Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese United Front

#PUBLICATION NOTE

This edition of Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese United Front has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the following edition: Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese United Front, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Vol. 2, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.

#INTRODUCTION NOTE

This is an outline for a report delivered by Comrade Mao Zedong to a meeting of high-ranking cadres of the Communist Party of China in Yan'an, Shaanxi, China on the 11th of March, 1940. It was first published in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 2, in 1951.

#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!

#CURRENT PROBLEMS OF TACTICS IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE UNITED FRONT

#REPORT TO A MEETING OF HIGH-RANKING PARTY CADRES IN YAN'AN

#Mao Zedong
#11th of March, 1940

#★

#1

The present political situation is as follows:

  • Japanese imperialism has been dealt a heavy blow by China's War of Resistance and is already incapable of launching any more large-scale military offensives, so that the relation of forces between the enemy and ourselves has now reached the stage of strategic stalemate. But the enemy is still holding fast to their fundamental policy of subjugating China and is pursuing it by such means as undermining our anti-Japanese united front, intensifying their «mopping-up» campaigns in the rear areas, and stepping up their economic aggression.
  • Britain and France are finding their positions in Asia weakened by the war in Europe, while the United States is continuing its policy of «sitting on top of the mountain and watching the tigers fight», so that an Asian Munich Conference is out of the question for the moment.
  • The Council Union has gained new successes in its foreign policy and is maintaining its policy of giving active support to China's War of Resistance.
  • The pro-Japanese faction of the big bourgeoisie, having completely capitulated to Japan, is ready to play the puppet. The pro-European and pro-US big bourgeoisie may continue to resist Japan, but its proneness to conciliation remains serious. It follows a dual policy. While desiring to remain united with the various non-Nationalist forces to cope with Japan, it is doing all it can to suppress them, and especially the Communist Party and the other Left-wing forces. It forms the Right wing of the anti-Japanese united front.
  • The intermediate forces, including the middle bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry, and the regional power groups, often take a Centrist standpoint between the Left-wingers and the Right-wingers, because of their contradictions with the main ruling factions of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie on the one hand, and with the working class and the peasantry on the other. They form the Centre of the anti-Japanese united front.
  • Recently, the Communist-led Left-wing forces of the proletariat, the peasantry, and the urban small bourgeoisie have grown much stronger and in the main have succeeded in creating base areas in which anti-Japanese democratic political power has been established. Their influence is very great among the workers, peasants, and urban small bourgeoisie throughout the country and is also quite considerable among the Centrist forces. On the battlefield, the Communists are fighting roughly as many Japanese troops as is the Nationalist Party. They form the Left wing of the anti-Japanese united front.

This is the present political situation in China. In these circumstances, the possibility still exists of preventing the situation from deteriorating and of changing it for the better; the Central Committee's resolutions of the 1st of February are entirely correct.

#2

The fundamental condition for victory in the War of Resistance is the extension and consolidation of the anti-Japanese united front. The tactics required for this purpose are to develop the Left-wing forces, win over the Centrist forces, and combat the Right-wing forces; these are three inseparable links, and the means to be used to unite all the anti-Japanese forces is struggle. In the period of the anti-Japanese united front, struggle is the means to unity and unity is the aim of struggle. If unity is sought through struggle, it will live; if unity is sought through yielding, it will perish. This truth is gradually being grasped by Party comrades. However, there are still many who do not understand it; some think that struggle will split the united front or that struggle can be employed without restraint, and others use wrong tactics toward the Centrist forces or have mistaken notions about the Right-wing forces. All this must be corrected.

#3

Developing the Left-wing forces means building up the forces of the proletariat, the peasantry, and the urban small bourgeoisie, boldly expanding the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, establishing anti-Japanese democratic base areas on an extensive scale, building up Communist organizations throughout the country, developing national mass movements of the workers, peasants, youth, women, and children, winning over the intellectuals in all parts of the country, and spreading the movement for constitutional government among the masses as a struggle for democracy. Steady expansion of the Left-wing forces is the only way to prevent the situation from deteriorating, to forestall capitulation and splitting, and to lay a firm and indestructible foundation for victory in the War of Resistance. But the expansion of the Left-wing forces is a serious process of struggle, which must be ruthlessly waged, not only against the Japanese imperialists and the traitors, but also against the Right-wing forces. For the latter are opposed to the growth of the Left-wing forces, while the Centrist faction is sceptical. Unless we engage in resolute struggle against the Right-wing elements and, moreover, get tangible results, we shall be unable to resist their pressure or dispel the doubts of the Centrist section. In that case, the Left-wing forces will have no way of expanding.

#4

Winning over the Centrist forces means winning over the middle bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry, and the regional power groups. They are three distinct categories, but as things are, they all belong to the Centrist forces.

The middle bourgeoisie constitutes the national bourgeoisie as distinct from the comprador class, that is, from the big bourgeoisie. Although it has its class contradictions with the workers and does not approve of the independence of the working class, it still wants to resist Japan and, moreover, would like to grasp political power for itself, because it is oppressed by the Japanese imperialists in the occupied areas and kept down by the big landlords and big bourgeoisie in the Nationalist areas. When it comes to resisting Japan, it is in favour of united resistance; when it comes to winning political power, it is in favour of the movement for constitutional government and tries to exploit the contradictions between the Left wing and the Right win for its own ends. This is a stratum we must win over.

Then there are the enlightened gentry who are the Left wing of the landlord class, that is, the faction with a bourgeois colouration, whose political attitude is roughly the same as that of the middle bourgeoisie. Although they have class contradictions with the peasants, they also have their contradictions with the big landlords and big bourgeoisie. They do not support the Right-wing elements and they, too, want to exploit the contradictions between us and the Right-wing elements for their own political ends. On no account should we neglect this faction either, and our policy must be to win them over.

As for the regional power groups, they are of two kinds — the forces which control certain regions as their own, and the troops of miscellaneous brands which do not. Although these groups are in contradiction with the Left-wing forces, they also have their contradictions with the Nationalist Central Government, because of the self-seeking policy it pursues at their expense; they, too, want to exploit the contradictions between us and the Right-wing elements for their own political ends. Most of the leaders of the regional power groups belong to the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie and, therefore, Left-wing as they may appear at certain times during the war, they soon turn reactionary again; nevertheless, because of their contradictions with the Nationalist central authorities, the possibility exists of their remaining neutral in our struggle against the Right-wing elements, provided we pursue a correct policy.

Our policy toward the three categories of Centrist forces described above is to win them over. However, this policy differs from that of winning over the peasants and the urban small bourgeoisie, and, moreover, it varies for each category of the Centrist forces. While the peasants and the urban small bourgeoisie should be won over as fundamental allies, the Centrist forces should be won over as allies against imperialism. Among the Centrist forces, it is possible for the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry to join us in the common fight against Japan and also in the setting up of anti-Japanese democratic political power, but they fear agrarian revolution. In the struggle against the Right-wing elements, some may join in to a limited degree, others may observe a benevolent neutrality, and still others a rather reluctant neutrality. But, apart from joining us in the war, the regional power groups will at most observe a temporary neutrality in our struggle against the Right-wing elements; they are unwilling to join us in establishing democratic political power, since they themselves belong to the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie. The Centrist forces tend to vacillate and are bound to break up, and we should educate and criticize them appropriately, with special reference to their vacillating attitude.

The winning over of the Centrist forces is an extremely important task for us in the period of the anti-Japanese united front, but it can only be accomplished given certain conditions. These are:

  • First, that we have ample strength.
  • Second, that we respect their interests.
  • Third, that we are resolute in our struggle against the Right-wing forces and steadily win victories.

If these conditions are lacking, the Centrist forces will vacillate or even become allies of the Right-wing elements in the latter's attacks on us, because the Right-wing elements are also doing their best to win over the Centrist forces in order to isolate us. The Centrist forces carry considerable weight in China and may often be the decisive factor in our struggle against the Right wing; we must therefore be prudent in dealing with them.

#5

The Right-wing forces at the present time are the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie. Divided at the moment into the faction that has capitulated to Japan and the faction that favours resistance, these classes will gradually become still further differentiated. Within the big bourgeoisie, the faction favouring resistance is now different from the faction that has already capitulated. It pursues a dual policy. It still stands for unity against Japan, but at the same time, it follows the extremely reactionary policy of suppressing the Left-wing forces in preparation for its eventual capitulation. As it still favours unity against Japan, we can still try and keep it in the anti-Japanese united front, and the longer the better. It would be wrong to neglect our policy of winning over this faction and cooperating with it and to regard it as having already capitulated and as being on the verge of launching an anti-Communist war. But at the same time, we must adopt tactics of struggle to combat its reactionary policy and carry on a determined ideological, political, and military fight against it, because all over the country, it pursues the reactionary policy of suppressing the Left-wing forces; because instead of carrying out the common programme of the revolutionary «Three People's Principles», it stubbornly opposes our efforts to do so; and because it works hard to prevent us from going beyond the limits it has set for us, that is, it tries to confine us to the passive resistance it itself practises, and, moreover, it tries to assimilate us, failing which it applies ideological, political, and military pressure against us. Such is our revolutionary dual policy to meet the dual policy of the Right-wing elements, and such is our policy of seeking unity through struggle. If, in the ideological sphere, we can put forward correct revolutionary theory and strike hard at their counter-revolutionary theory; if, in the political sphere, we adopt tactics suited to the times and strike hard at their anti-Communist and anti-Left-wing policies; and if, in the military sphere, we take appropriate measures and strike back hard at their attacks — then we shall be able to restrict the effective range of their reactionary policy and compel them to recognize the status of the Left-wing forces, and we shall be able to expand the Left-wing forces, win over the Centrist forces, and isolate the Right-wing forces. What is more, we shall be able to induce those Right-wing elements who are still willing to resist Japan to prolong their participation in the anti-Japanese united front, and shall thus be able to avert a large-scale civil war of the kind that broke out before. Thus, the purpose of our struggle against the Right-wing elements in the period of the anti-Japanese united front is not only to parry their attacks in order to protect the Left-wing forces and enable the latter to go on growing, it is also to prolong the Right wing's resistance to Japan and to preserve our cooperation with it in order to avert large-scale civil war. Without struggle, these Left-wing forces would be exterminated by the Right-wing forces, the united front would cease to exist, there would be nothing to hinder the Right-wingers from capitulating to the enemy, and civil war would break out. Therefore, struggle against the Right wing is an indispensable means of uniting all the anti-Japanese forces, achieving a favourable turn in the situation, and averting large-scale civil war. All our experience confirms this truth.

However, there are several principles which we must observe in our struggle against the Right wing in the period of the anti-Japanese united front. First, the principle of self-defence. We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counter-attack. That is to say, we must never attack others without provocation, but once attacked, we must never fail to return the blow. Herein lies the defensive nature of our struggle. The military attacks of the Right-wing forces must be smashed — resolutely, thoroughly, wholly, and completely. Second, the principle of victory. We will not fight unless we are sure of victory; we must never fight without a plan, without preparation, and without certainty of success. We must know how to exploit the contradictions among the Right-wing forces and must not take on too many of them at a single time, but must direct our blows at the most reactionary of them first. Herein lies the limited nature of the struggle. Third, the principle of a truce. After repulsing one Right-wing attack, we should know when to stop and bring that particular fight to a close before another attack is made on us. A truce should be made in the interval. We should then take the initiative in seeking unity with the Right-wing forces and, if they concur, we should make a peace agreement with them. On no account should we fight on day after day without cease, or be carried away by success. Herein lies the temporary nature of each struggle. Only when the Right-wing forces launch a new attack should we counter with a new struggle. In other words, the three principles are to fight «on just grounds», «to our advantage», and «with restraint». By keeping to this kind of struggle, waged on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint, we can develop the Left-wing forces, win over the Centrist forces, and isolate the Right-wing forces, and we can also make the Right-wing forces think twice before attacking us, compromising with the enemy, or starting large-scale civil war. Thus, a favourable turn in the situation will become possible.

#6

The Nationalist Party is a heterogeneous political party, which includes Right-wing elements, Centrist elements, and Left-wing elements; taken as a whole, it must not be equated with the Right-wing elements. Some people regard the Nationalist Party as consisting entirely of Right-wing elements, because its Central Executive Committee has promulgated such counter-revolutionary, friction-mongering decrees as the «Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Political Parties» and has mobilized every ounce of its strength for counter-revolutionary friction-mongering in the ideological, political, and military spheres throughout the country. But this is a mistaken view. The Right-wing elements in the Nationalist Party are still in a position to dictate its policies, but numerically they are in a minority, while the majority of the membership (many are members only in name) are not necessarily Right-wing elements. This point must be clearly recognized if we are to take advantage of the contradictions within the Nationalist Party, follow a policy of differentiating between its different factions, and do our utmost to unite with its Centrist and Left-wing factions.

#7

On the question of political power in the anti-Japanese base areas, we must make sure that the political power established there is that of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. No such political power exists as yet in the Nationalist areas. It is the political power of all who support both resistance and democracy, that is, the joint democratic dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the traitors and reactionaries. It is different from the dictatorship of the landlord class and the bourgeoisie, and is also somewhat different from a strictly worker-peasant democratic dictatorship. Seats in the bodies of political power should be allocated as follows: 1/3 to the Communists, representing the proletariat and the poor peasantry; 1/3 to the Left-wing elements, representing the small bourgeoisie; and the remaining 1/3 to the Centrist and other elements, representing the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry. Traitors and anti-Communist elements are the only people disqualified from participation in these bodies of political power. This general rule for the allocation of seats is necessary, or otherwise it will not be possible to maintain the principle of united-front political power. This allocation of seats represents the genuine policy of our Party and must be carried out conscientiously; there must be no halfheartedness about it. It provides a broad rule, which has to be applied according to the specific conditions, and there must be no mechanical filling up of quotas. At the lowest level, the ratio may have to be somewhat modified to prevent domination by the landlords and evil gentry, but the fundamental spirit of this policy must not be violated. We should not labour the question of whether the non-Communists in these bodies have political party affiliations, or what their political party affiliations are. In areas under the political power of the united front, all political parties, whether the Nationalist Party or any other, must be granted legal status, so long as they cooperate with and do not oppose the Communist Party. On the question of suffrage, the policy is that every Chinese who reaches the age of 18 and is in favour of resistance and democracy should have the right to elect and to be elected, irrespective of class, nationality, political party affiliation, gender, creed, or educational level. The bodies of united-front political power should be elected by the people and then apply to the National Government for confirmation. Their form of organization must be based on democratic centralism. The fundamental point of departure for all major policy measures in the united-front bodies of political power should be opposition to Japanese imperialism, opposition to confirmed traitors and reactionaries, protection of the people who are resisting Japan, proper adjustment of the interests of all the anti-Japanese social strata, and improvement of the livelihood of the workers and peasants. The establishment of this anti-Japanese united-front political power will exert a great influence on the whole country and serve as a model for united-front political power on a national scale; therefore, this policy should be fully understood and resolutely carried out by all Party comrades.

#8

In our struggle to develop the Left-wing forces, win over the Centrist forces, and isolate the Right-wing forces, we must not overlook the role of the intellectuals, whom the Right-wingers are doing their utmost to win over; therefore, it is an important and indeed an essential policy to win over all Left-wing intellectuals and bring them under the influence of the Party.

#9

In our propaganda, we should stress the following programme:

  • Carry out the Testament of Dr. Sun Yixian by mobilizing the masses for united resistance to Japan.
  • Carry out the Principle of Nationalism by firmly resisting Japanese imperialism and striving for complete national liberation and the equality of all the nationalities within China.
  • Carry out the Principle of Democracy by granting the people absolute freedom to resist Japan and save the nation, by enabling them to elect governments at all levels, and by establishing the revolutionary-democratic political power of the Anti-Japanese National United Front.
  • Carry out the Principle of the People's Livelihood by abolishing exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous levies, reducing ground rent and interest, enforcing the eight-hour workday, developing agriculture, industry, and commerce, and improving the livelihood of the people.
  • Carry out Jiang Jieshi's declaration that «every person, young or old, in the North or in the South, must take up the responsibility of resisting Japan and defending our homeland».

All these points are in the Nationalist Party's own published programme, which is also the common programme of the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party. But the Nationalist Party has failed to carry out any part of this programme other than resistance to Japan; only the Communist Party and the Left-wing forces are able to carry it out. It is a simple enough programme and is widely known, yet many Communists fail to use it as a weapon for mobilizing the masses and isolating the Right-wingers. From now on, we should keep attention focused on the five points of this programme and popularize them through public notices, manifestos, leaflets, articles, speeches, statements, and so on. In the Nationalist areas, it is still only a propaganda programme, but in the areas reached by the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, it is already a programme of action. In acting according to this programme, we are within the law, and when the Right-wingers oppose our carrying it out, it is they who are outside the law. In the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, this programme of the Nationalist Party's is fundamentally the same as ours, but the ideology of the Nationalist Party is entirely different from that of the Communist Party. It is this common programme of the democratic revolution that we should put into practice, but on no account should we follow the ideology of the Nationalist Party.