On Peace Negotiations With the Nationalist Party of China

#PUBLICATION NOTE

This edition of On Peace Negotiations With the Nationalist Party of China has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the following editions:

• On Peace Negotiations With the Kuomintang, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Vol. 4, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.
• The CPC Central Committee's Directive on the Situation, Tasks, and Policies Following the Japanese Surrender, in Mao's Road to Power, First English Edition, Vol. 9, Routledge, New York and London, 2023.

#INTRODUCTION NOTE

This is an inner-Party circular drafted by Comrade Mao Zedong for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Yan'an, Shaanxi, China on the 26th of August, 1945. It was first published in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 4, in 1960.

This circular was drafted two days before Comrade Mao Zedong went to Chongqing for peace negotiations with Jiang Jieshi. Because the Communist Party of China and the broad masses of the Chinese people firmly opposed Jiang Jieshi's civil war plot and because US imperialism still had to pay some heed to worldwide democratic public opinion, which unanimously condemned his policy of civil war and dictatorship, Jiang sent three telegrams to Comrade Mao Zedong on the 14th, 20th, and 23rd of August, 1945, inviting him to Chongqing for peace negotiations, and for the same purpose, Patrick J. Hurley, then US Ambassador to China, came to Yan'an on the 27th of August. The Communist Party of China decided to send Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Wang Ruofei to Chongqing for peace negotiations with the Nationalist Party in order to make every possible effort for peace and also, in the process of struggling for peace, to show US imperialism and Jiang Jieshi in their true colours and so help unite and educate the masses of the people. This circular drafted by Comrade Mao Zedong analysed developments in China during the fortnight after Japan announced its surrender. It put forward the policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the peace negotiations, certain concessions the Party was prepared to make in the negotiations, and policies for coping with the two possible outcomes of the negotiations. It contained directives concerning the principles to be followed in the struggles in the Liberated Areas of northern and eastern China and of central and southern China respectively. And it warned the whole Party that it must absolutely not relax its vigilance or its struggle against Jiang Jieshi because negotiations were to take place. Comrade Mao Zedong and his colleagues arrived in Chongqing on the 28th of August and held negotiations with the Nationalist Party for 43 days. Although the negotiations resulted only in the publication of the «Summary of Conversations Between the Representatives of the Nationalist Party of China and the Communist Party of China» (also known as the «10th of October Agreement»), they were nevertheless successful in that, politically, they enabled the Communist Party to gain the initiative to a great extent and put the Nationalist Party in a passive position. Comrade Mao Zedong returned to Yan'an on the 11th of October. Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei remained in Chongqing to continue the negotiations. For the results, see On the Chongqing Negotiations.

#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!

#ON PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE NATIONALIST PARTY OF CHINA

#CIRCULAR OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

#Mao Zedong

#26th of August, 1945

#★

#To All Members of District Party Committees and Bureaus of the Central Committee

The speedy surrender of the Japanese invaders has changed the whole situation. The Soviet Red Army is advancing with caution, so as not to wreck the peace in East Asia (this is absolutely correct), and Jiang Jieshi has monopolized the right to accept the surrender. These two points generally determine that, for the time being (for a stage), the big cities and important lines of communication will not be in our hands. Nevertheless, in northern China, we should still fight hard, fight with all our might to take all we can. In the past two weeks, our army has recovered 59 cities of various sizes and vast rural areas, and including those already in our hands, we now control 175 cities, thus winning a great victory. In northern China, we have recovered Weihaiwei, Yantai, Longkou, Yidu, Zechuan, Yangliuqing, Bikeji, and Bo'ai, and yesterday, we recovered Zhangjiakou, Jining, and Fengzhen. The might of our army has shaken northern China and, together with the sweeping advance of the Soviet and Outer Mongolian forces to the Great Wall, has created a favourable position for our Party. In the coming period, we should continue the offensive and do our best to capture the Beijing-Suiyuan Railway, the northern section of the Datong-Puzhou Railway, and the Zhengding-Taiyuan, Dezhou-Shijiazhuang, Baigui-Jincheng, and Daokou-Qinghua Railways; and also to cut up the Beijing-Liaoning, Beijing-Hankou, Tianjin-Pukou, Qingdao-Ji'nan, Longhai, and Shanghai-Nanjing Railways. We should gain control of whatever we can, even though temporarily. At the same time, in accordance with the Central Committee's directive of the 22nd of August, the necessary forces should be employed to take as many villages, county and higher administrative centres, and small towns as possible. For example, a highly favourable situation has been created because the New Fourth Army has occupied many county towns lying between Nanjing, Lake Taihu, and the Tianmu Mountains and between the Yangzi and the Huai Rivers, because our forces in Shandong have occupied the whole of the Eastern Shandong Peninsula, and because our forces in the Shanxi-Suiyuan Border Region have occupied many cities and towns north and south of the Beijing-Suiyuan Railway. After another period of offensive operations, it will be possible for our Party to control most of the areas north of the lower Yangzi River and the Huai River, most of Shandong, Hebei, Shanxi, and Suiyuan Provinces, all of Rehe and Chaha'er Provinces (so as to welcome the advance of the Red Army and the Outer Mongolian forces), and a part of Liaoning Province.

At present, the Council Union, the United States, and Britain all disapprove of civil war in China;¹ at the same time, our Party has put forward the three great slogans of peace, democracy, and unity² and is sending Comrades Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Wang Ruofei to Chongqing to discuss with Jiang Jieshi the great issues of unity and national reconstruction; thus, it is possible that the civil war plot of the Chinese reactionaries may be frustrated. Besides, if they were to wage a civil war, the Council Union, the United States, and Britain might intervene. The Nationalist Party has now strengthened its position by recovering Shanghai, Nanjing, and other places, reopening sea communications, taking over the arms of the enemy, and incorporating the puppet troops into its own forces. Nevertheless, it is riddled with a thousand gaping wounds, torn by innumerable inner contradictions, and beset with great difficulties. It is possible that, after the negotiations, the Nationalist Party, under domestic and foreign pressure, may conditionally recognize our Party's status. Our Party, too, may conditionally recognize the status of the Nationalist Party. This would bring about a new stage of cooperation between the two political parties (plus the Democratic League,³ and so on) and of peaceful development. In that event, our Party should strive to master all methods of legal struggle and intensify its work in the Nationalist areas in the three main spheres: the cities, the villages, and the army (all weak points in our work there). During the negotiations, the Nationalist Party is sure to demand that we drastically reduce the size of the Liberated Areas, cut down the strength of the Liberation Army, and stop issuing currency. We on our side are prepared to make such concessions as are necessary and as do not damage the fundamental interests of the people. Without such concessions, we cannot explode the Nationalist Party's civil war plot, cannot gain the political initiative, cannot win the sympathy of world public opinion and the Centrist forces within the country, and cannot obtain in exchange legal status for our Party and a state of peace. But there are limits to such concessions; the principle is that they must not damage the fundamental interests of the people.

If the Nationalist Party still wants to launch civil war after our Party has taken the above steps, it will put itself in the wrong in the eyes of the whole nation and the whole world, and our Party will be justified in waging a war of self-defence to crush its attacks. Moreover, our Party is powerful, and if anyone attacks us and if the conditions are favourable for battle, we will certainly act in self-defence to wipe them out resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely (we do not strike rashly, but when we do strike, we must win). We must never be cowed by the bluster of reactionaries. But we must at all times firmly adhere to, and never forget, these principles: unity, struggle, unity through struggle; to wage struggles on just grounds, with advantage, and with restraint; and to make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few, and crush our enemies one by one.⁴

In Guangdong, Hunan, Hubei, Henan, and some other provinces, our Party forces are in a more difficult position than in northern China and the area between the Yangzi and the Huai Rivers. The comrades in those places are much in the thoughts of the Central Committee. But the Nationalist Party has many weak spots, and its areas are vast; our comrades will be fully able to deal with the situation, provided they make no big mistakes in military policy (movements and operations) and in the policy of uniting with the people, and provided they are modest and prudent, not conceited or rash. Besides receiving the necessary directives from the Central Committee, the comrades in these areas must use their own judgement to analyse the situation, solve their problems, surmount difficulties, maintain themselves, and expand their forces. When the Nationalist Party becomes unable to do anything with you, it may be compelled in the negotiations between the two political parties to give your forces recognition and agree to arrangements advantageous to both sides. But you must definitely not rely on the negotiations, must definitely not hope that the Nationalist Party will be kindhearted, because it will never be kindhearted. You must rely on your own strength, on correct guidance of activities, on fraternal unity within the Party, and on good relations with the people. Firmly rely on the people, that is your way out. The Central Committee has decided to send over 1'000 cadres led by Comrade Lin Feng to the North-East. The army led by Comrade Fang Yi should advance to the border of Rehe and await orders there. If we are allowed to advance to the North-East, we can continue. If not, the army can expand forces in Rehe, thus fostering a strong base area there (Rehe and Chaha'er are not covered by the Sino-Soviet Treaty).

To sum up, our Party is confronted with many difficulties which must not be ignored, and all Party comrades must be well prepared mentally. But the general trend of the international and internal situation is favourable to our Party and to the people. So long as the whole Party is united as one, we shall be able to overcome all difficulties step by step.

#Central Committee