On Dialectical Materialism
#PUBLICATION NOTE
This edition of On Dialectical Materialism has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the following editions:
- On Practice, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Vol. 1, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.
- On Contradiction, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Vol. 1, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.
- On Dialectical Materialism (Lecture Notes), in Mao's Road to Power, First English Edition, Vol. 6, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk and London, 2004.
#INTRODUCTION NOTE
This is a series of lectures held by Comrade Mao Zedong at the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Military and Political College in Yan'an, Shaanxi, China in July-August 1937. It was first published in the Kangzhan Daxue in April-May 1938.
In the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War (1927-36), the Communist Party of China was deeply afflicted by two different revisionist deviations in the philosophical sphere, which led to a number of opportunist political deviations: dogmatism, or a «Left-wing» deviation from the Marxist theory of knowledge, and empiricism, or a Right-wing deviation from the Marxist theory of knowledge. These deviations, the dogmatist deviation in particular, did great harm to the Chinese revolution in the form of the three «Left»-opportunist lines of Qu Qiubai, Li Lisan, and Wang Ming, mainly of Wang Ming, whose opportunist line reigned in the Party from 1931 to '34 and caused the loss of 90% of the revolutionary forces and necessitated the Long March in 1935. The dogmatists denied the truth that Marxism is not a dogma, but a guide to action, and overwhelmed people with quotations from Marxist works, torn out of context. The empiricists restricted themselves to their own fragmentary experience and denied the truth that, without revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary movement. In direct and indirect ways, the empiricists and the dogmatists actually collaborated in fighting the correct line of Comrade Mao Zedong in the Party, forming what Mao would later refer to as a «Left»-Right bloc.
After the Zunyi Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Party's Central Committee in January 1935, Comrade Mao Zedong paid great attention to rectifying the roots of opportunism in the Party, starting with the two philosophical deviations discussed above. He did so, firstly, with the present lectures, and, later, with the Rectification Movement in 1942-45, which culminated in the Seventh National Congress of the Party in 1945. Through this painstaking ideological work, the Party was able to lead the Great Chinese Revolution to victory in 1949.
After the victory of the Chinese revolution, Comrade Mao Zedong significantly revised two sections of these lectures for publication as separate essays, On Practice and On Contradiction.
#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!
#ON DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM
#LECTURES DELIVERED AT THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S ANTI-JAPANESE MILITARY AND POLITICAL COLLEGE
#Mao Zedong
#July-August 1937
#★
#1. IDEALISM AND MATERIALISM
#1.1. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE TWO PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS
The whole history of philosophy is the history of the struggle between and development of the two mutually opposed philosophical schools of idealism and materialism. All philosophical trends of thought and schools are metamorphoses of these two fundamental schools.
All the various philosophical theories have been created by people belonging to definite social classes. The ideas of these people have, moreover, been historically determined by a particular social being. All philosophical doctrines express the needs of a given social class and reflect the level of development of the social productive forces and the historical stage in humanity's cognition of nature. The fate of a philosophy is determined by the degree to which it meets the needs of a social class.
The social origins of idealism and materialism lie in a social formation marked by class contradictions. The earliest appearance of idealism was the product of the ignorance and superstition of the human race during its early and late primitive stages of development. Subsequently, the productive forces developed, thus pushing forward the development of scientific knowledge as well. Logically, idealism should then have declined, and materialism should have risen to take its place. And yet, from ancient times to the present, idealism has not only not declined, but, on the contrary, has developed and waged a struggle for supremacy with materialism, from which neither side has emerged the victor. The reason lies in the fact that society is divided into classes. On the one hand, the oppressing classes, in pursuit of their own interests, cannot but develop and consolidate their idealist doctrines. On the other hand, the oppressed classes, likewise in their own interest, cannot but develop and consolidate their materialist doctrines. Both idealist and materialist doctrines exist as weapons in the class struggle, and, so long as classes have not been eliminated, the conflict between idealism and materialism cannot be eliminated. Idealism, in the process of its historical development, represents the ideology of the exploiting classes and serves reactionary purposes. Materialism, however, is the worldview of the revolutionary class; it has grown and developed in the midst of an incessant struggle against the reactionary philosophy of idealism. Consequently, the struggle between idealism and materialism in philosophy has reflected from beginning to end the struggle of interests between the reactionary classes and the revolutionary classes. Whether or not the philosophers are aware of it, a given philosophical trend always approximates the political orientation of their own class. Any philosophical trend always directly or indirectly fosters the fundamental political interests of the class to which its authors belong. In this sense, a given philosophical trend is, in the final analysis, a manifestation in a particular guise of the policy of the social class to which the philosophers belong.
The distinguishing characteristic of Marxist philosophy ─ that is, of dialectical materialism ─ is its effort to explain clearly the class character of all social consciousness (including philosophy). It publicly declares a resolute struggle between its own, proletarian character and the idealist philosophy of the propertied classes. Moreover, it subordinates its own special tasks to such general tasks as overthrowing capitalism, organizing and building the dictatorship of the proletariat, and building a socialist society. The tasks of philosophy during the present stage in China are subordinate to the general tasks of overthrowing imperialism and semi-feudalism, thoroughly realizing bourgeois democracy, establishing a new-democratic Republic of China, and preparing the transformation by peaceful means to a socialist and a communist society. Philosophical theory and political reality must be closely linked.
#1.2. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN IDEALISM AND MATERIALISM
Wherein lies the fundamental difference between idealism and materialism? It lies in the opposite answers given by the two to the fundamental question in philosophy, that of the relationship between spirit and matter (or thinking and being). Idealism considers spirit (thinking, concepts, the subject) as the source of all that exists in the world, and matter (nature, society, the object) as subordinate to it. Materialism recognizes the independent existence of matter apart from spirit and considers spirit subordinate to it. A confusing variety of opinions on all questions arises from the opposite answers given to this fundamental question.
According to idealism, the world is either a synthesis of our perceptions of all kinds or the spiritual process created by our logic or the logic of the world; it regards the external material world either as a completely fabricated illusion or as the material external trapping of spiritual elements. Idealism regards human knowledge as emanating spontaneously from the subject and as the product of spirit itself.
Materialism, on the contrary, considers the unity of the Universe to derive from its material character and holds that spirit (thinking) is one of the natural characteristics of matter which emerges only after matter has developed to a certain stage. Nature, matter, and the objective world exist apart from spirit and are independent of it. Human knowledge is a reflection of the objective external world.
#1.3. THE SOURCE OF THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF IDEALISM
Idealism regards matter as the product of spirit, thus turning the real world upside down. What is the source of the emergence and development of such a philosophy?
As stated previously, the earliest occurrence of idealism was the product of the ignorance and superstition of the human race during its early and late primitive periods. But, afterward, the development of the productive forces brought about the conditions for the primacy of idealism among the various trends of philosophical thought, namely, the division between manual and mental labour. With the development of the social productive forces, the division of labour appeared; the further development of the division of labour saw the emergence of people devoting themselves entirely to mental labour. But, during the period when the productive forces were weak, the division between the two did not reach the stage of complete separation. When classes appeared, private property emerged, and exploitation became the basis for the existence of a ruling class, a great transformation occurred. Mental labour then became the privilege of the ruling class, while manual labour became the fate of the oppressed classes. The ruling class began to examine the relation between themselves and the oppressed classes in an upside-down fashion; it was not the labourers who furnished them with the means of existence, but, rather, they who provided the labourers with those means. Hence, they looked down on manual labour and developed idealist conceptions. To eliminate the distinction between manual and mental labour is one of the preconditions for eliminating idealist philosophy.
Among the social roots which have made possible the development of idealist philosophy, the main one was the conscious expression of the interests of the ruling class by that philosophy. The dominance of idealist philosophy in all spheres of culture must be explained in the light of this. The final elimination of idealist philosophy can come only after the elimination of classes and the establishment of communist society.
The source which has enabled idealism to develop and deepen, and given it the capacity to struggle with materialism, must be sought in the process of human cognition. When humans employ concepts to think, there exists the possibility of drifting into idealism. Humans cannot but use concepts when thinking, and this can easily lead us to divide our cognition into two aspects. One aspect relates to individual and particular things, and the other relates to generalized concepts (such as the conclusion, «Yan'an is a city».) The particular and the general are inseparably linked; once separated, they depart from objective truth. Objective truth is expressed in the unity of the general and the particular. Without the particular, the general could not exist, and, without the general, there could be no particular. To separate the general from the particular, that is, to treat the general as an objective entity and to regard the particular only as a form of existence of the general ─ such is the method adopted by all idealists. All idealists substitute thinking, spirit, or concepts for objective entities which exist independently of human consciousness. Starting from this premise, idealism stresses the dynamic role of human thinking in social practice. The idealists cannot point out the materialist truth that thinking is limited by being, but maintain that only consciousness is active, whereas matter is merely an inert composite entity. Urged on, moreover, by their own class character, the idealists then use every method to exaggerate the dynamic role of thinking. They develop this aspect one-sidedly, expanding it without limit, so that it becomes the dominant aspect of cognition. They conceal the other aspect, leaving it subordinate. This artificially expanded role for thinking is established as a general worldview to the extent of transforming it into a god or an idol. Idealist economics greatly exaggerates an inessential aspect of exchange, raising the law of supply and demand to the status of the fundamental law of capitalism. Many people have observed the active role that science plays in social life, but they fail to realize that this role is determined and limited by definite social relations of production, and come to the conclusion that science is the motive force of society. Idealist historians regard heroes as the makers of history. Idealist statespersons regard politics as something omnipotent. Idealist military strategists practise the methods of desperate combat. Idealist revolutionaries advocate Blanquism. The Far Right say that the only way to revive our nation is to restore the old morality. All this results from the excessive exaggeration of conscious activity. Our thinking cannot reflect a phenomenon in its entirety at one stroke, but is constituted of knowledge which, in a dialectical process, approximates reality and is lively and infinitely varied. Idealism is founded on the specific properties of thinking and has exaggerated this individual aspect; it is thus unable to achieve a correct reflection of this process and only succeeds in distorting it. Lenin said: «Human knowledge is not (or does not follow) a straight line, but a curve, which endlessly approximates a series of circles, a spiral. Any fragment, segment, section of this curve can be transformed (transformed one-sidedly) into an independent, complete, straight line, which then (if one does not see the wood for the trees) leads into the quagmire, into clerical obscurantism (where it is anchored by the class interests of the ruling classes). Rectilinearity and one-sidedness, woodenness and petrification, subjectivism and subjective blindness ─ voilà [here you see] the epistemological roots of idealism.» «[...] philosophical idealism is a one-sided, exaggerated [...] development (inflation, distention), of one of the features, aspects, facets of knowledge into an absolute, divorced from matter, from nature, apotheosized. Idealism is clerical obscurantism.»1
Pre-Marxist materialism (mechanical materialism) did not stress the process of cognition in the development of knowledge, but attributed to thinking merely a passive role, as a mirror that reflects nature. Mechanical materialism adopted an unreasonable attitude toward idealism, ignoring the causes of its theory of knowledge, and, consequently, was incapable of overcoming it. Only dialectical materialism correctly points out the active role of thought and, at the same time, points out the limitation imposed on thinking by being. It points out that thought arises from social practice and, at the same time, actively shapes practice. Only this kind of dialectical theory of the «unity of thinking and being» can thoroughly overcome idealism.
#1.4. THE SOURCE OF THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF MATERIALISM
The recognition that matter exists independently and apart from consciousness in the external world is the basis of materialism. Humanity created this basis through practice. Through the practice of productive labour, the class struggle, and scientific experiment, humanity gradually broke away from superstition and wishful thinking (idealism), gradually recognized the essence of the world, and, in so doing, arrived at materialism.
Obliged to submit to natural forces, and capable of using only simple tools, primitive humans could not explain changes in the environment and, consequently, sought help from the gods. This was the origin of religion and idealism.
But, in the lengthy process of production, humans came into contact with the natural world surrounding them, acted upon it, and, in transforming nature, created things to be used for clothing, food, and shelter, adapting the natural world to the interests of humanity, and causing humans to believe deeply that matter exists objectively.
In the social life of humanity, reciprocal relations and influences arise between individuals, and, in class society, the class struggle also takes place. The oppressed class considers the situation, estimates its own strength, and makes plans. When their struggle is successful, this makes them confident that their views are in no sense the product of an illusion, but the reflection of an objectively existing material world. The fact that the oppressed class fails when it adopts the wrong plans, and succeeds when it corrects those plans, makes this class understand that it can achieve its objectives only when its subjective plans are based on a correct understanding of the material character of the objective world and the fact that it is governed by laws.
Scientific history has proved to humans the material character of the world and the fact that it is governed by laws, made them aware of the futility of the illusions of religion and idealism, and led them to materialist conclusions.
In sum, the history of humanity's practice over a long period of time comprises the history of its struggle with nature, the history of the class struggle, and the history of science. Because of the necessities of life and struggle, humans have reflected on the reality of matter and its laws, demonstrated the correctness of materialist philosophy, and discovered the ideological instrument for their own struggle: materialist philosophy. The higher the level to which the social productive forces develop, the greater the development of the class struggle, and the more scientific knowledge reveals the «secrets» of nature, the greater the development and consolidation of materialist philosophy. Thus, humanity can be liberated gradually from the two-fold oppression of nature and society.
The bourgeoisie, during the period of its struggle against the feudal classes and at a time when the proletariat did not yet constitute a threat to it, had already discovered and, moreover, employed materialism as an instrument in its own struggle; it was already convinced that objects in the environment were material products and not spiritual products. It was only when the bourgeoisie itself became the ruling class and the struggle of the proletariat threatened it that it abandoned this «useless» instrument and took up once again another ─ the philosophy of idealism. Living evidence of this is the change in thought before and after 1927 ─ from materialism to idealism ─ by the spokespersons of the Chinese bourgeoisie, Dai Jitao and Wu Zhihui.
The gravediggers of capitalism, the proletariat, are «intrinsically materialist». But, because the proletariat is the most progressive class in history, its materialism is different from that of the bourgeoisie. It is more thorough and profound, and it alone is dialectical and not mechanical. The proletariat has assimilated the entire practice of humanity throughout its history, and, through its spokespersons and leaders, Marx and Engels, it has created dialectical materialism, which maintains not only that matter is divorced from human consciousness and exists independently of it, but also that matter changes. Dialectical materialism has become a thoroughly systematic and completely new worldview and methodology. Dialectical materialism is Marxist philosophy.
#2. DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM
#2.1. DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM IS THE REVOLUTIONARY WEAPON OF THE PROLETARIAT
This question has already been discussed in Section 1; here, I shall discuss it once again in simple terms.
Dialectical materialism is the worldview of the proletariat. The proletarians then proceed to use dialectical materialism as a mental weapon in their struggles and as the philosophical basis for all of their views. Only when we adopt the standpoint of the proletariat in order to understand the world can we correctly and completely grasp the worldview of dialectical materialism. Only when we start from such a standpoint can we achieve true and objective knowledge of the real world. This is because, on the one hand, only the proletariat is the most progressive and most revolutionary class; on the other hand, only dialectical materialism is a most authentic and most revolutionary worldview and methodology, uniting a high level and rigorous scientific character and a thorough and uncompromising revolutionary character.
The Chinese proletariat, having assumed at the present time the historical task of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, must make use of dialectical materialism as its mental weapon. If dialectical materialism is used by the Chinese proletariat and the Communist Party of China, as well as the broad revolutionary elements consisting of all those who are prepared to adopt the standpoint of the proletariat as a most correct and most revolutionary worldview and methodology, they will then be in a position correctly to understand the changes which emerge in the course of the revolutionary movement, to put forward revolutionary tasks, to unite their own ranks and those of their allies, to defeat reactionary theories, to adopt a correct line of action, to avoid errors in their work, and to achieve their aims of liberating and building up China. The study of dialectical materialism is even more indispensable for the cadres who lead the revolutionary movement, because the two erroneous theories and methodologies of subjectivism and metaphysics frequently subsist among the cadres and, as a result, frequently cause the cadres to go against Marxism and to lead the revolutionary movement astray. If we wish to avoid or correct such deficiencies, the only solution lies in conscious study and understanding of dialectical materialism, in order to arm one's brain anew.
#2.2. ON THE RELATION BETWEEN THE PHILOSOPHICAL HERITAGE OF THE PAST AND DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM
Modern materialism is not simply the successor of the various philosophical doctrines of the past. It was born and developed in the struggles against the dominant philosophies of the past, and the struggles for the elimination of idealism and superstition. Marxist philosophy ─ dialectical materialism ─ is not only the successor to the highest product of idealism ─ the doctrine of Hegel ─ at the same time, it has also overcome the idealism of the latter doctrine and transformed its dialectics in a materialist direction. Nor is Marxism simply the continuation and completion of the materialist developments of the past. At the same time, it opposes the narrowness of all the materialist doctrines of the past, that is, mechanical and naive materialism (mainly French materialism and Feuerbach's materialism). Marxist philosophy ─ dialectical materialism ─ continues the heritage of the scientific culture of the past. At the same time, it causes this heritage to undergo a revolutionary transformation in order to form a most correct, most revolutionary, and most complete philosophical science, such as has never existed before in history.
After the 4th of May Movement in China in 1919, as a consequence of the conscious appearance of the Chinese proletariat on the political stage, and the elevation of its scientific level, a Marxist philosophical movement arose and developed in China. In its first period, however, the level of understanding of materialist dialectics within the materialist trend of thought was rather weak, and mechanical materialism, influenced by the bourgeoisie, as well as the subjectivism of the Deborin clique, were its main components. After the defeat of the revolution in 1927, the level of understanding of Marxism-Leninism progressed, and dialectical-materialist thought gradually developed. Just recently, because of the severity of the national and social crisis, and also because of the influence of the movement to expose and criticize deviations in Soviet philosophy, a broad movement of materialist dialectics has developed in China's intellectual circles.
Because of the backward stage of Chinese social development, the philosophical trend of dialectical materialism developing in China today has resulted, not from taking over and reforming our own philosophical heritage, but from the study of Marxism-Leninism. Nevertheless, if we wish to make the dialectical-materialist trend of thought penetrate deeply and continue to develop in China, give firm guidance to the Chinese revolution, and lead it onto the road of complete victory, then we must struggle against all the outdated philosophies now existing in China, raise the flag of criticism on the ideological front throughout the whole country, and thereby liquidate the philosophical heritage of ancient China. Only thus can we attain our objective.
#2.3. ON THE UNITY OF WORLDVIEW AND METHODOLOGY IN DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM
Dialectical materialism is the worldview of the proletariat. At the same time, it is the method of the proletariat for getting to know the surrounding world and the method of revolutionary action of the proletariat. It is the unity of worldview and methodology. The revisionists, who are idealists rather than Marxists, hold that the whole substance of dialectical materialism lies in its methodology. They divorce methodology from worldview. They divorce the dialectical method from materialism. They do not understand that Marxist methodology ─ dialectics ─ is not like idealist dialectics, like that of Hegel, but is materialist dialectics, and that Marxist methodology cannot be separated, even to the slightest degree, from its worldview. For their part, the mechanical materialists simply take Marxist philosophy and regard it as a worldview, divorce it from dialectics, and, moreover, hold that this worldview corresponds to the various conclusions of the natural sciences. They do not understand that Marxist materialism is not vulgar materialism, but dialectical materialism. These two fragmentary standpoints regarding Marxist philosophy are both erroneous. Dialectical materialism is the unity of worldview and methodology.
#2.4. ON THE OBJECT OF PHILOSOPHY (WHAT DOES MATERIALIST DIALECTICS SERVE TO STUDY?)
Lenin regarded materialist dialectics (as viewed from the standpoint of the science of Marxist philosophy) as the science dealing with the principles of the development of the objective world (as reflecting the objective Universe in the various domains of dialectics) and of the principles of the development of knowledge. He said that logic is not a science dealing with external forms of thought, but rather a science dealing with the principles of development of all material, natural, and spiritual phenomena. In other words, it is a science dealing with the principles of development of the concrete content of the whole Universe and of the knowledge of this content. That is to say, logic is the content, summation, and evaluation of the history of our knowledge of the world. Although Lenin emphasized the significance of materialist dialectics considered as the methodology of all science, this is because dialectics has emerged from the history of the knowledge of the world. Because of this, he said that dialectics is «the history of knowledge of the world».2
I have just presented Lenin's definition of materialist dialectics considered as a science, and of its object. What he means by this is, firstly, that materialist dialectics, like any other science, has its object of study, and this object is the most general principles of the development of nature, history, and human thought. Moreover, in carrying out such studies, the task of materialist dialectics is not to proceed from the ideas in our heads regarding the relation between various existing phenomena, but to derive the relation between phenomena from observations of these phenomena themselves. There is a fundamental difference between this conception of Lenin's and the approach of the Minoritarian idealists, who viewed the study of categories (in fact, divorced from concrete science and concrete knowledge) as the object of materialist dialectics. Because the Minoritarian idealists endeavoured to set up a compartmentalized philosophical system divorced from the knowledge of history and of the social sciences, and from recent developments in the natural sciences, in this way, they, in reality, abandoned materialist dialectics. Lenin's second point is that each branch of science (mathematics, mechanics, chemistry, physics, biology, economics, and the other natural and social sciences) constitutes a particular aspect of the study of the development of the material world and of our knowledge of this world. As a result, the principles of each branch of science are narrowly limited by each concrete object of research. This is not true of the principles of materialist dialectics, which correspond to all that is valuable and general in the content of all the concrete sciences ─ that is, the sum, evaluation, further elaboration, and generalization of all of humanity's other scientific knowledge. Thus, the concepts, judgements, and principles of materialist dialectics consist in various extremely broad laws and rules (including in themselves the most general principles of all sciences and therefore applicable to the nature of the material world). This is one aspect, and, from this point of view, materialist dialectics constitutes a worldview, but, from another point of view, materialist dialectics is the basis of the logic and the theory of knowledge of all true scientific knowledge emancipated from utopianism, clericalism, and metaphysics. Hence, it is the only correct and objectively founded methodology for the study of the concrete sciences. Our statement that materialist dialectics, or dialectical materialism, represents the unity of worldview and methodology thus receives further elucidation. Thus, we can also understand the errors of the distorters and vulgarizers of Marxist philosophy, who deny the right of philosophy to exist.
As regards the question of the object of philosophy, Marx and Lenin both opposed divorcing philosophy from actual reality and making it into a thing endowed with its own, independent nature. They pointed out the necessity of a philosophy derived from the analysis of real life and real relations. They opposed the methods of the idealists, which were based purely on theoretical concepts and theoretical studies. What we refer to as philosophy having developed from the analysis of real life and of real relations is precisely the theory of development known as materialist dialectics. Marx, Engels, and Lenin all explained materialist dialectics as the theory of development. Engels called materialist dialectics «the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society, and thought».3 Lenin regarded materialist dialectics as «the most comprehensive and profound doctrine of development, and the richest in content».4 They all considered that «any other formulation of the principle of development, of evolution, was one-sided and poor in content, and could only distort and mutilate the actual course of development». 4 As for the reason why materialist dialectics can be called the most comprehensive, profound, and richest in content of all doctrines of development, this is because materialist dialectics reflects most comprehensively, profoundly, and with the richest content the contradictions and ruptures in the process of natural and social transformation, and for no other reason.
Under the heading of the object of philosophy, we must still solve another problem, namely, the problem of the unity of dialectics, logic, and the theory of knowledge.
Lenin emphasized the unity of dialectics, logic, and the theory of knowledge, saying that «three words are not needed: it is one and the same thing».5 He was fundamentally opposed to the practice of the revisionists, who dealt with the three as completely separate and independent theories.
Materialist dialectics is the only scientific theory of knowledge, and it is also the only scientific logic. Materialist dialectics studies the origin and development of our knowledge of the outside world. It studies the transition from not knowing to knowing, and from incomplete knowledge to more complete knowledge; it studies how the laws of the development of nature and society are daily reflected more profoundly and more extensively in the human mind. This is precisely the unity of materialist dialectics and the theory of knowledge. Materialist dialectics studies the most general laws of the development of the objective world. It studies the reflection and representation of the most highly developed aspects of the material world in thought. Thus, materialist dialectics studies the principles governing the appearance, development, diminution, and reciprocal transformations of all the processes and phenomena of real things. At the same time, it studies the representations in human thought which reflect the principles of development of the objective world. This is precisely the unity of materialist dialectics and logic.
If we wish to understand thoroughly why dialectics, logic, and the theory of knowledge are all one and the same thing, let us now consider how materialist dialectics solves the problem of the relation between things logical and things historical, and we will then see this clearly.
Engels said: «What distinguished Hegel's mode of thinking from that of all other philosophers was the exceptional historical sense underlying it. However abstract and idealist the form employed, the development of his ideas runs always parallel to the development of world history, and the latter is indeed supposed to be only the proof of the former.»6 History often advances in a discontinuous and confusing fashion. Because such circumstances occur, if one wants to follow history, then not only must one frequently pay attention to many unimportant materials, but the process of thought may be unavoidably interrupted. In such cases, the only appropriate method is the logical method, but, in science, this logical method is also the historical method; it has merely been relived of its historical expression and the chance nature inherent in history, that is all. A full measure of attention was accorded by Marx, Engels, and Lenin to such thinking, marked by «the unity of logical development and historical development».7 «The categories of logic are abbreviations [...] for the ‹endless multitude› of ‹particulars of external existence and of action›».2 A sphere is a distinct stage. This will help us to take cognizance of this key link between two chains. «The practical activity of humanity had to lead its consciousness to the repetition of the various logical figures thousands of millions of times in order that these figures could obtain the significance of axioms.»2 «Humanity's practice, repeating itself a thousand million times, becomes consolidated in humanity's consciousness by figures of logic. Precisely (and only) on account of this billion-fold repetition, these figures have the stability of a prejudice, an axiomatic character.»2 The above words of Lenin's make clear the particular characteristics of the logic of materialist dialectics. It is not like formal logic, which unreservedly regards its laws as empty forms existing independently of their content, and without any regard for their content; nor is it like Hegelian logic, which regards its laws as existing independently of the material world. The essence of the concept of development consists in regarding laws as the reflection in and transplanting to our minds (moreover, further elaborated in our minds) of the manifestations of the movement of matter. Hegel took his standpoint on the unity of thinking and being. He regarded the unity of dialectics, logic, and theory of knowledge as the unity of idealism. In Marxist philosophy, on the contrary, the unity of dialectics, logic, and theory of knowledge is founded on a materialist basis. Only by using materialism to arrive at a solution to the problem of the relation between thinking and being, only by taking one's standpoint on the theory of reflection, can one arrive at a thorough solution to the problems of dialectics, logic, and theory of knowledge.
Marx's Capital must be accounted the best example of the use of dialectical materialism to solve the problem of the interrelation of theoretical and historical things. Capital includes the first explanation of the historical development of capitalist society; at the same time, it also contains the logical development of this society. What is analysed in Capital is the dialectics of the development of all economic patterns as reflected in the birth, development, and decay of capitalist society. The materialist nature of the solution to this question lies in the use of objective material history as a basis, and in treating concepts and categories as a reflection of this real history. The unity of the theory and history of capitalism, the unity of the logic and theory of knowledge of capitalist society, are expressed in exemplary fashion in Capital. From this, we can understand a little of the path taken by the unity of dialectics, logic, and theory of knowledge.
#2.5. ON MATTER
The materialist line whereby Marxism has continued and further developed philosophy has correctly solved the problem of the relation between thinking and being, and, in a consistently materialist manner, has pointed out the material nature of the world, the real objective existence of matter, and the fundamental nature of matter as compared to consciousness (or the dependent relation of consciousness on being).
The material nature of the world and its objective existence is a premise for the recognition of the fundamental nature of matter in relation to consciousness. The very first condition for belonging to the materialist camp consists in recognizing the independent existence of the material world, separate from human consciousness ─ the fact that it existed before the appearance of humanity and has continued to exist since the appearance of humanity, independently and outside human consciousness. To recognize this point is a fundamental premise of all scientific research.
How shall we demonstrate this? The proofs are extremely numerous. Humanity is constantly in contact with the material world and must, moreover, struggle fiercely against the pressure and resistance of the outside world (nature and society). Moreover, we not only must, but can overcome this pressure and resistance. All these real circumstances of the social practice of humanity, as manifested in the historical development of human society, are the best proof of the existence of the material world. Throughout the course of the 10'000-li [5'000-kilometre] Long March, the Red Army had no doubts about the objective existence of the regions it traversed, the Yangzi and Yellow Rivers, the snow-covered mountains, and the grasslands, or the enemy armies which did battle with it, and so on; neither did it doubt the objective existence of the Red Army itself. China doubts neither the objective existence of Japanese imperialism, which has invaded our country, nor that of the Chinese people themselves. The students of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College also do not doubt the objective existence of the College and of the students themselves. All these things are material things, which exist objectively and independently, separately from our consciousness. This is the fundamental standpoint of all materialism, and it is also the materialist standpoint of philosophy.
The materialist standpoint of philosophy is not the same as the materialist standpoint of the natural sciences. If we say that the materialist standpoint of philosophy consists in pointing out the objective existence of matter, what we call matter refers to the whole world existing independently outside (this world acts on people's senses, stimulates their consciousness, and is, moreover, reflected in consciousness). This formulation is not subject to change throughout all eternity; it is absolute. The materialist standpoint of the natural sciences consists in the study of the structure of matter, such as, for example, the previous theory of the atom and the more recent theory of the electron. These formulations change in accordance with the progress of the natural sciences. They are relative.
To distinguish the materialist standpoint of philosophy from the materialist standpoint of the natural sciences in accordance with dialectical materialism is a necessary condition for thoroughly realizing the materialist line in philosophy, and has great significance in the struggle against idealism and metaphysics.
On the basis of the discovery of the theory of the electron, the materialists have blown up the false theory of the vanishing of matter. The partisans of this latter theory do not know that the progress of scientific knowledge regarding the structure of matter has demonstrated the correctness of the theory of dialectical materialism regarding matter. Because certain attributes of matter expressed in the old concept of matter (weight, hardness, impenetrability, inertia, and so on), following the discoveries of modern natural science, that is, the discovery of the theory of the electron, have been shown to be applicable only to certain forms of matter and do not exist in other forms of matter. Facts such as these have done away with the superficiality and narrowness of the concept of matter as formulated in the old materialism and serve precisely to demonstrate the correctness of a concept of matter which recognizes the existence of the world. Originally, the view of matter of dialectical materialism saw the unity of the material world as the unity of the multiplicity of matter. There is not the slightest contradiction between this view of matter and the fact of eternal and universal movement by which matter is transformed from one form to another. Aether, electrons, atoms, molecules, crystals, cells, social phenomena, the phenomena of thought ─ all these are various stages in the development of matter. Scientific research penetrates profoundly into the discovery of various forms of matter (the discovery of the multiplicity of matter). This merely enriches the content of the concept of matter in dialectical materialism. Where can there be any contradiction in this? It is necessary to distinguish the materialist standpoint of philosophy from the materialist standpoint of the natural sciences, because they are not of the same scope, but they are not mutually contradictory, because matter in the broad sense includes matter in the narrow sense.
The materialist standpoint of dialectical materialism does not recognize so-called immaterial things (independent spiritual things). Matter exists eternally and universally, and is limited neither in space nor in time. If we say that there exists something in the world which was always like it is and is like that everywhere (referring to its unity), then it is nothing but the objectively existing matter spoken of in philosophy. If we consider this thing known as consciousness in the light of thoroughgoing materialism (that is, in the light of materialist dialectics), then what we call consciousness is nothing but one form of the movement of matter, a particular characteristic of the brain of human beings; it is that particular characteristic of the human brain which causes the material processes outside consciousness to be reflected in consciousness. From this, we see that, when we distinguish matter from consciousness, and when, moreover, we oppose them to one another, this is only conditional; that is, it has meaning only from the standpoint of the theory of knowledge. Because consciousness or thought is only a property of matter (of the brain), the opposition between thinking and being, that is, between matter that knows and matter that is known, cannot be much greater. Thus, the opposition between the subject and the object has not the slightest meaning apart from the theory of knowledge. If, apart from the theory of knowledge, we oppose ideas and matter, this is nothing but a betrayal of materialism. In the world, there is nothing but matter and its various manifestations. This finds expression in the fact that the subject itself is also material, in the so-called material nature of the world (matter is eternal and universal), in the objective reality of matter, and in the fundamental character of matter as opposed to consciousness. In a word, everything in the Universe is matter. The ancients said: «All power belongs to Sima Yi.»8 We say: «All power belongs to matter.» This is the source of the unity of the world.
The above is the theory of matter of dialectical materialism.
#2.6. ON MOTION (ON DEVELOPMENT)
The first fundamental principle of dialectical materialism lies in its materialist standpoint, that is, in the recognition of the material nature of the world, the objective reality of matter, and the fundamental character of matter, as opposed to consciousness. This principle of the unity of the world has already been explained above in discussing matter.
The second fundamental principle of dialectical materialism lies in its theory of motion (or theory of development). This means the recognition that motion is the form of existence of matter, an inherent attribute of matter, a manifestation of the multiplicity of matter. This is the principle of the development of the world. The combination of the principle of the development of the world with the principle of the unity of the world, put forward above, constitutes the whole of the worldview of dialectical materialism. The world is nothing but matter in a process of unlimited development (or, the material world develops without limit).
The materialist standpoint of dialectical materialism can admit neither thinking apart motion apart from matter, nor thinking about matter apart from motion, nor simplifying the motion of matter. The dialectical-materialist theory of motion has been established in clear and resolute struggle against these idealist, metaphysical, and mechanical standpoints.
The dialectical-materialist theory of motion is in opposition, first of all, to philosophical idealism, and to theological and religious concepts. The fundamental nature of all philosophical idealism and religious theology derives from their denial of the unity and material nature of the world, and in imagining that the motion and development of the world take place apart from matter, or took place, at least in the beginning, apart from matter, and are the result of the action of ideas, God, or other divine forces. The German idealist philosopher Hegel held that the present world results from the development of the so-called World Idea. In China, the philosophy of the Book of Changes, and the metaphysics of the Song and the Ming Dynasties, all put forward idealist views on the development of the Universe. Christianity says that God created the world; Buddhism and all of China's various folk religions attribute the motion and development of all the myriad phenomena of the Universe to spiritual forces. All these doctrines, which ponder motion apart from matter, are fundamentally incompatible with dialectical materialism. Moreover, not only idealism and religion, but all forms of materialism prior to Marx, and all the present-day anti-Marxist mechanical materialists, in discussing natural phenomena, are partisans of a materialist theory of motion, but, as soon as they talk about social phenomena, there is none who does not abandon material causation and have recourse to spiritual causation.
Dialectical materialism resolutely condemns all these erroneous views of motion and points out their historically limited nature ─ limitations of class status and limitations imposed by the level of scientific development ─ and establishes its own conception of motion on the basis of a consistently materialist standpoint, founded on a proletarian class standpoint and the highest level of scientific development. Dialectical materialism first points out that motion is the form of existence of matter, that it is a category inherent in matter (matter is not set in motion by outside forces). To imagine motion without matter is quite as unthinkable as to imagine matter without motion. This sharply opposes the materialist conception of motion to the idealist or spiritualist conception of motion.
To consider matter separately from motion corresponds to the metaphysical concept of the immobility of the Universe or absolute equilibrium. Such people imagine that matter is eternally unchanged, that matter exhibits no such thing as progress. They imagine that absolute immobility is the normal or original state of matter. Dialectical materialism resolutely combats such ideas. It holds that motion is the most universal state of matter, that it is an inherent and inseparable attribute of matter, and that motion is thus absolute. Dialectical materialism recognizes that all forms of matter have the possibility of relative rest or equilibrium; moreover, it considers that this is the most important condition for distinguishing between different forms of matter, and, hence, for distinguishing between living and dead matter. But dialectical materialism also considers that rest or equilibrium is merely one element of motion, that it is merely one particular circumstance of motion. The error of thinking about matter separately from motion consists in exaggerating this component of rest or equilibrium, of using it to hide or replace the whole, of generalizing a particular circumstance of motion and transforming it into an absolute. A sentence which the metaphysical thinkers of China loved to repeat ─ «Heaven changeth not, likewise the Way changeth not»9 ─ corresponds to such a theory of the immobility of the Universe. These thinkers also recognized motion in the Universe and in social phenomena, but they did not recognize transformations in their fundamental nature. In their view, the fundamental nature of the Universe and of society was eternally unchanging. The reason they adopted this attitude is to be found primarily in their class limitations. If the feudal landlord class had recognized that the fundamental nature of the Universe and of society is subject to motion and development, then most certainly they would have been pronouncing in theory a death sentence on their own class. The philosophies of all reactionary forces are theories of immobility. Revolutionary classes and the masses of the people have all perceived the principle of the development of the world and consequently advocate transforming society and the world. Their philosophy is dialectical materialism.
Apart from this, dialectical materialism also does not recognize a simplified view of motion, that is to say, reducing all motion to a single form, namely, to mechanical motion. This is a particular characteristic of the old materialist worldview. The old materialism (the French materialism of the 17th and 18th centuries, and the 19th-century German materialism of Feuerbach) did, in fact, recognize the eternal existence and incessant motion of matter (they recognized the unlimited character of motion), but they nevertheless did not find a way out of the metaphysical worldview. This is not to say that their explanations in the domain of social science also corresponded to an idealist theory of development, but in the natural sciences, they reduced the unity of the material world to a certain superficial category; they reduced it to one form of motion, mechanical motion, and they saw the cause of this type of motion in external forces, just as a machine is set in motion by external forces. They did not explain matter and motion, and the complexity of their interrelations, whether from the standpoint of their nature or from the standpoint of internal causality. Moreover, they explained things on the basis of simplified externally perceived forms, and on the basis of causes relating to external forces, and in all this way, they, in reality, lost sight of the multiplicity of the world. They reduced all motion in the world to displacement from one point to another and to quantitative increase and decrease. A given material object is at a certain point at a certain instant, and, at another instant, it is at another point. This is called motion. If there is transformation, this transformation is merely the transformation of quantitative increase or decrease; there is no qualitative change. Change is cyclical; it is the result of recurrent birth. Dialectical materialism, on the contrary, does not regard motion simply as displacement or as cyclical motion, but regards it as of unlimited complexity, regards it as a transformation from one form to another, as the unity and motion of the material world. Engels said: «This is not to say that each of the higher forms of motion is not always necessarily connected with some real mechanical (external or molecular) motion, just as the higher forms of motion simultaneously also produce other forms, and just as chemical action is not possible without change of temperature and electric changes, organic life without mechanical, molecular, chemical, thermal, electric, and so on, changes. But the presence of these subsidiary forms does not exhaust the essence of the main form in each case.»10 These words are absolutely in conformity with reality. Indeed, even simple mechanical motion cannot be explained from a metaphysical standpoint, for we must know that all the forms of motion are dialectical, although the profundity and complexity of their dialectical nature varies greatly. Mechanical motion is also dialectical motion. In reality, when a certain material object is at a certain point at a certain time, it both is and is not at a certain point; what we call being in a certain place, what we call rest, is merely a certain circumstance of motion and remains fundamentally motion. A material object moves in a limited time in a limited space. All material objects are constantly overcoming such limitations, emerging from the bounds of time and space, and engaging in endless motion. Moreover, mechanical motion is merely one form of the motion of material objects. In the present real world, it never exists in absolute independence, but is always linked with other forms of motion. Heat, chemical reactions, light, electricity, and so on, down to organic and social phenomena, are all qualitatively different forms of the motion of matter. The epoch-making great achievements of the natural sciences at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries lay precisely in the discovery of the laws of transformation and motion. It was shown then that the motion of matter in general consists in transformation from one form to another, this new transformed aspect being fundamentally different from the old aspect. The cause of the transformation of matter is to be found, not outside, but inside. It is not because of the impulse of external mechanical forces, but because of the existence within the matter in question of two aspects different in their nature and mutually contradictory which struggle against each other, thus giving an impetus to the motion and development of the matter in question. As a result of the discovery of the laws of such motion and transformation, dialectical materialism is capable of enlarging the principle of the material unity of the world, extending it to the history of nature and society. Thus, not only is it possible to research the world considered as matter in perpetual motion, but the world can also be researched as matter endlessly in motion from a lower form to a higher form. That is, it is possible to research the world as a process of development. In a word, the unified material world is a process of development. Thus, the cyclical theory of the old materialism is smashed. Dialectical materialism has profoundly and comprehensively observed the forms of motion of nature and society. It holds that the process of development of the world, taken as a whole, is eternal (it has no beginning and no end), but, at the same time, each concrete, historical form of motion is temporary (having a beginning and an end). That is, it appeared under certain conditions and will disappear under certain other conditions. Dialectical materialism holds that the process of development of the world proceeds by a lower form of motion giving birth to a higher form of motion, thus demonstrating its historical and temporary nature, but, at the same time, no form of motion participates in an eternal flux (a flux without beginning or end). In accordance with the principle of the struggle of opposites (the cause whereby objects cause themselves to move), in general, any given form of motion reaches a higher stage than its predecessors. It continues to move forward, but, at the same time, as far as each form of motion is concerned (as far as each concrete process of development is concerned), both forward and backward transformation or motion may occur. Forward and backward motion is linked and, taken as a whole, constitutes a complex and cyclical movement. Dialectical materialism holds that a new form of motion comes into being as the antithesis (the opposite) of the old form of motion, but, at the same time, the new form of motion necessarily preserves many elements of the old form of motion. The new is born out of the old. Dialectical materialism holds that the appearance of a new form, characteristic, or category of things arises from a rupture in continuity and the passage through a leap resulting from a clash and a breakthrough, but, at the same time, the continuity and the reciprocal links between things can definitely not be absolutely demolished. Finally, dialectical materialism holds that the world is infinite (unlimited), and this is true, not only of the world as a whole, but also of its parts. Are not electrons and atoms manifestations of a complex yet infinite world?
The fundamental forms of the motion of matter also determine the various fundamental disciples of the natural sciences. Dialectical materialism researches the development of the world as a progressive movement from the inorganic to the organic, and from that to the highest form of the motion of matter (society). The relations between the categories of these forms of motion have become the corresponding sciences (this is the basis for the relation between the categories of the inorganic sciences, the organic sciences, and the social sciences. Engels said: «Classification of the sciences, each of which analyses a single form of motion, or a series of forms of motion, that belong together and pass into one another, is therefore the classification, the arrangement, of these forms of motion themselves according to their inherent sequence, and herein lies its importance.»10
The world as a whole, including human society, embraces various qualitatively different forms of matter in motion. Because of this, we must not forget the question of the various concrete forms of matter in motion. There are no such things as so-called matter in general and motion in general. In the world, there are only many different forms of concrete matter and motion. «Words like matter and motion are nothing but abbreviations in which we comprehend many different sensuously perceptible things according to their common properties.»10
What we have just discussed is the dialectical-materialist theory of the motion of the world, or the principle of the development of the world. This doctrine is the essence of Marxist philosophy. It is the worldview and methodology of the proletariat. If the proletariat and all revolutionaries take up this consistently scientific weapon, then they will be able to understand and transform the world.
#2.7. ON TIME AND SPACE
Motion is a form of the existence of matter, and space and time are also forms of the existence of matter. Matter in motion exists in time and space, and, moreover, the motion of matter is itself the premise for these two forms of existence of matter. Space and time cannot be separated from matter. The sentence, «Matter exists in space», says that matte itself possesses the capacity of expansion; the material world is a world in which the capacity of expansion exists internally. It does not suggest that matter is situation in a space which is a non-material void. Neither space nor time are independent, non-material things; neither are they subjective forms of our perceptions. They are forms of existence of the objective material world; they are objective and have no existence apart from matter, nor does matter exist apart from them.
The conception of space and time as forms of the existence of matter is the thoroughgoing materialist standpoint. This conception of time and space is in fundamental opposition to the following idealist conceptions of time and space:
- The Kantian conception of time and space, which considers time and space not to be objective realities, but forms of human intuition.
- The Hegelian conception of time and space, which incorporates a conception of time and space as developing increasingly toward the Absolute Idea.
- The Machian conception of time and space, which considers time and space to be «categories of sense perception» and «instruments for the harmonization of experience».
None of these idealist standpoints recognizes the objective reality of time and space, nor does it recognize that, in their own development, the concepts of time and space reflect materially existing forms. These incorrect theories have all been refuted one by one by dialectical materialism.
On the question of time and space, dialectical materialism not only fights against these idealist theories listed above, it also fights against mechanical materialism. Of particular note is Newtonian mechanics, which treats space and time as unrelated and static insubstantial entities and which situates matter within this insubstantial context. Dialectical materialism, in opposition to this theory of mechanics, points out that our conception of time and space is a developmental one: «There is nothing in the world but matter in motion, and matter in motion cannot move otherwise than in space and time. Human conceptions of space and time are relative, but these relative conceptions go to compound absolute truth. These relative conceptions, in their development, move toward absolute truth and approach nearer and nearer to it. The mutability of human conceptions of space and time no more refutes the objective reality of space and time than the mutability of scientific knowledge of the structure and forms of matter in motion refutes the objective reality of the external world.»11
This is the dialectical-materialist conception of time and space.
#2.8. ON CONSCIOUSNESS
Dialectical materialism considers consciousness to be a product of matter, to be one form of the development of matter, and to be a specific characteristic of a definite form of matter. This historical-materialist theory of consciousness is in fundamental opposition to the standpoint of all forms of idealism and mechanical materialism on this question.
According to the Marxist standpoint, consciousness originated in the development from the inorganic world without consciousness to the animal world possessing rudimentary forms of consciousness; then, there developed humanity, which possesses high-level forms of consciousness. Such high-level forms of consciousness not only cannot be separated from the advanced nervous systems which came with physiological development, they also cannot be separated from productive labour, which came about with the development of society. Marx and Engels emphatically pointed out the dependent relation which consciousness has to the development of material production and the relation between consciousness and the development of human language.
Consciousness is a particular characteristic of a definite form of matter; this form of matter is composed of a complex nervous system, and this type of nervous system can occur only at a high stage in the evolution of the natural world. The entire inorganic world, plants, and rudimentary animals ─ none of these has the ability to comprehend those processes which occur either inside or outside of them; are are without consciousness. It is only higher animals that possess an advanced nervous system with the ability to comprehend processes; that is, with the ability to reflect internally or comprehend these processes. The objective physiological processes of the human nervous system function in line with the subjective manifestations of the forms of consciousness that they adopt internally; these are themselves all objective things, are certain types of material processes; however, they simultaneously also constitute subjective psychological functions in the substance of the brain.
There is no such thing as a special mind devoted exclusively to thought, there is only thinking matter ─ the brain. This thinking matter is matter of a particular quality, matter which has developed to a high degree following the development of language in human social life. This matter possesses the particular characteristic of thought, something possessed by no other type of matter.
Vulgar materialists, however, consider thought to be matter secreted from within the brain; this standpoint misrepresents our conception of this question. It must be understood that the behaviour of thought, emotion, and will is weightless, nor does it possess the capacity to expand; and yet consciousness, together with weight, the capacity to expand, and so on, are all matter with different characteristics. Consciousness is an intrinsic condition of matter in motion; it reflects the particular characteristics of the physiological processes which occur with matter which is in motion. These particular characteristics cannot be separated from the objective processes of nerve function, but they are not the same as such processes. The confusion of these two and the repudiation of the particularity of consciousness ─ such is the standpoint of the vulgar materialists.
Similarly, the mechanical theory of revisionism echoes the standpoint of certain bourgeois Right-wing schools of thought within psychology; this in actuality has also completely overturned consciousness. These revisionists and so-called evolutionary psychologists understand consciousness as a physio-chemical, physiological process and consider that the study of the behaviour of this advanced substance can be carried out through the study of objective physiology and biology. They do not understand the qualitatively particular characteristics of the essence of consciousness and do not recognize that consciousness is a product of human social practice. For the concrete historical unity of object and subject, they substitute the equality of object and subject and the one-sided, mechanical objective world. These standpoints, which confuse consciousness with a physiological process, are tantamount to the abolition of the fundamental question of philosophy, namely, the question of the relation between thinking and being. The Minoritarian idealists attempt to employ a compromise theory, one which reconciles materialism and idealism, as a substitute for the Marxist theory of knowledge. They oppose the principle of dialectics through the «synthesis» of objectivity and subjectivity and the «mutual assistance» of these two methods, but this principle of dialectics is both non-mechanical objectivity and non-idealist subjectivity and represents the concrete historical unity of the object and the subject.
Finally, there is another singular ideology, Plehanov's animist view on the question of consciousness, which is fully expressed in his celebrated dictum: «A stone also possesses consciousness.» According to this standpoint, consciousness does not occur in the process of development of matter, but exists in all matter from the very beginning; there is only a quantitative difference between the consciousness of humans, low-level organisms, and a stone. This anti-historical standpoint is fundamentally opposed to the dialectical-materialist standpoint, which considers consciousness to be the ultimate particular characteristic of matter.
Only the dialectical-materialist theory of consciousness is the correct theory on questions of consciousness.
#2.9. ON REFLECTION
To be a thoroughgoing materialist, it is insufficient simply to acknowledge the material origins of consciousness; the knowability of matter by consciousness must also be acknowledged.
The question of whether matter can be known is a complex one; it is a question which all philosophers in the past have felt powerless to deal with. Only dialectical materialism is able to provide the correct solution. On this question, the standpoint of dialectical materialism has been in opposition to agnosticism and is different from vulgar realism.
The agnosticism of Hume and Kant isolates the subject of knowledge from the object and considers it impossible to transcend the limits which isolate the subject; between the «thing-in-itself» and its external form exists an impassable chasm.
The vulgar realism of Machism equates the object with sense perceptions and considers the truth to be already established in final form in sense perceptions. At the same time, Machism not only does not understand that sense perceptions are the result of the effects of the external world; moreover, it does not understand the active role of the subject in the process of cognition, namely, the transformative work of the sense organs and thinking brain of the subject, on the effects of the external world (such that two forms ─ impressions and concepts ─ are made manifest).
It is only the dialectical-materialist theory of reflection which has positively answered the question of knowability and thus become the «soul» of the Marxist theory of knowledge. This theory has clearly demonstrated that our impressions and concepts not only arise from objective matter, but also reflects it. It demonstrates that impressions and concepts are neither a product of the spontaneous development of the subject, as the idealists suggest, nor the label given objective matter, as suggested by the agnostics; they are, rather, the reflections of objective matter, photographic images and sample copies of them.
Objective truth exists independently and does not depend on the subject. Although it is reflected in our sense perceptions and concepts, it achieves form gradually rather than instantaneously. The standpoint of vulgar realism, which considers objective truth to achieve final form in sense perceptions and that we gain it thus, is a mistaken one.
Although objective truth does not achieve final form at once in our sense perceptions and concepts, it is not unknowable. The dialectical-materialist theory of reflection opposes the standpoint and agnosticism and considers that consciousness can reflect objective truth in the process of cognition. The process of cognition is a complex one; in this process, when the as-yet-unknown «thing-in-itself» is reflected in our sense perceptions, impressions, and concepts, it becomes a «thing-for-us». Sense perceptions and ideas certainly do not, as Kant stated, isolate us from the external world; rather, they are what links us with it. Sense perceptions and ideas are reflections of the objective external world. Mental things (impressions and concepts) can only be «the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought».12 In the process of cognition, the material world is increasingly reflected in our knowledge more closely, precisely, multifariously, and profoundly. It is the task of the Marxist theory of knowledge to wage a struggle on two fronts against Machism and Kantianism, and to expose the errors of vulgar realism and agnosticism.
The dialectical-materialist theory of reflection considers our capacity to know the world to be infinite; this view is in fundamental opposition to the standpoint of the agnostics, who consider the human capacity for knowledge to be finite. However, there are definite historical limits on each approach we make to absolute truth. Lenin referred to it thus: «The limits of approximation of our knowledge to objective, absolute truth are historically conditional, but the existence of such truth is unconditional, and the fact that we are approaching near to it is also unconditional. The contours of the picture are historically conditional, but the fact that this picture depicts an objectively existing model is unconditional.»11 We acknowledge that human knowledge is subject to the limitations of historical conditions and that truth cannot be achieved at once. But we are not agnostics and recognize that truth becomes complete in the historical motion of human knowledge. Lenin also stated: «The reflection of nature in human thought must be understood, not ‹lifelessly›, not ‹abstractly›, not devoid of movement, not without contradictions, but in the eternal process of movement, the arising of contradictions and their solution.»2 The motion of knowledge is complex and replete with contradictions and struggle. This is the standpoint of the dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge.
The anti-historical standpoint of all those philosophies which, epistemologically, do not treat knowledge as a process is consequently a narrow one. This standpoint of narrow empiricism has created a deep chasm between sense perceptions and concepts; in the rationalist school, it has caused concepts to become divorced from sense perceptions. It is only the dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge (the theory of reflection) which treats cognition as a process, and, in so doing, thoroughly eliminates this narrow standpoint; it does so by attributing to cognition a material and dialectical character.
This theory of reflection points out that the process of reflection is not limited to sense perceptions and impressions and exists in thought (in abstract concepts); cognition is a process of motion from sense perceptions to thought. As Lenin said: «Knowledge is the reflection of nature by humanity. But this is not a simple, not an immediate, not a complete reflection, but the process of a series of abstractions, the formation and development of concepts, laws, and so on, and these concepts, laws, and so on.»2
At the same time, Lenin pointed out: «The process of cognition involving a movement from sense perceptions to thought is accomplished through a leap.»7 Lenin, here, clearly expounded the dialectical-materialist conception of the interrelation between the empirical and rational aspects of cognition. Many philosophers do not comprehend the sudden change that occurs within the process of the motion of knowledge, that is, the process of development from sense perceptions to thought (from impressions to concepts). Consequently, to understand this transformation, which is produced by contradiction and takes the form of a leap, namely, to comprehend that the unity of sense perceptions and thought is a dialectical unity, is to have comprehended the most important element of Lenin's theory of reflection.
#2.10. ON TRUTH
Truth is objective and relative; it is also absolute ─ this is the dialectical-materialist conception of truth.
First of all, truth is objective. To have recognized the objective existence of matter and the material origin of consciousness is to have recognized the objective character of truth. Objective truth, that is, the objectively existing material world, is the only source of the content of our knowledge or concepts; there is no other source. It is only idealists who deny that the material world exists independently of human consciousness ─ this fundamental principle of idealism maintains that knowledge or concepts emerge subjectively, spontaneously, and without any objective content. Because of this, it acknowledges subjective truth and rejects objective truth. This is, however, at odds with reality, for any knowledge or concept which fails to reflect the laws of the objective world is not scientific knowledge or objective truth; it is superstition or wishful thinking, which subjectively engages in deception of oneself and others. All human practical activity, which has as its purpose the transformation of the external world, is subject to the leadership of thought (knowledge), regardless of whether it be productive activity, class struggle, national struggle, or any other kind of activity. If this thought does not conform to objective laws, that is, if objective laws are not reflected in the brain of the person undertaking the action and do not constitute the content of their thought or knowledge, then that action will certainly not be able to achieve its purpose. The errors of subjectivism in the revolutionary movement are indicative of this. Marxism is revolutionary, scientific knowledge, precisely because it correctly reflects the actual laws of the objective world; it is objective truth. All thought that opposes Marxism is therefore incorrect, because it is not based on correct objective laws and is completely subjective wishful thinking. There are those who say that what is universally accepted is objective truth (the subjective idealist Bogdanov stated this view). According to this standpoint, then, religion and prejudice are also objective truth, because, although religion and prejudice are in fact erroneous views, they are frequently accepted by a majority of people, and sometimes correct, scientific thought cannot overturn these erroneous, widely held beliefs. Dialectical materialism is fundamentally opposed to this standpoint; it considers that only scientific knowledge, which correctly reflects objective laws, can be designated as truth. All truth must be objective. Truth and falsehood are absolutely in opposition to each other. The only way to determine whether any knowledge is true is to see whether it reflects objective laws. If it does not conform to objective laws, even if it is acknowledged by the general population or by certain wildly extravagant theorists within the revolutionary movement, then it can only be treated as erroneous.
The first question of the dialectical-materialist theory of truth is the question of subjective and objective truth. Its response is to deny the former and recognize the latter. Its second question is the question of absolute and relative truth. Its response is, while recognizing both, it does not one-sidedly accept or reject either aspect; moreover, it points out that a correct, dialectical relation exists between them.
Dialectical materialism acknowledges absolute truth when it acknowledges objective truth. This is because, when we say that the content of knowledge is a reflection of the objective world, that is the same as acknowledging that the object of our knowledge is that external, absolute world. «All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, and hence essentially absolute.»10 However, objective, absolute truth does not instantaneously and completely become the knowledge that we have; rather, through the introduction of countless relative truths in the infinite process of development of our thought, absolute truth is arrived at. The sum total of these countless relative truths is the manifestation of absolute truth. By its very nature, human thought can provide us with absolute truth. Absolute truth can come about only from the accumulation of many relative truths. Each stage of scientific development adds a new dimension to the sum total of absolute truth. However, the limits of the truth of each scientific principle are invariably relative; absolute truth is manifest only in countless relative truths; and if it were not so manifest through relative truth, absolute truth could not be known. Dialectical materialism certainly does not deny the relative character of all knowledge, but, in doing so, it is only indicating the historically conditional character of the limits of the approximation of our knowledge to objective, absolute truth and not suggesting that knowledge itself is only relative. All scientific inventions are historically limited and relative. But scientific knowledge is different from falsehood; it displays and depicts objective, absolute truth. This is the dialectical-materialist conception of the interrelation between absolute and relative truth.
There are two incorrect conceptions of the interrelation between absolute and relative truth. One is that of metaphysical materialism, the other is that of idealist relativism.
On the basis of their fundamental metaphysical principle of «the unchangeable material world», metaphysical materialists consider human thought to be also unchanging; that is, they consider that this unchanging objective world can instantaneously and in its entirety be absorbed into human consciousness. That is, they acknowledge absolute truth, but for them, it is acquired only once by people; they regard truth as immobile and lifeless, something that does not develop. Their error does not lie in acknowledging that there is absolute truth ─ to acknowledge this point is correct. Rather, it lies in their failure to understand the historical character of truth and in their not perceiving the acquisition of truth as a process of cognition. It also lies in their not understanding that absolute truth can only come to fruition little by little in the process of development of human cognition, and that every step forward in cognition expresses the content of absolute truth; that, in relation to the complete truth, however, such knowledge possesses only relative significance and certainly cannot instantaneously achieve the completeness of absolute truth. The metaphysical-materialist conception of truth is an expression of one extreme of the theory of knowledge.
The other extreme of the theory of knowledge on the question of truth is idealist relativism. People of this persuasion deny that knowledge is characterized by absolute truth, only acknowledging its relative significance. They consider that all scientific discoveries contain no absolute truth; they are thus not objective truth. Truth is only subjective and relative. Consequently, all erroneous standpoints have the right to exist. Where imperialism invades a weak and small nation, where a ruling class exploits the working masses, this doctrine of invasion and system of exploitation are also true, since truth is only subjective and relative in any case. The result of the rejection of objective and absolute truth inevitably leads to this conclusion. Moreover, the purpose of idealist relativism is actually to present the case for the ruling class; for example, the purpose of pragmatic relativism (or narrow empiricism) is just that.
It can therefore be seen that neither metaphysical materialism nor idealist relativism can correctly solve the question of the interrelation between absolute and relative truth. Only dialectical materialism can provide the correct answer to the question of the relation between thinking and being, and, consequently, determine the objective character of scientific knowledge; furthermore, it provides, at the same time, a correct understanding of absolute and relative truth. This is the dialectical-materialist conception of truth.
#2.11. ON PRACTICE (ON THE RELATION BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICE, BETWEEN KNOWING AND DOING)
Before Marx, materialism examined the problem of knowledge apart from the social nature of humanity and apart from its historical development, and was therefore incapable of understanding the dependence of knowledge on social practice, that is, the dependence of knowledge on production and the class struggle.
Above all, Marxists regard people's activity in production as the most fundamental practical activity, the determinant of all their other activities. People's knowledge depends mainly on their activity in material production, through which they come gradually to understand the phenomena, the properties, and the laws of nature, and the relations between themselves and nature; and through their activity in production, they also gradually come to understand, in varying degrees, certain relations that exist between people. None of this knowledge can be acquired apart from activity in production. In a classless society, every person, as a member of society, joins in common effort with the other members, enters into definite relations of production with them, and engages in production to meet humanity's material needs. In all class societies, the members of the different social classes also enter, in different ways, into definite relations of production and engage in production to meet their material needs. This is the primary source from which human knowledge develops.
People's social practice is not confined to activity in production, but takes many other forms ─ class struggle, political life, scientific and artistic pursuits; in short, as social beings, people participate in all spheres of the practical life of society. Thus people, in varying degrees, come to know the different relations between people, not only through their material life, but also through their political and cultural life (both of which are intimately bound up with material life). Of these other types of social practice, class struggle in particular, in all its various forms, exerts a profound influence on the development of people's knowledge. In class society, everyone lives as a member of a particular class, and every kind of thinking, without exception, is stamped with the brand of a class.
Marxists hold that, in human society, activity in production develops step by step from a lower to a higher level and that, consequently, people's knowledge, whether of nature or of society, also develops step by step from a lower to a higher level, that is, from the shallower to the deeper, from the one-sided to the many-sided. For a very long period in history, people were necessarily confined to a one-sided understanding of the history of society, because, for one thing, the bias of the exploiting classes always distorted history, and, for another, the small scale of production limited people's worldview. It was not until the modern proletariat emerged along with immense productive forces (large-scale industry) that people were able to acquire a comprehensive, historical understanding of the development of society and turn this knowledge into a science, the science of Marxism.
Marxists hold that people's social practice alone is the criterion of the truth of their knowledge of the external world. What actually happens is that people's knowledge is verified only when they achieve the anticipated results in the process of social practice (material production, class struggle, or scientific experiment). Why is it that peasants are unable to harvest their crops, workers are unable to use their tools, there are strikes and struggle, troops go to war, and the national revolution has not win victory? It is because people's knowledge has not faithfully reflected the laws of the processes of the external world, and people therefore cannot achieve the anticipated results in their practical activities. If a person wants to succeed in their work, that is, to achieve the anticipated results, they must bring their ideas into correspondence with the laws of the objective external world; if they do not correspond, they will fail in their practice. After they fail, they draw their lessons, correct their ideas to make them correspond to the laws of the external world, and can thus turn failure into success; this is what is meant by «failure is the mother of success» and «a fall into the pit, a gain in your wit». The dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge places practice in the primary position, holding that human knowledge can in no way be separated from practice and repudiating all the erroneous theories which deny the importance of practice or separate knowledge from practice. Thus, Lenin said: «Practice is higher than (theoretical) knowledge, for it has not only the dignity of universality, but also of immediate actuality.»2 The Marxist philosophy of dialectical materialism has two outstanding characteristics. One is its class nature: it openly avows that dialectical materialism is in the service of the proletariat. The other is its practicality: it emphasizes the dependence of theory on practice, emphasizes that theory is based on practice and in turn serves practice. The truth of any knowledge or theory is determined, not by subjective feelings, but by objective results in social practice. Only social practice can be the criterion of truth. The standpoint of practice is the primary and fundamental standpoint in the dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge.13
But how then does human knowledge arise from practice and in turn serve practice? This will become clear if we look at the process of development of knowledge.
In the process of practice, people at first see only the phenomenal side, the separate aspects, the external relations of things. For instance, some people from outside come to Yan'an on a tour of observation. In the first day or two, they see its topography, streets, and houses; they meet many people, attend banquets, evening parties and mass meetings, hear talk of various kinds, and read various documents, all these being the phenomena, the separate aspects, and the external relations of things. This is called the perceptual stage of cognition, namely, the stage of sense perceptions and impressions. That is, these particular things in Yan'an act on the sense organs of the members of the observation group, evoke sense perceptions, and give rise in their brains to many impressions, together with a rough sketch of the external relations among these impressions: this is the first stage of cognition. At this stage, people cannot as yet form concepts, which are deeper, or draw logical conclusions.
As social practice continues, things that give rise to people's sense perceptions and impressions in the course of their practice are repeated many times; then a sudden change (leap) takes place in the brain in the process of cognition, and concepts are formed. Concepts are no longer the phenomena, the separate aspects, and the external relations of things; they grasp the essence, the totality, and the internal relations of things. Between concepts and sense perceptions, there is not only a quantitative, but also a qualitative difference. Proceeding further, by means of judgement and inference, one is able to draw logical conclusions. The expression in the Romance of the Three Kingdoms,14 «knit the brows and a stratagem comes to mind», or, in everyday language, «let me think it over», refers to people's use of concepts in the brain to form judgements and inferences. This is the second stage of cognition, which is known as the rational or the logical stage. When the members of the observation group have collected various data and, what is more, have «thought them over», they are able to arrive at the judgement that «the Communist Party's policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and Nationalist-Communist cooperation is thorough, sincere, and genuine». Having made this judgement, they can, if they, too, are genuine about uniting to save the nation, go a step further and draw the following conclusion: «The Anti-Japanese National United Front and Nationalist-Communist cooperation can succeed.» This stage of conception, judgement, and inference is the more important stage in the entire process of knowing a thing; it is the stage of rational knowledge. The real task of knowing is, through perception, to arrive at thought, to arrive step by step at the comprehension of the internal contradictions of objective things, of their laws, and of the internal relations between one process and another, that is, to arrive at logical knowledge. To repeat, logical knowledge differs from perceptual knowledge in that perceptual knowledge pertains to the separate aspects, the phenomena, and the external relations of things, whereas logical knowledge takes a big stride forward to reach the totality, the essence, and the internal relations of things and discloses the inner contradictions in the surrounding world. Therefore, logical knowledge is capable of grasping the development of the surrounding world in its totality, in the internal relations of all its aspects.
This dialectical-materialist theory of the process of development of knowledge, basing itself on practice and proceeding from the shallower to the deeper, was never worked out by anybody before the rise of Marxism. Marxist materialism solved this problem correctly for the first time, pointing out both materialistically and dialectically the deepening movement of cognition, the movement by which people in society progress from perceptual knowledge to logical knowledge in their complex, constantly recurring practice of production and class struggle. Lenin said: «The abstraction of matter, of a law of nature, the abstraction of value, and so on, in short all scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, truly, and completely.»2 Marxism-Leninism holds that each of the two stages in the process of cognition has its own characteristics, with knowledge manifesting itself as perceptual at the lower stage and logical at the higher stage, but that both are stages in an integrated process of cognition. The perceptual and the rational are qualitatively different, but are not divorced from each other; they are unified on the basis of practice. Our practice proves that what is perceived cannot at once be comprehended and that only what is comprehended can be more deeply perceived. Perception only solves the problem of phenomena; theory alone can solve the problem of essence. The solving of both these problems is not separable in the slightest degree from practice. Whoever wants to know a thing has no way of doing so except by coming into contact with it, that is, by living (practising) in its environment. In feudal society, it was impossible to know the laws of capitalist society in advance, because capitalism had not yet emerged, the relevant practice was lacking. Marxism could be the product only of capitalist society. Marx, in the era of free-trade capitalism, could not concretely know certain laws peculiar to the era of imperialism beforehand, because imperialism, the last stage of capitalism, had not yet emerged and the relevant practice was lacking; only Lenin and Stalin could undertake this task. Marxism-Leninism also could not have been produced in the economically backward, colonial countries, because, although they were contemporaneous with them, there was a difference in location. Leaving aside their genius, the reason why Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin could work out their theories was mainly that they personally took part in the practice of the class struggle and the scientific experimentation of their time; lacking this condition, no genius could have succeeded. The saying, «without stepping outside their gate, the scholar knows all the wide world's affairs», was mere empty talk in past times, when technology was undeveloped. Even though this saying can be valid in the present age of developed technology, the people with real personal knowledge are those engaged in practice the wide world over. And it is only when these people have come to «know» through their practice and when their knowledge has reached them through writing and technical media that the «scholar» can indirectly «know all the wide world's affairs». If you want to know a certain thing or a certain class of things directly, you must personally participate in the practical struggle to change reality, to change that thing or class of things, for only thus can you come into contact with them as phenomena; only through personal participation in the practical struggle to change reality can you uncover the essence of that thing or class of things and comprehend them. This is the path to knowledge which every person actually travels, though some people, deliberately distorting matters, argue to the contrary. The most ridiculous person in the world is the «know-it-all», who picks up a smattering of hearsay knowledge and proclaims themself «the world's Number One authority»; this merely shows that they have not taken a proper measure of themself. Knowledge is a matter of science, and no dishonesty or conceit whatsoever is permissible. What is required is definitely the reverse ─ honesty and modesty. If you want knowledge, you must take part in the practice of changing reality. If you want to know the taste of a pear, you must change the pear by eating it yourself. If you want to know the structure and properties of the atom, you must make physical and chemical experiments to change the state of the atom. If you want to know the theory and methods of revolution, you must take part in revolution. All genuine knowledge originates in direct experience. But one cannot have direct experience of everything; as a matter of fact, most of our knowledge comes from indirect experience, for example, all knowledge from past times and foreign countries. To our ancestors and to foreigners, such knowledge was ─ or is ─ a matter of direct experience, and this knowledge is reliable if in the course of their direct experience the requirement of «scientific abstraction», spoken of by Lenin, was ─ or is ─ fulfilled and objective reality scientifically reflected, otherwise it is not reliable. Hence, a person's knowledge consists only of two parts, that which comes from direct experience and that which comes from indirect experience. Moreover, what is indirect experience for me is direct experience for other people. Consequently, considered as a whole, knowledge of any kind is inseparable from direct experience. All knowledge originates in perception of the objective external world through people's physical sense organs. Anyone who denies such perception, denies direct experience, or denies personal participation in the practice that changes reality, is not a materialist. That is why the «know-it-all» is ridiculous. There is an old Chinese saying: «How can you catch tiger cubs without entering the tiger's lair?» This saying holds true for people's practice and it also holds true for the theory of knowledge. There can be no knowledge apart from practice.
To make clear the dialectical-materialist movement of cognition arising on the basis of the practice which changes reality ─ to make clear the gradually deepening movement of cognition ─ a few additional concrete examples are given below.
In its knowledge of capitalist society, the proletariat was only in the perceptual stage of cognition in the first period of its practice, the period of machine-breaking and spontaneous struggle; it knew only some of the aspects and the external relations of the phenomena of capitalism. The proletariat was then still a «class-in-itself». But when it reached the second period of its practice, the period of conscious and organized economic and political struggles, the proletariat was able to comprehend the essence of capitalist society, the relations of exploitation between social classes, and its own historical task; and it was able to do so because of its own practice and because of its experience of prolonged struggle, which Marx and Engels scientifically summed up in all its variety to create the theory of Marxism for the education of the proletariat. It was then that the proletariat became a «class-for-itself».
Similarly with the Chinese people's knowledge of imperialism. The first stage was one of superficial, perceptual knowledge, as shown in the indiscriminate anti-foreign struggles of the Movement of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the Boxer Movement, and so on. It was only in the second stage that the Chinese people reached the stage of rational knowledge, saw the internal and external contradictions of imperialism, and saw the essential truth that imperialism had allied itself with China's comprador and feudal classes to oppress and exploit the great masses of the Chinese people. This knowledge began about the time of the 4th of May Movement of 1919.
Next, let us consider war. If those who lead a war lack experience of war, then, at the initial stage, they will not understand the profound laws pertaining to the directing of a specific war (such as our Agrarian Revolutionary War of the past decade). At the initial stage, they will merely experience a good deal of fighting and, what is more, suffer many defeats. But this experience (the experience of battles won and especially of battles lost) enables them to comprehend the inner thread of the whole war, namely, the laws of that specific war, to understand its strategy and tactics, and, consequently, to direct the war with confidence. If, at such a moment, the command is turned over to an inexperienced person, then they, too, will have to suffer a number of defeats (gain experience) before they can comprehend the true laws of the war.
«I am not sure I can handle it.» We often hear this remark when a comrade hesitates to accept an assignment. Why are they unsure of themself? Because they have no systematic understanding of the content and circumstances of the assignment, or because they have had little or no contact with such work, and so the laws governing it are beyond them. After a detailed analysis of the nature and circumstances of the assignment, they will feel more sure of themself and do it willingly. If they spend some time at the job and gain experience, and if they are a person who is willing to look into matters with an open mind and not one who approaches problems subjectively, one-sidedly, and superficially, then they can draw conclusions for themself as to how to go about the job and do it with much more courage. Only those who are subjective, one-sided, and superficial in their approach to problems will smugly issue instructions the moment they arrive on the scene, without considering the circumstances, without viewing things in their totality (their history and their present state as a whole), and without getting to the essence of things (their nature and the internal relations between one thing and another). Such people are bound to trip and fall.
Thus, it can be seen that the first step in the process of cognition is contact with the objects of the external world; this belongs to the stage of perception. The second step is to synthesize the data of perception by arranging and reconstructing them; this belongs to the stage of conception, judgement, and inference. It is only when the data of perception are very rich (not fragmentary) and correspond to reality (are not illusory) that they can be the basis for forming correct concepts and theories.
Here, two important points must be emphasized. The first, which has been stated before, but should be repeated here, is the dependence of rational knowledge upon perceptual knowledge. Anyone who thinks that rational knowledge need not be derived from perceptual knowledge is an idealist. In the history of philosophy, there is the «rationalist» school that admits the reality only of reason and not of experience, believing that reason alone is reliable while perceptual experience is not; this school errs by turning things upside down. The rational is reliable precisely because it has its source in sense perceptions, otherwise it would be like water without a source, a tree without roots, subjective, self-engendered, and unreliable. As to the sequence in the process of cognition, perceptual experience comes first; we stress the significance of social practice in the process of cognition precisely because social practice alone can give rise to human knowledge and it alone can start people on the acquisition of perceptual experience from the objective world. For a person who shuts their eyes, stops their ears, and totally cuts themself off from the objective world, there can be no such thing as knowledge. Knowledge begins with experience ─ this is the materialism of the theory of knowledge.
The second point is that knowledge needs to be deepened, that the perceptual stage of knowledge needs to be developed to the rational stage ─ this is the dialectics of the theory of knowledge.15 To think that knowledge can stop at the lower, perceptual stage and that perceptual knowledge alone is reliable while rational knowledge is not, would be to repeat the historical error of «empiricism». This theory errs in failing to understand that, although the data of perception reflect certain realities in the objective world (I am not speaking here of idealist empiricism, which confines experience to so-called introspection), they are merely one-sided and superficial, reflecting things incompletely and not reflecting their essence. Fully to reflect a thing in its totality, to reflect its essence, to reflect its inherent laws, it is necessary, through the exercise of thought, to reconstruct the rich data of sense perception, discarding the dross and selecting the essential, eliminating the false and retaining the true, proceeding from the one to the other and from the outside to the inside, in order to form a system of concepts and theories ─ it is necessary to make a leap from perceptual to rational knowledge. Such reconstructed knowledge is not more empty or more unreliable; on the contrary, whatever has been scientifically reconstructed in the process of cognition, on the basis of practice, reflects objective reality, as Lenin said, more deeply, more truly, more fully. As against this, vulgar «pragmatists» respect experience, but despise theory, and therefore cannot have a comprehensive view of an entire objective process, lack clear direction and long-range perspective, and are complacent over occasional successes and glimpses of the truth. If such persons direct a revolution, they will lead it up a blind alley.
Rational knowledge depends upon perceptual knowledge and perceptual knowledge remains to be developed into rational knowledge ─ this is the dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge. In philosophy, neither «rationalism» nor «empiricism» understands the historical or the dialectical nature of knowledge, and, although each of these schools contains one aspect of the truth (here I am referring to materialist, not to idealist, rationalism and empiricism), both are wrong on the theory of knowledge as a whole. The dialectical-materialist movement of knowledge from the perceptual to the rational holds true for a minor process of cognition (for instance, knowing a single thing or task) as well as for a major process of cognition (for instance, knowing a whole society or a revolution).
But the movement of knowledge does not end here. If the dialectical-materialist movement of knowledge were to stop at rational knowledge, only half the problem would be dealt with. And, as far as Marxist philosophy is concerned, only the less important half at that. Marxist philosophy holds that the most important problem does not lie in understanding the laws of the objective world and thus being able to explain it, but in applying the knowledge of these laws actively to change the world. From the Marxist standpoint, theory is important, and its importance is fully expressed in Lenin's statement: «Without revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary movement.»16 Each of a person's actions (their practice) is guided by their thinking, so naturally, without thought, their can be no action whatsoever. But Marxism emphasizes the importance of theory precisely and only because it can guide action. If we have a correct theory, but merely prate about it, pigeonhole it, and do not put it into practice, then that theory, however good, is of no significance. Knowledge begins with practice, and theoretical knowledge is acquired through practice and must then return to practice. The active function of knowledge manifests itself, not only in the active leap from perceptual to rational knowledge, but ─ and this is more important ─ it must manifest itself in the leap from rational knowledge to revolutionary practice. The knowledge which grasps the laws of the world, must be redirected to the practice of changing the world, must be applied anew in the practice of production, in the practice of revolutionary class struggle and revolutionary national struggle, and in the practice of scientific experiment. This is the process of testing and developing theory, the continuation of the whole process of cognition. The problem of whether theory corresponds to objective reality is not, and cannot be, completely solved in the movement of knowledge from the perceptual to the rational, mentioned above. The only way to solve this problem completely is to redirect rational knowledge to social practice, apply theory to practice, and see whether it can achieve the objectives one has in mind. Many theories of natural science are held to be true, not only because they were so considered when natural scientists originated them, but because they have been verified in subsequent scientific practice. Similarly, Marxism-Leninism is held to be true, not only because it was so considered when it was scientifically formulated by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, but because it has been verified in the subsequent practice of revolutionary class struggle and revolutionary national struggle. Dialectical materialism is universally true, because it is impossible for anyone to escape from its domain in their practice. The history of human knowledge tells us that the truth of many theories is incomplete and that this incompleteness is remedied through the test of practice. Many theories are erroneous and it is through the test of practice that their errors are corrected. That is why practice is the criterion of truth and why «the standpoint of life, of practice, should be first and fundamental in the theory of knowledge».11 Stalin has well said: «Theory becomes purposeless if it is not connected with revolutionary practice, just as practice gropes in the dark if its path is not illumined by revolutionary theory.»17
When we get to this point, is the movement of knowledge completed? Our answer is: it is and yet it is not. When people in society throw themselves into the practice of changing a certain objective process (whether natural or social) at a certain stage of its development, they can, as a result of the reflection of the objective process in their brains and the exercise of their subjective activity, advance their knowledge from the perceptual to the rational, and create ideas, theories, plans, or programmes which correspond in general to the laws of that objective process. They then apply these ideas, theories, plans, or programmes in practice in the same objective process. And if they can realize the aims they have in mind, that is, if in that same process of practice they can translate, or on the whole translate, those previously formulated ideas, theories, plans, or programmes into fact, then the movement of knowledge may be considered completed with regard to this particular process. In the process of changing nature, take, for example, the fulfilment of an engineering plan, the verification of a scientific hypothesis, the manufacture of an implement, or the reaping of a crop; or in the process of changing society, take, for example, the victory of a strike, victory in a war, the fulfilment of an educational plan, or the establishment of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. All these may be considered the realization of aims one has in mind. But, generally speaking, whether in the practice of changing nature or of changing society, people's original ideas, theories, plans, or programmes are seldom realized without any alteration. This is because people engaged in changing reality are usually subject to numerous limitations; they are limited, not only by existing scientific and technological conditions, but also by the development of the objective process itself and the degree to which this process has become manifest (the aspects and the essence of the objective process have not yet been fully revealed). In such a situation, ideas, theories, plans, or programmes are usually altered partially and sometimes even wholly, because of the discovery of unforeseen circumstances in the course of practice. That is to say, it does happen that the original ideas, theories, plans, or programmes fail to correspond with reality either in whole or in part and are wholly or partially incorrect. In many instances, failures have to be repeated many times before errors in knowledge can be corrected and correspondence with the laws of the objective process achieved, and, consequently, before the subjective can be transformed into the objective, or, in other words, before the anticipated results can be achieved in practice. But when that point is reached, no matter how, the movement of human knowledge regarding a certain objective process at a certain stage of its development may be considered completed.
However, so far as the progression of the process is concerned, the movement of human knowledge is not completed. Every process, whether in the realm of nature or of society, progresses and develops by reason of its internal contradiction and struggle, and the movement of human knowledge should also progress and develop along with it. As far as social movements are concerned, true revolutionary leaders must not only be good at correcting their ideas, theories, plans, or programmes when errors are discovered, as has been indicated above; but, when a certain objective process has already progressed and changed from one stage of development to another, they must also be good at making themselves and all their fellow revolutionaries progress and change in their subjective knowledge along with it, that is to say, they must ensure that the proposed new revolutionary tasks and new working programmes correspond to the new changes in the situation. In a revolutionary period, the situation changes very rapidly; if the knowledge of the revolutionaries does not change rapidly in accordance with the changed situation, they will be unable to lead the revolution to victory.
It often happens, however, that thinking lags behind reality; this is because people's cognition is limited by numerous social conditions. Many people are limited by class conditions (the reactionary, exploiting classes have no capacity for knowing any truth and, as a result, have no capacity for transforming the world; on the contrary, they have become enemies of truth and of the transformation of the world). Some people are limited by the division of labour (the division between mental and manual labour and the divisions between various industries). Still others are limited by their original erroneous ideas (idealism, metaphysics, and so on; many such people are exploiting elements, but some are also exploited elements, because they are educated by the exploiting elements). A general reason, however, is the limitation which results from the historical conditions of the level of technological and scientific development. The proletariat and its political party should utilize their own naturally superior class conditions (which no other class possesses), utilize the new technology and science, and employ the Marxist worldview and methodology, so as, closely relying on revolutionary practice as the basis, to ensure that their knowledge changes with changes in the objective situation, and that the logical keeps pace with the historical, so that they attain their goal of completely changing the world.
We are opposed to conservatives in the revolutionary ranks, whose thinking fails to advance with changing objective circumstances and has manifested itself historically as Right-wing opportunism. Chen Duxiu-ism in China in 1927 and Buharinism in the Council Union are examples of Right-wing opportunism. These people fail to see that the struggle of opposites has already pushed the objective process forward, while their knowledge has stopped at the old stage. This is characteristic of the thinking of all conservatives. Their thinking is divorced from social practice, and they cannot march ahead to guide the chariot of society; they simply trail behind, grumbling that it goes too fast and trying to drag it back or turn it in the opposite direction.
We are also opposed to «Left-wing» phrase-mongering. Li Lisan-ism in China in 1930, Trotskijism in the Council Union, when it could still be regarded as a faction in the Communist movement (now it has become extremely reactionary), and the thinking of the «Far Left» in all countries of the world are all examples of «Left-wing» opportunism. The thinking of «Left-wingers» outstrips a given stage of development of the objective process; some regard their fantasies as truth, while others strain to realize in the present an ideal which can only be realized in the future. They alienate themselves from the current practice of the majority of the people and from the realities of the day, and show themselves adventurist in their actions.
Idealism and mechanical materialism, opportunism and adventurism, are all characterized by the breach between the subjective and the objective, by the separation of knowledge from practice. None of them is based on the dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge. The Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge, characterized as it is by scientific social practice, cannot but resolutely oppose these wrong ideologies. Marxists recognize that, in the absolute and general process of development of the Universe, the development of each particular process is relative, and that, hence, in the endless flow of absolute truth, people's knowledge of a particular process at any given stage of development is only relative truth. The sum total of innumerable relative truths constitutes absolute truth.11 The development of an objective process is full of contradictions and struggles, and so is the development of the movement of human knowledge. All the dialectical movements of the objective world can sooner or later be reflected in human knowledge. In social practice, the process of coming into being, developing, and passing away is infinite, and so is the process of coming into being, developing, and passing away in human knowledge. As people's practice, which changes objective reality in accordance with given ideas, theories, plans, or programmes, advances further and further, their knowledge of objective reality likewise becomes deeper and deeper. The movement of change in the world of objective reality is never-ending, and so is people's cognition of truth through practice. Marxism-Leninism has in no way exhausted truth, but ceaselessly opens up roads to the knowledge of truth in the course of practice. Our conclusion is the concrete, historical unity of the subjective and the objective, of theory and practice, of knowing and doing, and we are opposed to all erroneous ideologies, whether «Left-wing» or Right-wing, which depart from concrete history.
Throughout the whole Universe, in the present epoch of the development of nature and society, the responsibility of correctly knowing and changing the world has been placed by history upon the shoulders of the proletariat and its political party. This process, the practice of changing the world, which is determined in accordance with scientific knowledge, has already reached a historic moment in the world and in China, a great moment unprecedented in human history, that is, the moment for completely banishing darkness from the world and from China and for changing the world into a world of light such as never previously existed. The struggle of the proletariat and the revolutionary people to change the world comprises the fulfilment of the following tasks: to change the objective world and, at the same time, their own subjective world ─ to change their cognitive ability and change the relations between the subjective and the objective world. Such a change has already come about in one part of the globe, in the Council Union. There, the people are pushing forward this process of change. The people of China and the rest of the world either are going through, or will go through, such a process. And the objective world which is to be changed also includes all the opponents of change, who, in order to be changed, must go through a stage of compulsion before they can enter the stage of voluntary, conscious change. The epoch of world communism will be reached when all humanity voluntarily and consciously changes itself and the world.
Discover the truth through practice, and again through practice verify and further develop the truth. Start from perceptual knowledge and actively develop it into rational knowledge; then start from rational knowledge and actively guide revolutionary practice to change both the subjective and the objective world. Practice, knowledge, again practice, and again knowledge. This form repeats itself in endless cycles, and, with each cycle, the content of practice and knowledge rises to a higher level. Such is the whole of the dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge, and such is the dialectical-materialist theory of the unity of knowing and doing.
#3. ON CONTRADICTION
The two questions of «Idealism and Materialism» and «Dialectical Materialism» have been briefly dealt with above. We come now to a systematic discussion of the question of dialectics, which has been mentioned only in outline.
#3.1. MATERIALIST DIALECTICS
The Marxist worldview (or conception of the Universe) is dialectical materialism, not metaphysical (or mechanical) materialism. This is a major distinction of fundamental importance. What is the world? From ancient times until the present, there have been three major responses to this question. The first is the idealist response (either metaphysical or dialectical idealism), which states that the world is created by the mind or, by extension, by the spirit. The second is the mechanical-materialist response, which denies that the world is the product of the mind; the world is material, but matter neither develops nor changes. The third is the Marxist response, which has overthrown the two previous responses; it states that the world is not the product of the mind, or does it consist of static matter; rather, it is a developing material world. This is the standpoint of dialectical materialism.
Is not this Marxist conception of the Universe, which has revolutionized the worldview previously held by humanity, a discourse of earth-shaking significance? There were those in Ancient Greece who espoused the view that the world is a developing material world, but, because of the limitations of the time, it was discussed only in simple and general terms; their worldview may be described as naive dialectical materialism. It did not have (indeed, could not have had) a scientific basis. However, its standpoint was fundamentally correct. Hegel created dialectical idealism, stating that the world is developmental, but is the product of the mind. He was a developmental idealist. His theory of development (that is, dialectics) was correct, but his idealism was erroneous. In the West, during the 17th to 19th centuries, the bourgeois materialism of Germany, France, and other countries was mechanical materialism. They asserted that the world was machine-like in its motion, with only quantitative increase and decrease taking place, there being no qualitative change ─ an incorrect view. Marx inherited the naive dialectical materialism of Ancient Greece, transformed mechanical materialism and dialectical idealism, and created modern dialectical materialism, which until then had not been placed on a scientific basis, and which became the revolutionary weapon of the entire international proletariat and all oppressed people.
Materialist dialectics is the scientific method of Marxism; it is the methodology of knowledge and logic, and yet it is a worldview. The world is actually a developing material world ─ this constitutes a worldview. This worldview becomes a methodology if used to observe, research, consider, and resolve the problems of the world, to lead a revolution, to do labour, to engage in production, to wage war, or to discuss a person's strengths and weaknesses ─ this constitutes a methodology. There is no other methodology than this; therefore, in the hands of Marxists, worldview and methodology constitute a single whole, and so, too, do dialectics, the theory of knowledge, and logic.
We will systematically discuss materialist dialectics and its many issues ─ its numerous categories, laws, and principles (these three terms have the same meaning).
What actually are the laws of materialist dialectics? And, of these, what are the fundamental laws, and what are the derived laws which constitute the aspects, features, and issues of materialist dialectics which are indispensable and must be resolved? Why are all these laws inherent in the objective world and not created subjectively? Why study and understand these laws?
The complete, revolutionary theory of materialist dialectics was created by Marx and Engels and developed further by Lenin. At present, with the victory of socialism in the Council Union and the era of the proletarian world revolution, this theory has entered a new stage of development, which has enhanced and enriched its content.
The following categories constitute the fundamental laws of the theory of materialist dialectics:
- The law of the unity of opposites.
- The law of the mutual transformation of quality and quantity.
- The law of the negation of the negation.
Apart from the naive dialectical materialism of Ancient Greece, which simply and unsystematically pointed out the significance of these laws, and Hegel, who developed these laws in an idealist manner, they have been repudiated by all metaphysical philosophies (the so-called metaphysical philosophies are theories opposed to the theory of development). It was only with Marx and Engels, who transformed these laws of Hegel's from a materialist standpoint, that they became the most fundamental part of the Marxist worldview and methodology.
Apart from the fundamental laws outlined above, and derived from these fundamental laws, materialist dialectics includes the following categories:
- Essence and appearance.
- Form and content.
- Cause and effect.
- Basis and guide.
- Possibility and reality.
- Accident and necessity.
- Necessity and freedom.
- Chain and link.
And so on.
Of these categories, some were previously studied in depth by metaphysical materialism and dialectical idealism, some were studied only one-sidedly, and some were put forward by Marxism for the first time. In the hands of theoretical and practical Marxist revolutionaries, these categories have been stripped of the idealist and metaphysical husk of pre-Marxist philosophy, overcome their one-sidedness, and discovered their true form; moreover, as time has progressed, their content has been greatly enriched, thus becoming important components of the revolutionary scientific method. The combination of these secondary categories and the primary categories mentioned above constitutes a complete and profound system of materialist dialectics.
None of these laws or categories was created by human thought itself; they are actual laws governing the objective world. All idealists assert that matter is the product of spirit, and, from this standpoint, the tenets, principles, laws, and categories of philosophy are naturally the products of the mind. Hegel, who developed the system of dialectics, perceived dialectics in this manner. He saw the laws of dialectics, not as being abstracted from natural and social history, but as a logical system of pure thought. After human thought created this system, it would then impose it on nature and society. Marx and Engels stripped away Hegel's mystical shell, discarded his idealism, and placed his dialectics on a material basis. Engels stated: «It is, therefore, from the history of nature and human society that the laws of dialectics are abstracted. For they are nothing but the most general laws of these two stages of historical development, as well as of thought itself. And indeed they can be reduced in the main to three: the law of the transformation of quantity into quality and the other way around; the law of the interpenetration of opposites; and the law of the negation of the negation.»10 While being laws of the objective world, the laws of dialectics are also laws of subjective thought, because the laws of human thought are nothing but the laws of the objective world reflected in the human brain through practice. As discussed previously, dialectics, the theory of knowledge, and logic are one and the same thing.
Why do we study dialectics? For no other reason than to change the world, to change the age-old relations in this world between people and between people and matter. The lives of the vast majority of the people of the world are filled with misery and suffering as a result of the oppression of political and economic systems dominated by a minority. The people who live in our China suffer a two-fold cruel and inhuman oppression ─ national oppression and social oppression. We must change these age-old relations and strive for national and social liberation.
Why is it necessary to study dialectics to achieve the objective of changing China and the world? It is because dialectics consists of the most general laws of development of nature and society; when we comprehend dialectics, we have gained a scientific weapon, and, in the revolutionary practice of changing nature and society, we have come to possess a worldview and methodology suited to this practice. Materialist dialectics is itself a science ─ a philosophical science; it is the starting point of all sciences, and it is also a scientific method. Our revolutionary practice is itself also a science ─ a social or political science. If we don't understand dialectics, our affairs will be mishandled; the revolution makes mistakes when dialectics are violated. However, when dialectics is understood, immense results can be achieved; and if all things done correctly are researched, it will be found that they conform with dialectics. Consequently, all revolutionary comrades and, above all, cadres should diligently study dialectics.
There are those who say that many people understand practical dialectics and, moreover, are practical materialists; and, although they have not read books on dialectics, things that they do are done correctly and, in fact, conform with materialist dialectics. They surely have no particular need to study dialectics. This sort of talk is incorrect. Materialist dialectics is a profound and complete science. Although revolutionaries who really do possess materialist and dialectical minds learn a great deal of dialectics from practice, it is not systematized and lacks the completeness and profundity already achieved by materialist dialectics. Therefore, they are unable to see clearly the long-term future of the movement, unable to analyse a complex process of development, unable to grasp important political links, and unable to handle the various aspects of revolutionary work. Because of this, they still need to study dialectics.
There are others who say that dialectics is abstruse and difficult to fathom, and that ordinary people have no possibility of mastering it. This is also incorrect. Dialectics encompasses the laws of nature, society, and thought. Anyone with some social experience (experience of production and class struggle) actually understands some dialectics. Those with even more social experience actually have a greater understanding of dialectics, although their understanding remains at the chaotic level of common sense and is neither complete nor profound. It is not difficult to bring order to this common-sense dialectics and deepen it through further study. The reason why people feel that dialectics is difficult is that there exist no books which explain dialectics well. In China, there are many book on dialectics which, while not incorrect, are explained poorly or none too well and which frighten people off. Books which are good at explaining dialectics employ everyday language and relate moving experiences. Sooner or later, such a book must be put together. These lectures of mine are also far from adequate, since I myself have only just begun to study dialectics. There has been no possibility of writing a useful book on the subject yet, although perhaps the opportunity may present itself in the future. I wish to do so, but this will be decided by how my studies proceed.
#3.2. THE LAW OF THE UNITY OF OPPOSITES
The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the fundamental law of materialist dialectics. Lenin said: «Dialectics in the proper sense is the study of contradiction in the very essence of objects.»18 Lenin often called this law the essence of dialectics; he also called it the kernel of dialectics.19 Because of this, in our study of dialectics, discussion should commence from this problem, which should, moreover, be discussed in somewhat greater detail than other problems.
In studying this law, therefore, we cannot but touch upon a variety of questions, upon a number of philosophical problems. If we can become clear on all these problems, we shall arrive at a fundamental understanding of materialist dialectics.
The criticism to which the idealism of the Deborin school has been subjected in Soviet philosophical circles in recent years has awakened great interest among us. Deborin's idealism has exerted a very bad influence in the Communist Party of China, and it cannot be said that the dogmatist thinking in our Party is unrelated to the approach of that school. Our present study of philosophy should therefore have the eradication of dogmatist thinking as its main objective.
#3.3. THE TWO CONCEPTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT
Throughout the history of human knowledge, there have been two conceptions concerning the law of development of the Universe: the metaphysical conception and the dialectical conception. Lenin said:
The two fundamental (or two possible? or two historically observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation).1
Here, Lenin was referring to these two different conceptions of development.
#3.3.1. THE METAPHYSICAL CONCEPTION OF DEVELOPMENT
In China, another name for metaphysics is xuanxue. For a long period in history, whether in China or in Europe, this way of thinking, which is part and parcel of the idealist worldview, occupied a dominant position in human thought. In Europe, the materialism of the bourgeoisie in its early days was also metaphysical. As the social economy of many European countries advanced to the stage of highly developed capitalism, as the productive forces, the class struggle, and the sciences developed to a level unprecedented in history, and as the industrial proletariat became the greatest motive force in historical development, there arose the Marxist worldview of materialist dialectics. Then, in addition to open and barefaced reactionary idealism, vulgar evolutionism emerged among the bourgeoisie to oppose materialist dialectics.
The metaphysical or vulgar-evolutionist conception of development sees things as isolated, static, and one-sided. It regards all things in the Universe, their forms and their species, as eternally isolated from one another and immutable. Such change as there is can only be an increase or decrease in quantity or a change of place. Moreover, the cause of such an increase or decrease or change of place is not inside things, but outside them, that is, the motive force is external. Metaphysicians hold that all the different kinds of things in the Universe and all their characteristics have been the same ever since they first came into being. All subsequent changes have simply been increases or decreases in quantity. They contend that a thing can only keep on repeating itself as the same kind of thing and cannot change into anything different. In their opinion, capitalist exploitation, capitalist competition, the individualist ideology of capitalist society, and so on, can all be found in ancient slave society, or even in primitive-communal society, and will exist forever unchanged. They ascribe the causes of social development to factors external to society, such as geography and climate. They search in an oversimplified way outside a thing for the causes of its development, and they deny the theory of materialist dialectics, which holds that development arises from the contradictions inside a thing. Consequently, they can explain neither the qualitative diversity of things, nor the phenomenon of one quality changing into another. In Europe, this mode of thinking existed as mechanical materialism in the 17th and 18th centuries and as vulgar evolutionism at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries (such as Buharin's vulgar evolutionism). In China, there was the metaphysical thinking exemplified in the saying, «Heaven changeth not, likewise the Way changeth not», and it was supported by the decadent feudal ruling classes for a long time. Mechanical materialism and vulgar evolutionism, which were imported from Europe in the last 100 years, are supported by the bourgeoisie.
#3.3.2. THE DIALECTICAL CONCEPTION OF DEVELOPMENT
As opposed to the metaphysical conception of development, the dialectical-materialist conception of development holds that, in order to understand the development of a thing, we should study it internally and in its relations with other things; in other words, the development of things should be seen as their internal and necessary self-movement, while each thing in its movement is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it. The fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external, but internal; it lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development. Contradictoriness within a thing is the primary cause of its development, while its interrelations and interactions with other things are secondary causes. Thus, materialist dialectics effectively combats the theory of external causes, or of an external motive force, advanced by metaphysical mechanical materialism and vulgar evolutionism. It is evident that purely external causes can only give rise to mechanical motion, that is, to changes in scale or quantity, but cannot explain why things differ qualitatively in thousands of ways and why one thing changes into another. As a matter of fact, even mechanical motion under external force occurs through the internal contradictoriness of things. Simple growth in plants and animals, their quantitative development, is likewise chiefly the result of their internal contradictions. Similarly, social development is due chiefly not to external, but to internal causes. Countries with almost the same geographical and climatic conditions display great diversity and unevenness in their development. Moreover, great social changes may take place in one and the same country although its geography and climate remain unchanged. Imperialist Russia changed into the Union of Socialist Council Republics, and feudal Japan, which had locked its doors against the world, changed into imperialist Japan, although no change occurred in the geography and climate of either country. Long dominated by feudalism, China has undergone great changes in the last 100 years and is now changing in the direction of a new China, liberated and free, and yet no change has occurred in its geography and climate. Changes do take place in the geography and climate of the Earth as a whole and in every part of it, but they are insignificant when compared with changes in society; geographical and climatic changes manifest themselves in terms of tens of thousands of years, while social changes manifest themselves in thousands, hundreds, or tens of years, and even in a few years or months in times of revolution. According to materialist dialectics, changes in nature are due chiefly to the development of the internal contradictions in nature. Changes in society are due chiefly to the development of the internal contradictions in society, that is, the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production, the contradiction between classes, and the contradiction between the old and the new; it is the development of these contradictions that pushes society forward and gives the impetus for the replacement of the old society by the new. Does materialist dialectics exclude external causes? Not at all. It holds that external causes are the condition of change and internal causes are the basis of change, and that external causes become operative through internal causes. In a suitable temperature, an egg changes into a chicken, but no temperature can change a stone into a chicken, because each has a different basis. There is constant interaction between the peoples of different countries. In the era of capitalism, and especially in the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution, the interaction and mutual impact of different countries in the political, economic, and cultural spheres are extremely great. The November Socialist Revolution ushered in a new epoch in world history as well as in Russian history. It exerted influence on internal changes in the other countries in the world and, similarly and in a particularly profound way, on internal changes in China. These changes, however, were effected through the inner laws of development of these countries, China included. The pressure of outside imperialism accelerated changes in Chinese society, but these changes were effected through the internal contradictions of China itself. In battle, one army is victorious and the other is defeated; both the victory and the defeat are determined by internal causes. The one is victorious either because it is strong or because of its competent generalship, the other is vanquished either because it is weak or be cause of its incompetent generalship; it is through internal causes that external causes become operative. In China in 1927, the defeat of the proletariat by the big bourgeoisie came about through the opportunism then to be found within the Chinese proletariat itself (inside the Communist Party of China). When we liquidated this opportunism, the Chinese revolution resumed its advance. Later, the Chinese revolution again suffered severe setbacks at the hands of the enemy, because adventurism had risen within our Party. When we liquidated this adventurism, our cause advanced once again. Thus, it can be seen that, to lead the revolution to victory, a political party must depend on the correctness of its own political line and the solidity of its own organization. In China, the loss of Manchuria and the crisis in northern China are due mainly to China's weakness (because of the defeat of the Revolution of 1927, the people lost political power, and this gave rise to civil war and one-party dictatorship). Japanese imperialism took advantage of this situation and invaded. In order to drive out the Japanese bandits, we must rely mainly on the Anti-Japanese National United Front to wage a resolute revolutionary war. Su Dongpo said: «Insects appear only once things are rotten; people only speak evil of others after they become suspicious of them.»20 Confucius correctly said: «When internal examination discovers nothing wrong, what is there to be anxious about, what is there to fear?»21 If a person exercises and becomes strong in their youth, then they will never get sick easily; to this day, the Council Union has not been attacked by Japan, and this is entirely because of its strength. «When Lord Bei beat the tofu, he chose a weak object to bully.»22 Everything depends solely on one's strength, so it is no use blaming Heaven or other people; people are the masters of their own fate. Difficulties can be overcome and external conditions can be changed ─ this is our philosophy.
The dialectical concept of development emerged in ancient times both in China and in Europe. Ancient dialectics, however, had a somewhat spontaneous and naive character; in the social and historical conditions then prevailing, it was not yet able to form a theoretical system, hence it could not fully explain the world and was supplanted by metaphysics. The famous German philosopher Hegel, who lived in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, made most important contributions to dialectics, but his dialectics was idealist. It was not until Marx and Engels, the great protagonists of the proletarian movement, had synthesized the positive achievements in the history of human knowledge and, in particular, critically absorbed the rational elements of Hegelian dialectics and created the great theory of dialectical and historical materialism, that an unprecedented revolution occurred in the history of human knowledge. This theory was further developed by Lenin and Stalin. As soon as it spread to China, it wrought tremendous changes in the world of Chinese thought.
This dialectical conception of development teaches us primarily how to observe and analyse the movement of opposites in different things and, on the basis of such analysis, to indicate the methods for resolving contradictions. It is therefore most important for us to understand the law of contradiction in things in a concrete way.
We oppose the metaphysical conception of development and advocate the dialectical conception of development. We advocate the theory of change and oppose the theory of immobility. We advocate the theory of internal causation and oppose the theory of external causation.
#3.4. THE TWO CONCEPTIONS OF LOGIC
We have discussed above the two conceptions of development: the metaphysical and the dialectical. The struggle between these two worldviews is reflected in the struggle between the two methodologies: formal logic and dialectical logic.
Bourgeois formal logic has three fundamental laws: the law of identity, the law of contradiction, and the law of the excluded middle.
What is the law of identity? The law of identity states: In the process of thought, a concept remains unchanged throughout, being forever equal to itself. For example, a chemical element is forever equal to that chemical element; China is forever equal to China; and a certain person is forever equal to that certain person. Its formula is: A = A. This law is metaphysical. Engels that it is the fundamental law of the old worldview. Its mistake lies in not recognizing contradiction and change within a thing, and, because of this, removing temporariness and relativity from a concept, attributing permanence and absoluteness to it. It does not understand that a thing and the concept that reflects a thing are both relative and changeable; a certain chemical element is certainly not forever equal to that certain element, and all forms of chemical elements are changing. China also will not forever be equal to China, for China is changing; the age-old, feudal China of the past and the free, liberated China of the future are two different things. A certain person is also not forever equal to that certain person; a person's physique and ideas change. Concepts in thought are reflections of objective things, and objective things are changing; the content of a concept is also changing. In fact, there is no such thing as a concept which is forever equal to itself.
What is the law of contradiction? The law of contradiction states: A concept itself cannot at the same time contain two or more mutually contradictory meanings; if a concept contains two contradictory meanings, that is regarded as a logical error. A contradictory concept cannot simultaneously have both aspects be correct or both aspects be incorrect, and only one of the two aspects can be correct. Its formula is: A ≠ not-A. Kant enumerated the four following antinomies:
- The world has a beginning and an end in time, and is finite in space; the world has no beginning or end in time, and is infinite in space.
- The world consists only of simple matter, which cannot be further divided; the world contains no simple things, everything is complex and can be further divided.
- The world is governed by free causation; the world has no freedom, everything is inevitable.
- The world has a certain inevitable essence; nothing in the world is inevitable, everything is accidental.
Kant gave these irreconcilable and mutually contradictory principles the title of the «Second Law of Contradiction». He stated, however, that these were only contradictions in people's thinking; in the real world, they really did not exist. According to the law of contradiction of formal logic, these contradictions were thus a mistake and had to be rejected. But, in reality, thought is a reflection of matter. There is nothing that does not contain contradiction, and, because of this, there is no concept that does not contain contradiction. This is not an error in thought, but precisely where thought is correct, and the law of the unity of opposites of dialectical logic is founded on this basis. It is only with formal logic's rejection of contradiction that thought becomes really incorrect. The law of contradiction of formal logic is only a manifestation of the negative aspect of the law of identity, and it supplements the law of identity, the purpose of which is to consolidate the formula in the law of identity that a concept is equal to itself, that A = A.
What is the law of the excluded middle? The law of the excluded middle states: Of the two opposite meanings of a concept, the correct one must be one or the other, for it is not possible for both to be incorrect or to rush to a third as the correct meaning. Its formula is: Either A = B or A ≠ B, but A ≠ C. Formal logic does not realize that things and concepts are developing, and, in the process of development of things and concepts, not only are their internal contradictory aspects made manifest, but these contradictory aspects can be removed, negated, and resolved to become a third thing, which is not-A and not-B; change to become a new and higher thing or concept. Correct thought should not exclude the third factor, that is, should not exclude the law of the negation of the negation. According to the law of the excluded middle, in the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the correct one is either the former or the latter; it cannot be a classless society. However, it is a good thing that the process of social evolution does not stop at the class struggle, but progresses toward a communist society. China and Japanese imperialism form a contradiction. We oppose the Japanese imperialist invasion, but we do not agree that post-independence China should forever remain in a state of hostility toward Japan. We maintain that, through national revolution in China and revolution within Japan, the two nations will reach a stage of free association. The same applies to the opposition between bourgeois democracy and proletarian democracy; at a higher stage for both of them, there will be the epoch in which there will be no States nor governments, and this will be arrived at through proletarian democracy. The law of the excluded middle in formal logic also supplements the law of identity of formal logic, which recognizes only the fixed condition of a concept and opposes its development, opposes qualitative leaps, and opposes the negation of the negation.
It can be seen, therefore, that all the laws of formal logic oppose contradictoriness and advocate identity, oppose development and change and advocate solidification and immobility. This is in direct opposition to dialectics.
Why does formal logic advocate these things? Because it observes things separate from their continuous mutual function and interconnections; that is, it observes things at rest rather than in motion, and as separate rather than connected things. Therefore, it is not possible for it to consider and acknowledge the importance of contradictoriness and the negation of the negation within things and concepts, and so it advocates the rigid and inflexible law of identity.
Dialectics, in contrast, observes things in motion and in connection and is in direct opposition to the law of identity of formal logic, advocating instead the revolutionary law of contradiction.
Dialectics considers that contradictions in thought are only the reflection of objective external contradictions. Dialectics does not ritualistically adhere to two principles which appear externally to be in a state of mutual conflict (for example, the many antinomies raised by Kant in his four contradictory principles, to which I referred above), but sees through the external appearance of things to their internal essence. The task of dialectics is to perform the task that formal logic has not carried out ─ study of an object ─ to concentrate attention on finding out the strength of its internal contradictions, their tendencies, their aspects, and the fixed nature of their internal relations. The external world and human thought are both in motion and are dialectical; they are not static and metaphysical. For this reason, the revolutionary law of contradiction (namely, the principle of the unity of opposites) occupies the main position in dialectics.
The entirety of formal logic has only one nucleus, and that is the reactionary law of identity. The entirety of dialectics also has only one nucleus, and that is the revolutionary law of contradiction.
Does dialectics oppose the identity of things or concepts? It does not. Dialectics recognizes the relative identity (unity) of things or concepts. Why, then, does dialectics oppose the law of identity of formal logic? It is because the law of identity of formal logic is an absolute law, which rejects contradictions. Dialectics acknowledges the unity of things or concepts, but asserts that they simultaneously contain contradictions and are interconnected; this kind of unity indicates the interconnection of contradictions; it is relative and temporary. Since the law of identity of formal logic is an absolute law, which rejects contradictions, it cannot but advance the law of the excluded middle, which opposes one thing or concept changing into another thing or concept. Dialectics, however, regards the unity of a thing or concept as temporary, relative, and conditional; because the struggle of opposites guides the regularities of change and development of a thing or concept, such struggle is forever absolute and unconditional. Because formal logic does not reflect a thing in its true condition, dialectics cannot allow its existence. There is only one scientific truth, and that is dialectics.
#3.5. THE UNIVERSALITY OF CONTRADICTION
For convenience of exposition, I shall deal first with the universality of contradiction and then proceed to the particularity of contradiction. The reason is that the universality of contradiction can be explained more briefly, for it has been widely recognized ever since the materialist-dialectical worldview was discovered and materialist dialectics applied with outstanding success to analysing many aspects of human history and natural history and to changing many aspects of society and nature (as in the Council Union) by the great creators and continuators of Marxism ─ Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin; whereas the particularity of contradiction is still not clearly understood by many comrades, and especially by the dogmatists. They do not understand that it is precisely in the particularity of contradiction that the universality of contradiction resides. Nor do they understand how important is the study of the particularity of contradiction in the concrete things confronting us for guiding the course of revolutionary practice. Therefore, it is necessary to stress the study of the particularity of contradiction and to explain it at adequate length. For this reason, in our analysis of the law of contradiction in things, we shall first analyse the universality of contradiction, then place special stress on analysing the particularity of contradiction, and finally return to the universality of contradiction.
The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a two-fold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end.
Engels said: «Motion itself is a contradiction.»3 Lenin defined the law of the unit of opposites as «the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including mind and society)».1 Are these ideas correct? Yes, they are. The interdependence of the contradictory aspects present in all things and the struggle between these aspects determine the life of all things and push their development forward. There is nothing that does not contain contradiction; without contradiction, nothing would exist. As a result, the law of contradiction is the most universal law, applicable to all phenomena of the objective world and also to the phenomena of thought. Within dialectics, it is the most fundamental law and has decisive significance.
Why do we say that contradiction is motion? Haven't there been those who have disputed Engels's assertion? This is because the theory of contradiction discussed by Marx, Engels, and Lenin has become the most important theoretical basis for the proletarian revolution. This has led to all-out attacks by bourgeois theoreticians, who constantly hope to overturn Engels's law that motion is contradiction. Upholding their obstreperous refutations, they have, moreover, produced the following reasons: the motion of things in the real world is in different instances of time and through different points in space; when a thing is positioned at a certain point, it occupies that point, and when it moves to another point, it occupies that other point. In this way, the motion of things in time and space is divided into many sections; there are no contradictions, for if there were contradictions, there could be no motion.
Lenin pointed out the absurdity of this reasoning, pointed out that this reasoning in fact, by observing continuous motion as many sections in time and space and as many static conditions, results in negating motion. They do not know that, when a thing occupies a new position, it is because the thing has moved in space from one point to another as a result of motion. Without the contradiction of motion, in which a thing occupies one point and at the same time does not occupy one point, and, without this continuous and interrupted unity, the unity of motion and rest, inaction and action, motion would be fundamentally impossible. To negate contradiction is to negate motion. All motion in nature, society, and thought is contradictory motion.
Contradiction is the basis of the simple forms of motion (for instance, mechanical motion) and still more so of the complex forms of motion.
Engels explained the universality of contradiction as follows:
If simple mechanical change of position contains a contradiction, this is even more true of the higher forms of motion of matter, and especially of organic life and its development. [...] life consists precisely and primarily in this — that a being is at each moment itself and yet something else. Life is therefore also a contradiction which is present in things and processes themselves, and which constantly originates and resolves itself; and as soon as the contradiction ceases, life, too, comes to an end, and death steps in. We likewise saw that also in the sphere of thought we could not escape contradictions, and that for example the contradiction between humanity's inherently unlimited capacity for knowledge and its actual presence only in people who are externally limited and possess limited cognition finds its solution in what is — at least practically, for us — an endless succession of generations, in infinite progress. [...] one of the fundamental principles of higher mathematics is the contradiction that, in certain circumstances, straight lines and curves may be the same. [...]
But even lower mathematics teems with contradictions.3
Lenin illustrated the universality of contradiction as follows:
In mathematics: addition and subtraction, differential and integral. In mechanics: action and reaction. In physics: positive and negative electricity. In chemistry: the combination and dissociation of atoms. In social science: the class struggle.1
In war, offence and defence, advance and retreat, victory and defeat, are all mutually contradictory phenomena. One cannot exist without the other. The two aspects are at once in conflict and in interdependence, and this constitutes the totality of a war, pushes its development forward and solves its problems.
Every difference in people's concepts should be regarded as reflecting an objective contradiction. Objective contradictions are reflected in subjective thinking, and this process constitutes the contradictory movement of concepts, pushes forward the development of thought, and ceaselessly solves problems in people's thinking.
Opposition and struggle between ideas of different kinds constantly occur within the Party; this is a reflection within the Party of contradictions between classes and between the new and the old in society. If there were no contradictions in the Party and no ideological struggles to resolve them, the Party's life would come to an end.
Thus, it is already clear that contradiction exists universally and in all processes, whether in the simple or in the complex forms of motion, whether in objective phenomena or ideological phenomena. But does contradiction also exist at the initial stage of each process? Is there a movement of opposites from beginning to end in the process of development of every single thing?
As can be seen from the articles written by Soviet philosophers criticizing it, the Deborin school maintains that contradiction appears, not at the inception of a process, but only when it has developed to a certain stage. If this were the case, then the cause of the development of the process before that stage would be external and not internal. Deborin thus reverts to the metaphysical theories of external causality and of mechanism. Applying this view in the analysis of concrete problems, the Deborin school sees only differences but not contradictions between the rich peasants and the poor and middle peasants under existing conditions in the Council Union, thus entirely agreeing with Buharin. In analysing the Great French Revolution, it holds that, before the revolution, there were likewise only differences, but not contradictions, within the Third Estate, which was composed of the workers, the peasants, and the bourgeoisie. These views of the Deborin school are anti-Marxist. This school does not understand that each and every difference already contains contradiction and that difference itself is contradiction. Labour and capital have been in contradiction ever since the two classes came into being, only at first, the contradiction had not yet become intense. Even under the social conditions existing in the Council Union, there is a difference between workers and peasants, and this very difference is a contradiction, although, unlike the contradiction between labour and capital, it will not become intensified into antagonism or assume the form of class struggle; the workers and the peasants have established a firm alliance in the course of socialist construction and are gradually resolving this contradiction in the course of the advance from socialism to communism. The question is one of different kinds of contradiction, not of the presence or absence of contradiction. Contradiction is universal and absolute, it is present in the process of development of all things and permeates every process from beginning to end.
What is meant by the emergence of a new process? The old unity with its constituent opposites yields to a new unity with its constituent opposites, whereupon a new process emerges to replace the old. The old process ends and the new one begins. The new process contains new contradictions and begins its own history of the development of contradictions.
As Lenin pointed out, Marx in his Capital gave a model analysis of this movement of opposites, which runs through the process of development of things from beginning to end. This is the method that must be employed in studying the development of all things. Lenin, too, employed this method correctly and adhered to it in all his writings.
In his Capital, Marx first analyses the simplest, most ordinary and fundamental, most common and everyday relation of bourgeois (commodity) society, a relation encountered billions of times, that is to say, the exchange of commodities. In this very simple phenomenon (in this «cell» of bourgeois society) analysis reveals all the contradictions (or the germs of all the contradictions) of modern society. The subsequent exposition shows us the development (both growth and movement) of these contradictions and of this society in the summation of its individual parts, from its beginning to its end.
Such must also be the method of exposition (or study) of dialectics in general [...].1
Chinese Communists must learn this method; only then will they be able correctly to analyse the history and the present state of the Chinese revolution and infer its future.
#3.6. THE PARTICULARITY OF CONTRADICTION
Contradiction is present in the process of development of all things; it permeates the process of development of each thing from beginning to end. This is the universality and absoluteness of contradiction which we have discussed above. Now let us discuss the particularity and relativity of contradiction.
This problem should be studied on several levels.
First, the contradiction in each form of motion of matter has its particularity. People's knowledge of matter is knowledge of its forms of motion, because there is nothing in this world except matter in motion, and this motion must assume certain forms. In considering each form of motion of matter, we must observe the points which it has in common with other forms of motion. But what is especially important and necessary, constituting as it does the basis of our knowledge of a thing, is to observe what is particular to this form of motion of matter, namely, to observe the qualitative difference between this form of motion and other forms. Only when we have done so can we distinguish between things. Every form of motion contains within itself its own particular contradiction. This particular contradiction constitutes the particular essence which distinguishes one thing from another. It is the internal cause or, as it may be called, the basis for the immense variety of things in the world. There are many forms of motion in nature: mechanical motion, sound, light, heat, electricity, dissociation, combination, and so on. All these forms are interdependent, but, in its essence, each is different from the others. The particular essence of each form of motion is determined by its own particular contradiction. This holds true not only for nature but also for social and ideological phenomena. Every form of society, every form of ideology, has its own particular contradiction and particular essence.
The sciences are differentiated precisely on the basis of the particular contradictions inherent in their respective objects of study. Thus, the contradiction peculiar to a certain field of phenomena constitutes the object of study for a specific branch of science. For example, positive and negative numbers in mathematics; action and reaction in mechanics; positive and negative electricity in physics; dissociation and combination in chemistry; forces of production and relations of production, classes and class struggle, in social science; offence and defence in military science; idealism and materialism, the metaphysical conception of development and the dialectical conception of development, in philosophy; and so on ─ all these are the objects of study of different branches of science, precisely because each branch has its own particular contradiction and particular essence. Of course, unless we understand the universality of contradiction, we have no way of discovering the universal cause or universal basis for the movement or development of things; however, unless we study the particularity of contradiction, we have no way of determining the particular essence of a thing which differentiates it from other things, no way of discovering the particular cause or particular basis for the movement or development of a thing, and no way of distinguishing one thing from another or of demarcating the fields of science.
As regards the sequence in the movement of people's knowledge, there is always a gradual growth from the knowledge of individual and particular things to the knowledge of things in general. Only after a person knows the particular essence of many different things can they proceed to generalization and know the common essence of things. When a person attains the knowledge of this common essence, they use it as a guide and proceed to study various concrete things which have not yet been studied, or studied thoroughly, and to discover the particular essence of each; only thus are they able to supplement, enrich, and develop their knowledge of their common essence and prevent such knowledge from withering or petrifying. These are the two processes of cognition: one, from the particular to the general, and the other, from the general to the particular. Thus cognition always moves in cycles and (so long as scientific method is strictly adhered to) each cycle advances human knowledge a step higher and so makes it more and more profound. Where our dogmatists err on this question is that, on the one hand, they do not understand that we have to study the particularity of contradiction and know the particular essence of individual things before we can adequately know the universality of contradiction and the common essence of things, and that, on the other hand, they do not understand that after knowing the common essence of things, we must go further and study the concrete things that have not yet been thoroughly studied or have only just emerged. Our dogmatists are lazy-bones. They refuse to undertake any painstaking study of concrete things, they regard general truths as emerging out of the void, they turn them into purely abstract unfathomable formulas, and thereby completely deny and reverse the normal sequence by which people come to know truth. Nor do they understand the interconnection of the two processes in cognition ─ from the particular to the general and then from the general to the particular. They understand nothing of the Marxist theory of knowledge.
It is necessary not only to study the particular contradiction and the essence determined thereby of every great system of the forms of motion of matter, but also to study the particular contradiction and the essence of each process in the long course of development of each form of motion of matter. In every form of motion, each process of development which is real (and not imaginary) is qualitatively different. Our study must emphasize and start from this point.
Qualitatively different contradictions can only be resolved by qualitatively different methods. For instance, the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is resolved by the method of socialist revolution; the contradiction between the great masses of the people and the feudal system is resolved by the method of democratic revolution; the contradiction between the colonies and imperialism is resolved by the method of national-revolutionary war; the contradiction between the working class and the peasant class in socialist society is resolved by the method of collectivization and mechanization in agriculture; contradiction within the Communist Party is resolved by the method of criticism and self-criticism; the contradiction between society and nature is resolved by the method of developing the productive forces. Processes change, old processes and old contradictions disappear, new processes and new contradictions emerge, and the methods of resolving contradictions differ accordingly. In Russia, there was a fundamental difference between the contradiction resolved by the March Revolution and the contradiction resolved by the November Revolution, as well as between the methods used to resolve them. The principle of using different methods to resolve different contradictions is one which Marxist-Leninists must strictly observe. The dogmatists do not observe this principle; they do not understand that conditions differ in different kinds of revolution and so do not understand that different methods should be used to resolve different contradictions; on the contrary, they invariably adopt what they imagine to be an unalterable formula and arbitrarily apply it everywhere, which only causes setbacks to the revolution or makes a sorry mess of what was originally well done.
In order to reveal the particularity of the contradictions in any process in the development of a thing, in their totality or interconnections, that is, in order to reveal the essence of the process, it is necessary to reveal the particularity of the two aspects of each of the contradictions in that process; otherwise it will be impossible to discover the essence of the process. This likewise requires the utmost attention in our study.
There are many contradictions in the course of development of any major thing. For instance, in the course of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution, where the conditions are exceedingly complex, there exist the contradiction between all the oppressed classes in Chinese society and imperialism, the contradiction between the great masses of the people and feudalism, the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the contradiction between the peasantry and the urban small bourgeoisie on the one hand and the bourgeoisie on the other, the contradiction between the various reactionary ruling groups, and so on. These contradictions cannot be treated in the same way since each has its own particularity; moreover, the two aspects of each contradiction cannot be treated in the same way, since each aspect has its own characteristics. We who are engaged in the Chinese revolution should not only understand the particularity of these contradictions in their totality, that is, in their interconnections, but should also study the two aspects of each contradiction as the only means of understanding the totality. When we speak of understanding each aspect of a contradiction, we mean understanding what specific position each aspect occupies, what concrete forms it assumes in its interdependence and in its contradiction with its opposite, and what concrete methods are employed in the struggle with its opposite, when the two are both interdependent and in contradiction, and also after the interdependence breaks down. It is of great importance to study these problems. Lenin meant just this when he said that the most essential thing in Marxism, the living soul of Marxism, is the concrete analysis of concrete conditions. Our dogmatists have violated Lenin's teachings; they never use their brains to analyse anything concretely, and, in their writings and speeches, they always use stereotypes devoid of content, thereby creating a very bad style of work in our Party.
In studying a problem, we must shun subjectivity, one-sidedness and superficiality. To be subjective means not to look at problems objectively, that is, not to use the materialist standpoint in looking at problems. I have discussed this in Section 2.11 above. To be one-sided means not to look at problems all-sidedly, for example, to understand only China but not Japan, only the Communist Party but not the Nationalist Party, only the proletariat but not the bourgeoisie, only the peasants but not the landlords, only the favourable conditions but not the difficult ones, only good-mannered people but not bad-mannered people, only the past but not the future, only oneself but not others, only individual parts but not the whole, only the defects but not the achievements, only the plaintiff's case but not the defendant's, only secret revolutionary work but not open revolutionary work, and so on. In a word, it means not to understand the characteristics of both aspects of a contradiction. This is what we mean by looking at a problem one-sidedly. Or it may be called seeing the part but not the whole, seeing the trees but not the forest. That way it is impossible to find the method for resolving a contradiction, it is impossible to accomplish the tasks of the revolution, to carry out assignments well or to develop inner-Party ideological struggle correctly. When Sun Wu said in discussing military science, «Know the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles with no danger of defeat»,23 he was referring to the two sides in a battle. Wei Zheng24 of the Tang Dynasty also understood the error of one-sidedness when he said: «Listen to both sides and you will be enlightened, heed only one side and you will be benighted.» But our comrades often look at problems one-sidedly, and so they often run into snags. In the countryside, if two families or clans are engaged in conflict, the mediator must recognize the reasons for the conflict on both sides, the bone of contention, the present situation, the demands, and so on; only then will they be able to think up a method of resolving the dispute. There are such people in the countryside who are good at mediation, and they are constantly invited to mediate when a dispute arises; these people actually understand the dialectics of which we speak, the need to understand the particular characteristics of the various aspects of a contradiction. In the novel Water Margin, Song Jiang thrice attacked Zhu Village.25 Twice he was defeated, because he was ignorant of the local conditions and used the wrong method. Later, he changed his method; first, he investigated the situation, and he familiarized himself with the maze of roads, then he broke up the alliance between the Li, Hu, and Zhu Villages and sent his troops in disguise into the enemy camp to lie in wait, using a stratagem similar to that of the Trojan Horse in the foreign story. And, on the third occasion, he won. There are many examples of materialist dialectics in Water Margin, of which the episode of the three attacks on Zhu Village is one of the best. Lenin said:
[...] if we are to have a true knowledge of an object, we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and «mediacies». That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely, but the rule of comprehensiveness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity.26
We should remember his words. To be superficial means to consider neither the characteristics of a contradiction in its totality nor the characteristics of each of its aspects; it means to deny the necessity for probing deeply into a thing and minutely studying the characteristics of its contradiction, but instead merely to look from afar and, after glimpsing the rough outline, immediately to try to resolve the contradiction (to answer a question, settle a dispute, handle work, or direct a military operation). This way of doing things is bound to lead to trouble. The reason the dogmatist and empiricist comrades in China have made mistakes lies precisely in their subjectivist, one-sided, and superficial way of looking at things. To be one-sided and superficial is at the same time to be subjective. For all objective things are actually interconnected and are governed by inner laws, but instead of undertaking the task of reflecting things as they really are some people only look at things one-sidedly or superficially and who know neither their interconnections nor their inner laws, and so their method is subjectivist.
Not only does the whole process of the movement of opposites in the development of a thing, both in their interconnections and in each of the aspects, have particular features to which we must give attention, but each stage in the process has its particular features to which we must give attention, too.
The fundamental contradiction in the process of development of a thing and the essence of the process determined by this fundamental contradiction will not disappear until the process is completed; but, in a lengthy process, the conditions usually differ at each stage. The reason is that, although the nature of the fundamental contradiction in the process of development of a thing and the essence of the process remain unchanged, the fundamental contradiction becomes more and more intensified as it passes from one stage to another in the lengthy process. In addition, among the numerous major and minor contradictions which are determined or influenced by the fundamental contradiction, some become intensified, some are temporarily or partially resolved or mitigated, and some new ones emerge; hence, the process is marked by stages. If people do not pay attention to the stages in the process of development of a thing, they cannot deal with its contradictions properly.
For instance, when the capitalism of the era of free competition developed into imperialism, there was no change in the class nature of the two classes in fundamental contradiction, namely, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, or in the capitalist essence of society; however, the contradiction between these two classes became intensified, the contradiction between monopoly and non-monopoly capital emerged, the contradiction between the various monopoly groups emerged, the contradiction between capital export and commodity export emerged, the contradiction between the colonial powers and the colonies became intensified, the contradiction among the capitalist countries resulting from their uneven development manifested itself with particular sharpness, and thus there arose the special stage of capitalism, the stage of imperialism. Leninism is the Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution, precisely because Lenin and Stalin have correctly explained these contradictions and correctly formulated the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution for their resolution.
Take the process of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution, which began with the Revolution of 1911; it, too, has several distinct stages. There are probably still several stages through which this revolution must pass before it is completed. In particular, the revolution in its period of bourgeois leadership and the revolution in its period of proletarian leadership represent two vastly different historical stages. In other words, proletarian leadership has fundamentally changed the whole face of the revolution, has brought about a new alignment of classes, given rise to a tremendous upsurge in the peasant revolution, imparted thoroughness to the revolution against imperialism and feudalism, created the possibility of the transition from the democratic revolution to the socialist revolution, and so on. None of these was possible in the period when the revolution was under bourgeois leadership. Although no change has taken place in the nature of the fundamental contradiction in the process as a whole, that is, in the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic-revolutionary nature of the process (the opposite of which is its semi-colonial and semi-feudal nature), nonetheless this process has passed through several stages of development in the course of more than 20 years; during this time, many great events have taken place ─ the failure of the Revolution of 1911 and the establishment of the regime of the Northern Warlords, the formation of the First National United Front and the Revolution of 1924-27, the breakup of the united front and the desertion of the bourgeoisie to the side of the counter-revolution, the wars among the new warlords, the Agrarian Revolutionary War, the end of the Council Republic, the change in Nationalist policy, the establishment of the Second National United Front, and the War of Resistance Against Japan. These stages are marked by particular features, such as the intensification of certain contradictions (for example, the Agrarian Revolutionary War and the Japanese invasion of the four north-eastern provinces), the partial or temporary resolution of other contradictions (for example, the destruction of the Northern Warlords and our confiscation of the land of the landlords in the Red areas), and the emergence of yet other contradictions (for example, the conflicts among the new warlords, and the landlords' recapture of the land after the loss of our revolutionary base areas in the South).
In studying the particularities of the contradictions at each stage in the process of development of a thing, we must not only observe them in their interconnections or their totality, we must also examine the two aspects of each contradiction.
For instance, consider the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party. Take one aspect, the Nationalist Party of China. In the period of the First National United Front, the Nationalist Party carried out Sun Yixian's «Three Great Policies» of alliance with Russia, cooperation with the Communist Party, and assistance to the peasants and workers; hence, it was revolutionary and vigorous, it was an alliance of various classes for the democratic revolution. After 1927, however, the Nationalist Party changed into its opposite and became a reactionary bloc of the landlords and big bourgeoisie. After the Xi'an Incident in December 1936, it began another change in the direction of ending the civil war and cooperating with the Communist Party for joint opposition to Japanese imperialism. Such have been the particular features of the Nationalist Party in the three stages. Of course, these features have arisen from a variety of causes. Now take the other aspect, the Communist Party of China. In the period of the First National United Front, the Communist Party of China was in its infancy; it courageously led the Revolution of 1924-27, but revealed its immaturity in its understanding of the character, the tasks, and the methods of the revolution, and, consequently, it became possible for Chen Duxiu-ism, which appeared during the latter part of this revolution, to assert itself and bring about the defeat of the revolution. After 1927, the Communist Party courageously led the Agrarian Revolutionary War and created the revolutionary army and revolutionary base areas; however, it committed adventurist errors, which brought about very great losses both to the army and to the base areas. Since 1935, the Party has corrected these errors and has been leading the new united front for resistance to Japan; this great struggle is now developing. At the present stage, the Communist Party is a political party that has gone through the test of two revolutions and acquired a wealth of experience. Such have been the particular features of the Communist Party of China in the three stages. These features, too, have arisen from a variety of causes. Without studying both these sets of features we cannot understand the particular relations between the two political parties during the various stages of their development, namely, the establishment of a united front, the breakup of the united front, and the establishment of another united front. What is even more fundamental for the study of the particular features of the two political parties is the examination of the class basis of the two political parties and the resultant contradictions which have arisen between each political party and other forces at different periods. For instance, in the period of its first cooperation with the Communist Party, the Nationalist Party stood in contradiction to foreign imperialism and was therefore anti-imperialist; on the other hand, it stood in contradiction to the great masses of the people within the country ─ although in words it promised many benefits to the working people, in fact it gave them little or nothing. In the period when it carried on the anti-Communist war, the Nationalist Party collaborated with imperialism and feudalism against the great masses of the people and wiped out all the gains they had won in the revolution, and thereby intensified its contradictions with them. In the present period of the anti-Japanese war, the Nationalist Party stands in contradiction to Japanese imperialism and wants cooperation with the Communist Party, without however relaxing its struggle against the Communist Party and the people or its oppression of them. As for the Communist Party, it has always, in every period, stood with the great masses of the people against imperialism and feudalism, but, in the present period of the anti-Japanese war, it has adopted a moderate policy toward the Nationalist Party and the domestic feudal forces, because the Nationalist Party has expressed itself in favour of resisting Japan. The above circumstances have resulted now in alliance between the two political parties and now in struggle between them, and, even during the periods of alliance, there has been a complicated state of simultaneous alliance and struggle. If we do not study the particular features of both aspects of the contradiction, we shall fail to understand, not only the relations of each political party with the other forces, but also the relations between the two political parties.
It can thus be seen that in studying the particularity of any kind of contradiction ─ the contradiction in each form of motion of matter, the contradiction in each of its processes of development, the two aspects of the contradiction in each process, the contradiction at each stage of a process, and the two aspects of the contradiction at each stage ─ in studying the particularity of all these contradictions, we must not be subjective and arbitrary, but must analyse it concretely. Without concrete analysis, there can be no knowledge of the particularity of any contradiction. We must always remember Lenin's words: the concrete analysis of a concrete situation.
Marx and Engels were the first to provide us with excellent models of such concrete analysis.
When Marx and Engels applied the law of contradiction in things to the study of the socio-historical process, they discovered the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production, they discovered the contradiction between the exploiting and exploited classes and also the resultant contradiction between the economic basis and its superstructure (politics, ideology, and so on), and they discovered how these contradictions inevitably lead to different kinds of social revolution in different kinds of class society.
When Marx applied this law to the study of the economic structure of capitalist society, he discovered that the fundamental contradiction of this society is the contradiction between the social character of production and the private character of ownership. This contradiction manifests itself in the contradiction between the organized character of production in individual enterprises and the anarchic character of production in society as a whole. In terms of class relations, it manifests itself in the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.
Because the range of things is vast and there is no limit to their development, what is universal in one context becomes particular in another. Conversely, what is particular in one context becomes universal in another. The contradiction in the capitalist system between the social character of production and the private ownership of the means of production is common to all countries where capitalism exists and develops; as far as capitalism is concerned, this constitutes the universality of contradiction. But this contradiction of capitalism belongs only to a certain historical stage in the general development of class society; as far as the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production in class society as a whole is concerned, it constitutes the particularity of contradiction. However, in the course of dissecting the particularity of all these contradictions in capitalist society, Marx gave a still more profound, more adequate, and more complete elucidation of the universality of the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production in class society in general.
Since the particular is united with the universal and since the universality as well as the particularity of contradiction is inherent in everything, universality residing in particularity, we should, when studying an object, try to discover both the particular and the universal and their interconnection, to discover both particularity and universality and also their interconnection within the object itself, and to discover the interconnections of this object with the many objects outside it. When Stalin explained the historical roots of Leninism in his famous work, The Foundations of Leninism, he analysed the international situation in which Leninism arose, analysed those contradictions of capitalism which reached their culmination under imperialism, and showed how these contradictions made proletarian revolution a matter for immediate action and created favourable conditions for a direct onslaught on capitalism. What is more, he analysed the reasons why Russia became the cradle of Leninism, why Tsarist Russia became the focus of all the contradictions of imperialism, and why it was possible for the Russian proletariat to become the vanguard of the international revolutionary proletariat. Thus, Stalin analysed the universality of contradiction in imperialism, showing why Leninism is the Marxism of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution, and, at the same time, analysed the particularity of Tsarist Russian imperialism within this general contradiction, showing why Russia became the birthplace of the theory and tactics of proletarian revolution and how the universality of contradiction is contained in this particularity. Stalin's analysis provides us with a model for understanding the particularity and the universality of contradiction and their interconnection.
On the question of using dialectics in the study of objective phenomena, Marx and Engels, and likewise Lenin and Stalin, always enjoin people not to be in any way subjective and arbitrary but, from the concrete conditions in the actual objective movement of these phenomena, to discover their concrete contradictions, the concrete position of each aspect of every contradiction, and the concrete interrelations of the contradictions. Our dogmatists do not have this attitude in study and therefore can never get anything right. We must take warning from their failure and learn to acquire this attitude which is the only correct one in study.
The relationship between the universality and the particularity of contradiction is the relationship between the general character and the individual character of contradiction. By the former, we mean that contradiction exists in and runs through all processes from beginning to end; motion, things, processes, thinking ─ all are contradictions. To deny contradiction is to deny everything. This is a universal truth for all times and all countries, which admits of no exception. Hence the general character, the absoluteness of contradiction. But this general character is contained in every individual character; without individual character, there can be no general character. If all individual character were removed, what general character would remain? It is because each contradiction is particular that individual character arises. All individual character exists conditionally and temporarily, and hence is relative. Su Dongpo stated: «If we look at things through the eyes of change, there is not an instant of stillness in all creation.» In modern terms, it could be said that what he was speaking of was the particularity and relativity of contradiction. «But, if we observe the changelessness of things, then we and alike have no end.» This speaks of the universality and absoluteness of contradiction.
This truth concerning general and individual character, concerning absoluteness and relativity, is the quintessence of the problem of contradiction in things; failure to understand it is tantamount to abandoning dialectics. The ancients used to say that, to master anything, one must be familiar with the Way. From the perspective of today, to master anything, one must be familiar with the law of contradiction.
#3.7. THE PRIMARY CONTRADICTION AND THE PRIMARY ASPECT OF A CONTRADICTION
There are still two points in the problem of the particularity of contradiction which must be singled out for analysis, namely, the primary contradiction and the primary aspect of a contradiction.
There are many contradictions in the process of development of a complex thing, and one of them is necessarily the primary contradiction, whose existence and development determine or influence the existence and development of the other contradictions.
For instance, in capitalist society, the two forces in contradiction, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, form the primary contradiction. The other contradictions, such as those between the remnant feudal class and the bourgeoisie, between the peasant small bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie, between the proletariat and the peasant small bourgeoisie, between the non-monopoly capitalists and the monopoly capitalists, between bourgeois democracy and bourgeois fascism, among the capitalist countries, and between imperialism and the colonies, are all determined or influenced by this primary contradiction.
In a semi-colonial country, such as China, the relationship between the primary contradiction and the secondary contradictions presents a complicated picture. Before a semi-colonial country begins to suffer from imperialist oppression, its primary contradiction is the contradiction between the broad masses of the people and the feudal or semi-feudal system. All other contradictions are determined by this primary contradiction. However, when such a country begins to suffer from imperialist oppression, the internal primary contradiction temporarily changes into a secondary contradiction, and the contradiction between the entire (or almost entire) semi-colonial nation and imperialism becomes the primary one, determining the development of all other contradictions. The status of the primary or secondary contradiction change at this time according to the extent of imperialist oppression and the extent of the people's revolution in the semi-colonial country in question.
For instance, when imperialism launches a war of aggression against such a country, all its various classes, except for some traitors, can temporarily unite in a national war against imperialism. At such a time, the contradiction between imperialism and the country concerned becomes the primary contradiction, while all the contradictions among the various classes within the country (including what was the primary contradiction, between the feudal system and the great masses of the people) are temporarily relegated to a secondary and subordinate position. So it was in China in the Opium War of 1840, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and the Boxer War of 1900, and so it is now in the present Sino-Japanese War. In foreign countries, the American War of Independence, the Boer War, the Philippine War of Independence, and so on, are all examples of this.
But, in another situation, the contradictions change position. When imperialism carries on its oppression not by war, but by milder means ─ political, economic, and cultural ─ the ruling classes in semi-colonial countries capitulate to imperialism, and the two form an alliance for the joint oppression of the masses of the people. At such a time, the masses often resort to civil war against the alliance of imperialism and the feudal classes, while imperialism often employs indirect methods rather than direct action in helping the reactionaries in the semi-colonial countries to oppress the people, and, thus, the internal contradictions become particularly sharp. This is what happened in China in the War of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the Revolutionary War of 1911, the Revolutionary War of 1924-27, and the ten years of Agrarian Revolutionary War after 1927. Wars among the various reactionary ruling groups in the semi-colonial countries, for example, the wars among the warlords in China and Latin America, fall into the same category. In foreign countries, there are examples such as the March and November Revolutions in Russia (Russia, too, had many semi-colonial characteristics), the numerous civil wars in Latin America, and so on.
When a revolutionary civil war develops to the point of threatening the very existence of imperialism and its lackeys, the domestic reactionaries, imperialism often adopts other methods in order to maintain its rule; it either tries to split the revolutionary front from within or sends armed forces to help the domestic reactionaries directly. At such a time, foreign imperialism and domestic reaction stand quite openly at one pole while the masses of the people stand at the other pole, thus forming the primary contradiction, which determines or influences the development of the other contradictions. The assistance given by various capitalist countries to the Russian reactionaries after the November Revolution is an example of armed intervention, and another example is the present Spanish Civil War. Jiang Jieshi's betrayal in 1927 is an example of splitting the revolutionary front.
But whatever happens, there is no doubt at all that, at every stage in the development of a process, there is only one primary contradiction which plays the leading role.
Hence, if in any process there are a number of contradictions, one of them must be the primary contradiction playing the leading and decisive role, while the rest occupy a secondary and subordinate position. Therefore, in studying any complex process in which there are two or more contradictions, we must devote every effort to finding its primary contradiction. Once this primary contradiction is grasped, all problems can be readily solved. This is the method Marx taught us in his study of capitalist society. Likewise, Lenin and Stalin taught us this method when they studied imperialism and the general crisis of capitalism and when they studied the Soviet economy. There are thousands of scholars and people of action who do not understand it, and the result is that, lost in a fog, they are unable to get to the heart of a problem and naturally cannot find a way to resolve its contradictions.
As we have said, one must not treat all the contradictions in a process as being equal, but must distinguish between the primary and the secondary contradictions, and pay special attention to grasping the primary one. But, in any given contradiction, whether primary or secondary, should the two contradictory aspects be treated as equal? Again, no. In any contradiction, the development of the contradictory aspects is uneven. Sometimes, they seem to be in equilibrium, which is however only temporary and relative, while unevenness is absolute. Of the two contradictory aspects, one must be primary and the other secondary. The primary aspect is the one playing the leading role in the contradiction. The nature of a thing is determined mainly by the primary aspect of a contradiction, the aspect which has gained the dominant position.
But this situation is not static; the primary and the secondary aspects of a contradiction transform themselves into each other, and the nature of the thing changes accordingly. In a given process or at a given stage in the development of a contradiction, A is the primary aspect and B is the secondary aspect; at another stage or in another process, the roles are reversed ─ a change determined by the extent of the increase or decrease in the force of each aspect in its struggle against the other in the course of the development of a thing.
We often speak of «the new superseding the old». The supersession of the old by the new is a general, eternal, and inviolable law of the Universe. The transformation of one thing into another, through leaps of different forms in accordance with its essence and external conditions ─ this is the process of the new superseding the old. In each thing, there is contradiction between its new and its old aspects, and this gives rise to a series of struggles with many twists and turns. As a result of these struggles, the new aspect changes from being minor to being major and rises to predominance, while the old aspect changes from being major to being minor and gradually dies out. And the moment the new aspect gains dominance over the old, the old thing changes qualitatively into a new thing. It can thus be seen that the nature of a thing is mainly determined by the primary aspect of the contradiction, the aspect which has gained predominance. When the primary aspect which has gained predominance changes, the nature of a thing changes accordingly.
In capitalist society, capitalism has changed its position from being a subordinate force in the old feudal era to being the dominant force, and the nature of society has accordingly changed from feudal to capitalist. In the new, capitalist era, the feudal forces changed from their former dominant position to a subordinate one, gradually dying out. Such was the case, for example, in Britain and France. With the development of the productive forces, the bourgeoisie changes from being a new class playing a progressive role to being an old class playing a reactionary role, until it is finally overthrown by the proletariat and becomes a class deprived of privately owned means of production and stripped of power, when it, too, gradually dies out. The proletariat, which is much more numerous than the bourgeoisie and grows simultaneously with it but under its rule, is a new force which, initially subordinate to the bourgeoisie, gradually gains strength, becomes an independent class playing the leading role in history, and finally conquers political power and becomes the ruling class. Thereupon, the nature of society changes and the old capitalist society becomes the new socialist society. This is the path already taken by the Council Union, a path that all other countries will inevitably take.
But how do we explain Tsarist Russia? In this cases, the feudal forces still enjoyed superiority, and capitalism was still not the dominant aspect. This was because its contradictory aspects had not yet completed their decisive change. Because of the time period, this change could not take the old historical road, but had to take a road under different historical conditions; that is to say, in which the landlord class and the bourgeoisie changed entirely to a position of being dominated and in which the proletariat and the peasantry rose to occupy the leading position. At present, all countries which have still not completed a capitalist transformation, China included, will take this new road, although they cannot leap over the stage of the democratic revolution; however, this democratic revolution will be led and carried out by the proletariat.
In China, imperialism occupies the primary position in the contradiction in which China has been reduced to a semi-colony, it oppresses the Chinese people, and China has been changed from an independent country into a semi-colonial one. But this state of affairs will inevitably change; in the struggle between the two aspects, the power of the Chinese people, which is growing under the leadership of the proletariat, will inevitably change China from a semi-colony into an independent country, whereas imperialism will be overthrown and Old China will inevitably change into New China.
The change of Old China into New China also involves a change in the relation between the old feudal forces and the new popular forces within the country. The old feudal landlord class will be overthrown, and, from being the ruler, it will change into being the ruled; and this class, too, will gradually die out. From being the ruled, the people, led by the proletariat, will become the rulers. Thereupon, the nature of Chinese society will change, and the old, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society will change into a new-democratic society.
Instances of such reciprocal transformation are found in our past experience. The Qing Dynasty, which ruled China for nearly 300 years, was overthrown in the Revolution of 1911, and the revolutionary Chinese Revolutionary Alliance under Sun Yixian's leadership was victorious for a time. In the Revolutionary War of 1924-27, the revolutionary forces of the Communist-Nationalist alliance in the South changed from being weak to being strong and won victory in the Northern Expedition, while the Northern Warlords, who once ruled the roost, were overthrown. In 1927, the people's forces led by the Communist Party were greatly reduced numerically under the attacks of Nationalist reaction, but with the elimination of opportunism within their ranks, they gradually grew again. In the revolutionary base areas under Communist leadership, the peasants have been transformed from being the ruled to being the rulers, while the landlords have undergone a reverse transformation. It is always so in the world, the new displacing the old, the old being superseded by the new, the old being eliminated to make way for the new, and the new emerging out of the old.
At certain times in the revolutionary struggle, the difficulties outweigh the favourable conditions and so constitute the primary aspect of the contradiction and the favourable conditions constitute the secondary aspect. But, through their efforts, the revolutionaries can overcome the difficulties step by step and open up a favourable new situation; thus, a difficult situation yields place to a favourable one. This is what happened after the failure of the revolution in China in 1927 and during the Long March of the Chinese Red Army. In the present Sino-Japanese War, China is again in a difficult position, but we can change this and fundamentally transform the situation as between China and Japan. Conversely, favourable conditions can be transformed into difficulty if the revolutionaries make mistakes. Thus, the victory of the Revolution of 1924-27 turned into defeat. The revolutionary base areas which grew up in the southern provinces after 1927 had all suffered defeat by 1934. The victory of the Central Red Area in smashing the first, second, third, and fourth «encirclement and suppression» campaigns changed into defeat in the face of the fifth «encirclement and suppression» campaign.
When we engage in study, the same holds good for the contradiction in the passage from ignorance to knowledge. At the very beginning of our study of Marxism, our ignorance of or scanty acquaintance with Marxism stands in contradiction to knowledge of Marxism. But, by assiduous study, ignorance can be transformed into knowledge, scanty knowledge into substantial knowledge, and blindness in the application of Marxism into mastery of its application. Many of our comrades are moving in that direction. The opposite situation is the same; if one refuses to progress when only half the distance has been covered, lets confusion grow in one's mind, or takes the wrong road, then one's knowledge can change into ignorance and correctness into error. Kautsky, Plehanov, Chen Duxiu, and others took this road. Some conceited people within our ranks are also in danger of doing this if they do not change.
I regard all primary and secondary aspects of a contradiction as involved in this mutual change.
Some people think that this is not true of certain contradictions. For instance, in the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production, the productive forces are the primary aspect; in the contradiction between theory and practice, practice is the primary aspect; in the contradiction between the economic basis and the superstructure, the economic base is the primary aspect; and there is no change in their respective positions. This is the mechanical-materialist conception, not the dialectical-materialist conception. True, the productive forces, practice and the economic basis generally play the primary and decisive role; whoever denies this is not a materialist. But it must also be admitted that, in certain conditions, such aspects as the relations of production, theory, and the superstructure in turn manifest themselves in the primary and decisive role. When it is impossible for the productive forces to develop without a change in the relations of production, then the change in the relations of production plays the primary and decisive role. The creation and advocacy of revolutionary theory plays the primary and decisive role in those times of which Lenin said: «Without revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary movement.»16 When a task, no matter which, has to be performed, but there is as yet no guiding line, method, plan, or policy, the primary and decisive thing is to decide on a guiding line, method, plan, or policy. When the superstructure (politics, culture, and so on) obstructs the development of the economic basis, political and cultural changes become primary and decisive. Are we going against materialism when we say this? No. The reason is that, while we recognize that in the general development of history the material determines the mental and social being determines social consciousness, we also ─ and indeed must ─ recognize the reaction of mental on material things, of social consciousness on social being, and of the superstructure on the economic basis. This does not go against materialism; on the contrary, it avoids mechanical materialism and firmly upholds dialectical materialism.
In studying the particularity of contradiction, unless we examine these two facets ─ the primary and the secondary contradictions in a process, and the primary and the secondary aspects of a contradiction ─ that is, unless we examine the distinctive character of these two facets of contradiction, we shall get bogged down in abstractions, be unable to understand contradiction concretely, and consequently be unable to find the correct method of resolving it. The distinctive character or particularity of these two facets of contradiction represents the unevenness of the forces that are in contradiction. Nothing in this world develops absolutely evenly; we must oppose the theory of even development or the theory of equilibrium. Moreover, it is these concrete features of a contradiction and the changes in the primary and secondary aspects of a contradiction in the course of its development that manifest the force of the new superseding the old. The study of the various states of unevenness in contradictions, of the primary and secondary contradictions, and of the primary and the secondary aspects of a contradiction constitutes an essential method by which a revolutionary political party correctly determines its strategic and tactical policies both in political and in military affairs. All Communists must pay attention to it.
#3.8. THE UNITY AND STRUGGLE OF THE ASPECTS OF A CONTRADICTION
When we understand the universality and the particularity of contradiction, we must proceed to study the problem of the unity and struggle of the aspects of a contradiction.
Identity, unity, coincidence, interpenetration, interpermeation, interdependence (or mutual dependence for existence), interconnection, or mutual cooperation ─ all these different terms mean the same thing and refer to the following two points: first, the existence of each of the two aspects of a contradiction in the process of the development of a thing presupposes the existence of the other aspect, and both aspects coexist in a single entity; second, in given conditions, each of the two contradictory aspects transforms itself into its opposite. This is the meaning of identity. Lenin said:
Dialectics is the teaching which shows how opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they become) identical ─ under what conditions they are identical, transforming themselves into one another ─ why the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another.2
What does this passage mean?
The contradictory aspects in every process exclude each other, struggle with each other, and are in opposition to each other. Without exception, they are contained in the process of development of all things and in all human thought. A simple process contains only a single pair of opposites, while a complex process contains more. And in turn, the pairs of opposites are in contradiction to one another. That is how all things in the objective world and all human thought are constituted and how they are set in motion.
This being so, there is an utter lack of identity or unity. How then can one speak of identity or unity?
The fact is that no contradictory aspect can exist in isolation. Without its opposite aspect, each loses the condition for its existence. Just think, can any one contradictory aspect of a thing or of a concept in the human mind exist independently? Without life, there would be no death; without death, there would be no life. Without «above», there would be no «below»; without «below», there would be no «above». Without misfortune, there would be no good fortune; without good fortune, there would be no misfortune. Without facility, there would be no difficulty; without difficulty, there would be no facility. Without landlords, there would be no tenant-peasants; without tenant-peasants, there would be no landlords. Without the bourgeoisie, there would be no proletariat; without the proletariat, there would be no bourgeoisie. Without imperialist oppression of nations, there would be no colonies or semi-colonies; without colonies or semi-colonies, there would be no imperialist oppression of nations. It is so with all opposites; in given conditions, on the one hand, they are opposed to each other, and, on the other, they are interconnected, interpenetrating, interpermeating, and interdependent, and this character is described as unity. In given conditions, all contradictory aspects possess the character of non-unity and hence are described as being in contradiction. But they also possess the character of unity and hence are interconnected. This is what Lenin means when he says that dialectics studies «how opposites can be [...] identical».2 How, then, can they be united? Because each is the condition for the other's existence. This is the first meaning of unity.
But is it enough to say merely that each of the contradictory aspects is the condition for the other's existence, that there is unity between them, and that, consequently, they can coexist in a single entity? No, it is not. The matter does not end with their dependence on each other for their existence; what is more important is their transformation into each other. That is to say, in given conditions, each of the contradictory aspects within a thing transforms itself into its opposite, changes its position to that of its opposite. This is the second meaning of the unity of contradiction.
Why is there identity here, too? You see, by means of revolution the proletariat, at one time the ruled, is transformed into the ruler, while the bourgeoisie, the erstwhile ruler, is transformed into the ruled and changes its position to that originally occupied by its opposite. This has already taken place in the Council Union, as it will take place throughout the world. If there were no interconnection and unity of opposites in given conditions, how could such a change take place?
In the relation between life and death, whether inside an organism or a cell, life is transformed into death; life can never last indefinitely, and, under certain conditions, it moves toward its opposite and changes into death. Under certain conditions, death, too, can produce new life, and death is transformed into life; it is not something which comes to an end with death. One could ask: If there is no connection, involvement, or relation, that is, no unity, between life and death, why is it that the two opposites of life and death are capable of changing into each other?
Neither imperialist oppression of the colonies nor the fate of the colonies to suffer under that oppression can last forever. The imperialists will be overthrown by the revolutionary efforts of their own peoples and the peoples of the colonies, and all countries will be ruled by the people. How about the peoples of the colonies and of the imperialist countries? The day will come when oppression will be discarded and freedom and liberation (the opposite of oppression) will be achieved; because of certain conditions, there are unity and common characteristics between the two aspects.
The regular warfare of the Great Revolution of 1927 changed into the guerrilla warfare of the Red Army, which again subsequently changed into regular warfare. The Agrarian Revolutionary War is now changing into the War of Resistance Against Japan. There emerged unity in these periods because of certain conditions, interpenetration, interpermeation, and alliance between the two opposites.
The Nationalist Party of China, which played a certain positive role at a certain stage in modern Chinese history, became a counter-revolutionary political party after 1927, because of its inherent class nature and because of imperialist blandishments (these being the conditions); but it has been compelled to agree to resist Japan, because of the sharpening of the contradiction between China and Japan, and because of the Communist Party's policy of the united front (these being the conditions). Things in contradiction change into one another, and herein lies a definite unity.
Our agrarian revolution has been a process in which the landlord class owning the land is transformed into a class that has lost its land, while the peasants who once lost their land are transformed into small holders who have acquired land, and it will be such a process once again. In given conditions, having and not having, acquiring and losing, are interconnected; there is unity of the two sides. Under socialism, private peasant ownership is transformed into the public ownership of socialist agriculture; this has already taken place in the Council Union, as it will take place everywhere else. There is a bridge leading from private property to public property, which in philosophy is called unity, or transformation into each other, or interpenetration.
Bourgeois democracy and proletarian democracy are in opposition to one another, but the former invariably changes into the latter; under certain conditions, there are complementary elements produced between opposites.
To raise the national culture is in fact to prepare the conditions for changing to an international culture; to strive for a democratic republic is in fact to prepare the conditions for abolishing the democratic republic and changing to a new government system; and to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat or the dictatorship of the people is in fact to prepare the conditions for abolishing this dictatorship and advancing to the higher stage when all State systems are eliminated. To establish and build the Communist Party is in fact to prepare the conditions for the elimination of the Communist Party and all political parties. To build a revolutionary army under the leadership of the Communist Party and to wage revolutionary war is in fact to prepare the conditions for the permanent elimination of war. These opposites are at the same time complementary.
There are those who say that the Communist Party is internationalist, so it is absolutely incapable of being patriotic at the same time. We declare, however, that we are internationalists, but, at the same time, because we are a political party in a colony (this is the condition), we fight in defence of the homeland and against imperialist oppression. Only when we have first escaped from imperialist oppression can we participate in a worldwide communist society. It is this that allows the two to constitute a unity. Under certain conditions, patriotism and internationalism are both in opposition and complementary. Why is it that the Communist Parties of imperialist countries resolutely oppose patriotism? It is because patriotism in that context has unity only with the interests of the bourgeoisie and is fundamentally opposed to the interests of the proletariat.
There are also those who say that the Communist Party cannot believe in Communism and in the «Three People's Principles» simultaneously. But we declare that, at the present stage, while adhering firmly to the Party's Communist Maximum Programme, the Communist movement in China cannot do otherwise than resolutely lead the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal national-democratic revolution (this is the condition). Therefore, not only do we not oppose the «Three People's Principles», we previously carried out the genuine «Three People's Principles» (nationalism in the form of anti-imperialism, democracy in the form of the Council Power, and the people's livelihood in the form of the agrarian revolution). Moreover, during the past decade, the tradition of the genuine «Three People's Principles» has remained only with the Communist Party. Apart from a few figures, such as Song Qingling, He Xiangning, and Li Xijiu, the Nationalist Party has discarded this tradition. The Communist Party's Minimum Programme, its programme for the democratic revolution, is not in conflict with the genuine «Three People's Principles»; on the contrary, it corresponds to the genuine and revolutionary «Three People's Principles». When we have passed through the democratic stage, we will begin to fight for communism. The «Three People's Principles» and Communism do not constitute a single entity, and the two are in contradiction; in the present and future stages of the revolution, they do not form a single unity, and they are in contradiction. They are, however, both in opposition and complementary; under certain conditions, unity can be created.
War and peace, as everybody knows, transform themselves into each other. War is transformed into peace; for instance, the First World War was transformed into the post-war peace, and the civil war in China has now stopped, giving place to internal peace. Peace is transformed into war; for instance, Nationalist-Communist cooperation was transformed into war in 1927, the peace following Japan's invasion of the four north-eastern provinces is now changing into war, and today's situation of world peace may be transformed into a Second World War. Why is this so? Because in class society, such contradictory things as war and peace have unity in given conditions. The Chinese proletariat and bourgeoisie have agreed upon the Anti-Japanese National United Front; this is one aspect of the contradiction. The proletariat must raise its political consciousness and pay close attention to the political vacillations of the bourgeoisie and its corrupting and destructive effect on the Communist Party, in order to guarantee the independence of the proletarian class and political party; this is the other aspect of the contradiction. A united front of the various political parties and the independence of those political parties are the two aspects of the contradiction constituting the present political movement. There would be no contradiction if one of these two aspects, the Party's right to determine its own policies, was removed. We give the people freedom; this is one aspect. We also suppress the Chinese traitors and wreckers; this is the other aspect. Because of certain conditions, these two aspects ─ freedom and lack of freedom ─ are connected, and it won't do to be without either of them; this is the unity or identity of opposites. The organizational form of the Communists and the Council Power, as well as the anti-Japanese government which we advocate, is democratic centralism; it is democratic, but also centralist, and these two aspects are in unity and struggle, because, under certain conditions, they have unity. The dictatorship of the proletariat in the Council Union, and our workers' and peasants' democratic dictatorship of the past decade, are democratic toward the revolutionary classes; they are also dictatorial toward the counter-revolutionary classes. There is unity between the two opposite extremes.
The resting and training of troops is at the same time a condition for victory in battle; «troops are trained for a thousand days to use them for one morning». To separate and advance is at the same time a condition for a combined attack (develop to attack jointly); retreat and defense are at the same time in order to counter-attack and take the offensive (retreat to advance, and defend to attack). There is no reason for being devious other than that it is the most effective method of wiping out the enemy (be devious to be direct); in order to succeed in the West, make a thrust toward the East (make a feint in the East to attack in the West). Divide the soldiers to win over the masses, in order to facilitate centralization to wipe out the enemy; centralize to wipe out the enemy in order to facilitate the division of soldiers to win over the masses. Order should be resolutely enforced, but, at the same time, freedom of action should be permitted in the context of a unified plan; discipline must be strictly enforced, but, at the same time, conscious activity should be promoted; the statement of individual interest is permissible, but, in the end, it must be subordinated to the group decision; work at the front is important, but work in the rear cannot be discarded or ignored; if one's health is poor, one must think of convalescence; but in times of urgency, one also must think of sacrifice; everybody wants life to be easy, but when economic difficulties arise, one has to suffer; military training is important, and without it, we could not smash the enemy, but political work is also important, for without it, we would be defeated; the abundant experience of old soldiers and cadres is worthwhile and valuable, but if there are no new soldiers and cadres, the war and our work cannot be continued; courage is important, but there must be a stratagem; although Zhang Fei was not bad, in the last analysis, he was not as good as Zhao Zilong. The part of the work which we lead is important, but the part led by others and the work as a whole is also important, if not more important; the small-group mentality is incorrect, and when one's own opinion and that of the group or higher authorities are in contradiction, one's opinion can and should be explained; it is, however, impermissible freely to express that opinion to any other member at a time when the group or higher authorities have not yet given approval, still less to instigate the subordinate members to oppose the higher authorities; the discipline of the minority subordinating itself to the majority, and the lower level subordinating itself to the higher level, is the minimum discipline of the Communist Party and the Red Army. «Good medicine is bitter to the taste, but beneficial for one's conduct. It is on disaster that good fortune perches; it is beneath good fortune that disaster crouches.»21 «To know and yet love their bad qualities, to know and yet hate their good qualities.» To glance ahead but not behind is called being a boorish oaf; to know one but not two is called not yet being a sage.
All contradictory things are interconnected; not only do they coexist in a single entity in given conditions, but in other given conditions, they also transform themselves into each other. This is the full meaning of the identity of opposites. This is what Lenin meant when he discussed «how they happen to be (how they become) identical ─ under what conditions they are identical, transforming themselves into one another».2
Why is it that «the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another»?2 Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary, and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite. Reflected in people's thinking, this becomes the Marxist worldview of materialist dialectics. It is only the reactionary ruling classes of the past and present and the metaphysicians in their service who regard opposites, not as living, conditional, mobile, and transforming themselves into one another, but as dead and rigid, and they propagate this fallacy everywhere to delude the masses of the people, thus seeking to perpetuate their rule. The task of Communists is to expose the fallacies of the reactionaries and metaphysicians, to propagate the dialectics inherent in things, and so accelerate the transformation of things and achieve the goal of revolution.
In speaking of the unity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another. There are innumerable transformations in mythology, for instance, Gua Fu's race with the Sun in the Book of Mountains and Seas,27 Yi's shooting down of nine suns in The Writings of the Huainan Masters,28 the Monkey King's 72 metamorphoses in Journey to the West,29 the numerous episodes of ghosts and foxes metamorphosed into human beings in the Strange Tales of Liao Zhai,30 and so on. But these legendary transformations of opposites are not concrete changes reflecting concrete contradictions. They are naive, imaginary, subjectively conceived transformations conjured up in people's minds by innumerable real and complex transformations of opposites into one another. Marx said: «All mythology subdues, dominates, and fashions the forces of nature in the imagination and through the imagination; it therefore disappears when real domination over these forces is established.»31 The myriads of changes in mythology (and also in nursery tales) delight people, because they imaginatively picture humanity's conquest of the forces of nature, and the best myths possess «eternal charm»,31 as Marx put it; but myths are not built out of the concrete contradictions existing in given conditions and therefore are not a scientific reflection of reality. That is to say, in myths or nursery tales, the aspects constituting a contradiction have only an imaginary unity, not a concrete identity. The scientific reflection of the unity in real transformations is Marxist dialectics.
Why can an egg, but not a stone, be transformed into a chicken? Why is there unity between war and peace and none between war and a stone? Why can human beings give birth only to human beings and not to anything else? The sole reason is that the unity of opposites exists only in necessary given conditions. Without these necessary given conditions, there can be no unity whatsoever.
Why is it that in Russia in 1917, the bourgeois-democratic March Revolution was directly linked with the proletarian-socialist November Revolution, while in France, the bourgeois revolution was not directly linked with a socialist revolution and the Paris Commune of 1871 ended in failure? Why is it, on the other hand, that the nomadic system of Mongolia and Central Asia has been directly linked with socialism? Why is it that the Chinese revolution can avoid a capitalist future and be directly linked with socialism without taking the old historical road of England, France, the United States, and so on, without passing through a period of bourgeois dictatorship? Why is it that the Russian Revolution of 1905 and the Chinese Revolutions of 1911 and '27 were linked, not with victory, but with failure? Why is it that, for his entire life, most of Napoleon's wars were linked with victory, while, at the Battle of Waterloo, he was roundly defeated, his army beaten, and himself taken prisoner? Why is it possible to build a railroad to Xinjiang and not to the Moon? Why have the cordial relations between Germany and the Council Union turned into enmity, while the enmity between France and the Council Union has turned temporarily into cordial relations? The sole reason is the concrete conditions of the time. When certain necessary conditions are present, certain contradictions arise in the process of development of things and, moreover, the opposites contained in them are interdependent and become transformed into one another; otherwise, none of this would be possible. It is for this reason that none of the following can become a unity of opposites, or a concrete contradiction, and merely add to the material for annoyance and amusement for people:
- Don Quixote's mighty battle with the windmills.
- The Monkey King's somersault of 108'000 li [54'000 kilometres] over the clouds.
- Alice's journey through Wonderland.
- Robinson Crusoe's wanderings on his lone island.
- Ah Q's spiritual victory.
- Hitler's world domination.
- Hegel's Absolute Idea.
- Buharin's theory of equilibrium.
- Trotskij's permanent revolution.
- The ideological unity of the Emperor's scholars.
- Chen Duxiu's opportunism.
- The theory that «weapons decide everything» of the pro-Japanese faction.
Such is the problem of unity. What then is struggle? And what is the relation between unity and struggle?
Lenin said:
The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute.1
What does this passage mean?
All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute. The unity, identity, consistency, constancy, and union of opposites are contained within the struggle of opposites and become an element in the struggle of opposites. That is the meaning of Lenin's statement.
There are two states of motion in all things, that of relative rest and that of conspicuous change. Both are caused by the struggle between the two contradictory elements contained in a thing. When the thing is in the first state of motion, it is undergoing only quantitative and not qualitative change and consequently presents the outward appearance of being at rest. When the thing is in the second state of motion, the quantitative change of the first state has already reached a culminating point and gives rise to the dissolution of the thing as an entity and thereupon a qualitative change ensues, hence the appearance of a conspicuous change. Such unity, solidarity, combination, harmony, balance, stalemate, deadlock, rest, constancy, equilibrium, solidity, attraction, and so on, as we see in daily life, are all the appearances of things in the state of quantitative change. On the other hand, the dissolution of unity, that is, the destruction of this solidarity, combination, harmony, balance, stalemate, deadlock, rest, constancy, equilibrium, solidity, and attraction, and the change of each into its opposite are all the appearances of things in the state of qualitative change, the transformation of one process into another. Things are constantly transforming themselves from the first into the second state of motion; the struggle of opposites goes on in both states but the contradiction is resolved through the second state. That is why we say that the unity of opposites is conditional, temporary and relative, while the struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute.
When we said above that two opposite things can coexist in a single entity and can transform themselves into each other because there is unity between them, we were speaking of conditionality, that is to say, in given conditions, two contradictory things can be united and can transform themselves into each other, but in the absence of these conditions, they cannot constitute a contradiction, cannot coexist in the same entity, and cannot transform themselves into one another. It is because the unity of opposites exists only in given conditions that we have said unity is conditional and relative. We may add that the struggle between opposites permeates a process from beginning to end and makes one process transform itself into another, that it is ubiquitous, and that struggle is therefore unconditional and absolute.
The combination of conditional, relative identity, and unconditional, absolute struggle constitutes the movement of opposites in all things.
We Chinese often say: «Things that oppose each other also complement each other.»32 That is, things opposed to each other have unity. This saying is dialectical and contrary to metaphysics. «Oppose each other» refers to the mutual exclusion or the struggle of two contradictory aspects. «Complement each other» means that, in given conditions, the two contradictory aspects unite and achieve unity. Yet struggle is inherent in unity, and without struggle, there can be no unity.
In unity, there is struggle; in particularity, there is universality; and, in individuality, there is generality. To quote Lenin: «There is an absolute within the relative.»1 Because of this, the unity of opposites is itself a manifestation or an element of the struggle of opposites. This is our conclusion with regard to this problem.
According to this conclusion, it is perfectly evident whether the theories of so-called class harmony and unity of public opinion still have any standing. The theory of international class harmony becomes the opportunism of the labour movements in every country, and it has no function other than for the opportunists simply to serve as the lackeys of the bourgeoisie. China, too, has a theory of so-called class harmony, but this is a tune sung by bourgeois reformism. It has no purpose other than specifically to swindle the proletariat, so that it will remain forever the slave of the bourgeoisie. The meaningless cliche of the theory of so-called unity of public opinion directly or indirectly depends on the nonsense spewed by bureaucrats that something is «the learned opinion of the scholars». Its purpose is nothing but the suppression of truth and the obstruction of revolutionary progress. The only true, scientific theory is the law of the unity of opposites of materialist dialectics, and not these other melodies.
#3.9. THE PLACE OF ANTAGONISM IN CONTRADICTION
The question of the struggle of opposites includes the question of what is antagonism. Our answer is that antagonism is one form, but not the only form, of the struggle of opposites. When certain contradictions in a certain process of development adopt a form in which force becomes overt and there is mutual conflict, the struggle of opposites manifests itself as antagonism.
In human history, antagonism between classes exists as a particular manifestation of the struggle of opposites. Consider the contradiction between the exploiting and the exploited classes. Such contradictory classes coexist for a long time in the same society, be it slave society, feudal society, or capitalist society, and they struggle with each other; but it is not until the contradiction between the two classes develops to a certain stage that it assumes the form of open antagonism and develops into revolution. The same holds for the transformation of peace into war in class society.
Before it explodes, a bomb is a single entity in which opposites coexist in given conditions. The explosion takes place only when a new condition, ignition, is present. An analogous situation arises in all those natural phenomena which finally assume the form of open conflict to resolve old contradictions and produce new things.
It is highly important to grasp this fact. It enables us to understand that revolutions and revolutionary wars are inevitable in class society and that, without them, it is impossible to accomplish any leap in social development and to overthrow the reactionary ruling classes and therefore impossible for the people to win political power. Communists must expose the deceitful propaganda of the reactionaries, such as the assertion that social revolution is unnecessary and impossible. They must firmly uphold the Marxist-Leninist theory of social revolution and enable the people to understand that social revolution is not only entirely necessary, but also entirely practicable, and that the whole of human history and the triumph of the Council Union have confirmed this scientific truth.
However, we must make a concrete study of the circumstances of each specific struggle of opposites and should not arbitrarily apply the formula discussed above to everything. Contradiction and struggle are universal and absolute, but the methods of resolving contradictions, that is, the forms of struggle, differ according to the differences in the nature of the contradictions. Some contradictions are characterized by open antagonism, others are not. In accordance with the concrete development of things, some contradictions which were originally non-antagonistic develop into antagonistic ones, while others which were originally antagonistic develop into non antagonistic ones.
As already mentioned, so long as classes exist, contradictions between correct and incorrect ideas in the Communist Party are reflections within the Party of class contradictions. At first, with regard to certain issues, such contradictions may not manifest themselves as antagonistic. But with the development of the class struggle, they may grow and become antagonistic. The history of the Communist Party of the Council Union shows us that the contradictions between the correct thinking of Lenin and Stalin and the fallacious thinking of Trotskij, Buharin, and others did not at first manifest themselves in an antagonistic form, but that later they did develop into antagonism. There are similar cases in the history of the Communist Party of China. At first, the contradictions between the correct thinking of many of our Party comrades and the fallacious thinking of Chen Duxiu, Zhang Guotao, and others also did not manifest themselves in an antagonistic form, but later they did develop into antagonism. At present, the contradiction between correct and incorrect thinking in our Party does not manifest itself in an antagonistic form, and if comrades who have committed mistakes can correct them, it will not develop into antagonism. Therefore, the Party must, on the one hand, wage a serious struggle against erroneous thinking, and, on the other, give the comrades who have committed errors ample opportunity to wake up. This being the case, excessive struggle is obviously inappropriate. But if the people who have committed errors persist in them and aggravate them, there is the possibility that this contradiction will develop into antagonism.
Economically, the contradiction between city and countryside is an extremely antagonistic one, both in capitalist society, where under the rule of the bourgeoisie the cities ruthlessly plunder the countryside, and in the White areas in China, where under the rule of foreign imperialism and the Chinese big comprador bourgeoisie the cities most rapaciously plunder the countryside. But in a socialist country and in our revolutionary base areas, this antagonistic contradiction has changed into one that is non-antagonistic; and when communist society is reached, it will be abolished.
Buharin regards contradiction and antagonism as one and the same thing. He therefore considers that, in a socialist society, there is neither antagonism nor contradiction. In response to this theory, Lenin said: «Antagonism and contradiction are not at all one and the same. Under socialism, the first will disappear, the second will remain.»33 That is to say, antagonism is one form, but not the only form, of the struggle of opposites; the formula of antagonism cannot be arbitrarily applied everywhere.
Buharin is an advocate of the theory of equilibrium, which refuses to recognize that the development of a thing results from the motion of internal contradictions and considers that society will continue to develop under socialism precisely because it assumes that there are no contradictions.
Trotskij sets out from a different extreme, but also regards contradiction and antagonism as one and the same thing. As a result, he considers that, under socialism, a contradiction between the workers and the peasants not only exists, but will develop in an antagonistic way, just like the contradiction between labour and capital, which can be resolved only by employing revolutionary methods. The Council Union, however, has used the method of the socialization of agriculture to resolve this contradiction, and, moreover, has resolved it under the conditions of socialism in one country, without having to wait for the world revolution alleged by the Trotskijites to be necessary for its resolution.
Buharin has reduced contradiction to the point of elimination, while Trotskij has elevated contradiction to the point of antagonism; neither of the two extremes, neither the Far Right nor the «Far Left», understands the problem of contradiction.
The method for resolving an ordinary contradiction is fundamentally different from the method for resolving an antagonistic contradiction; this is the particularity of contradiction and of the method for solving contradictions. Specific attention should be paid to this problem. All antagonisms are contradictions, but not all contradictions necessarily take on an antagonistic form, and here we have the general distinction between the two.
#3.10. CONCLUSION
We may now say a few words to sum up.
The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the fundamental law of nature and of society and therefore also the fundamental law of thought ─ the law of contradiction is the most fundamental law of the Universe. It stands opposed to the metaphysical concept of development and to the absolute law of identity of formal logic. It represents a great revolution in the history of human knowledge. According to dialectical materialism, contradiction is present in all processes of objectively existing things and of subjective thought and permeates all these processes from beginning to end; this is the universality and absoluteness of contradiction. Each contradiction and each of its aspects have their respective characteristics; this is the particularity and relativity of contradiction. In given conditions, opposites possess unity, and consequently can coexist in a single entity and can transform themselves into each other; this again is the particularity and relativity of contradiction. But the struggle of opposites is ceaseless, it goes on both when the opposites are coexisting and when they are transforming themselves into each other, and becomes especially conspicuous when they are transforming themselves into one another; this again is the universality and absoluteness of contradiction. In studying the particularity and relativity of contradiction, we must pay attention to the distinction between the primary contradiction and the secondary contradictions and to the distinction between the primary aspect and the secondary aspect of a contradiction; in studying the universality of contradiction and the struggle of opposites in contradiction, we must pay attention to the distinction between the different forms of struggle. Otherwise, we shall make mistakes. If, through study, we achieve a real understanding of the essentials explained above, we shall be able to demolish dogmatist ideas, which are contrary to the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism and detrimental to our revolutionary cause, and our comrades with practical experience will be able to organize their experience into principles and avoid repeating empiricist errors. These are a few simple conclusions from our study of the law of contradiction.
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Source: Nikolaj Lenin: On the Question of Dialectics (1915) ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
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Source: Nikolaj Lenin: Conspectus of Hegel's Book The Science of Logic (September-December 1914) ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
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Source: Friedrich Engels: Anti-Dühring (September 1876-June 1878) ↩ ↩ ↩
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Source: Nikolaj Lenin: Plan of Hegel's Dialectics (Logic) (1915) ↩
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Source: Friedrich Engels: Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (3rd to 15th of August, 1859) ↩
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Editor's Note: Sima Yi was the powerful general of Cao Cao in ancient times. ↩
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Source: A saying of Dong Zhongshu (179-104 BCE), a well-known exponent of Confucianism in the Han Dynasty. ↩
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Source: Friedrich Engels: Dialectics of Nature (1873-1882) ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
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Source: Nikolaj Lenin: Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (February-October 1908) ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
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Source: Karl Marx: Postface to the 1873 German Edition of Capital, Vol. 1 (24th of January, 1873) ↩
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See: Karl Marx: Theses on Feuerbach (April 1845) and Nikolaj Lenin: Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (February-October 1908) ↩
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Editor's Note: Romance of the Three Kingdoms is a famous Chinese historical novel by Luo Guanzhong (late 14th and early 15th century). ↩
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See: Nikolaj Lenin: Conspectus of Hegel's Book The Science of Logic (September-December 1914), in which Lenin states: «In order to understand, it is necessary empirically to begin understanding, study, to rise from empiricism to the universal.» ↩
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Source: Nikolaj Lenin: What Is To Be Done? (Autumn 1901-February 1902) ↩ ↩
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Source: I.B. Stalin: The Foundations of Leninism (April 1924) ↩
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Source: Nikolaj Lenin: Conspectus of Hegel's Book «Lectures on the History of Philosophy» (1915) ↩
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See: Nikolaj Lenin: On the Question of Dialectics (1915), in which Lenin states: «The splitting in two of a single whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts [...] is the essence (one of the ‹essentials›, one of the main, if not the main, characteristics or features) of dialectics.» See also Nikolaj Lenin: Conspectus of Hegel's Book «The Science of Logic» (September-December 1914), in which Lenin states: «In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This grasps the kernel of dialectics, but it requires explanations and development.» ↩
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Source: Su Shi: On Fan Zeng (11th Century) ↩
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See: Mao Zedong: On Protracted War (May-June 1938) ↩
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See: Mao Zedong: Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War (Autumn-December 1936) ↩
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Editor's Note: Wei Zheng (580-643 CE) was a statesperson and historian of the Tang Dynasty. ↩
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Editor's Note: Water Margin is a celebrated Chinese novel describing a peasant war. The novel is attributed to Shi Nai'an, who lived around the end of the Yuan Dynasty and the beginning of the Ming Dynasty (14th century). The novel was the subject of a mass criticism movement during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, because it promoted the idea of capitulationism. Zhu Village was in the vicinity of Liangshanpo, where Song Jiang, leader of the peasant uprising and hero of the novel, established his base. Zhu Chaofeng, the head of this village, was a despotic landlord. ↩
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Source: Nikolaj Lenin: Once Again on the Trade Unions, the Present Situation, and the Mistakes of Trotskij and Buharin (25th of January, 1921) ↩
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Editor's Note: The Book of Mountains and Seas was written in the era of the Warring States (403-221 BCE). In one of its fables, Kuafu, a superhuman, pursued and overtook the Sun. But he died of thirst, whereupon his staff was transformed into the forest of Deng. ↩
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Editor's Note: Yi is one of the legendary heroes of ancient China, famous for his archery. According to a legend in the Writings of Master Huainan, compiled in the 2nd century BCE, there were ten suns in the sky in the days of Emperor Yao. To put an end to the damage to vegetation caused by these scorching suns, Emperor Yao ordered Yi to shoot them down. In another legend recorded by Wang Yi (2nd century CE), the archer is said to have shot down nine of the ten suns. ↩
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Editor's Note: Pilgrimage to the West is a 16th-century novel, the hero of which is the monkey god Sun Wukong. He could miraculously change at will into 72 different shapes, such as a bird, a tree, and a stone. ↩
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Editor's Note: The Strange Tales of Liao Zhai, written by Pu Songling in the 17th century, is a well-known collection of 431 tales, mostly about ghosts and fox spirits. ↩
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Source: Karl Marx: Capital, Vol. 1 (Before September 1867) ↩ ↩
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Editor's Note: The saying «Things that oppose each other also complement each other» first appeared in the History of the Earlier Han Dynasty by Ban Gu, a celebrated historian in the 1st century CE. It has long been a popular saying. ↩
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Source: Nikolaj Lenin: Remarks on N.I. Buharin's Economics of the Transitional Period (1920) ↩