A Statement on Jiang Jieshi's Statement

#PUBLICATION NOTE

This edition of A Statement on Jiang Jieshi's Statement has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the following editions:

  • A Statement on Jiang Jieshi's Statement, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Vol. 1, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.
  • A Statement on Chiang Kaishek's Proclamation of the 26th, in Mao's Road to Power, First English Edition, Vol. 5, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk and London, 1999.

#INTRODUCTION NOTE

This is a statement issued by Comrade Mao Zedong in response to Jiang Jieshi's Admonition to Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng of the 26th of December, 1936. It was first published in the Douzheng (29th of December, 1936).


#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!

#A STATEMENT ON JIANG JIESHI'S STATEMENT

#Mao Zedong
#28th of December, 1936

#

In Xi'an, Jiang Jieshi accepted the demand for resistance to Japan put forward by Generals Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng and the people of the North-West and, as an initial step, he has ordered his civil war troops to withdraw from the provinces of Shaanxi and Gansu. This marks the beginning of Jiang's reversal of his wrong policy in the past decade.1 It is a blow to the intrigues conducted by the Japanese imperialists and the Chinese «punitive» group2 to stage-manage a civil war, foment splits, and get Jiang killed in the Xi'an Incident. Their disappointment is already apparent. The indication that Jiang Jieshi is beginning to wake up may be considered a sign of the Nationalist Party's willingness to end the wrong policy it has pursued for ten years. If, in the future, it continues to develop along the lines that meet the hopes of the people in general, this would be a victory, not only for the masses of the Chinese people, but for all the peace-loving people of the world.

On the 26th of December, Jiang Jieshi issued a statement in Luoyang, the so-called Admonition to Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, which is so ambiguous and evasive as to be an interesting specimen among China's political documents. If Jiang really wants to draw a serious lesson from the incident and try to revitalize the Nationalist Party, and if he wants to end his consistently wrong policy of compromise in foreign affairs and of civil war and oppression at home, so that the Nationalist Party will no longer stand opposed to the wishes of the people, then, as a token of good faith, he should have produced a better piece of writing, repenting his political past and setting a new course for the future. The statement of the 26th of December cannot meet the demands of the Chinese masses. Moreover, it even fails to meet the demands of the Left-wing Nationalists.

However, Jiang's very length, 2'000-character proclamation does contain one praiseworthy passage, in which he asserts that «promises must be kept and action must be resolute». This means that, although he did not sign the terms set forth by Zhang and Yang in Xi'an, he is willing to accept such demands as are beneficial to the State and the nation and will not break his word on the grounds that he did not sign. Chinese national custom places great emphasis on good faith, so that there is a saying that a person's word is worth a thousand pieces of gold, and when merchants do business, they often dispense with having things in writing, and instead rely on spoken agreement. Having heard of this, the foreigners say that Jiang's making good on his Xi'an promise in the future will prove even more the value of good faith. We shall see whether, after he has withdrawn his troops, Jiang will act in good faith and carry out the terms he has accepted. The terms are:

  • First, to reorganize the Kuomintang and the National Government, expel the pro-Japanese group, and admit anti-Japanese elements.
  • Second, to release the patriotic leaders in Shanghai[] and all other political prisoners, and guarantee the freedoms and rights of the people.
  • Third, to end the policy of «suppressing the Communists» and enter into an alliance with the Red Army to resist Japan.
  • Fourth, to convene a national salvation conference, representing all political parties, groups, sections of the population, and armies, to decide on the policy of resisting Japan and saving the nation.
  • Fifth, to enter into cooperation with countries sympathetic to China's resistance to Japan.
  • Sixth, to adopt other specific ways and means to save the nation.

The fulfilment of these terms requires above all good faith, and also some courage. We shall judge Jiang by his future actions.

But his statement contains the remark that the Xi'an Incident was brought about under the pressure of «reactionaries». It is a pity that he did not explain what kind of people he meant by «reactionaries», nor is it clear how the word «reactionary» is defined in Jiang's dictionary. However, what is certain is that the Xi'an Incident took place under the influence of the following forces:

  • First, the mounting indignation against Japan among the troops of Generals Zhang and Yang and among the revolutionary people of the North-West.
  • Second, the mounting indignation against Japan among the people of the whole country.
  • Third, the growth of the Left-wing forces in the Nationalist Party.
  • Fourth, the demand by the groups in power in various provinces for resistance to Japan and for the salvation of the nation.
  • Fifth, the stand taken by the Communist Party for a national united front against Japan.
  • Sixth, the development of the world peace front.

All these are indisputable facts. It is just these forces that Jiang calls «reactionary»; while other people call them revolutionary, Jiang calls them «reactionary» — that is all. Since he declared in Xi'an that he would fight Japan in earnest, presumably he will not resume violent attacks on the revolutionary forces immediately after leaving Xi'an; not only does his own political life and that of his group hang upon his good faith, but they now have confronting them and obstructing their political path a force which has expanded to their detriment — the «punitive» group which tried to get him killed in the Xi'an Incident. We therefore advise Jiang Jieshi to revise his political dictionary, changing the word «reactionary» to «revolutionary», for it is better to use terms corresponding to the facts.

Jiang should remember that he owes his safe departure from Xi'an to the mediation of the Communist Party and the Left wing of the Nationalist Party, as well as to the efforts of Generals Zhang and Yang, the leaders in the Xi'an Incident. Throughout the incident, the Communist Party firmly opposed civil war, stood for a peaceful settlement, and made every effort to that end, acting solely in the interests of national survival. Had the civil war spread and had Zhang and Yang kept Jiang Jieshi in custody for long, the incident could only have developed in favour of the Japanese imperialists and the Chinese «punitive» group. It was in these circumstances that the Communist Party firmly exposed the intrigues of the Japanese imperialists and of Wang Jingwei,3 He Yingqin, Zhang Qun, Wu Tingchang, Zhang Jia'ao, He Chengjun, Chen Shaokuan, 4 and other members of the Chinese «punitive» group, and firmly advocated a peaceful settlement, which happened to coincide with the views of Generals Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng and such Left-wing members of the Nationalist Party as Song Ziwen.5 This is exactly what the people through out the country call for, because they bitterly detest the present civil war.

Jiang was set free upon his acceptance of the Xi'an terms. From now on, the question is whether he will carry out to the letter his pledge that «promises must be kept and action must be resolute», and strictly fulfil all the terms for saving the nation. The nation will not permit any further hesitation on his part or allow him any discount in fulfilling the terms. Japanese aggression and the pro-Japanese faction's political suicide certainly cannot be allowed to continue even for an instant. If he wavers on the issue of resisting Japan or delays in fulfilling his pledge, then the nationwide revolutionary tide will sweep him away. Jiang and his group should bear in mind the old saying: «If someone does not keep their word, what are they good for?»

If Jiang can clean up the dirt created by the Nationalist Party's reactionary policy over the past ten years, thoroughly correct his fundamental errors of compromise in foreign affairs and of civil war and oppression at home, immediately join the anti-Japanese front uniting all political parties and groups, and really take the military and political measures that can save the nation, then of course the Communist Party will support him. As early as the 25th of August, the Communist Party promised such support to Jiang and the Nationalist Party in its letter to the Nationalist Party.6 The people throughout the country have known for 15 years that the Communist Party observes the maxim: «Promises must be kept and action must be resolute.» They undoubtedly have more confidence in the words and deeds of the Communist Party than in those of any other political party or group in China. This is not something alleged by only one political party, but rather something commonly known by everyone.


  1. Editor's Note: Under the influence of the Chinese Red Army and the people's anti-Japanese movement, the Nationalist Party's North-Eastern Army, headed by Zhang Xueliang, and the Nationalist Party's 17th Route Army, headed by Yang Hucheng, agreed to the Anti-Japanese National United Front proposed by the Communist Party of China and demanded that Jiang Jieshi should unite with the Communist Party to resist Japan. He refused, became still more active in his military preparations for the «suppression of the Communists», and massacred young people in Xi'an who were anti-Japanese. Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng took joint action and arrested Jiang Jieshi. This was the famous Xi'an Incident of the 12th of December, 1936. He was forced to accept the terms of unity with the Communist Party and resistance to Japan, and was then set free to return to Nanjing. 

  2. Editor's Note: The Chinese «punitive» group consisted of the pro-Japanese elements in the Nationalist government in Nanjing, who tried to wrest power from Jiang Jieshi during the Xi'an Incident. With Wang Jingwei and He Yingqin as their leaders, they advocated a «punitive expedition» against Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. Availing themselves of the incident, they prepared to start large-scale civil war in order to clear the way for the Japanese invaders and wrest political power from Jiang Jieshi. 

  3. Editor's Note: Wang Jingwei was the head of the pro-Japanese faction in the Nationalist Party of China. He had stood for compromise with the Japanese imperialists ever since their invasion of the North-East in 1931. In December 1938, he left Chongqing, openly capitulated to the Japanese invaders, and set up a puppet government in Nanjing. 

  4. Editor's Note: He Yingqin, a Nationalist warlord, was another leader of the pro-Japanese faction. During the Xi'an Incident, he actively plotted civil war by deploying Nationalist troops for an attack on Shaanxi along the Longhai Railway. He planned to kill Jiang Jieshi by bombing Xi'an, in order to take over Jiang's post. 

  5. Editor's Note: Song Ziwen was a pro-US member of the Nationalist Party of China. Championing US interests, he, too, favoured a peaceful settlement of the Xi'an Incident, because US imperialism was at loggerheads with Japanese imperialism, with which it was then contending for supremacy in East Asia. 

  6. Editor's Note: This letter sternly criticized the Nationalist Party's reactionary rule and the decisions of the Second Plenary Session of its Central Executive Committee. It also set out the Communist Party's policy of forming an Anti-Japanese National United Front and renewing its cooperation with the Nationalist Party.