Build Stable Base Areas in the North-East

#PUBLICATION NOTE

This edition of Build Stable Base Areas in the North-East has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the following editions:

• Build Stable Base Areas in the Northeast, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Vol. 4, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.
• Directive of the CPC Central Committee on Work in the Northeast, in Mao's Road to Power, First English Edition, Vol. 9, Routledge, New York and London, 2023.

#INTRODUCTION NOTE

This is a directive to the North-Eastern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China drafted by Comrade Mao Zedong for the Party's Central Committee in Yan'an, Shaanxi, China on the 28th of December, 1945. It was first published in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 4, in 1960.

As soon as the Council Union declared war on Japan and the Soviet Red Army entered the North-East, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese People's Liberation Army sent large numbers of cadres and troops to the North-East to lead the people in wiping out the remnants of the Japanese invaders and the puppet «Manzhouguo» regime, cleaning out traitors, eradicating bandits, and establishing democratic local governments at various levels. But at the same time, the Nationalist reactionaries, bent on exclusive control over the entire North-East, transported large numbers of troops there by land, sea, and air with the aid of US imperialism and seized key places like Shanhaiguan and Jinzhou, which had already been liberated by the People's Liberation Army. A stern struggle was already inevitable in the North-East, and this struggle was obviously going to be of special significance for the situation in the whole country. In this directive, Comrade Mao Zedong predicted how arduous the struggle in the North-East would be and pointed out in good time that the centre of gravity of the work there should be in the cities and vast rural areas comparatively remote from the centres of Nationalist occupation; that is, we should «leave the high road alone and seize the land on both sides», in order to arouse the masses in earnest, build stable base areas, gradually accumulate strength, and prepare for the future shift to the counter-offensive. This correct policy of the Central Committee and Comrade Mao Zedong was effectively carried out by the North-Eastern Bureau headed by Lin Biao; hence the great victory, the liberation of the entire North-East three years later in November 1948.

#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!

#BUILD STABLE BASE AREAS IN THE NORTH-EAST

#DIRECTIVE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA TO ITS NORTH-EASTERN BUREAU

#Mao Zedong

#28th of December, 1945

#★

#To the North-Eastern Bureau (Lin Biao, Huang Kecheng, Li Fuchun, Li Yunchang, Rehe, Eastern Hebei, Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Shandong, Zhangjiakou, Jiaodong, and Central China)

#1

Our Party's present task in the North-East is to build base areas, stable military and political base areas in eastern, northern, and western Manchuria.¹ To build such base areas is no easy job; it requires hard and bitter struggle. Three or four years are needed to build such base areas. But a solid preliminary groundwork must be laid in the year 1946. Otherwise, we may not be able to stand our ground.

#2

It should now be made clear that these base areas are not to be built in the big cities or along the main communication lines that are or will be occupied by the Nationalist Party; under present international conditions, this is not practicable. Nor are they to be built in regions close to big cities or main communication lines held by the Nationalist Party. The reason is that the Nationalist Party, having seized the big cities and the main communication lines, will not let us build stable base areas in regions very close to them. Our Party should do adequate work and set up our first line of military defence in these regions, which must never be lightly abandoned. But they will be guerrilla zones for both parties and not our stable base areas. And they could become buffer zones for both parties as concessions to be made by both parties. Therefore, the regions in which to build stable bases are the cities and vast rural areas comparatively remote from the centres of Nationalist occupation. Those regions should now be designated, so that we can dispose our forces accordingly and lead the whole Party toward this goal.

#3

After we have decided on the location of our stable base areas and disposed our forces, and after our army's numerical strength has greatly increased, mass work will be the centre of gravity of our Party's work in the North-East. All cadres must be made to understand that the Nationalist Party will be stronger than our Party in the North-East for some time and that, unless our starting point is to mobilize the masses to struggle, solve their problems, and rely on them in every way, and unless we mobilize all forces to work painstakingly among the masses and lay a solid preliminary foundation within a year, and particularly in the next few critical months, we shall become isolated in the North-East, be unable to build stable base areas or defeat the attacks of the Nationalist Party, and indeed may encounter immense difficulties or even fail. Conversely, if we rely firmly on the masses, we shall overcome all difficulties and reach our goal step by step. Mass work consists in mobilizing the masses for struggles to settle accounts with traitors and in launching movements for rent reduction and wage increases and movements for production. In these struggles, we should form various kinds of mass organizations, set up Party cells, build armed units of the masses and bodies of people's political power, speedily raise mass economic struggles to the level of political struggles, and lead the masses to take part in building the base areas. The directive on mobilizing mass struggles recently issued by the Rehe Provincial Party Committee² may be applied in the North-East. Our Party must bring tangible material benefits to the people in the North-East; only then will the masses support us and oppose the Nationalist attacks. Otherwise, the masses will be unable to see clearly which of the two political parties, the Nationalist Party or the Communist Party, is good and which is bad, may be taken in for a time by deceitful Nationalist propaganda, and may even turn against our Party, and thus, an extremely unfavourable situation would be created for us in the North-East.

#4

At present, there is a subjective difficulty for our Party in the North-East. Large numbers of our cadres and armed forces in the North-East are newcomers, unfamiliar with the place and the people. Cadres are dissatisfied because we cannot occupy big cities and they are impatient with the arduous work of mobilizing the masses and building base areas. These circumstances are in contradiction with the present situation and the tasks of the Party. Again and again, we must teach all cadres from other areas to pay attention to research, to acquaint themselves with the place and the people, and to resolve to become one with the people of the North-East, and we must train large numbers of activists and cadres from among the masses. We should explain to the cadres that, although the big cities and the communication lines are in the hands of the Nationalist Party, the situation in the North-East is nevertheless favourable to us. So long as we spread among all cadres and soldiers the idea of mobilizing the masses and of building our base areas, and so long as we mobilize all forces and quickly undertake the great struggle to build these base areas, we shall be able to establish ourselves firmly in the North-East and in Rehe and be sure of victory. We must tell the cadres that they should on no account underestimate the strength of the Nationalist Party or become impatient with arduous work because they think the Nationalist Party is going to attack eastern and northern Manchuria anyway. Of course, in making these explanations, we should not lead the cadres to believe that the Nationalist Party is terribly strong and that its attacks cannot be smashed. It should be pointed out that the Nationalist Party has no deep, organized foundation in the North-East and that its attacks can be smashed; it is therefore possible for our Party to build base areas. But the Nationalist troops are now attacking the Rehe-Liaoning border, and if no blows are dealt them, they will attack eastern and northern Manchuria before long. All our Party members must therefore resolve to undertake the most difficult tasks, swiftly mobilize the masses, build our base areas, and smash the Nationalist attacks in western Manchuria and Rehe resolutely and in a planned way. In eastern and northern Manchuria, we should quickly prepare the conditions for smashing the Nationalist attacks. We must thoroughly clear away all ideas among our cadres of winning easy victories through good luck, without hard and bitter struggle, without sweat and blood.

#5

Promptly delimit military areas and sub-areas in western, eastern, and northern Manchuria and divide our forces into field armies and regional troops. Distribute a considerable part of the regular troops among the military sub-areas to mobilize the masses, wipe out bandits, set up bodies of political power, organize guerrillas, people's militias, and self-defence forces, so as to make our areas secure, coordinate with the field armies, and smash the Nationalist attacks. All troops must be assigned to specific areas and specific tasks; only in this way can they quickly unite with the people and build stable base areas.

#6

This time, over 100'000 of our troops have entered the North-East and Rehe; the army there has recently expanded by more than 200'000, and the trend is to keep on expanding. Adding Party and government workers, we estimate that the total will exceed 400'000 within a year. A situation in which such a large number of personnel, divorced from production, depends solely on the people of the North-East for supplies certainly cannot last long and is very dangerous. Therefore, all army units and government bodies must take part in production when not fighting or doing their regular work, except for those field armies which are concentrated and charged with major military actions. The year 1946 must not pass without results; the entire North-East must promptly make plans accordingly.

#7

In the North-East, the direction in which the workers and intellectuals move is vitally important to building our base areas and winning future victories. Our Party should therefore pay its full attention to work in the big cities and along the main communication lines and especially to winning over the workers and intellectuals. In view of the fact that, in the early years of the War of Resistance, our Party did not pay sufficient attention to winning over the workers and intellectuals to come to the base areas, the Party organizations in the North-East should now do everything possible to draw workers and intellectuals into our army and into the various construction tasks in the base areas, besides paying attention to secret work in the Nationalist areas.

#8

The directives of the Central Committee all apply to the North-East, including the directive on the current situation of the 20th of October, the directive on rent reduction and production of the 7th of November, and the directive on policy for our work of the 15th of December. This directive is drafted in line with the conditions in the North-East. It is hoped that the comrades on the North-Eastern Bureau, as well as its sub-bureaus, will implement all these directives in a well-planned, proper, and earnest manner.

#Central Committee