaries should be dealt with leniently. Corporal punishment must be abolished in trying criminals; the stress must be on the weight of evidence, and confessions should not be taken on trust. Our policy toward prisoners captured from the Japanese, puppet, or anti-Communist troops is to set them all free, except for those who have incurred the bitter hatred of the masses and must receive capital punishment and whose death sentence has been approved by the higher authorities. Among the prisoners, those who were coerced into joining the reactionary forces, but who are more or less inclined towards the revolution, should be won over in large numbers to work for our army. The rest should be released and, if they fight us and are captured again, should again be set free. We should not insult them, take away their personal effects, or try to exact recantations from them, but without exception should treat them sincerely and kindly. This should be our policy, however reactionary they may be. It is a very effective way of isolating the hard core of reaction. As for renegades, except for those who have committed heinous crimes, they should be given a chance to turn over a new leaf, provided they discontinue their anti-Communist activities; and if they come back and wish to rejoin the revolution, they may be accepted, but must not be readmitted into the Party. The general run of Nationalist intelligence agents must not be identified with the Japanese spies and Chinese traitors; the two should be differentiated and handled accordingly. An end should be put to the state of confusion, in which any governmental or non-governmental organization can make arrests. To establish revolutionary order in the interests of the war, it must be stipulated that, with the exception of army units in combat action, only government judicial or public security agencies shall be empowered to make arrests.

#3.6. THE PEOPLE'S RIGHTS

It must be laid down that all landlords and capitalists not opposed to the War of Resistance shall enjoy the same rights of person and property, the same right to vote, and the same freedom of speech, assembly, association, political conviction, and religious belief as the workers and peasants. The government shall take action only against saboteurs and those who organize riots in our base areas, and shall protect all others and not harass them.

#3.7. ECONOMIC POLICY

We must actively develop industry and agriculture and promote the circulation of commodities. Capitalists should be encouraged to come into our anti-Japanese base areas and start enterprises here if they so desire. Private enterprise should be encouraged and State enterprise regarded as only one sector of the economy. The purpose in all this is to achieve self-sufficiency. Care must be taken not to damage any useful enterprise. Both our tariff and our monetary policies should conform to our fundamental line of expanding agriculture, industry, and commerce, and not run counter to it. The essential factor in maintaining the base areas over a long period is the achievement of self-sufficiency through a conscientious and meticulous, not a crude and careless, organization of the economy.

#3.8. CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL POLICY

This should centre on promoting and spreading the knowledge and skills needed for the war and a sense of national pride among the masses of the people. Liberal bourgeois educators, scholars, journalists, scientists, and technical experts should be allowed to come to our base areas and cooperate with us in running schools and newspapers and doing other work. We should accept into our schools all intellectuals and students who show enthusiasm for resisting Japan, give them short-term training, and then assign them to work in the army, the government, or mass organizations; we should boldly draw them in, give them work, and promote them. We should not be over-cautious or too afraid of reactionaries sneaking in. Unavoidably, some such elements will creep in, but there will be time to comb them out in the course of study and work. Every base area must establish printing shops, publish books and newspapers, and organize distribution and delivery agencies. Every base area must also, as far as possible, set up big schools for training cadres, and the more and bigger, the better.

#3.9. MILITARY POLICY

There must be maximum expansion of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, because they are the most reliable armed forces of the Chinese people in pressing on with the National War of Resistance. We should continue our policy of never attacking the Nationalist troops unless attacked and do all we can to make friends with them. In order to help the construction of our army, no effort should be spared to draw those officers who are sympathetic to us into the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, whether they are members of the Nationalist Party or are without political party affiliation. Something must be done now to change the situation where Communists dominate everything in our armies by sheer numbers. Of course, the «three-in-one» combination should not be introduced into our main forces, but so long as the leadership of the army is kept in the hands of the Party (this is an absolute and inviolable necessity), we need not be afraid of drawing large numbers of sympathizers into the work of building up the military and technical departments of our army. Now that the ideological and organizational foundations of our Party and our army have been firmly laid, not only is there no danger in drawing in large numbers of sympathizers (not saboteurs of course), but it is indeed an indispensable policy, for otherwise, it will be impossible to win the sympathy of the whole country and expand our revolutionary forces.

#★ ★ ★

All these tactical principles for the united front and the concrete policies formulated in accordance with them must be firmly applied by the whole Party. At a time when the Japanese invaders are intensifying their aggression against China and when the big landlords and big bourgeoisie are pursuing high-handed policies and launching armed attacks against the Communist Party and the people, the application of the tactical principles and concrete policies outlined above is the only way to press on with the War of Resistance, broaden the united front, win the sympathy of the whole people, and bring about a turn for the better in the situation. In rectifying errors, however, we must proceed step by step, and must not be so hasty as to cause discontent among the cadres, suspicion among the masses, counter-attacks by the landlords, or other undesirable developments.