Concentrate a Superior Force to Destroy the Enemy Forces One by One

#PUBLICATION NOTE

This edition of Concentrate a Superior Force to Destroy the Enemy Forces One by One has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the following editions:

• Concentrate a Superior Force to Destroy the Enemy Forces One by One, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Vol. 4, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.
• Order of the People's Revolutionary Military Commission Regarding Amassing a Superior Force to Destroy the Enemy Forces One by One, in Mao's Road to Power, First English Edition, Vol. 9, Routledge, New York and London, 2023.

#INTRODUCTION NOTE

This is an order drafted by Comrade Mao Zedong for the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Yan'an, Shaanxi, China on the 16th of September, 1946. It was first published in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 4, in 1960.

#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!

#CONCENTRATE A SUPERIOR FORCE TO DESTROY THE ENEMY FORCES ONE BY ONE

#ORDER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COMMISSION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

#Mao Zedong

#16th of September, 1946

#★

#1

The method of fighting by concentrating a superior force to destroy the enemy forces¹ one by one must be employed, not only in the disposition of troops for a campaign, but also in the disposition of troops for a battle.

#2

With regard to the disposition for a campaign, when the enemy employs many brigades² (or regiments) and advances against our army from several directions, our army must concentrate an absolutely superior force — six, five, four, or at least three times the enemy strength — and pick an opportune moment to encircle and wipe out one enemy brigade tor regiment) first. It should be one of the enemy's weaker brigades (or regiments), or one that has less support, or one stationed where the terrain and the people are most favourable to us and unfavourable to the enemy. We should tie down the rest of the enemy brigades (or regiments) with small forces in order to prevent them from rushing reinforcements to the brigade (or regiment) we are encircling and attacking, so that we can destroy it first. When this has been achieved, we should, according to the circumstances, either wipe out one or several more enemy brigades or retire to rest and consolidate for further fighting. (Here are two examples of the former. Our troops in Central China under the command of Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin wiped out 5'000 of the enemy's communications police corps³ near Rugao on the 22nd of August, one enemy brigade on the 26th of August, and one and a half brigades on the 27th of August.⁴ Our troops under Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping annihilated one enemy brigade near Qingdao between the 3rd and 6th of September, another in the afternoon of the 6th of September, and two more on the 7th and 8th of September.⁵) In the disposition for a campaign, we must reject the wrong method of fighting, which underrates the enemy and therefore divides our forces to deal with all the enemy detachments, for by this method, we cannot destroy even one enemy detachment, but will land ourselves in a passive position.

#3

In the disposition for a battle, when we have concentrated an absolutely superior force and encircled one of the enemy detachments (a brigade or regiment), our attacking formations (or units) should not attempt to wipe out all the encircled enemy simultaneously at one swoop and thus divide themselves and strike everywhere without enough strength anywhere, losing time and making it hard to get results. Instead, we should concentrate an absolutely superior force, that is to say, a force six, five, four, or at least three times that of the enemy, concentrate the whole or the bulk of our artillery, select one (not two) of the weak spots in the enemy's positions, attack it fiercely, and be sure to win. This accomplished, swiftly exploit the victory and destroy the enemy forces one by one.

#4

The effects of this method of fighting are two-fold: first, complete annihilation; second, lightning warfare. Only complete annihilation can deal the most telling blows to the enemy, for when we wipe out one regiment, they will have one regiment less, and when we wipe out one brigade, they will have one brigade less. This method is most useful when employed against an enemy lacking second-line troops. Only complete annihilation can replenish our own forces to the greatest possible extent. It is now not only the main source of our arms and ammunition, but also an important source of our troops. Complete annihilation demoralizes the enemy's troops and depresses their followers; it raises the morale of our troops and inspires our people. Lightning warfare makes it possible for our troops either to wipe out the enemy reinforcements one by one or evade them. Lightning campaigns and battles are a necessary condition for the strategy of a protracted war.

#5

Among our military cadres, there are still many who, when not in action, approve the principle of concentrating our forces to wipe out the enemy forces one by one, but often fail to apply it in action. That is due to underestimation of the enemy and to lack of intensive education and study. It is necessary to cite detailed cases of past battles to explain again and again the advantages of this method of fighting and to point out that it is the chief method of defeating Jiang Jieshi's attacks. Using this method, we shall win. Acting counter to it, we shall lose.

#6

The principle of concentrating our forces to wipe out the enemy forces one by one has been a fine tradition of our army ever since its founding more than a decade ago; this is not the first time it has been put forward. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, however, the dispersal of our forces for guerrilla warfare was primary, and the concentration of our forces for mobile warfare was supplementary. In the present civil war, as conditions have changed, so should the method of fighting. The concentration of our forces for mobile warfare should be primary, and the dispersal of our forces for guerrilla warfare should be supplementary. Now that Jiang Jieshi's army has acquired more powerful weapons, it is necessary for our army to lay special stress on the method of concentrating a superior force to wipe out the enemy forces one by one.

#7

When the enemy is on the offensive and we are on the defensive, this method must be employed. However, when the enemy is on the defensive and we are on the offensive, we should distinguish between two kinds of situations and adopt different methods. When our force is big and the enemy in that locality is rather weak, or when we are making a surprise attack on the enemy, we may strike at several of their units simultaneously. For example, between the 5th and 10th of June, our troops in Shandong Province simultaneously attacked and captured more than ten towns on the Qingdao-Ji'nan and the Tianjin-Pukou Railways.⁶ Or to take another example, between the 10th and 21st of August, our troops under Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping attacked and captured more than ten towns along the section of the Longhai Railway between Kaifeng and Xuzhou.⁷ On the other hand, when we do not have enough forces, we should seize the enemy-occupied towns one by one and should not attack the enemy at several towns simultaneously. That was how our forces in Shanxi Province took the towns along the Datong-Puzhou Railway.⁸

#8

When the main force of our troops is concentrated to annihilate the enemy, it must coordinate its operations with vigorous activities by the regional formations, local guerrillas, and people's militias. When regional formations (or troops) attack an enemy regiment, battalion, or company, they should also adopt the principle of concentrating our forces to annihilate the enemy forces one by one.

#9

The principle of concentrating our forces to wipe out the enemy forces one by one is aimed chiefly at annihilating the enemy's effective strength, not at holding or seizing a place. In some circumstances, it is permissible to abandon certain places for the purpose of concentrating our forces to wipe out the enemy or of enabling our main force to avoid heavy enemy attacks and to facilitate rest and consolidation for further fighting. So long as we are able to wipe out the enemy's effective strength on a large scale, it will be possible to recover lost territory and seize new territory. Therefore, all those who succeed in destroying the enemy's effective strength should be commended. This applies not only to those who destroy the enemy's regular forces, but also to those who destroy their peace-preservation corps, home-going contingents,⁹ and other reactionary local armed bands. However, we must hold or seize territory wherever the relative strength of the enemy and our own forces makes this possible or wherever such territory is significant for our campaigns or battles; to do otherwise would be a mistake. Therefore, those who succeed in holding or seizing such territory should also be commended.