Freely Expand the Anti-Japanese Forces and Resist the Onslaughts of the Anti-Communist Right-Wingers

#PUBLICATION NOTE

This edition of Freely Expand the Anti-Japanese Forces and Resist the Onslaughts of the Anti-Communist Right-Wingers has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the following edition: Freely Expand the Anti-Japanese Forces and Resist the Onslaughts of the Anti-Communist Die-Hards, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Vol. 2, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.

#INTRODUCTION NOTE

This is a directive drafted by Comrade Mao Zedong for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and addressed to its South-Eastern Bureau. It was written in Yan'an, Shaanxi, China on the 4th of May, 1940, and was first published in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 2, in 1951.

At the time of writing, Comrade Xiang Ying, member of the Central Committee and secretary of its South-Eastern Bureau, held strong Right-wing views and was irresolute in carrying out the line of the Central Committee. He did not dare fully to mobilize the masses to action and to expand the Liberated Areas and the people's army in the Japanese-occupied areas, did not sufficiently realize the seriousness of the possibility of reactionary attacks by the Nationalist Party of China, and was therefore unprepared for them mentally and organizationally. When the directive reached the South-Eastern Bureau, Comrade Chen Yi, member of the South-Eastern Bureau and commander of the First Detachment of the New Fourth Army, immediately put it into effect, but Comrade Xiang Ying was reluctant to do so. He made no preparations against the attacks of the Nationalist reactionaries, so that he was in a weak and helpless position when Jiang Jieshi staged the Southern Anhui Incident in January 1941, in which 9'000 Communist-led troops were annihilated and Comrade Xiang Ying himself was killed.

#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!

#FREELY EXPAND THE ANTI-JAPANESE FORCES AND RESIST THE ONSLAUGHTS OF THE ANTI-COMMUNIST RIGHT-WINGERS

#DIRECTIVE TO THE SOUTH-EASTERN BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

#Mao Zedong

#4th of May, 1940

#★

#1

In all regions behind the enemy lines and in all the war zones, stress should be laid, not on particularity, but on identity; to do otherwise would be a gross error. While each region has its individual peculiarities, they are all identical in that all are confronted by the enemy and all are engaged in the War of Resistance, whether in northern, central, or southern China, in the areas north or south of the Yangzi River, or in the plains, mountain, or lake regions, and whether the force involved is the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, or the South China Guerrilla Column.¹ It follows that, in all cases, we can and should expand. The Central Committee has pointed out this policy of expansion to you time and again. To expand means to reach out into all enemy-occupied areas and not to be bound by the Nationalist Party's restrictions, but to go beyond the limits allowed by the Nationalist Party, not to expect official appointments from them or depend on the higher-ups for financial support, but instead to expand the armed forces freely and independently, set up base areas unhesitatingly, independently mobilize the masses in those areas to action, and build up united-front bodies of political power under the leadership of the Communist Party. In Jiangsu Province, for example, despite the verbal attacks and the restrictions and oppression by anti-Communist elements, such as Gu Zhutong, Leng Xin, and Han Deqin,² we should gain control of as many districts as possible from Nanjing in the West to the seacoast in the East and from Hangzhou in the South to Xuzhou in the North, and do so as fast as possible and yet steadily and systematically; and we should independently expand the armed forces, establish bodies of political power, set up fiscal offices to levy taxes for resistance to Japan and economic agencies to promote agriculture, industry, and commerce, and open up schools of various kinds to train large numbers of cadres. The Central Committee previously directed you to enlarge the anti-Japanese armed forces to 100'000 soldiers, with as many rifles, and to set up bodies of political power promptly in the regions behind the enemy lines in Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces before the end of this year. What concrete measures have you taken? Opportunities have been missed before, and if this year they are missed again, things will become still more difficult.

#2

At a time when the anti-Communist Right-wingers in the Nationalist Party are obstinately persisting in their policy of containing, restricting, and combating the Communist Party in preparation for capitulation to Japan, we must stress struggle and not unity; to do otherwise would be a gross error. Therefore, whether in the theoretical, the political, or the military sphere, we should, as a matter of principle, firmly resist all the verbal attacks, propaganda, orders, and laws of the anti-Communist Right-wingers designed to contain, restrict, and oppose the Communist Party, and our attitude toward them should be one of firm struggle. This struggle must be based on the principle of fighting on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint, that is, on the principles of self-defence, victory, and truce, which means that every concrete struggle is defensive, limited, and temporary in nature. We must take tit-for-tat action and conduct a determined struggle against all the reactionary verbal attacks, propaganda, orders, and laws of the anti-Communist Right-wingers. For instance, when they demanded that our Fourth and Fifth Detachments³ be moved to the South, we countered by insisting that it was absolutely impossible to do so; when they demanded that the units under Ye Fei and Zhang Daoyong⁴ be moved to the South, we countered by asking permission for a part of these units to move to the North; when they charged us with having undermined their conscription plans, we asked them to enlarge the recruiting area for the New Fourth Army; when they said we were carrying on wrong propaganda, we asked them to stop all their anti-Communist propaganda and to rescind all decrees and orders which cause «friction»; and whenever they launch military attacks against us, we should smash them by counter-attacks. We are on just grounds in carrying out this tit-for-tat policy. And it is not only the Central Committee of our Party that should take action whenever we are on just grounds, but every unit of our army should do so. What Zhang Yunyi did to Li Pinxian and what Li Xiannian did to Li Zongren⁵ are both good examples of strong protests from the lower levels to the higher-ups. This kind of strong attitude toward the Right-wingers and the policy of struggling against them on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint are the only way to make the Right-wingers somewhat afraid of repressing us, to reduce the scope of their activities in containing, restricting, and combating the Communist Party, to force them to recognize our legal status, and to make them think twice before causing a split. Therefore, struggle is by far the most important means of averting the danger of capitulation, of achieving a turn for the better in the situation, and of strengthening Nationalist-Communist cooperation. Within our own Party and army, persistence in the struggle against the Right-wingers is the only way to heighten our fighting spirit, give full play to our courage, unite our cadres, increase our strength, and consolidate our army and Party. In our relations with the Centrist factions, persistence in the struggle against the Right-wingers is the only way to win over the waverers and give support to our sympathizers — there is no other way. Similarly, struggle is the only policy which can ensure that the whole Party and the whole army are mentally on the alert against a possible nationwide emergency and are prepared for it in their work. Otherwise, the mistake of 1927⁶ will be repeated.

#3

In appraising the present situation, we should clearly understand that, while the danger of capitulation has greatly increased, it is still possible to avert it. The present military clashes are still local and not national. They are acts of strategic reconnaissance by our opponents and not yet «Communist suppression» on a large scale; they are steps preparatory to capitulation and not yet steps immediately preceding capitulation. Our task is persistently and vigorously to carry out the three-fold policy laid down by the Central Committee, which is the only correct policy, namely, to develop the Left-wing forces, win over the Centrist forces, and isolate the Right-wing forces, for the purpose of averting the danger of capitulation and bringing about a turn for the better in the situation. It would be perilous not to point out and correct any «Left-wing» or Right-wing deviations in appraising the situation and in defining our tasks.

#4

The battles of self-defence fought by the Fourth and the Fifth Detachments against the attacks of Han Deqin and Li Zongren in eastern Anhui and those fought by Li Xiannian's column against the Right-wingers' attacks in central and eastern Hubei, the determined struggle carried on by Peng Xuefeng's detachment north of the Huai River, the expansion of Ye Fei's forces north of the Yangzi River, and the southward movement of over 20'000 soldiers of the Eighth Route Army to areas north of the Huai River and to eastern Anhui and northern Jiangsu⁷ — all these were not only absolutely necessary and correct in themselves, but were indispensable for making Gu Zhutong think twice before attacking you in southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu. That is to say, the more victories we win and the more we expand north of the Yangzi River, the more will Gu Zhutong be afraid to act rashly south of the Yangzi River, and the easier will it be for you to play your role in southern Anhui and southern KJangsu. Similarly, the more the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the South China Guerrilla Column expand in north-western, northern, central, and southern China, and the more the Communist Party grows throughout the country, the greater will be the possibility of averting the danger of capitulation and bringing about a turn for the better in the situation, and the easier will it be for our Party to play its role in all parts of the country. It is wrong to make the opposite appraisal or adopt the opposite tactics in the belief that the more our forces expand, the more the Right-wingers will tend towards capitulation, that the more concessions we make, the more they will resist Japan, or that the whole country is on the verge of a split and Nationalist-Communist cooperation is no longer possible.

#5

The Anti-Japanese National United Front is our policy for the whole country in the War of Resistance. The establishment of democratic anti-Japanese base areas in the enemy rear is part of this policy. You should firmly carry out the Central Committee's decisions on the question of political power.

#6

Our policy in the Nationalist areas is different from that in the war zones and the areas behind the enemy lines. In the Nationalist areas, our policy is to have well-selected cadres working underground for a long period, to accumulate strength and bide our time, and to avoid rashness and exposure. In conformity with the principle of waging struggles on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint, our tactics in combating the Right-wingers are to wage steady and sure struggles and to build up our strength by utilizing all Nationalist laws and decrees that can serve our purpose, as well as everything permitted by social custom. If a member of our Party is forced to join the Nationalist Party, let them do so; our members should penetrate the bao [watch], the jia [tithing],⁸ and the educational, economic, and military organizations everywhere; they should develop extensive united-front work, that is, make friends, in the Central Army and among the troops of miscellaneous brands.⁹ In all the Nationalist areas, the Party's fundamental policy is likewise to develop the Left-wing forces (the Party organizations and the mass movements), to win over the Centrist forces (seven categories in all, namely: the national bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry, the troops of miscellaneous brands, the Centrist factions in the Nationalist Party, the Centrist factions in the Central Army, the upper stratum of the small bourgeoisie, and the small political parties and groups), and to isolate the Right-wing forces, in order to avert the danger of capitulation and bring about a favourable turn in the situation. At the same time, we should be fully prepared to deal with any emergency on a local or national scale. Our Party organizations in the Nationalist areas must be kept strictly secret. In the South-Eastern Bureau¹⁰ and in all the provincial, special, county, and district committees, the whole personnel (from Party secretaries to cooks) must be strictly scrutinized one by one, and no one open to the slightest suspicion should be allowed to remain in any of these leading bodies. Great care must be taken to protect our cadres, and whoever is in danger of being arrested and killed by the Nationalist Party while working in an open or semi-open capacity should either be sent to some other locality and go underground or be transferred to the army. In the Japanese-occupied areas (in Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuhu, or Wuxi, or in any other city, big or small, and also in the countryside), our policy is fundamentally the same as in the Nationalist areas.

#7

The present tactical directive was decided upon by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee at its recent meeting, and comrades of the South-Eastern Bureau and the military sub-commission are requested to discuss it, relay it to all cadres in the Party organizations and the army, and firmly carry it out.

#8

Comrade Xiang Ying is instructed to relay this directive in southern Anhui and Comrade Chen Yi to relay it in southern Jiangsu. Discussion and relaying should be completed within a month of receiving this telegram. Comrade Xiang Ying has the overall responsibility for arranging Party and army work in the whole area in accordance with the line of the Central Committee and should report the results to the Central Committee.