Goodbye, Leighton Stuart!

#PUBLICATION NOTE

This edition of Goodbye, Leighton Stuart! has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the following editions:

• Farewell, Leighton Stuart!, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Vol. 4, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.
• Farewell, Leighton Stuart!, in Mao's Road to Power, First English Edition, Vol. 10, Routledge, New York and London, 2023.

#INTRODUCTION NOTE

This is a comment written by Comrade Mao Zedong for the New China News Agency in Beijing, China on the 18th of August, 1949. It was first published in the Renmin Ribao (19th of August, 1949).

This is part of a series of six comments on the White Paper of the US State Department and Dean Acheson's Letter of Transmittal. With the exception of the first comment, A Confession of Helplessness (12th of August, 1949), they were written by Comrade Mao Zedong to expose the imperialist nature of US policy toward China, criticize the illusions about US imperialism harboured by some of the bourgeois intellectuals in China, and give a theoretical explanation of the reasons for the rise of the Chinese revolution and for its victory.

The US White Paper, US Relations with China, was published by the US State Department on the 5th of August, 1949. Acheson's Letter of Transmittal to President Truman was dated the 30th of July, 1949. The main body of the White Paper, divided into eight chapters, deals with Sino-US relations in the period from 1844, when the United States forced China to sign the «»Treaty of Wangxia», to 1949, when victory was fundamentally won throughout the country in the Chinese people's revolution. The White Paper goes into particular detail about how, in the five years from the last part of the War of Resistance Against Japan to 1949, the United States pursued a policy of support for Jiang Jieshi and of Anti-Communism, opposed the Chinese people by every possible means and finally met with defeat. The White Paper and Acheson's Letter of Transmittal are full of distortions, omissions, and fabrications, and also of venomous slanders and deep hatred against the Chinese people. In the quarrel within the US reactionary camp over its policy toward China, imperialists like Truman and Acheson were compelled to reveal publicly through the White Paper some of the truth about their counter-revolutionary activities in an attempt to convince their opponents. Thus, in its objective effect, the White Paper became a confession by US imperialism of its crimes of aggression against China.

#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!

#GOODBYE, LEIGHTON STUART!

#THIRD COMMENT ON THE U.S. WHITE PAPER

#Mao Zedong

#18th of August, 1949

#★

It is understandable that the date chosen for the publication of the US White Paper was the 5th of August, a time when Leighton Stuart¹ had departed from Nanjing for Washington, but had not yet arrived there, since Leighton Stuart is a symbol of the complete defeat of the US policy of aggression. Leighton Stuart is an American born in China; he has fairly wide social connections and spent many years running missionary schools in China; he once sat in a Japanese gaol during the War of Resistance; he used to pretend to love both the United States and China and was able to deceive quite a number of Chinese. Hence, he was picked out by George C. Marshall, was made US Ambassador to China, and became a celebrity in the Marshall group. In the eyes of the Marshall group, he had only one fault, namely, that the whole period when he was ambassador to China as an exponent of their policy was the very period in which that policy was utterly defeated by the Chinese people; that was no small responsibility. It is only natural that the White Paper, which is designed to evade this responsibility, should have been published at a time when Leighton Stuart was on his way to Washington, but had not yet arrived.

The war to turn China into a US colony, a war in which the United States of America supplies the money and guns and Jiang Jieshi the troops to fight for the United States and slaughter the Chinese people, has been an important component of the US imperialist policy of worldwide aggression since the Second World War. The US policy of aggression has several targets. The three main targets are Europe, Asia, and the Americas. China, the centre of gravity in Asia, is a large country with a population of 475'000'000; by seizing China, the United States would possess all of Asia. With its Asian front consolidated, US imperialism could concentrate its forces on attacking and defeating Europe. US imperialism considers its front in the Americas relatively secure. These are the smug overall calculations of the US aggressors.

But in the first place, the American people and the peoples of the world do not want war. Secondly, the attention of the United States has largely been absorbed by the awakening of the peoples of Europe, by the rise of the People's Democracies in Eastern Europe, and particularly by the towering presence of the Council Union, this unprecedentedly powerful bulwark of peace bestriding Europe and Asia, and by its strong resistance to the US policy of aggression. Thirdly, and this is most important, the Chinese people have awakened, and the armed forces and the organized strength of the people under the leadership of the Communist Party of China have become more powerful than ever before. Consequently, the ruling clique of US imperialism has been prevented from adopting a policy of direct, large-scale armed attacks on China and instead has adopted a policy of helping Jiang Jieshi fight the civil war.

US naval, ground, and air forces did participate in the war in China. There were US naval bases in Qingdao, Shanghai, and Taiwan. US troops were stationed in Beijing, Tianjin, Tangshan, Qinhuangdao, Qingdao, Shanghai, and Nanjing. The US air force controlled all of China's air space and took aerial photographs of all China's strategic areas for military maps. At the town of Anping near Beijing, at Jiutai near Changchun, at Tangshan, and in the Eastern Shandong Peninsula, US troops and other military personnel clashed with the People's Liberation Army and on several occasions were captured.² Chennault's air fleet took an extensive part in the civil war.³ Besides transporting troops for Jiang Jieshi, the US air force bombed and sank the cruiser Chongqing, which had mutinied against the Nationalist Party. All these were acts of direct participation in the war, although they fell short of an open declaration of war and were not large in scale, and although the main method of US aggression was the large-scale supply of money, munitions, and advisers to help Jiang Jieshi fight the civil war.

The use of this method by the United States was determined by the objective situation in China and the rest of the world, and not by any lack of desire on the part of the Truman-Marshall group, the ruling clique of US imperialism, to launch direct aggression against China. Moreover, at the outset of its help to Jiang Jieshi in fighting the civil war, a crude farce was staged in which the United States appeared as mediator in the conflict between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party; this was an attempt to soften up the Communist Party of China, deceive the Chinese people, and thus gain control of all China without fighting. The peace negotiations failed, the deception fell through and the curtain rose on the war.

Liberals or «democratic individualists» who cherish illusions about the United States and have short memories! Please look at Acheson's own words:

When peace came the United States was confronted with three possible alternatives in China: first, it could have pulled out lock, stock, and barrel; second, it could have intervened militarily on a major scale to assist the Nationalists to destroy the Communists; or, third, it could, while assisting the Nationalists to assert their authority over as much of China as possible, endeavor to avoid a civil war by working for a compromise between the two sides.

Why didn't the United States adopt the first of these policies? Acheson says:

The first alternative would, and I believe American public opinion at the time so felt, have represented an abandonment of our international responsibilities and of our traditional policy of friendship for China before we had made a determined effort to be of assistance.

So that's how things stand: the «international responsibilities» of the United States and its «traditional policy of friendship for China» are nothing but intervention against China. Intervention is called assuming international responsibilities and showing friendship for China; as to non-intervention, it simply won't do. Here, Acheson defiles US public opinion; his is the «public opinion» of Wall Street, not the public opinion of the American people.

Why didn't the United States adopt the second of these policies? Acheson says:

The second alternative policy, while it may look attractive theoretically and in retrospect, was wholly impracticable. The Nationalists had been unable to destroy the Communists during the ten years before the war. Now, after the war, the Nationalists were, as indicated above, weakened, demoralized, and unpopular. They had quickly dissipated their popular support and prestige in the areas liberated from the Japanese by the conduct of their civil and military officials. The Communists, on the other hand, were much stronger than they had ever been and were in control of most of North China. Because of the ineffectiveness of the Nationalist forces, which was later to be tragically demonstrated, the Communists probably could have been dislodged only by American arms. It is obvious that the American people would not have sanctioned such a colossal commitment of our armies in 1945 or later. We therefore came to the third alternative policy.

What a splendid idea! The United States supplies the money and guns and Jiang Jieshi the troops to fight for the United States and slaughter the Chinese people, to «destroy the Communists» and turn China into a US colony, so that the United States may fulfil its «international responsibilities» and carry out its «traditional policy of friendship for China».

Although the Nationalist Party was corrupt and incompetent, «demoralized and unpopular», the United States nevertheless supplied it with money and guns and made it fight. Direct armed intervention was all right, «theoretically». It also seems all right «in retrospect» to the rulers of the United States. For direct armed intervention would really have been interesting and it might «look attractive». But it would not have worked in practice, for «it is obvious that the American people would not have sanctioned» it. Not that the imperialist group of Truman, Marshall, Acheson, and their like did not desire it — they very much desired it — but the situation in China, in the United States, and in the world as a whole (a point Acheson does not mention) did not permit it; they had to give up their preference and take the third way.

Let those Chinese who believe that «victory is possible even without international help» listen. Acheson is giving you a lesson. Acheson is a good teacher, giving lessons free of charge, and he is telling the whole truth with tireless zeal and great candour. The United States refrained from dispatching large forces to attack China, not because the US government didn't want to, but because it had worries. First worry: the Chinese people would oppose it, and the US government was afraid of getting hopelessly bogged down in a quagmire. Second worry: the American people would oppose it, and so the US government dared not order mobilization. Third worry: the people of the Council Union, of Europe, and of the rest of the world would oppose it, and the US government would face universal condemnation. Acheson's charming candour has its limits and he is unwilling to mention the third worry. The reason is: he is afraid of losing face before the Council Union, he is afraid that the Marshall Plan in Europe,⁴ which is already a failure despite pretences to the contrary, may end dismally in total collapse.

Let those Chinese who are short-sighted, muddle-headed Liberals or democratic individualists listen. Acheson is giving you a lesson; he is a good teacher for you. He has made a clean sweep of your fancied US humanity, justice, and virtue. Isn't that so? Can you find a trace of humanity, justice, or virtue in the White Paper or in Acheson's Letter of Transmittal?

True, the United States has science and technology. But unfortunately, they are in the grip of the capitalists, not in the hands of the people, and are used to exploit and oppress the people at home and to perpetrate aggression and to slaughter people abroad. There is also «democracy» in the United States. But unfortunately, it is only another name for the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie by itself. The United States has plenty of money. But unfortunately, it is willing to give money only to the Jiang Jieshi reactionaries, who are rotten to the core. The United States, it is said, is and will be quite willing to give money to its fifth column in China, but is unwilling to give it to the ordinary run of Liberals or democratic individualists, who are much too bookish and do not know how to appreciate favours, and naturally, it is even more unwilling to give money to the Communists. Money may be given, but only conditionally. What is the condition? Follow the United States. The Americans have sprinkled some relief flour in Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai to see who will stoop to pick it up. Like Jiang Taigong fishing,⁵ they have cast the line for the fish who want to be caught. But someone who swallows food handed out in contempt⁶ will get a bellyache.

We Chinese have backbone. Many who were once Liberals or democratic individualists have stood up to the US imperialists and their lackeys, the Nationalist reactionaries. Wen Yiduo rose to his full height and smote the table, angrily faced the Nationalist pistols, and died rather than submit.⁷ Zhu Ziqing, though seriously ill, starved to death rather than accept US «relief food».⁸ Han Yu of the Tang Dynasty wrote a Eulogy of Bo Yi,⁹ praising a man with quite a few «democratic-individualist» ideas, who shirked his duty toward the people of his own country, deserted his post, and opposed the People's War of Liberation of that time, led by King Wu. He lauded the wrong person. We should write eulogies of Wen Yiduo and Zhu Ziqing, who demonstrated the heroic spirit of our nation.

What matter if we have to face some difficulties? Let them blockade us! Let them blockade us for eight or ten years! By that time, all of China's problems will have been solved. Will the Chinese cower before difficulties when they are not afraid even of death? Laozi said: «The people fear not death, why threaten them with it?»¹⁰ US imperialism and its lackeys, the Jiang Jieshi reactionaries, have not only «threatened» us with death but actually put many of us to death. Besides people like Wen Yiduo, they have killed millions of Chinese in the last three years with US carbines, machine-guns, 60-millimetre mortars, 82-millimetre mortars, bazookas, 15-centimetre howitzers, tanks, and bombs dropped from aeroplanes. This situation is now coming to an end. They have been defeated. It is we who are going in to attack them, not they who are coming out to attack us. They will soon be finished. True, the few problems left to us, such as blockade, unemployment, famine, inflation, and rising prices, are difficulties, but we have already begun to breathe more easily than in the past three years. We have come triumphantly through the ordeal of the last three years, why can't we overcome these few difficulties of today? Why can't we live without the United States?

When the People's Liberation Army crossed the Yangzi River, the US colonial government at Nanjing fled helter-skelter. Yet His Excellency Ambassador Stuart sat tight, watching wide-eyed, hoping to set up shop under a new signboard and to reap some profit. But what did he see? Apart from the People's Liberation Army marching past, column after column, and the workers, peasants, and students rising up in hosts, he saw something else — the Chinese Liberals or democratic individualists turning out in force, shouting slogans, and talking revolution together with the workers, peasants, soldiers, and students. In short, he was left out in the cold, «standing all alone, body and shadow comforting each other».¹¹ There was nothing more for him to do, and he had to take to the road, his briefcase under his arm.

There are still some intellectuals and other people in China who have muddled ideas and illusions about the United States. Therefore, we should try our best to explain things to them, win them over, educate them, and unite with them in good faith, so they will come over to the side of the people and not fall into the snares set by imperialism. But the prestige of US imperialism among the Chinese people is completely bankrupt, and the White Paper is a record of its bankruptcy. Progressives should make good use of the White Paper to educate the Chinese people.

Leighton Stuart has departed and the White Paper has arrived. Very good. Very good. Both events are worth celebrating.